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Once serving the whole value chain by what has become known as vertical inte-
gration, companies have long since started to outsource value creation processes
to specialized partners. Moreover, societal changes have induced a paradigm shift
from product-driven to service-dominated value creation. Capabilities of informa-
tion technology lets both of these developments take a new dimension. Well-defined
interfaces and standardization as fundamental concepts of service orientation bring
about a high degree of interoperability, which enables companies to establish mul-
tiple linkages and to combine capabilities and assets from diverse parties. Signif-
icant business impact of such tendencies can be observed in the software indus-
try. Already shaken by the fundamental transition from selling traditional software
products to the provisioning of on-demand services, a second wave of innovation
includes the specialization and modularization of services, giving way to complex
services composed of modules offered by diversified providers. Coordination of
participants takes place in highly agile and modular service value networks (SVNs)
that exploit the power of combinatorics credited to Web services: they allow for
a flexible recombination of service modules to meet heterogeneous customer de-
mands.
These newly arising networks include both cooperation and competition as in-
herent building blocks. On the one hand, a certain set of service providers must
cooperate in order to create value. On the other hand, substitutive services com-
pete to be included in complex offerings. What is more, partners turn into rivals
when it comes to distributing a jointly created surplus which cannot be precisely ac-
credited to the contributors. While the technological side to enabling SVNs already
enjoys intensified research activity, economic considerations that include both the
co-opetitive environment and the characteristics of (complex) services are lagging
behind.
This thesis tackles the challenge of coordinating self-interested, yet partly inter-
dependent service providers by designing an adequate mechanism which shall be
capable of handling the duality of cooperation and competition. Taking the view-
point of a mechanism or network operator of a newly launched SVN, participants’
interests need to be aligned with the network’s global objectives in an incentive
engineering approach. Classic mechanism design focusses on economic properties
such as allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility, however, it lacks in objec-
tives that arise from the perspective of network design. Such network-related goals
are, among others, healthy network growth, a fair distribution of jointly generated
value, or interoperability. Additionally, specific requirements of (Web) services need
to be considered. On the one hand, support for the negotiation over diverse non-
vi
price attributes that constitute a service’s configuration, that is, quality of service
(QoS), is of crucial importance. On the other hand, the sequence of service modules
determine a complex service’s functionality and must, therefore, be captured by the
mechanism proposed in this thesis.
Academic literature currently does not yield contributions that cover above-
mentioned aspects in an integrated effort. In this vein, the work at hand presents a
novel mechanism design approach – the co-opetition mechanism – that is tailored to
additional requirements imposed both by co-opetitive environments and to crucial
characteristics of complex Web services. The latter is addressed by a comprehen-
sive analysis, definition, and formalization of SVNs, which forms the basis for an
appropriate bidding language that supports various types of QoS. Co-opetition is
captured in the fashion how payments are distributed by the mechanism: the co-
opetition mechanism reflects the radically novel concept to not only compensate
those providers which are actually allocated for service provisioning, but also to
pay out potential value creators “on standby” that are not part of the complex ser-
vice delivered at a time. In order to capture the potential value created in the sys-
tem, the power ratio is introduced as a suitable measure. Classic mechanism design
properties are not first priority, yet remain in the focus. In order to substantiate this
thesis’ contribution, desired mechanism properties are evaluated both analytically
and numerically.
Rewarding the very contribution of service providers to network formation, the
co-opetition mechanism is a promising approach to boost the combinatorial poten-
tial of SVNs in their launch phase.
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S ince the end of the 1990s, the software industry has undergone tremendouschanges. Driven by maturing Web service technologies and the wide accep-
tance of the service-oriented architecture paradigm, the software industry’s tradi-
tional business models along with business strategies have already started to erode
– with far-reaching consequences: software vendors turn into service providers.
While traditional software products are installed at the customer site, including
prepaid perpetual-use licences, so-called software-as-a-service (SaaS) or on-demand
software is hosted and maintained by the service provider itself and offers usage- or
subscription-based pricing models [103, 73, 72, 281]. Salesforce.com’s Sales Cloud 2
is repeatedly referred to as a prime example for SaaS, mapping valuable customer
relationship management (CRM) software into an online service infrastructure that
can be accessed via Web browsers.1 Exploiting the capabilities of service-oriented
architectures, such services are made available “one-to-many”, that is, a multitude
of application instances can be run at once in a common environment. In the last
decade, a large body of surveys and studies has been published which indicate the
enormous potential of on-demand service provisioning. According to a series of
Gartner studies, the worldwide market for on-demand enterprise applications in-
creased by more than 25% from 2007 to 2008 (adding up to revenues of $6.4 billion)
and is supposed to more than double until 2012, which will account for approxi-
mately 25% of the entire enterprise application market. SaaS is expected to exhibit
consistent compound annual growth of roughly 20% through 2013 which is nearly
five times the growth predicted for the total market [223, 222, 224].
The prosperous future accredited to the SaaS market by a multitude of surveys
seems to turn into reality: offerings that have been in the market for several years
constantly exhibit almost skyrocketing usage figures. For instance, in 2007, the
bandwidth consumed by Amazon’s Web service offerings such as the Elastic Com-
pute Cloud (EC2)2 or the Simple Storage Service (S3)3 for the first time exceeded




4http://aws.typepad.com/aws/2008/05/lots-of-bits.html, accessed on 04/13/2010.
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force.com reported roughly 30,000 paying subscribers in 2001, the subscription fig-
ures exploded to 1.5 million by the end of 2009.5
While the success story of on-demand software is likely to continue, a second
wave of innovation has great potentials to shake the software industry’s founda-
tions once again. Exploiting the capabilities of Internet standards and interoper-
ability, joint value creation of service providers has emerged. Open standards and
service-oriented architectures constitute important building blocks for innovative
Web service networks, tying together the competencies of specialized contributors.
This development was first described in Coase’s [79] seminal paper on companies’
sizes. Once serving the whole value chain, celebrating what has become well-known
as vertical integration, companies now focus on their core competencies. If trans-
action costs in the open market decrease, companies will consequently downsize:
vertical integration is abandoned in favor of flexible cooperation between adaptive
and lean competence-orientated partners [79, 100, 152]. In the Web service market,
a multitude of small and highly specialized providers offer modular services of al-
most any kind. Such market structures imply that contracting out is more efficient
than relying on internal transactions.
The adaptiveness of the partners coincides with the development of software
customers demanding more sophisticated as well as more specialized solutions and,
at the same time, longing for more flexible service provisioning [51, 100, 311, 265, 28].
One of the most powerful approaches to handle complexity is modularity, that is
composing the ensemble from smaller subsystems that are designed independently,
yet function together as a whole [23]. Along those lines, vendors concentrate on their
core activity while leveraging knowledge and assets of complementary partners.
That way, they are able to stay agile and to flexibly adapt their services to changes
in the environment, be it customer-, competition-, or regulation-driven [284, 252].
Such joint value creation in terms of Web services is mostly coordinated by a me-
diating entity as present in today’s leading service platforms: Salesforce.com offers
its on-demand service market place AppExchange6 and its development platform
force.com7, Xignite operates the Splice Mashup Platform8, and StrikeIron has the
IronCloud Web services delivery platform9 ready, just to name a few. Recent sur-
veys predict that such SaaS platforms will be a crucial factor for an even broader
SaaS adoption [193, 102].
However, besides the above-mentioned increase in customers’ demands for com-
plex applications and the resulting agility of service providers to tackle these re-
quirements, other concrete economic factors are driving this second innovation
wave of the software industry. In this thesis, it argued that it has its seeds in the
long tail phenomenon which was initially promoted by Anderson [9]. The origi-
nal long tail story was bred by the emergence of e-business which made it possi-
ble to transfer traditional physical business to the Internet. In online stores, mer-
chandise assortments can be displayed without the physical restrictions present in







the tyranny of compromise-ridden mass products by the possibility of pushing
the niche through information and communication technology (ICT). Altogether,
since customers highly value the new possibilities of accommodating specialized
demand, the large amount of small sales of specialized products has the potential to
overcompensate revenues generated by selling mass products.
The long tail’s striking relevance for electronic services, and Web services in par-
ticular, has been largely neglected by academic literature so far. Requirements for
functional and non-functional characteristics of Web services are much more pro-
nounced and specific than in other domains. Such specificity of requirements con-
siderably intensifies the niche effect. For instance, several goods exhibit the so-called
blockbuster characteristic: The availability of highly specialized offers does not cut
back the success of products that are designed to fit the mass appeal. This is certainly
not true for Web services to such an extent. If the customer can choose between a
Web service that perfectly fits his needs and a Web service that is programmed to
capture the mass, he will most probably go for the former – if priced appropriately.
However, not only the specific requirements make the long tail phenomenon impor-
tant for the Web service domain. Modular services can be combined and configured
into value-added complex services which have the potential to meet virtually every
conceivable customer requirement, giving rise to a new level of customization. Such
complex services involve the assembly and invocation of several specialized service
modules offered by a multitude of expert partners in order to accomplish a multi-
step business functionality [256]. Recombining service modules, new functionality
is created “off-the-shelf”. Beyond that, such individual composition of Web services
is capable of even more: Web services are invoked more often if they provide added
value in a multitude of complex services. In fact, if n services are registered with
a service platform, up to ∑nk=1
n!
(n−k)! alternative service mashups could be created,
each of them potentially meeting a specialized demand. That way, service providers
can exploit economies of scope [255]: their offerings are not designed to be included
in one or few complex services, but contribute to various solutions capturing diver-
sified customer needs.
From a technical perspective, dynamic Web services are increasingly used in the
context of service mashups, facilitating lightweight approaches such as RESTful ar-
chitectures [126, 272] and slim messaging formats such as JSON [89]. The service
mashup platform ProgrammableWeb reported that 71% of all listed APIs exposed
REST interfaces by April 2010, foretelling the trend to an internet of interoperable
Web services.10 Economically, value is created through the interplay of various dis-
tributed service providers that jointly contribute to an individualized and integrated
solution. However, not only partners offering complements constitute the long val-
ley, but also substitutive services and vendors that serve the same customer seg-
ments. Thus, service providers find themselves in the fruitful state of co-opetition,
breeding both complementary opportunities and competitive threats [54]. While
cooperation enables advanced value creation and the access to partners’ assets and
knowledge [34], the competitive component diminishes adverse effects of market
power and spurs improvement and innovation pressure [264, 167].
10http://www.programmableweb.com/apis, accessed on 04/13/2010.
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The above-introduced second innovation wave of the software industry (cp.
Figure 1.1), most notably the combinatorics in service mashups, can be optimally
catalyzed by universally accessible service orchestration platforms – service value
networks (SVNs) – which are the underlying organizational form of this thesis.
Thereby, optimality denotes the SVN’s ability to exploit the exponentially grow-
ing number of service mashups which are offered to customers (i) in an automated





Flexible and adaptive  
partner network
Orchestration platform
Figure 1.1: From hard-wired value chains to adaptive service value networks
Adapted from Heuser et al. [155]
While the technological side to enabling SVNs and related approaches, for in-
stance highlighting aspects such as service engineering, service description, or ser-
vice discovery, enjoys heavy research activity (cp. e.g. [344, 65, 27, 200, 318, 66, 249,
286]), economic considerations are lagging behind. Focussing on the operator of an
SVN, a multitude of challenges need to be tackled when entering the market as a
mediating party between service customers and service providers. New entrants to
the Web service platform market have to demonstrate competitive and innovative
business models. Meeting this challenge, effective strategies must include a lever
to sustainably attract market participants from both sides of the markets, customers
and providers. What is more, an attractive service portfolio in terms of variety and
quality should be a result of the incentives given. Therefore, a certain set of objec-
tives is to be fulfilled. Mechanism design has proven to be a powerful instrument
to solve problems that involve self-interested individuals holding private informa-
tion [215, 257]. In particular, auction-based approaches are ideally suited to extract
distributed valuations in environments in which heterogenous services are traded
[300, 262, 168].
However, only little theoretic research has been dedicated to the distinct situa-
tion of providers that are related both in cooperative and competitive terms [34]. An
efficient coordination in such an environment requires schemes and measures that
are particularly tailored to co-opetitive value creation.
11Cp. Section 2.2.2.
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1.1 Research Questions & Problem Description
In line with the research gap indicated in the previous paragraph, the core research
activity in this thesis is dedicated to the design and evaluation of a scheme, or mech-
anism, that is tailored to coordinate the trade of complex services in newly aris-
ing service value networks, thereby capturing their characteristics and features. In
SVNs, an inherent dependency of service providers can be observed, both sharing
the fate of the network as a whole and directly relying on partners when offering
and delivering a complex service to customers [166]. Besides the seminal contribu-
tion of Brandenburger and Nalebuff [54] that puts co-opetition on the agenda as an
economic state that is worth to be analyzed, academia provides only little work that
deals with application scenarios of the co-opetition phenomenon. What is more,
as the importance and influence of services in today’s world is constantly and irre-
versibly rising, insights on upcoming organizational forms driven by this develop-
ment are still scarce. Therefore, the first research question of this thesis addresses
the emergence of service value networks. In more detail, it scrutinizes (i) why complex
services are composed by diverse providers’ offerings beyond company boundaries
and (ii) which characteristics are exhibited by organizational forms such as SVNs
that breed this kind of value creation.
Research Question 1 ≺CHARACTERISTICS AND EMERGENCE OF
SERVICE VALUE NETWORKSÂ. How can service value networks be de-
fined and which economic factors drive their emergence?
While supporting the enablement of SVNs from a technical perspective has al-
ready gained immense research momentum with spearheads such as service de-
scription [225, 249] or (semantic) service discovery [200, 318], just to name a few, eco-
nomic aspects fall behind. For this reason, Research Question 1 is addressed from an
economic standpoint, first by defining Web services from an interdisciplinary per-
spective as the kind of services that optimally suit SVNs. The reasons for SVNs to
emerge, their characteristics, and their determination for Web services are analyzed
and motivated in a second step. By formalizing SVNs in a graph-based approach,
an essential basis for the design of theoretic models in this domain is set.
The solution to Research Question 1 lays the foundation for defining a mecha-
nism that is customized to the challenges imposed by service value networks. It is
well-known that there is no “all-in-one” mechanism to suit any setting in any kind
of application scenario [329, 240]. Therefore, designing a mechanism to facilitate the
trade of complex services in SVNs requires a thorough analysis of the environment
at hand. In more detail, taking over the role of a network designer, the mecha-
nism design problem arises as participating agents act opportunistically according
to their private preferences for different outcomes – which are, most probably, not
in line with the system’s overall goals [257]. These two conflicting fields must be
brought together by a network designer, or operator, when launching a new plat-
form.
8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
This issue makes the transition to Research Questions 2 and 3. First, as will be
shown in this thesis, mechanism design in its narrow form does not fully match
the problem at hand. Classic economic objectives that are considered in mechanism
design are certainly important in the context of service networks, however, miss out
crucial objectives of network design, as for instance installing effective incentives for
participants to join. Therefore, it is important to upgrade classic mechanism design
to a networked mechanism design perspective. In this regard, some of the desiderata of
classic mechanism design are likely to fall victim to the new objectives that shall be
met in networked environments.
Research Question 2 ≺NETWORKED MECHANISM DESIGNÂ. How
can classic mechanism design be mapped to networked mechanism design?
This question will be addressed by reviewing mechanism design theory and ap-
proaches that relax certain classic assumptions as, for instance, is done in Nisan and
Ronen [245], Parkes et al. [260]. In this thesis, by incorporating objectives from coop-
erative and network games, the scope of classic mechanism design in a narrow sense
is widened to a broader understanding which will be called networked mechanism
design.
Picking up this approach, it is possible to define mechanism requirements that
go beyond the ones usually applied in classic mechanism design. This is also the
case with the co-opetition mechanism that shall coordinate service providers tailored
to the requirements that arise in the launch phase of a service value network.
Research Question 3 ≺MECHANISM REQUIREMENTS IN SERVICE
VALUE NETWORKSÂ. Which are the design objectives of the co-opetition
mechanism in order to suit the requirements of early service value networks?
In order to define the components of the mechanism designer’s goals, the third
research question is tackled by a thorough environmental analysis, which includes
objectives from classic mechanism design, cooperative game theory, and network
games. The consideration of merely competition-oriented design goals would
miss out the cooperative, value co-creating element of SVNs while an exclusively
cooperation-based consideration would be likely to impinge on price and quality
competition.
Each of the three research questions outlined so far in turn lead to the core contri-
bution of this thesis – the implementation of the co-opetition mechanism based on
the objectives resulting from the environmental analysis. The most important ob-
jectives originate from the network side, including incentives not only to boost net-
work growth, but also to earn participants’ commitment to remain in the SVN by not
only rewarding service providers for a transaction made, but also distributing some
1.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS & PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 9
share of the revenue to service providers that keep valuable offerings available. If
payments are distributed to a superset of the allocated service providers, fairness
is particularly important to adhere to. The more valuable a service provider is with
respect to complex services offered in the SVN, the more vital it is for value creation,
and therefore, the greater its reward should be. Moreover, the co-opetition mecha-
nism is to reward efforts of service providers to increase their degree of interoper-
ability. On top, some objectives from classic mechanism design need to be fulfilled:
in order to make the mechanism sustainable, its operator should not subsidize it
and participants must be willing to voluntarily participate. Finally, applicability re-
quirements with respect to SVNs are to be met. Especially in an environment which
enables the trading of highly specialized services, quality is said to be the main dif-
ferentiator [256], that is, the mechanism shall capture the multiattribute character of
services. Moreover, when composing modular Web services, their sequence deter-
mines the offered functionality.
Research Question 4 ≺IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CO-OPETITION
MECHANISMÂ. How can the co-opetition mechanism be implemented to
meet both requirements from network design and from classic mechanism
design subject to its ability to handle multiattribute and sequence-sensitive
complex services?
Research Question 4 is addressed as follows: first, based upon the formaliza-
tion of SVNs presented in this thesis, a bidding language that allows for the sub-
mission of multiattribute service inquiries and service offers is provided. It cap-
tures the multiple non-functional quality attributes and the price of a service at both
customer- and provider-side. Offered service qualities and the customer’s prefer-
ences are mapped via a scoring function. That way, different levels of service quality
are adequately incorporated in the auction procedure – the co-opetition mechanism
– which consists of an allocation function and a transfer function. While the alloca-
tion function, that is, the determination of the “winning” service components to be
offered to the customer, is closely based upon classic mechanism design theory by
maximizing the system’s expected welfare, the transfer payments follow a radically
novel approach with respect to their scope of distribution. Applying the power ratio-
based transfer function, service providers are granted a payment that reflects their
marginal contribution to all available complex services that create value for the net-
work, no matter if allocated or not. The applied metric to measure this contribution
– the power ratio – is based on a renowned solution concept from cooperative game
theory: the Shapley value [292].
The implementation of the co-opetition mechanism is, however, only a part of
what is necessary to complete the work. It is similarly important to evaluate if the
proposed mechanism meets the desired requirements. Due to the different levels
of granularity in respect of the mechanism’s objectives, ranging from fine-grained
desiderata to target settings stated in relative terms, both analytical and numerical
methodologies are applied.
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Research Question 5 ≺EVALUATION OF THE CO-OPETITION
MECHANISMÂ. How can the co-opetition mechanism be (numerically and
analytically) evaluated regarding its properties?
Concerning the network-related properties, some consequences of applying net-
worked mechanism design must be paid attention to. Network-owed properties are
potentially likely to differ from classic desiderata. While the latter can be formulated
on a very high level of granularity, the former may also take over the characteristic
of a more globally formulated target setting rather than a desideratum. In this con-
nection and aberrant from classic mechanism design desiderata, target settings may
be formulated in relative terms. Such relative verbalization requires a comparison
to suitable benchmarks.
This is the case for network growth. Due to the complexity of the Shapley-style
calculations, the co-opetition mechanism’s ability to foster network growth, that is,
to set incentives for participants to join the SVN, can only be analytically discussed
to a limited extent while deeper analyses have to be made numerically. Other net-
work design properties turn out to be provable in an analytic fashion, as for in-
stance, the co-opetition mechanism’s potential to foster interoperability. Assuming
that technical interoperability is already ensured by the common standards imposed
by the operator of the SVN, interconnectedness can be analyzed subject to strategic
considerations.
Further, classic mechanism design objectives are partly met by construction,
however, with respect to other desiderata, the complexity imposed by the various
factors that determine the power ratio-based transfer function can only be tackled in
a series of simulative approaches. The results of these simulations are twofold: first,
considering equilibrium strategies of service providers, their expected utility is non-
negative. Second, the simulations show that the co-opetition mechanism, although
not being incentive compatible in an analytic sense, limits strategic behavior and is
able to account for a high degree of allocative efficiency subject to realistic network
scenarios.
1.2 Structure
The previously described research outline reflects the structure of this thesis. The
work at hand is subdivided into four parts. Part I includes essential foundations
of the networked mechanism design approach presented in Part II, which is then
comprehensively evaluated in Part III. Part IV concludes the thesis and highlights
future research directions.
A high-level illustration of this work’s structure is shown in Figure 1.2. Chapter
1 shed light on current developments in the software industry and summarized the
research questions resulting thereof. Chapter 2 establishes a common basic under-
standing of the term “services”, in particular “Web services”, as they are the actual
objects to be composed, allocated, priced, and evaluated in this work. Such activities
are coordinated and conducted in service value networks, which are motivated, de-
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fined, and formalized. Chapter 3 is limited to elucidate those economic foundations
that directly prepare the reader for the main part of this work: mechanism design
(Section 3.1) and selected concepts and approaches from cooperative game theory





































Figure 1.2: Structure of this thesis
The foundations laid in Part I open out into Chapter 4 which merges the appli-
cation scenario of SVNs and the economic foundations to a networked mechanism
design perspective. It prepares the introduction of the core model by elaborating
requirements, highlighting the central idea of the model, and by differentiating it
from related approaches. The co-opetition mechanism is introduced in Chapter 5,
focussing on a bidding language for the exchange of appropriate information ob-
jects, and the mechanism implementation that consists of an allocation function and
a transfer function. The chapter concludes with an overview of the algorithmic re-
alization of the co-opetition mechanism.
In Sections 6 and 7, the postulated properties of the co-opetition mechanism are
evaluated both theoretically and numerically. Chapter 8 summarizes the key contri-
butions of this work and points to future research, limitations, and complementary
topics.
Finally, note that for didactical reasons, in Part I, mechanism design as the un-
derlying concept to this work is introduced before cooperative game theory and
network design are discussed. In Part III, this sequence is reversed in order to high-
light the major role of network design objectives (cp. Figure 1.2).
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1.3 Research Development
Parts of this thesis were reviewed and presented at various academic conferences
and workshops as well as published in the respective proceedings and in interna-
tional journals. This section does not only give an overview of the published mate-
rial, but also sketches the development and refinement steps that have taken place
in the course of working on and writing this thesis.
An article dedicated to SVNs and their characteristics (cp. Section 2.2) was pre-
sented at the 11th IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing [49].
The current stage of development with respect to SVNs based on the long valley
phenomenon is available on SSRN and, as an abstract, in the ERN Economics of
Networks eJournal [197]. Furthermore, some considerations on the current Web ser-
vice market (cp. Section 2.2.4) were accepted in the Electronic Commerce Research
and Applications journal [46] and in the e-Service Journal [83].
With respect to Chapter 4, the postulated networked mechanism design perspec-
tive was accepted at the 16th Americas Conference on Information Systems [80].
The co-opetition mechanism presented in Section 5 that forms the core of this
thesis was firstly presented at the 17th Annual Frontiers in Service Conference [86].
Alongside other results, a detailed description of the appropriate bidding language
was accepted in the e-Service Journal [83]. The most recent version of the co-
opetition mechanism was presented at the 18th Annual Frontiers in Service Con-
ference [84] and in several other publications that also include an evaluation of cer-
tain mechanism properties [82, 85, 80]. In a shortened version, fairness properties
as shown in Section 6.1 were published in the proceedings of the 1st INFORMS In-
ternational Conference on Service Science [82]. A preliminary version of the con-
siderations on interoperability (cp. Section 6.3) was presented at the 15th Ameri-
cas Conference on Information Systems [81]. A paper dealing with the co-opetition
mechanism’s ability to foster network growth as shown in Section 6.4 was accepted
at the 18th European Conference on Information Systems [85].
Furthermore, considerations on the relative power ratio as discussed in Section
8.2.2 are included in an article accepted for publication in the e-Service Journal [83].
Beyond that, between 2007 and 2010, research on SVNs and the co-opetition
mechanism was contributed to and reviewed within the THESEUS program initi-
ated by the Federal Ministry of Economy and Technology.12 In more detail, the
formalization of SVNs, the multiattribute bidding language for such environments,
the co-opetition mechanism, and its evaluation in terms of network growth and fair-
ness properties were contributed to the research project TEXO which is the part of
the THESEUS program that aims at creating a platform to make modular services






Towards Service Value Networks
T he current chapter’s objective is to give a detailed introduction into the appli-cation scenario of this thesis – services and service value networks (SVNs). As
the mechanism design approach, that is particularly tailored to service value net-
works, forms the main part of this work, it is of utmost importance to thoroughly
discuss and define SVNs as its very foundation.
Section 2.1 discusses the general concept of a service from an information systems
(IS) perspective. On the one hand, current economic definitions of services, mostly
originating from the marketing discipline, are not clear-cut enough to transfer them
to service value networks. Moreover, the definitions lack technical background. On
the other hand, computer scientists have provided a bunch of definitions for (Web)
services which are, however, too technical to tackle the research questions of this
thesis. Based on an extensive literature overview provided in Section 2.1.1, a defini-
tion and differentiation of the terms service, electronic service, and Web service is given
in Section 2.1.2.
Following this definition, the organizational form of service value networks will be
introduced as a novel network type and specialization of business networks. Sec-
tion 2.2 does not only contribute a fundamental definition of the SVN concept and
its differentiation from related network types (cp. Sections 2.2.2), but also a thor-
ough analysis of the environment in which SVNs evolve – Web service markets (cp.
Section 2.2.1). These are, in particular, subject to some interesting characteristics
that allow for an extension of Anderson’s [9] well-known long tail phenomenon by
the services’ composition depth as a third dimension. Section 2.2.3 provides a for-
malization of SVNs that will serve as the notational basis for the mechanism design
introduced in Part II of this thesis. Several examples for SVNs presented in Section
2.2.4 round off this chapter.
It remains to be pointed out that this fundamental chapter will address the first
research question as stated in Section 1.1. Based on the service definition, this chap-
ter discusses the economic factors that foster the emergence of SVNs and provides
a clear-cut definition for this type of networked organization.
14 CHAPTER 2. TOWARDS SERVICE VALUE NETWORKS
2.1 The Service Paradigm
Without any questions, services have become the major driver of value creation in
the last decades. This statement manifests in official statistics showing that ser-
vices make up the largest part of the gross domestic product (GDP) in industrial-
ized countries. In 2009, the service sector’s share of the GDP within the European
Union amounted to 71.9% and to 76.9% in the United States.1 As statistics show,
the economic importance of the service sector increased steadily over the last years
[250, 335, 30, 304]. For instance, in Germany, the GDP accredited to the service sector
amounted to 67.8 % in 2007, rising to 69.3 % in 2008, and finally adding up to 72.6 %
in 2009.2 At the same time, since the 1990s, the service sector is the only sector in
industrialized countries to provide growth, both in terms of the GDP and in terms
of employment [122, 55].3
This trend is further amplified by the “servicification” of traditional products
in many industries. According to Vargo and Lusch [320], the major shift towards
a service-centered view is driven by changes in society and markets that lead to
exchanges of services rather than goods. For instance, automobile companies en-
rich their products by offering additional services that round off the purchase and
usage of a car, be it financial services or enhanced mobility services. For instance,
BMW offers its premium service “ConnectedDrive” which provides an intelligent
network of information, communication, and assistant systems to the driver, both
from within the vehicle and external to it.4 Such services are usually provided by
partnering companies; in case of ConnectedDrive, the partner network includes, for
instance, the news agency AFP, Google, or T-Systems, just to name a few. Generally
and across industries, companies that were traditionally ranked “manufacturers”
increasingly integrate services into their core product offerings. It is not only stag-
nant product demand in many domains, but also the customer’s demand for cus-
tomized and sophisticated goods which has pushed economic value downstream
– away from manufacturing and toward the offering of services, both in preparing
and customizing sales and in aftersales [29, 251]. Driven by advancing Web ser-
vice technologies, servicification in the software industry is a fundamental trend
that tremendously changes the companies strategies and business models: software
vendors become service providers [103] (cp. Section 1).
The goal Section 2.1 is to provide a thorough introduction to the service concept
itself as a groundwork for this thesis by defining services in general and subse-
quently restrain this definition to electronic services and Web services. As an ex-
haustive literature review will show, scholars did not yet merge economists’ and
computer scientists’ perspectives on services, which is, however, essential to prop-






3For a comprehensive overview on productivity and employment growth in the service sector, the
interested reader is pointed to Wölfl [335], Breitenfellner and Hildebrandt [55].
4http://www.bmw.com/com/en/insights/technology/connecteddrive/overview.
html
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2.1.1 Related Work
Up to now, each research direction that dealt with service worked isolatedly within
the bounds of a definition that suited the respective needs best. This approach led to
an immense amount of diverse sector-specific definitions of “services”. While com-
puter scientists define a service based on the requirements emerging from practical
implementations and, hence, focus on the technical properties of a service, they cre-
ate a specification that economists cannot deal with. On the other hand, business
economists put the emphasis on general properties of a service, its prerequisites,
and the creation of value, thereby neglecting technical issues. In the following, an
overview of existent business-related and technical service definitions is given.
2.1.1.1 Business Perspective
In spite of the large body of contributions to literature, a common definition of what
a service actually is has not been agreed on yet. What is more, we do not only face
different approaches to define or circumscribe services, but also entirely different
philosophies.
According to Corsten and Gössinger [87], the approaches taken to explicitly de-
fine the term service may be divided into three classes: enumerative definitions that
merely name examples for services, negative definitions that try to circumscribe ser-
vices by stating what they are not, and explicit definitions that specify constitutive
characteristics of services. In accordance with Meffert and Bruhn [220], only the
class of explicit definitions is suited to establish a common basis for concise discus-
sions and allows for an accurate derivation of implications.
Considering explicit definitions, three perspectives on value creation, which most
service definitions are based on, can be identified: potential-, process-, and outcome-
orientation [114]. The former focuses on the allocation of factors of production and
hence comprises the preparation for service supply. The second dimension considers
services as the activation and integration of the allocated resources, describing the
activity of resource usage by both the service customer and the service provider, which
define the invariably involved roles when services are provided and consumed. The
third dimension concentrates on the result of this process.
In line with Engelhardt et al. [114] one needs to distinguish between preparation
as a first phase and delivery as a second phase when defining a service. The first
phase creates the readiness of a service provider, setting up the requirements for
the immediate ability to actually deliver a service. In case of a hair cutting service,
for instance, such preparation would include, inter alia, the training or hiring of
staff, procurement of equipment, leasing of an accommodation, and so forth. For
a Web-based service, the preparation phase includes, for instance, programming
efforts and the allocation of sufficient storage and computation capacity. In more
detail, the preparation phase includes general preparation activities that do not re-
quire the presence of the service customer herself or entities owned by her. At the
same time, potential customers reason about the service specification that suits their
needs best – in other words – they need to elicit their preferences. The delivery
phase revolves around provisioning of the service by the provider and its simulta-
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neous consumption by the customer itself or entities owned by him.5 Additionally,
further sub-phases need to be considered: typically, an agreement between service
provider and service consumer is made before provisioning and consumption is ini-
tiated, oftentimes including individual preparation.6 While the preparation phase is
universal, i.e. represents the basis for every concrete service delivery, the outcome


















Figure 2.1: The interrelation of service preparation, delivery, and its outcome
This thesis takes the view that a potential-orientated definition of services is in-
appropriate since the allocation of factors is necessary in almost any value creation
activity and therefore is not sufficiently distinctive. Outcome-orientation concen-
trates on the nature of the outcome being material or immaterial wherein, again,
the essence of a service cannot be found. It is rather the delivery phase that de-
fines the heart of a service by adequately and equally awarding importance to both
the service provider and the service customer [114]. In order to prepare the service
definition that underlies this thesis, a selection of the most frequently cited service
definitions in academia which are focused on service delivery is presented in the
following.
The service dominant logic is rather a philosophy than a definition. It sees services
as “the application of specialized competencies (knowledge and skills) through
deeds, processes, and performances for the benefit of another entity or the entity
itself” [320]. This view of the service world is shared by the concept of service sys-
tems [213, 302], which are dynamic value co-creation configurations of resources.
These include people, organizations, shared information (i.e. language, laws, mea-
sures, methods), and technology.
This quite encyclopedic view of services comes at the price of concreteness: the
vagueness of the service dominant logic does not allow for an explicit definition
of what constitutes a service. The continuum-based approach takes a similar line by
defining dimensions to characterize services. Its key message is, however, that there
is no dichotomy between products and services: a clear-cut separation of services
and products is therefore not possible [297, 69, 36].
5According to the uno acto principle, delivery and consumption of a service are inseparable. Please
refer to the inseparability characteristic of the IHIP criteria presented in this section.
6Services are subject to high degrees of customization (cf. the heterogeneity characteristics of the
IHIP criteria). Therefore, additional preparation in terms of customization is likely to antecede
service provisioning and consumption. The more personalized a service, the greater the importance
of the individual preparation included.
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Another direction of impact driven by service marketing literature discusses
four characteristics of services in order to separate services from goods. These are
intangibility, heterogeneity, inseparability of production and consumption, and
perishability (IHIP criteria) [271, 270, 297, 343, 108].
Intangibility means that a service and its characteristics cannot be perceived be-
fore being bought [196, 127]. Many scholars argue that intangibility is the central
difference between products and services [297]. Heterogeneity denotes the poten-
tially high variability in service delivery [343]. Merging the perspective of service
dominant logic to this issue, services that are performed with a particular input of
specialized competencies are likely to be subject to potentially varying performance
of people [270, 67, 343]. However, heterogeneity can also be interpreted as a source
for providing high degrees of customization, flexibility, and variability. Inseparabil-
ity reflects the uno actu principle which denotes the simultaneous consumption of
services at their provisioning [271, 337] (cp. also Phase 2 in Fig. 2.1). It enables
customers to affect or shape the performance and quality of service [139, 342]. Per-
ishability circumscribes that services cannot be stored, inventoried, or transported
[270, 99, 343].
The applicability of the IHIP criteria has been subject to discussion (cp. e.g.
[210, 321, 110]): numerous services take some form of tangible representation (e.g.
car repair, programming, etc.) and thus are not completely intangible. Also, prod-
ucts can be highly adapted to customers’ requests and hence must be rated hetero-
geneous, too. Importantly, the service definition approach pursued in this thesis
does not seek to differentiate services from goods, but to clearly define services in
order to tie down the basis for the underlying application scenario.
A more detailed description of a service was proposed by Hill [156]. In his defi-
nition, a service denotes an activity that is performed by an economic unit B for an
economic unit A, where the result of this activity is the change in condition of an
economic unit C that either is or belongs to economic unit A. Additionally, the prior
agreement of economic unit A is assumed. The “production of a service” is defined
as the activity itself which affects persons or goods. Hence, it is not the ability to
perform a task (potential-oriented definition), but rather the performance itself that
constitutes the “production of a service” and therefore, the creation of value. Trans-
ferred to Fig. 2.1, Hill’s [156] definition refers to the delivery phase of a service.
While specifying “traditional” services very accurately, Hill’s [156] definition
does not allow for a distinction of services performed on electronic data or provided
via electronic networks, which is required for a more interdisciplinary understand-
ing of services. In fact, according to Karmarkar [186], information services (which
include electronic and Web services) already constitute 63% of the GDP of the US
service sector.
In this vein, Gadrey [128] formulated several extensions to the definition pro-
vided by Hill [156]. He denotes “service production” as a provider B selling the
right to use a technical or human capacity (resource) for a certain period to an eco-
nomic unit A in order to produce useful effects on economic unit A himself or on
economic units C that A owns. The use may take the form of intervention, use of
technical capacity, or a human “performance”. Besides being quite inapprehensi-
ble, the definition includes technical capacities, which forms a first approximation
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towards services performed electronically. However, technical services do not only
include the provision of technical resources, but also operations on electronic data or
information. Thus, the definition has to be extended and stated more precisely in or-
der to allow not only for goods and persons to be affected, but as well for electronic
resources in general to be changed.
2.1.1.2 Computer Science Perspective
More recently, with the advent of service-oriented computing and Web services, per-
spectives from information and computer science increasingly entered the research
field of service science. Technical services do not only affect humans and goods, but
also other electronic resources such as addressable data sets. From a technological
viewpoint, Web services are situated on an abstraction layer above different network
protocols, operating systems, and programming languages. Thus, Web services pro-
vide possibilities to expose the functionality of an application system by means of
Web technologies [5].
Apart from this rather generic characterization and akin to the business-related
definition, no agreement on a common definition on Web services has been made so
far. According to W3C [326], a Web service is a software system that is designed to
support interoperable machine-to-machine interaction over a network. Part of the
definition is also an interface, which is described in a machine-processable format
– in particular WSDL. Other systems must be able to interact with the Web service
in a way that is prescribed by its description using SOAP-messages. The latter are
transmitted via HTTP with an XML serialization in conjunction with other Web-
related standards.
Berners-Lee et al. [35] supplement the definition above by concretizing that a
Web service is a software service, which is identified by a uniform resource identifier
(URI), exposing a public interface based on Internet standards.
The definitions sketched above may serve computer scientists’ needs, but do not
include important economic aspects of a service such as involved parties besides
electronic resources, changes of state, and value creation.
2.1.2 Service Definition
This sections takes a constructive approach, both technical definitions aiming at the
formal description of a service by means of exchanged messages, protocols, or in-
terfaces and definitions that stress the economic aspect of services shall be amalga-
mated in order to introduce a general definition of services that holds for interdisci-
plinary service research. Until today, academia has not delivered such a definition.
Firstly, a generic definition for any kind of service is given which is followed
by two specializations, namely electronic services and Web services. The latter are,
again, a special case of electronic services. Based on the definition provided by Hill
[156] and its extension by Gadrey [128], a service shall be defined as follows, thereby
resorting to the general roles of a service customer and a service provider.
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Definition 2.1 [SERVICE]. A service is a set of activities performed by a provider and
intended to bring about a change of state of either an entity that is owned or used by a
customer or the customer itself. This change is based on a prior agreement between customer
and provider which aims at a co-creation of value.
Definition 2.1 points up the intention to change the state of an entity. Further-
more, it requires a prior agreement on the provision of the service in order to ex-
clude unintended and unrequested acting. By co-creation of value, the contribution
of both parties, service customer and provider, is emphasized. The customer’s con-
tribution can be manifold, reaching from provisioning of the entity that is changed
to intensely supporting the execution of the set of activities. The provider’s contri-
bution is the performance of the activities that constitute the service provisioning.
Definition 2.1 shall be able to cover any kind of service, ranging from hair cutting, to
teaching or consulting, to entirely Web-based services such as, for instance, Amazon
Web services.
With the rapid growth of ICT and the Web, the environment of service delivery
fundamentally changed. In this context, a special kind of service emerged that is
defined as electronic service which is accounted for in an extended definition based
on Definition 2.1.
Definition 2.2 [ELECTRONIC SERVICE]. An electronic service (e-service) is a service of
which the input and outcome is provided via an electronic network.
In more detail, a service turns into an electronic service as soon as both the in-
put provided by the customer and the output of the service delivery take place via
electronic channels. The latter can, for instance, be a telephone network or the In-
ternet. A service that is entirely based on telephone communication is classified an
electronic service just like services that are initiated and finalized via email commu-
nication or Web protocols. Note that the actual activity performed by the provider
is not required to be electronic, however, any kind of interaction, as for instance
follow-up inquiries that take place within service delivery, must be made via an
electronic network.
As already stated in Section 1, the undergoing change in the software industry
brings about on-demand services that are entirely hosted and maintained by the
service provider and can be accessed via Web browsers. Due to their well-defined
interface, they are interoperable with other services of that kind, being composable
to meet individual customer requests. This specific kind of e-service is denoted a
Web service, which requires a renewed specialization of Definition 2.2.
Definition 2.3 [WEB SERVICE]. A Web service is an e-service identified by a URI that
exposes a public, well-defined interface. Both the input and outcome is provided via a Web
protocol.
The differentiation of a Web service and the other aforementioned service types
is twofold. First, the requirement of having a URI that exposes a publicly available,
well-defined interface as stated in Section 2.1.1.2 must be included. A well-defined
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interface is not only essential from a computer science perspective, but also lays the
groundwork for joint value creation in service networks (cp. Section 2.2). Second,
Definition 2.2 is specialized in terms of the nature of how the input and outcome
must be provided. Again, the requirement of communication via a Web protocol is
a key enabler of automated service composition, which, in turn, is the driver for ser-
vice value networks. Typical examples for Web services are salesforce.com’s Sales
Cloud 2 or the above-mentioned Amazon Web services, e.g. EC2 or S3. Yet, akin
to Definition 2.2, service provisioning itself does not need to take place via commu-
nication by means of a Web protocol. A prime example for such a Web service is
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk7, an on-demand scalable workforce in which inquiries
and the output are standardized as in any “traditional” Web service, however, the
contents that are requested are processed by humans. Figure 2.2 summarizes the






Figure 2.2: Service definitions and their interrelation
2.1.3 Conclusion
In this section, a comprehensive literature overview of service ideologies and defini-
tions was presented, shedding light on the perspectives taken on services from dif-
ferent disciplines. Surprisingly, an interdisciplinary definition, looking at services
from both an economic and a technical viewpoint has not been given up to now. In
a constructive effort, Section 2.1.2 provided a general definition of services and de-
rived a specialized description thereof for electronic services and for Web services
by determining distinctive characteristics for each service type.
According to these criteria, which are summarized in Table 2.1, an electronic ser-
vice is distinguished from a service by the transmission of input and outcome. Anal-
ogously, a Web service is an e-service with a well-defined interface and to which
communication is performed via a Web protocol.
Web services – in either variation – form the basis for service value networks.
Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 will discuss why Web services’ characteristics in this kind of
environment are particularly important.
7https://www.mturk.com/mturk/
2.2. SERVICE VALUE NETWORKS 21
Table 2.1: Distinctive characteristics of service types
Characteristic Service E-service Web service
Input/outcome transmission any electronically electronically
Interface any any well-defined
Communication protocol any any Web protocol
2.2 Service Value Networks
The long tail phenomenon has been heavily discussed in recent years. What has
been neglected so far is its striking relevance for Web services as they are defined in
Section 2.1.2. Whereas customers’ expectations about information goods are often
vague and transient, their requirements are more pronounced and specific when
it comes to articulating functional and non-functional characteristics of Web ser-
vices. Moreover, modular Web services can be combined and configured into ser-
vice mashups that meet virtually every conceivable customer requirement. In this
vein, the long tail phenomenon can be leveraged into a new dimension – the long
valley, where every service exerts positive network externalities on the remaining
services, thereby spurring an increase in supply and demand. The combinatorics of
constructible service mashups are enabled by universally accessible service orches-
tration platforms named service value networks (SVNs).
The remainder of this Section 2.2 will highlight different facets of service value
networks. In the following section, the reasons for service value networks to form
will be deducted from current industry trends and academic advances. In Section
2.2.2, based on a thorough literature review, service value networks are differenti-
ated from related organizational forms and their major characteristics are discussed.
As we will see, management literature, social science, and computer science have
developed tons of definitions for all kinds of networks. However, service value net-
works exhibit special characteristics compared to the known definitions that are not
yet sufficiently discussed and formulated. As both academics and practitioners still
lack approaches to formalize and economically analyze SVNs, this research gap is
filled by introducing a formalization of SVNs in Section 2.2.3 that builds the foun-
dation for the co-opetition mechanism. In order to support the definition of SVNs,
Section 2.2.4 outlines different examples ranging from real-world SVN forerunners
to efforts in research projects to a comprehensive fictional example. A conclusion
in Section 2.2.5 rounds off this section by summarizing the benefits bred by service
value networks.
2.2.1 Unleashing the Combinatorial Power of Service Mashups
Many niche products are available on the Internet, and customers are snapping
them up.8 For example, in their analysis of Amazon’s sales patterns, Brynjolfsson
8It is well-known that the Internet facilitates easy reproduction and distribution of digital goods.
Constantly decreasing prices for electronic transactions made it possible to cheaply store not only
popular, but also a multitude of niche products [10].
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et al. [58] find that 30%-40% of sales are for books that are not commonly available in
a brick-and-mortar store. This phenomenon of selling less of more has become known
as the long tail [10]. It is especially pronounced for digital goods, which can be kept
in stock at virtually no cost. However, Brynjolfsson et al. [59] provide evidence that
the long tail phenomenon is more than just a result of decreased costs and increased
supply. The factual availability of niche products can also change customer tastes:
from mere exposure to products that were previously unavailable, customers start
to cultivate a dedicated taste for the niche – a latent demand.
Consequently, the distribution of sold products not only has a longer tail due to
the plethora of more “obscure” products being offered, but the tail is also growing
“fatter” because customers are increasingly coming to like non-mainstream prod-
ucts [10]. In conclusion, several studies indicate that the aggregated sales volume
attributed to the tail is quite substantial [58, 10, 59, 130, 57]. Putting all of these small
sales volumes together, they reveal the potential to grow something big. For in-
stance, most of the monthly sales for the online music streaming service Rhapsody9
are for songs that are not among its top 10,000 sellers [10]. Further, AdMob Inc. [3]
analyzed the ordered demand distribution of free iPhone applications in Apple’s
App Store and found that only 5% of the applications (116 apps) are downloaded
by more than 100,000 users. Conversely, an astonishing 81% of the applications are
downloaded by less than 10,000 users.
What is true for digital products also holds for electronic services. This thesis
argues that the long tail effect is considerably more pronounced in the domain
of Web services. Compared to products, electronic services possess at least two
additional properties that are conducive to creating a long tail: (i) they are usually
requested by service customers with specific functionality requirements in mind, and
(ii) due to their modular nature, they can easily be combined into service mashups that
have the potential to meet virtually any conceivable customer requirement.
Specific functionality requirements. Some aspects of the long tail phenomenon are
disputed. In particular, critics argue that it is mitigated by the so-called blockbuster
effect, which is commonly observed in the product domains of books, music, and
movies that are often referred to in this context. The blockbuster effect is said to
occur when the consumption of blockbusters, i.e. products with mass appeal and
huge sales, remains robust even when more special interest products are introduced
[219]. Elberse [111], for example, finds empirical support for this hypothesis in data
from the Australian online DVD vendor QuickFlix10. Customers who buy niche
movies tend to be heavy users who also go for the blockbusters. In other words,
although you might have a penchant for documentaries about viniculture in Mace-
donia, you might still want to purchase BBC’s top-selling, high-polish non-fiction
about the world’s most exclusive wineries. This is the snare in Anderson’s [9] long
tail story: blockbusters and the newly cultivated taste for niche products are not
mutually exclusive. Profits made through niche products might thus be overlain by
blockbuster revenues as evident in Elberse [111].
9http://www.rhapsody.com/
10http://www.quickflix.com.au/
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However, we argue in support of the long tail phenomenon that Web services are
less affected by the blockbuster effect than the above-mentioned “leisure products”
are. Customers of Web services expose very particular functionality requirements
that are much more diversified than specifications for books, music, or movies
[202, 221]. Consequently, customers will always prefer a more specialized service
that closely meets their requirements over a one-size-fits-all service – if it comes
at a reasonable price.11 This taste for more specialized services fuels the long tail
advocates’ main argument, namely that customers suffer from the tyranny of the
mainstream offerings inherent to the traditional brick-and-mortar-business [9].12
Specialization through service composition. In contrast to information goods, elec-
tronic services can be effectively configured and combined to form service mashups
that meet even the most specialized customer demand. Mashups are complex ser-
vice solutions composed of various modular service components according to the
customers’ requirements; this composition process constitutes a value-added and
multi-step business functionality [256]. The ability to compose specialized service
mashups from a set of existing services dramatically boosts the long tail idea. On
the one hand, the individual services become more attractive to customers because
they can be combined to create many different specialized service mashups. On the
other hand, each of the available services is more attractive to customers because
they can be employed in a number of specialized service mashups. Consequently,
service composition enables a new generation of combinatorics that transforms the
long tail phenomenon into a long valley. In other words, the combinatorics adds a
third dimension to the long tail, thereby creating a plane (cp. Figure 2.3). Thus, the
sales volume generated by a long valley-style distribution not only depends on the
length of the tail, but also on the composition depth, i.e. the number of possible
ways to recombine services.
In the long valley, the long tail phenomenon is dramatically amplified. First, the
long valley offers a large host of specialized solutions “off-the-shelf” that are highly
valued by the customer. According to a Forrester study [154], for example, cus-
tomers are currently dissatisfied with the lack of customization options and dearth
of specific business applications. Both shortcomings can be addressed by service
composition [338].
Second, service providers will also benefit from service composition, because in ad-
dition to potentially bolstering the stand-alone appeal of their product, they might
also see their services become a valuable part of a complex service. Thereby, each
available service offering becomes more valuable and will be invoked more often.
Service providers can therefore exploit economies of scope by contributing to var-
ious solutions that meet multifaceted demands. Unlike in other domains, it is not
only the customers whose preferences give rise to network effects in SVNs. It is
also, and maybe even more, the core competencies of the service providers that fuel
economies of networks, in particular, economies of scope.
Third, service composition will also create network externalities that will further
multiply the previous effects. As the number of available services increases, more
11A detailed survey on service characteristics, especially heterogeneity, which necessitates a high
degree of customization, can be found in Section 2.1.1 and in Zeithaml et al. [343].
12Due to physical restrictions, brick-and-mortar stores are doomed to offer a selection of mainstream
products, which account for an exponentially large share of sales.
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Figure 2.3: The long valley expands the long tail by adding composition depth as
the third dimension
specialized service mashups can be configured. This in turn creates more customer
value and thus boosts demand, which motivates service providers to offer more ser-
vices, and thus the cycle begins anew. In short, service composition creates a two-
sided market [62, 274, 14] in which customers appreciate the availability of more
service providers and vice versa.
This trend towards more specialized, but modular service offerings is already
observable. In 2007, the bandwidth consumed by Amazon Web Services exceeded
the bandwidth taken up by the entire global network of Amazon.com retail websites
for the first time.13 The number of specialized, modular services on the market has
continued to boom ever since. Moreover, over the course of 2009, the number of
mashups listed at ProgrammableWeb14 shot up by roughly 25% to a total of more
than 4,500 composite Web services.
From a technological standpoint, complex Web services or Web service mashups
came to life with the advent of Web 2.0 technologies and the renaissance of HTTP
appreciation. While the first mashups were dedicated to small customer applica-
tions integrating simple data in the Web browser (e.g. RSS feeds), today’s mashup
technology has the potential to integrate enterprise applications. Big and RESTful
Web services encapsulate functionality and put them behind clearly defined inter-
faces based on SOAP, WSDL, and HTTP, thereby facilitating lightweight approaches
such as RESTful architectures [126] and slim messaging formats such as JSON [89].
Through extensive reuse of existing resources and simple programming models,
mashups not only facilitate the ad-hoc development of highly situation-specific ap-
plications, but also boost the composition depth of complex services.
13http://aws.typepad.com/aws/2008/05/lots-of-bits.html
14http://www.programmableweb.org
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The business side of the long valley is closely connected with the technological
aspects. The value for the customer is created through the interplay of comple-
mentary service providers, each of whom contributes an incremental added value
to the overall complex service [51, 28]. Due to specialization, most single service
providers are not able to serve a customer request without the assets of comple-
mentary partners. However, in order to keep up with innovation pressure and to
alleviate the adverse effects of market power, the long valley should also contain
substitutive service offerings [264, 167]. Service providers thus find themselves in
the fruitful state of co-opetition, which breeds both complementary opportunities and
competitive threats [54]. We argue that service value networks provide the appropri-
ate technological and economic governance structure in which the long valley can
be cultivated and prosper. SVNs support the duality of cooperation and compe-
tition, thereby driving the strategies and actions of the participants without them
explicitly cooperating. The next section will reference to this argument in detail.
2.2.2 Definition & Related Concepts
When asked for a definition of a “service value network”, academics and practi-
tioners alike usually bubble over with riotous examples and visionary scenarios.
The uninitiated recipient of such torrents of words consequently assumes that there
must be a tacit common understanding of the concept and refrains from further
questioning. However, the relevant literature has in fact failed to provide an explicit
and unambiguous definition of SVNs to date (cp. e.g. [146, 71, 147, 28, 43]). Despite
the relative straightforwardness of exemplary instantiations of SVNs, considerable
uncertainty and disagreement on what is actually not an SVN remains. In an effort
to map out the conceptual boundaries and formulate an explicit definition of SVNs,
related concepts from organizational theory are compared, which shows that many
of their features are not exclusive.
But before developing a definition for SVNs, we have to back up a bit first:
Ever since the seminal work by Williamson [332], economists distinguish between
markets and hierarchies as the two extreme forms of organization. Networked orga-
nizations are a hybrid organizational form that has gathered momentum in recent
decades [226, 316, 19]. Most importantly, networked organizations combine the ad-
vantages of markets, such as flexibility, adaptability, and efficiency, with those of
hierarchies, above all control and protection of knowledge and core competencies.
This combination results in the following advantages:
• adaptability and flexibility while maintaining control [145, 152]
• protection of business knowledge through modularization [23, 163, 158]
• efficiency through market-based coordination [226]
• insurance against uncertainty in supply and demand [181]
The most prominent types of networked organizations are business networks
[162, 143, 273], strategic alliances [95, 339], virtual organizations [134, 159], and
smart business networks [324, 323, 152, 153, 60]. Clearly, SVNs should also be on
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this list. But what distinguishes SVNs from other organizational types in this cate-
gory?
Business networks constitute the most general form of economically motivated
cooperation among different firms or legal entities [162]. As in any cooperation,
participation in a business network is based on the perception of mutual benefit
and believed to lead to the co-creation of business value. In addition, business net-
works tend to be temporary, project-driven, or goal-oriented cooperations that can
comprise both homogeneous (i.e. competing) as well as heterogeneous (i.e. comple-
mentary) network partners [34].
Strategic alliances and virtual organizations are derivatives of business networks.
Strategic alliances usually denote cooperations among otherwise competing firms
with the intention to share risk or achieve economies of scale [145, 231]. Virtual
organizations, on the contrary, stress the formation of firms with complementary
core competencies in order to achieve a goal one alone cannot master [307, 336].
Smart business networks (SBNs) refer to a new era of business networks that em-
phasize the smart use of ICT to facilitate network interaction. Smartness is in this
case a relative term connoting effectiveness and a comparative advantage through
the use of ICT [153]. ICT is also seen as an enabler of network agility, i.e. the
network’s ability to “rapidly pick, plug, and play” business processes [152]. The
concept of SBNs is tightly coupled with the evolution from “mass customization”
to “mass individualization”, because such networks have the capability to quickly
evolve on demand according to specific customer needs and requirements [60].
Moreover, after an individual request has been fulfilled, an SBN can quickly be dis-
solved again. These quick connect and disconnect capabilities, which enable ad-hoc
joint value creation, are only possible because the firms collaborating in an SBN pro-
vide modular business capabilities. In addition, the modularity of potential network
members not only allows for spontaneous network orchestration, but also provides
better protection for a firm’s core competencies [163]. Trust problems, which are
commonly encountered in virtual organizations, are thus not as severe and the SBN
may recruit members from a more open pool of potential partners [317]. The for-
mation and coordination of SBNs is provided by one or more particular firms in the
network pool. Hinterhuber [157] denotes these firms as “network orchestrators”.
Network orchestrator and network operator can thereby coincide. A prominent ex-
ample of a smart business network orchestrator is Li & Fung15, which coordinates a
network of more than 8,000 network partners.
This review demonstrates that the same prototypical characteristics cited by the
service science community to describe SVNs are also found in more general organi-
zational concepts. For example, Hamilton [147] notes the presence of complement-
ing and competing firms in SVNs and Spohrer et al. [302] underscore the interaction
of different entities for mutual benefit; both phenomena are inherent parts of a busi-
ness network. Basole and Rouse [28] additionally emphasize the role of information
technology as an enabler for SVNs and highlight its importance in empowering cus-
tomers as the “triggers of all activities in the network”. However, these elements are
also definitive for SBNs [152].
15http://www.lifung.com/eng/global/home.php
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One might also argue that SVNs are located within the service domain, while
SBNs focus on products. Though SVNs do inherently have a strong service fo-
cus, this differentiation lacks teeth in that service scientists themselves tend to view
products as mere “vehicles for service delivery” [320, 12]. Much more precisely and
concrete, SVNs are a special case of SBNs in which the coordination and orchestra-
tion of services is performed automatically by a universally accessible network or-
chestration platform which itself is not necessarily technically centralized (cp. also
Figure 2.4).
Definition 2.4 [SERVICE VALUE NETWORK]. Service value networks are smart business
networks that provide business value by performing automated on-demand composition of
complex services from a steady but open pool of complementary as well as substitutive stan-










Figure 2.4: Relationship between different concepts of networked organizations
This definition is distinctive because network composition and orchestration
is generally not automated in SBNs. Let us consider each part of the definition in
more detail.
Complex services. A complex service is composed of various component services.
More precisely, complex services typically involve the assembly and invocation of
several component services offered by diverse enterprises in order to complete a
multi-step business functionality [256]. In turn, component services are either other
complex services or functionalities that are provided via a Web service.
Standardized service modules. Services must be plug-and-playable in order to
harness the combinatorial power of service mashups, which can ultimately be used
to harvest the latent demand of the long valley. This can only be achieved through
service modules with standardized interfaces. Furthermore, the SVN’s automated
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service orchestration requires that standardization encompasses the specification of
acceptable parameter values in machine-readable form.
Steady but open pool of complementary and substitutive services. Services have
to be (manually or automatically) registered with the service value network in order
to be eligible for composition. This set of registered services forms the steady pool
from which a complex service is composed. However, the registration is open for
any service which meets certain minimum requirements, in particular with respect
to appropriate interface specifications. It is also conceivable that the service value
network itself will actively browse the service landscape for eligible services and
register them automatically. In this context steady means that the SVN maintains
a list of services (including their interface descriptions), independent of whether
there is a current service composition request in the network. Open, however,
refers to the fact that no service can be excluded from the network, as long as it
meets the publicly known minimum requirements defined by the platform provider.
Automated on-demand service composition. On-demand refers to the network’s
ability to orchestrate a complex service ad-hoc and upon customer request. At
the time of the request, the SVN will automatically search for an optimal path
through its network of registered services (cp. Section 5.2.2). Optimality is thereby
evaluated with respect to a goal function, for example the overall wealth of all
parties involved which is known as market efficiency. In general, a path through the
network is automatically chosen such that the economic surplus of one or more
market participants is maximized. However, automating the mashup orchestration
process does not only require a goal function to be specified, but also calls for a
mechanism that guarantees the maximization of the goal function – as for example
the mechanism presented in this thesis.
Universally accessible network orchestration platform. Finally, all of the above
components are brought to life via the network orchestration platform. The
platform encompasses the technical infrastructure and business logic necessary to
perform market-based on-demand service composition and maintains an up-to-
date list of orchestratable services. As such, the platform is the definitive interface
for and between service customers and providers. Consequently, it is absolutely
critical for the platform to be universally accessible and permanently available
within its service domain; otherwise available services may be excluded from the
platform (thereby violating the openness requirement) and business opportunities
will be lost.
2.2.3 Formalizing Service Value Network
As introduced in Section 2.2.2, services must register (or be registered) with the ser-
vice value network in order to be eligible for composition. The set of r registered ser-
vices Ṽ = {ṽ1, ..., ṽr} forms the steady pool from which a specific, customer-driven
complex service, so to say one possible instantiation of the SVN tailored to a specific
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customer requirement, can be composed. As stated above, services are owned by
diverse service providers Ñ = {ñ1, ..., ñq}, q≤ r. Therefore, formally, services expose
a injective ownership function σ̃ : Ñ →P(Ṽ) that indicates which service provider
offers (and thus “owns”) which services registered in the SVN.
It is often useful to not consider the entire pool of services, but to restrict attention
to the above-mentioned specific SVN that forms upon customer request. In other
words, it is an excerpt from the overall SVN which only includes candidate pools
(and thus services) that meet the functionality demanded by the customer. In the
further course of this thesis, SVNs will denote both the entire network of registered
service providers and concrete instances thereof that meet specific requests.16
The following model of a (specific customer-driven) SVN captures its character-
istics stated in Definition 2.2.2 using a formal notation. An SVN is described by
means of a simplified statechart model [148] and is aligned with the representation
presented by Zeng et al. [344]. Statecharts have proven to be the preferred choice for
specifying process models as they expose well-defined semantics and they provide
flow constructs offered by prominent process modeling languages (e.g. WS-BPEL17)
and therefore allow for simple serialization in standardized formalisms.
A service value network is represented by a directed, k-partite, and acyclic graph.
Each partition represents a different functionality requested by the service customer.
Services. The set of nodes V = {v1, ...,vn}, V ⊆ Ṽ denotes the set of service offers
that are suitable to meet the requested functionality. Two auxiliary notes, source
vs and sink v f act as a makeshift to formalize complex services as an end-to-end
connection. Therefore, these nodes are not interpreted as services in the network.
Candidate pools. According to the different service functionalities that are com-
bined in order to constitute the demanded complex service, services are clustered
into k partitions referred to as candidate pools. Substitutive services are mapped
to one and the same candidate pool. The vector of all candidate pools is denoted
by Y = (Y1, . . . ,Yk, . . . ,Yk̃), 1≤ k̃ ≤ n. Y specifies the sequence [1, . . . , k̃] of functional
steps within a complex service. Exactly one service out of each candidate pool is re-
quired to deliver an instance of the complex service requested by the customer. Let
Yk ⊂ V denote the set of all services that belong to the k-th candidate pool. Source
and sink are not considered a separate candidate pool. However, for notational sim-
plicity, “virtual” candidate pools Y0 = {vs} and Yk̃+1 = {v f } are introduced which
contain the source and sink, respectively.
Ownership of services. The set of n services is offered (and thus “owned”) by a
set of m service providers N = {n1, ...,nm}, N ⊆ Ñ, m ≤ n. The injective ownership
function σ : N →P(V) reveals which service provider owns which services within
the SVN. Vice versa, let σ̄ : V → N with σ̄(vj) = nl, vj ∈ σ(nl) for all j ∈ {1, ...,n},
16The respective context should clarify the intended semantics.
17http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/wsbpel/
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l ∈ {1, ...,m} denote the surjective function that maps any service vj ∈V to its distinct
owner nl.
Links between services. An edge eij denotes an integration relationship between
nodes vi and vj. That is, an edge between two nodes symbolizes the interoperabil-
ity of the services offered as well as their providers’ willingness to cooperate. Let
Ẽ :=
{
eij|vi ∈ Yk1 ,vj ∈ Yk2 ,1≤ k1 ≤ k2 ≤ k̃
} ∪ {esh|vh ∈ Y1
}
be the set of all possible
links in a k-partite graph. This set is further restricted to represent the process-
oriented view by only allowing nodes between adjoining candidate pools. There-
fore, let E :=
{
eij|vi ∈ Yk,vj ∈ Yk+1, k = 1, ..., k̃− 1
} ∪ {esh|vh ∈ Y1
}
be the set of all
possible links given the set of services V.
Fully intermeshed SVN and restrictions to the set of links. Based on the nota-
tion introduced above, the graph Ĝ = (V ∪ {vs,v f }, E ∪ {eh f |vh ∈ Yk̃}) represents
the fully intermeshed network including source and sink and with all theoretically
allowed links between services. However, the platform operator might not be able
to “force” service providers to establish links to each and every other eligible ser-
vice in the network. Therefore, in practice, not all of the possible links between
services are necessarily “activated”. Let Vm ⊆ V be an arbitrary subset of V and
E(Vm) :=
{
eij ∈ E|vi,vj ∈ Vm ∪ {vs}
}
the set of all associated and reasonable edges.
Thus, edges are only included if they form the incoming and outgoing edge of at
least one node.18 In this connection, let E(vj) ⊂ E(Vm) denote the set of incoming
links that are reasonably associated to a service vj within Vm (that is, they need to be
part of E(Vm)).
Complex services. Of particular interest in SVNs are complex services as a central
part of Definition 2.4 since they account for a value creating output. The possible re-
alizations of complex services are symbolized by complete paths from source to sink.
Importantly, a complex service incorporates exactly one service out of each candi-
date pool. vs and v f are formally excluded from paths due to them being not a ser-
vice. Thus, Fl := (Wl, E(Wl)) with Wl ∈
{
W ⊆ V|∀k ∈ {1, . . . , k̃} ∃1vj ∈W : vj ∈ Yk
}
defines a complex service as one element of the set F := {F1, . . . , Fl, . . . , Ft} of all t
complex services available.
Service configurations, costs, and prices. Each service vj exhibits a service config-
uration Aj that is characterized by a vector Aj = (a1j , . . . , amj , . . . , am̃j ) where amj is the
value of the m-th attribute type of service vj, thereby unambiguously defining all
relevant service characteristics. Aj represents the quality level provided by a ser-
vice and differentiates it from other services – it is therefore a major determinant
of its costs and price. Let pij := p(eij) with eij ∈ E denote the price for service vj
when being allocated as successor of service vi. Incoming edges of the sink are not
attached with prices since v f is not considered a service, and therefore, can neither
18This is true except for the links of services in Yk̃. In this case, only an incoming node is required.
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exhibit costs nor set prices.19 Typically, in order to determine pij, service providers
incorporate costs cij := c(eij) that accrue for executing their services at runtime de-
pendent upon service vi. It is assumed that the representation of internal variable
costs reflects the service providers’ valuations for their service offers being executed
in different composition-related contexts.20 Context-dependent prices can originate
from different underlying costs, for instance, efforts with respect to data conver-
sion. If, for example, some service vj has two preceding nodes vh and vi, phj > pij
can occur by reason of increased costs chj which emerge from additional conversion
expenses. Furthermore, strategic aspects can influence a service provider’s pricing
decision.
The formalized service value network. As a result from above-introduced no-
tation, a specific SVN can be formalized as follows: G := (V ∪ {vs,v f }, E(V) ∪
{ei f |vi ∈ Yk̃}). For technical reasons, a reduced graph G := (V, E(V)) is also defined,
cutting off vs, v f , and
{
ei f |vi ∈ Vk
}



























































Figure 2.5: Exemplary formalization of a service value network
Figure 2.5 illustrates an exemplary formalization of a service value
network with |Y| = 2 candidate pools which can be described as G =
({v1,v2,v3,v4,vs,v f },{es1, es2, e13, e23, e24, e3 f , e4 f }). Every feasible path from source
to sink represents a possible realization (instance) of a complex service. There
are three complex services F = (F1, F2, F3) in G with F1 = ({v1,v3},{es1, e13}),
F2 = ({v2,v3},{es2, e23}), and F3 = ({v2,v4},{es2, e24}).
19Consequently, links ei f , vi ∈ Yk̃, are not included in E
20The representation of a detailed cost structure of service providers is intentionally omitted, which
serves a better understanding and does not restrict the generalization of the model.
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2.2.4 Assessing the Value of SVNs in Practice
Now that the organizational concept of service value networks has been argued for,
defined, and formally introduced, it is time to consider different implementations
of SVNs. Building on the basic structure of today’s Web service market, the most
prominent forerunner of SVNs – salesforce.com’s AppExchange – and TEXO as a
current and closely related research project are discussed. Finally, a comprehensive
fictional example for a complex service as it could be offered in a representative
SVN, e.g. in TEXO, will be presented. This will not only help to differentiate SVNs
from other networked organizational forms, but will also demonstrate the profit
potential and benefits opened up by SVNs and the long valley.
2.2.4.1 The Structure of Today’s Web Service Market
The current Web service market clearly points the way towards service value net-
works. The current market can be divided into four quadrants as shown in Figure
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Figure 2.6: Typology of Web services
Figure 2.6 classifies the manifestations of the Web service market by the com-
plexity of the underlying business process and the degree of cross-organizational
interaction when developing and offering services. The variety of Web services that
support single steps of a process offered by individual service providers is already
vast. Prime examples are services provided by Google such as Google Docs21 as a
Web-based offering to create and share work online or Google Maps22, a map service
that can be easily embedded in Web sites or service mashups. Other examples that
21http://docs.google.com
22http://maps.google.com
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enjoy high popularity are the Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) as a simple Web
service that can be utilized to store and retrieve data and the Amazon Elastic Com-
pute Cloud (EC2) that provides resizable compute capacity in the cloud. These Web
services are already extensively used in service mashups, as for instance reflected
in ProgrammableWeb’s composition matrix: Google Maps, for instance, is currently
part of approximately 2,000 mashups listed at ProgrammableWeb while Amazon’s
S3 and EC2 are included in more than 100 mashups.23
On the other hand, applications supporting multi-step business processes are in-
creasingly offered as Web services, too. For instance, companies like salesforce.com
or Netsuite Inc.24 successfully entered the business software market with their
entirely Web based on-demand customer relationship management (CRM) suites.
Components offered within these suites can be dynamically composed to cus-
tomized processes. Additionally, traditional players in the software market started
to enhance their business models towards Web-based offerings. SAP’s enterprise
resource planning application BusinessByDesign and CRM on demand by Oracle
are only two examples for the postulated shift from traditional software products to
services [103]. Yet, these services are provided by single vendors.
The field of complex services that are composed of elements provided by different ven-
dors is where SVNs are to be classified. Web service marketplaces such as StrikeIron
and Xignite can be interpreted as SVN forerunners: they do offer a platform where
service providers can market their specialized Web services to customers, yet auto-
mated mediation is not available. For instance, neither functional integration nor
automatized matchmaking are provided. Added value through service composi-
tion can by created, however, both choice of an optimal combination and the actual
composition is left to the customer. Salesforce.com’s AppExchange goes one step
further into the SVN direction, providing a market for diverse vendors to offer their
complementary services to Sales Cloud 2. This network exhibits some, but not every
feature of a service value network (cp. also Section 2.2.4.2). The TEXO platform as a
part of the TEXO research project25 is a current example for providing both technical
and economic support for SVNs as defined in this thesis.
2.2.4.2 Real-World SVN Forerunner: AppExchange
Already being the worldwide leader in on-demand customer relationship manage-
ment services, salesforce.com launched their marketplace for third party on-demand
applications – AppExchange – in 2005 in order to innovate and extend their business
model. The core idea of AppExchange is to offer a platform for complementary ser-
vices grouped around Salesforce.com’s core offering Sales Cloud 2 (formerly known
as Salesforce CRM) in order to increase its value and range of covered functionali-
ties. The bulk of services to be found at AppExchange are third-party applications
offered by both freelance software developers and software companies. By May
23http://www.programmableweb.com/api/, accessed on 05/17/2010.
24http://www.netsuite.com
25TEXO is one component of the umbrella research program THESEUS initiated by the German
Federal Ministry of Economy and Technology. THESEUS aims at developing a novel Internet-
based infrastructure to improve the usage of knowledge available on the Internet (http://www.
theseus-programm.de/en-US/home/default.aspx).
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2010, AppExchange included approximately 900 Web services to complement Sales
Cloud 2.26
The offered services are fully integrated into Sales Cloud 2 which slashes adjust-
ment efforts on customer side. Seamless and automated integration is enabled by
the fact that all services offered at AppExchange (i) are deliberately built for Sales
Cloud 2 and (ii) are based on and restricted to a proprietary but open development
platform – Force.com27. Force.com as “platform-as-a-service” (PaaS) provides a
means that allow developers to engineer applications that are pre-integrated in Sales
Cloud 2 and can thus be marketed via AppExchange. Applications that are built via
Force.com use the same proprietary programming language (Apex) and the same
syntax to create the service’s interface (Visualforce). With Force.com, an on-demand
programming environment to facilitate third-party-built applications complements
the portfolio offered. However, even if the customer assembles an integrated, com-
plex service via AppExchange, single service level agreements (SLAs), billing, and
a proprietary pricing scheme applies for each of the purchased component services.
Pricing is thereby entirely left to the service vendors: pricing structures range from
a fee per user and month bound to an annual subscription to a fixed fee per year
plus additional charges that are linked to present Sales Cloud 2 users, just to name
two examples. Dynamic pricing as well as a pricing at a complex service level is
not available. Moreover, as one of the most important features of SVNs, automated
on-demand service composition is not featured. As we have seen in the previous
section, AppExchange can therefore be classified an SBN. However, the applied en-
abling technology theoretically allows for an extension towards an SVN.
In total, Salesforce.com’s AppExchange can certainly be rated the most promi-
nent SVN forerunner with approximately 65,000 potential customers that are given
access to a multitude of third-party services that provide complementary function-
ality to salesforce.com’s core offering.28 Applications are offered by approximately
450 diverse vendors, which shows that the postulated trend towards highly spe-
cialized providers that rely on their core competency [23, 100, 311] has already be-
come reality in the Web services industry: for example, in the category ”project man-
agement apps”, customers can find 15 Web services offered by 11 different service
providers.29
2.2.4.3 Current Research on SVNs: TEXO
The TEXO project envisages the creation of a platform and marketplace that enables
the innovation, engineering, offering, and consumption of Web services via the In-
ternet supported by its underlying IT infrastructure. The focus of the services traded
via TEXO is put upon value-added complex services that involve diverse modular
service components offered by different providers. Thus, TEXO is an electronic ser-
vice broker that allows for the offering and merchandizing of (complex) Web ser-





a0L30000001Qp82EAC&sort=6, accessed on 05/10/2010.
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vices, bringing together service supply and demand. The approach is based on a
service oriented architecture with its capability of exposing and connecting single
Web services from different sources [27].
Figure 2.7 gives a high level architecture overview on the TEXO platform com-
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Figure 2.7: High level TEXO architecture
The TEXO Service Management Platform (SMP) as the heart of TEXO comprises
TEXO Tools, the TEXO Portal, TEXO Management Services, and data storage com-
ponents. The TEXO Tools include two main components: the Innovation Cockpit
and the Integrated Service Engineering (ISE) Workbench. The Innovation Cockpit
offers tool-based support to service innovators such as idea mining and idea evalu-
ation tools [303]. The ISE Workbench is a service unified development environment
which gives providers support in modeling, design, and description [286]. Akin to
Force.com, the ISE workbench lays down the minimal requirements that must be
met in order to offer (compatible) services within the platform.
30http://www.fmc-modeling.org/home
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TEXO Management Services offer core platform functionalities including service
registration, service discovery, complex service auctioning, service level manager,
billing, and monitoring. These services, either offered by the platform itself or by
third-party providers, are deployed to the TEXO Management Runtime to be acces-
sible by other components, and are offered to service customers and providers via a
Web-based frontend – the TEXO portal. Most importantly, the TEXO Management
Services allow for an automated on-demand service composition that is a required
feature in SVNs. Further, a comprehensive service level management, monitoring,
billing, and pricing on complex service level is facilitated.
The TEXO registry allows for a registration of tradable services on the SMP while
the repositories provide and store all required information on tradable services such
as their description or monitoring data.
The required input to administrate monitoring and billing of services is provided
by the Tradable Services Runtime (TSR). Any service hoster can install a TSR and
offer a TEXO-related hosting service. As services are usually not hosted by TEXO
itself, the TEXO runtime adapter provides for an exchange of required data between
the TSR and the TEXO Service Management Platform. If a service provider does
not host its service itself, it can choose a TSR to deploy its service. The TEXO TSR
repository of each TSR stores the information of services that are deployed on the
respective TSR. Locally installed process and service engines are required to deploy
different service aspects, such as service process, or user interface.
Since an automated integration of services in the customer’s enterprise system is
another objective of the TEXO project, TEXO offers the Integration/Adoption Man-
ager. It is responsible for managing all integration aspects of a tradeable service into
the customer’s service-based application, or enterprise system, respectively [183].
The above-described architecture provides one possibility of a technical basis
for service value networks which goes beyond the composition of services that are
closely related to a core application as it is the case for AppExchange. In line with
a service value network’s characteristics, the TEXO platform is able to orchestrate
a complex service on customer request with the help of the TEXO Management
Services including automatized search for an optimal combination of services to
be composed according to the demanded functional and non-functional customer
requirements. The co-opetition mechanism elaborated in this thesis is a possible
instantiation of a market mechanism that can be applied within the TEXO SMP.
2.2.4.4 Fictional Example: Complex Picture Service
Let us now turn to a comprehensive real world example which is based on currently
available service offerings. Other than AppExchange and TEXO, it builds upon the
ideal conception of lightweight approaches. We will revisit this issue in Section 2.2.5.
Imagine you are the chief information officer of SizzlingNews, a news service and
editorial office, and are expected to streamline your company’s business processes.
Of course, as a matter of good journalism, the validity and relevance of the news
events that pop into your company every day have to be investigated and assembled
manually. But that is just the tip of the iceberg: the processing of a news event
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entails a multitude of routine tasks prior to publication. For example, assume that
SizzlingNews usually accompanies its stories with photos. The journalist therefore
needs to find and procure related pictures, store them, and add the pictures’ meta
information by tagging the relevant visual content. This is a tedious and highly
inefficient task if done manually. Worse yet, the process delays the release of the
news stories and thus severely hampers SizzlingNews’ competitive position in the
news industry.
While pondering the alternatives to doing these tasks manually, you dream of
a fully automated picture-retrieval-and-tagging process realized through services
that are readily available on the Internet. The images could be retrieved from photo
services such as Flickr31, Google’s Picasa32, or Yahoo!Image33. Web services for pic-
ture tagging are available either through crowdsourcing approaches [164], as used
by Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, or semantic and face recognition technologies, such
as those used by ImageNotion34 [327]. Finally, the assembled information could be
stored online with Amazon S3 or other services cavorting “in the cloud” such as
Wuala35 or SMEStorage36. But what if you could find a Web interface capable of
automatically locating and combining all of the individual services you need – in
the order you need them – to form a single complex service as depicted in Figure
2.8)?
In a service value network, this is in fact possible: RESTful architectures and
simplified interfaces have dramatically reduced the complexity of service composi-
tion and service description, finally enabling automated on-demand orchestration
of complex services.
The previous example can also be used to illustrate the definitional boundaries
of the SVN concept step by step (cp. Section 2.2.2). For instance, if instead of using
a Web service, suppose you were to verbally describe your service requirements to
a network coordination company like Li & Fung. The firm would then perform the
mashup orchestration for you and the SVN would degenerate into an SBN. It is im-
portant to realize that fully automated service orchestration requires more than just
the use of tightly integrated ICT among the network partners. Additionally, service
providers have to offer modularized services and strictly adhere to predefined in-
terfaces. Likewise, the SVN must provide a customer interface through which the
service request can be formally articulated. In SBNs, however, the ability to pick,
plug, and play network partners is emphasized, but not developed to the extent
that network orchestration can be executed automatically.
Moreover, if the SBN was unable to combine any picture service with any stor-
age or tagging service, it would further degenerate into a mere business network.
In contrast to an SBN, the network partners in a business network are much less
integrated and generally do not adhere to a common network standard with respect
to the employed ICT or interface specifications. This reduces the modularity of the



















































Figure 2.8: The picture-retrieval-and-tagging process as a service value network scenario
without disruption of the mashup’s overall functionality. Table 2.2 summarizes the
scenario variations and the resulting change in governance structures.
Table 2.2: Differentiation between network types
Network type Distinguishing characteristics
Service value network Interoperable service modulesAutomated service orchestration
Smart business network Non-automated service orchestration
Business network Non-compatible service modules
The high degree of standardization and modularization of services in an SVN is
also the key to achieving the service composition depth that is descriptive for the
long valley phenomenon. The long tail merely addresses the provision of all avail-
able services through one platform. In the long valley, however, any of the avail-
able services can be combined to create complex services that meet also the most
specialized demand. It is important to note that the order in which the services
are configured matters; different lineups can result in very different – and poten-
tially quite useful – service mashups. For instance, invoking the tagging service
first followed by the picture and the storage services could support a business pro-
cess in which people or situations are tagged on pictures that are already owned by
SizzlingNews. Thereafter, photos depicting the same event would be retrieved via
Flickr and the like, and are eventually stored on Wuala. You may indeed find vari-
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ous re-combinations of your original service specifications to be quite useful to your
company; perhaps you would also buy this new instantiation of the service mashup
in order to stock up SizzlingNews’ picture archive. In other words, the same set of
services can be reordered and sold multiple times to the same customer, with each
configuration addressing a different business need. In fact, if a total of n services
are registered with the SVN, there potentially exist up to ∑nk=1
n!
(n−k)! alternative ser-
vice mashups that could be sold to any one customer. This means that the number
of possible service mashups grows exponentially with the number of available ser-
vices, whereas the traditional long tail effect is only linear. Such is the combinatorial
power that constitutes the long valley.
2.2.5 Conclusion
In Section 2.2, the economic potential of service value network was analyzed. The
Web services domain was exposed to be the perfect environment for SVNs, breed-
ing the long valley of services through the power of Web service combinatorics. In
Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, a definition of service value networks and their distinction
from related concepts as well as a theoretical formalization were provided. Both
contributions are the very foundation for designing mechanisms to automatically
allocate and price complex services and to set incentives that boost SVNs in their
initial phase.
The focus of this concluding section is twofold: firstly, the benefits for partic-
ipants in SVNs shall be clarified. Secondly, the minimum requirements as to stan-
dards that are imposed by the platform operator shall be revisited due to differences
between the ideal conception and the state-of-the-art.
Benefits for SVN participants
If you are a service consumer, SVNs can provide the service mashups that you
have been looking for in vain. Earlier business applications provided over the In-
ternet were designed to catch the average requirements of small and medium enter-
prises (SME), but failed to offer customization possibilities and left special require-
ments unsatisfied [154]. In SVNs the procurement of affordable, customized appli-
cations on demand is made possible by virtue of automated service composition.
Indeed, SME tend to resort to these applications first, because they are desperate
for a cost-efficient alternative to pricey on-premise software requiring large upfront
investments as well as tedious do-it-yourself-solutions.37 However, SME long for
tailored solutions, too. Their best bet for finding these solutions are in SVNs, which
exploit the power of Web service combinatorics.
If you are a service provider, you will reap the benefits of the combinatoric and
network effects at play in the long valley. Your service offering can become a com-
plementary part in multiple valuable mashups. In this way, your services will gen-
erate more value than they would as stand-alone offerings, and they are more likely
to be purchased.
37A survey conducted by the Sandhill Group and McKinsey & Company showed that approximately
75% of the SME polled would be ready to use some sort of on-demand software offerings [102].
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Over and above those advantages, in SVNs you can become a prosumer [312],
both enjoying the ever-expanding composition matrix that constitutes the long val-
ley as a consumer and contributing to the networks’ value as a provider. Your IT
department can actually provide its own services in the SVN – services that were
created in-house since they were not yet available anywhere else. As noted in Sec-
tion 2.2.1, even the most obscure services are likely to find takers. So, each and every
company’s service has the potential to kiss awake latent demand.
Minimum requirements imposed by the platform operator
As stated in Section 2.2.1, Web service mashups came to life with emerging Web
2.0 technologies and the renaissance of HTTP appreciation. Typically, these service
mashups as consumed today can still predominantly classified as consumer or data
mashups. Consumer mashups combine data elements from diverse sources and
hide them behind a simple user interface (UI). Similarly, data mashups combine
data streams into a single data feed with a dedicated UI attached to it. Analyzing
the top mashup tags at Programmableweb.org, it becomes obvious that the most
popular mashups still belong to above-mentioned categories, with mapping, photo,
shopping, and video being the top four used tags to circumscribe the mashup of-
fered.38 Among the most popular mashups on ProgrammableWeb.org, one finds,
for instance, a mashup to help consumers locate a Nintendo Wii39, a mashup that
features live weather, forecasts, webcams, etc.40, or a mashup that grabs sad tweets
from Twitter41 and illustrates them via pictures taken from Flickr42.
These mashups mainly do base on RESTful Web services that encapsulate func-
tionality and put them behind clearly defined interfaces based on HTTP, thereby
facilitating lightweight approaches such as RESTful architectures and slim messag-
ing formats. However, this is only partially true for business-oriented, enterprise
mashups. While ProgrammableWeb.org increasingly lists APIs of business-related
Web services that can potentially be used in mashups providing business appli-
cation functionality43, other platforms rely on minimal requirements that are a bit
higher. In respect of valuable and interoperable business applications, composition
is not as simple as that [330]. Both salesforce.com’s AppExchange and the TEXO
platform impose open, but proprietary standards. As shown in Sections 2.2.4.2 and
2.2.4.3, AppExchange requires services to be implemented according to Apex via
Force.com; TEXO requires service providers to implement their service offerings
using ISE Workbench. Both approaches enable seamless composition and compati-
bility of service modules from a technical point of view.
Indeed, such open but proprietary standards do not fully reflect the lightweight,
ideal conception envisioned in Section 2.2.1. However, it is important to notice that






43For instance, by April 2010, approximately 80 enterprise service APIs were listed on Pro-
grammableWeb.org offering functionality such as CRM or IT management. These Web services
are potentially available to be included in a value-added enterprise mashup.
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the approaches pursued by AppExchange and TEXO do not contradict the notion
of SVNs. As long as the registration is open for any service that meets the defined
minimum requirements, in particular with respect to appropriate interface specifi-
cations, proprietary standards are acceptable (cp. Definition 2.4).
2.3 Summary
In Chapter 2, the first research question of this thesis, dealing with economic fac-
tors that foster the emergence of service value networks and their definition, was
addressed in detail. In order to actually provide an answer to Research Question
1, some preliminary analyses were required. A thorough distinction of different
service types provided a definition for Web services as the kind of service that is
required in service value networks. In a further analysis, the Web services’ potential
to extend the long valley by a third dimension, namely composition depth, was dis-
cussed. Services in general, though so far neglected when promoting the long tail,
actually amplify this effect since customers will usually prefer a more specialized
service that closely meets their requirements over a one-size-fits-all service. This is
not necessarily the case in (leisure) products such as books, movies, or music.
While the former argument applies for any kind of service, specialization
through service composition is unique to Web services. Web services bring about
the possibility of automated on-demand composition to complex services and fea-
ture modularity as well as well-defined interfaces. Moreover, by their transmission
via a Web protocol, provisioning of business value can take place via a universally
accessible network. Automated on-demand composition through a universally ac-
cessible orchestration platform is the distinguishing factor for SVNs, as shown in a
comprehensive overview on related networked organization forms.
In order to back up the definition of SVNs, different examples were given, illus-
trating both already implemented forerunners of service value networks and current
research endeavors. Additionally, a formalization of SVNs according to their defini-
tion was presented in order to build the groundwork for the mechanism design that




I n the preceding chapter, the situation of co-opetition was introduced as a key fea-ture of service value networks. Certainly, there is an inherent non-cooperative
element to be found in SVNs due to substitutive service offerings from competing
service providers. However, service providers cannot solely act non-cooperatively:
as described in Section 2.2, complex services are delivered by more than one ven-
dor in the majority of cases. Service providers are required to cooperate with other
members in the SVN, that is, their services need to interoperate with complemen-
tary offerings in order to fulfil a customer’s request (cp. Section 2.2.3). A strictly
non-cooperative consideration of such interaction would countervail the ecosystem-
like character of SVNs. In this vein, solution concepts and ideals from both non-
cooperative and cooperative game theory have to be considered, thereby taking ac-
count of the networked environment at hand. These concepts shall be the basis for
the coordination mechanism and its evaluation presented in Parts II and III of this
thesis.
In Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, mechanism design as the basic applicable concept
from non-cooperative game theory is introduced. It follows the approach of deter-
mining which rules a non-cooperative game needs to exhibit in order to achieve a
certain preferred outcome. Design desiderata, that is, properties of such a preferred
outcome, are outlined in Section 3.1.3. While Section 3.1.4 states impossibilities and
variants of classic mechanism design, Section 3.1.5 bridges the gap between desir-
able economic properties and requirements yielded by computer science. However,
as explained above, cooperative games and network games play a crucial role in
SVNs. Section 3.2.1 gives an overview of value distribution approaches in cooper-
ative and network games. Network formation as an important aspect in SVNs is
discussed in Section 3.2.2. Section 3.2.3 continues with outlining desired properties
of solutions in cooperative and networked environments.
Note that the contents in this chapter are kept domain neutral whenever possi-
ble in order to retain its character as a primer on mechanism design and cooperative
game theory. That way, this chapter may also be useful to other domains that un-
derly similar networked economics.
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3.1 Mechanism Design
The discipline of mechanism design focuses on implementing a preferred system-
wide solution to a decentralized optimization problem where self-interested agents
act according to their private preferences for different outcomes [257]. The agents’
private information cannot be verified by some central institution such as a mar-
ket or platform operator that seeks to achieve certain objectives [169]. Therefore,
the goal pursued cannot be solved directly. One has to design a mechanism which
establishes a set of incentives, for instance, via side payments to effectively coor-
dinate participants and to eventually enforce the system-wide solution [245]. Such
side payments shall compensate the agents for potential individual disadvantages
that arise if the desired result occurs. In other words, the challenge of mechanism
design is to implement institutional rules which determine decisions as a function
of the information known by the individuals in the economy, thereby ensuring de-
sired events to occur even if participants act strategically in order to maximize their
individual utility [237].
Classic mechanism design originates from the seminal contributions provided
by Vickrey [325], Clarke [77], and Groves [140], that are namesake to the promi-
nent class of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms. Such VCG mechanisms
focus on enforcing truth-telling. In truthful mechanisms, all agents are incentivized
to reveal their true type as an equilibrium strategy (cp. also Definition 3.12). As
outlined later in this section, classic mechanism design in the narrow sense induces
truth-telling. Yet, as will be shown in Section 3.1.4, mechanism design in the broader
sense also values desiderata other than truthfulness.
3.1.1 Basic Concepts and Definitions
By modeling the interaction of individual agents and determining their strategy
spaces, mechanism design is a sub-field of game theory [257]. The latter can roughly
be circumscribed as the study of multi-person decision problems [132]. In order to
introduce the basic concepts of mechanism design, a primer on fundamentals of
game theory is provided in the following.
As stated above, game theory deals with decisions made in a system that in-
cludes a multitude of agents. Agents can be persons, organizations, or technical sys-
tems. Regardless of whether an agent is human or not, rationality is a basic assump-
tion: agents want to maximize their own profits. Each agent i ∈ I, I = {1, . . . ,n}, is
endowed with possibly different preferences for different outcomes of a game. The
game itself can be interpreted as a set of rules according to which agents can act
[292]. The type of an agent denotes its private information relating to its preferences
with respect to possible outcomes of the game [169].
Definition 3.1 [TYPE OF AN AGENT]. The type θi ∈Θi of an agent i ∈ I determines agent
i’s preferences for different outcomes η̃ ∈ H̃ of a game, where Θi denotes the set of possible
types and H̃ stands for the set of all potential outcomes. θ = (θ1, ...,θn) denotes the vector of
types of all n agents.
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Based on its type, an agent will make decisions on how to act in a game. This is
referred to as an agent’s strategy
Definition 3.2 [STRATEGY OF AN AGENT]. An agent’s strategy ωi(θi)∈Ωi is a decision
rule that defines an agent’s choice of action dependent on every possible state of the game,
where Ωi denotes the strategy space that is at agent i’s command.
Oftentimes, dependency upon an agent’s own type is sufficient. How-
ever, an agent’s strategy can additionally depend upon the strategies ω−i =
(ω1, ...,ωi−1,ωi+1, ...,ωn) of the other agents, or i’s belief of what the other agents’
strategies are, respectively. Using ωi, this dependency is intentionally left implicit
in the following. Let further ω = (ω1, ...,ωn) ∈ Ω = (Ω1, ...,Ωn) denote a strategy
profile played be the n agents at hand. If we now zoom out to the overall game
whose rules define the set of valid agents’ strategies and possible outcomes, we can
formulate an agent’s individually experienced utility as a function of the outcome of
the game which, in turn, results from the agent’s set of strategies and the strategies
played by all other agents.
Definition 3.3 [UTILITY FUNCTION]. The utility of an agent i for the outcome η̃ of a
game, which results from the agent’s type θi, its own selected strategy ωi, and the strate-
gies ω−i chosen by each of the n − 1 remaining agents other than agent i, is denoted by
ui : Θ× H̃→R with ui(θi, η̃) = ui(θi,ω1, ...,ωn).
Thus, a relation ui(θi, η̃) > ui(θi, η̃′) indicates that an agent i of type θi prefers
an outcome η̃ (which is generally triggered by the decision ωi made by i and the
strategies ω−i of the other agents) over a different outcome η̃′.
In the remainder of this thesis it is assumed that agents exhibit quasi-linear pref-
erences and, therefore, have a quasi-linear utility function. This is a common as-
sumption in game theory [215, 257, 296]. Applying quasi-linear preferences, an
agent’s utility transfers to a valuation where the set of outcomes can be reduced
to a set of discrete choices. In more detail, the utility can be decomposed into a val-
uation for the outcome η from a discrete choice set H measured in terms of money,
and into a (monetary) payment ti for each agent i ∈ I. These components are linearly
related.
Definition 3.4 [QUASI-LINEAR UTILITY]. Assuming a quasi-linear utility function of
an agent i and some side payment ti granted to i by the mechanism if ti > 0, or paid by i
to the mechanism if ti < 0, i’s utility can be split into its valuation for the outcome τi(θi,η)
and its payment ti such that ui(θi,η, ti) = τi(θi,η) + ti.
By referring to τi(θi,η)+ ti, it is implicitly assumed that agent i is risk neutral and
that the slope of i’s value-for-money curve is not only linear, but also normalized to 1,
denoting that i’s utility for different choices can be directly expressed in monetary
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units, for instance, Euros [296]. Furthermore, this configuration is assumed to be
identical for every i ∈ I, which implies that agents exhibit transferable utilities.1
3.1.2 The Social Choice Function and its Implementation
A mechanism operator finds itself in a situation where participants act opportunisti-
cally and hold private information on their types which cannot be extracted directly.
Therefore, the mechanism operator does not only have to define its very goal, but
also needs to specify the framework, i.e. the rules, of the game at hand.
In a first step, the system-wide goal is defined via a social choice function. It is
to select a desired outcome (or choice in a quasi-linear setting), given the types θ
of all n considered agents, that meets the (howsoever selected) favored properties
reflecting the ideal of the mechanism operator [257].
Definition 3.5 [SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTION]. Given the agents types θ = (θ1, ...,θn) ∈
Θ = (Θ1 × ...×Θ1), a social choice function f : Θ1 × ...× Θn → H chooses the system-
wide preferred goal f (θ) ∈H.
In a second step, certain rules of the game at hand need to be defined. Such
rules are called the mechanism and determine the outcome of the game given the
strategies of the agents. In more detail, the mechanism is an outcome rule which
is composed of an allocation or choice function o : Ω → H and a transfer or payment
function t : Ω → Rn. The allocation rule defines the distribution over choices given
the agents’ strategies while the transfer rule determines the (monetary) payments
made to or by the agents. Note that the mechanism can only be decomposed into
allocation and transfer rule if we assume quasi-linear preferences.
Definition 3.6 [(QUASI-LINEAR) MECHANISM]. A (quasi-linear) mechanism
M = (Ω1, ...,Ωn,m(ω)) is defined by an outcome rule m(ω) which is split into an
allocation function o : Ω1 × ...×Ωn →H that maps agents’ strategies to a choice η, and a
transfer function ti : Ω1 × ...× Ωn → R with t(ω) = (t1(ω), ..., tn(ω)) that determines
the payment made or received by all agents i ∈ I.
Direct-revelation mechanisms are a special, easy-to-handle form of mechanisms,
in which agents directly claim their preferences as a strategy. That is, the strategy
of an agent is to declare a type θ̃i = ωi(θi), either truthful or not, based on its actual
private preferences θi [257, 199].
Definition 3.7 [DIRECT-REVELATION MECHANISM]. A direct-revelation mechanism
M = (Ω1, ...,Ωn,m(ω)) restricts the possible set of strategies to Ωi = Θi for each agent
1At full length, the definition of the payment is made via an agent-specific function, i.e. ui(θi,η, ti) =
τi(θi,η) + g̃i(ti). The curvature of g̃i gives the risk attitude of i, which specifies the value-for-money
coherency. In general, g̃i can be defined as an individual function for each agent. The simplifications
made in this thesis are a common and reasonable assumption in game theory, especially when the
amounts of money exchanged are moderate [257, 296].
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Auctions are a typical example for mechanisms: in an auction setting agent i’s
strategy space could be the possible bids that can be submitted according to the rules
of the auction. An outcome rule would specify the receiver of the auctioned object
and payments to be made by the bidders as a function of the submitted bids [169]. In
case of non-iterative auctions, agents are asked to state their types as strategies – this
is the definition for a direct-revelation mechanism. However, this is not always the
case as, for instance, in English auctions, where open bids are repeatedly submitted
to the auctioneer. Thus, the agents’ strategies are more complicated, as they are a
function of the agents’ private preferences.
In a third and last step, mechanism design brings together the defined system-
wide goal (cp. Definition 3.5) and the allocation as well as the transfer function of
the mechanism. A mechanism M is said to implement the social choice function
f (θ), if the outcome η∗ ∈H of the game as a result of equilibrium agent strategies is
a solution to the social choice function for all θ ∈ Θ [257].
Definition 3.8 [MECHANISM IMPLEMENTATION]. A mechanism M =
(Ω1, ...,Ωn,m(·)) implements a social choice function f (θ), if m(ω∗1(θ1), ...,ω∗n(θn)) =
f (θ), where ω∗ = (ω∗1 , ...,ω
∗
n) ∈ Ω1 × ... × Ωn is an equilibrium solution to the game
(induced by M).
The underlying equilibrium concept can be variable, for instance, a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium or a dominant-strategy equilibrium. The Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium is a reasonable concept in the context of mechanism design as it assumes a
common prior about the agents’ type distribution. Therefore, the equilibrium strat-
egy of an agent is a best response to the distribution over the strategies of the other
agents [257]. Dominant-strategy equilibria are a very strong solution concept since
every agent has to have a clearly defined strategy no matter what the other agents
do. Yet, the strict properties required by dominant strategies limit the set of situ-
ations where they actually exist [168]. For a detailed definition and discussion of
these and more solution concepts, the interested reader is pointed to Mas-Colell
et al. [215].
3.1.3 Classic Mechanism Design Objectives
After having defined the elementary modules of mechanism design, the properties
of a mechanism as classically consulted in mechanism design can be outlined. Per
se, mechanisms themselves do not expose these properties. However, a mechanism
has a certain property if it implements a social choice function with this property
[257]. Economic requirements, or oftentimes called ecomomic desiderata of a mech-
anism, are introduced in the following Definitions 3.9 to 3.11 based on Mas-Colell
et al. [215] and Parkes [257].
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Definition 3.9 [ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY]. A mechanism is allocatively efficient if its
social choice function always selects a choice η∗ = g(θ) ∈ H such that there is no other






Put differently, g(θ) is allocatively efficient if η∗ maximizes the total valuation
over all agents. Therefore, allocative efficiency is also called welfare maximization.
In this connection, it is important to note that τi(·) stands for the true valuation,
not for the agents’ declared valuations. As quasi-linear preferences are assumed,
it is sufficient to sum up the valuations instead of the utilities since valuations for
different η ∈ H can be traded off against transfers. Including the mechanism oper-
ator as a further agent that values money linearly and is indifferent between the
mechanism’s choices, it can be shown for quasi-linear settings that any efficient
outcome must allocate the same choice, however, may differ in how the transfers
t(·) = (t1(·), ..., tn(·)) are distributed [296].
Allocative efficiency as a design goal is not always desirable, e.g. if the objective
is to maximize the auctioneer’s revenue. In this case, the mechanism design prob-
lem is reformulated as an optimization problem which maximizes the utility of a
particular agent [235, 257, 91].
Definition 3.10 [BUDGET BALANCE]. A mechanism is budget balanced if no outside pay-
ments are required to realize the outcome rule. In addition, the net transfers between the




Thus, budget balance denotes a situation in which the amount of money avail-
able in the system is redistributed, yet remains unchanged after the outcome has
been determined. If net transfers can be made from agents to the mechanism (but
not the other way round), we refer to weak budget balance.2
Definition 3.11 [INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY]. A mechanism is individually rational
if it implements a social choice function that makes sure that agents are not worse-off by
participating than by waiving participation:
(3.3) ui( f (θi,θ−i)) ≥ u′i(θi)∀i ∈ I,θi ∈ Θi
where u′i(θi) denotes agent i’s outside option, that is, its utility in case of non-participation
in M.
For simplification, the utility u′i(θi) of an agent’s outside option is oftentimes
assumed to be zero. In this case, individual rationality denotes that the agents do
2One can also distinguish ex ante and ex post budget balance. In case of ex ante budget balance, the
net transfers to M are balanced in expectation for a distribution over agent preferences.
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not suffer any loss by participating. Therefore, this property is also called voluntary
participation. Ex interim individual rationality replaces the agents’ (absolute) utilities
by their expected utilities Ẽ(ui(·)), which means that agents exhibit some common
prior about the distribution of agents’ types.
As mentioned in the introduction to Section 3.1, a central element of classic mech-
anism design in the narrow sense is the question of how to incentivize agents to reveal
their private preferences (i.e. types) truthfully. If agents shall be prevented from
concealing their true type, a mechanism needs to be compatible to the incentives of
the agents [165]. Such incentive compatibility is said to be the key to overcome self-
ish behavior. Obviously, incentive compatibility is a concept for direct-revelation
mechanisms. Rational agents will only choose the strategy of reporting their type
truthfully to the mechanism if and only if their own utility is maximized in doing
so.
Definition 3.12 [INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY]. A mechanism is incentive compat-
ible if it is a direct-revelation mechanism in which the equilibrium strategies ω∗ =
(ω∗1(θ1), ...,ω
∗
n(θn)) reveal the agents’ true private types, i.e. ω∗i (θi) = θi for all i ∈ I.
As stated in Section 3.1.2, incentive compatibility can be considered at different
levels of equilibria. If truth revelation is a dominant strategy, agents want to reveal
their true type no matter which strategies are played by other participants.
Definition 3.13 [STRATEGY-PROOF MECHANISM (INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY IN
DOMINANT STRATEGIES)]. A mechanism is strategy-proof if it is a direct-revelation
mechanism in which truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all agents i ∈ I. There is one
dominant strategy ω∗i for all θi ∈Θi and for any ω−i, such that the following equation holds
for all other possible strategies ωi ∈ Ωi \ {ω∗i } available to agent i, ω∗i (θ) 6= ωi(θ)
(3.4) ui(ω∗i (θ),ω−i(θ),θi) ≥ ui(ωi(θ),ω−i(θ),θi)
Such incentive compatibility in dominant strategies is also a desirable property of
a mechanism in terms of its complexity. Agents do not have to reason about other
agents’ strategies since every agent decides to reveal its true induced by its own
self-interest regardless of ω∗−i [257]. Therefore, the agents’ strategy spaces are con-
siderably simplified. However, incentive compatibility can also be defined in other
equilibrium concepts such as Bayesian-Nash where agents exhibit a common prior
belief about the other agents’ distribution of types.
Definition 3.14 [BAYESIAN-NASH INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY]. A mechanism is
Bayesian-Nash incentive compatible if it is a direct-revelation mechanism in which truth-
ful revelation of private types is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy for all agents i ∈ I.
A strategy profile ω∗i (θi) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy if for all i ∈ I, θi ∈ Θi,
ω∗i (θi) 6= ωi(θi):
(3.5) Ẽ (ui(ω∗i (θi),ω−i(θ),θi)) ≥ Ẽ (ui(ωi(θi),ω−i(θ),θi))
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with Ẽ(ui(·)) denoting the expected utility over the distribution of agents’ types.
In other words, in an Bayesian-Nash incentive compatible mechanism, revealing
its preferences truthfully maximizes every agent’s expected utility in equilibrium
(with every other agent) [257].
3.1.4 Impossibilities & Non-Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms
The mechanism properties stated in Definitions 3.9 to 3.14 are partially interdepen-
dent and conflicting. Microeconomic literature offers a multitude of strong theoretic
results showing that it is impossible to achieve certain combinations of economic
design desiderata. Certainly, the Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem [239]
belongs to the most frequently cited ones.
Theorem 3.1 [MYERSON-SATTERTHWAITE IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM]. No bilateral
Bayesian-Nash incentive compatible mechanism can achieve allocative efficiency, weak bud-
get balance and ex interim individual rationality at the same time, even if agents’ utilities
are quasi-linear.
Theorem 3.1 implies that, given quasi-linear preferences of the agents, it is only
possible to implement (any) two out of the three desiderata allocative efficiency,
(weak) budget balance, and (interim) individual rationality regardless of Bayesian-
Nash incentive compatibility is fulfilled or not.3
In this connection, Mas-Colell et al. [215] and Parkes et al. [260] state that budget
balance and individual rationality are compulsory characteristics of a mechanism
to enable sustainability over time, and thus, actually make it implementable. On
the one hand, agents are not willing to voluntarily participate in a mechanism in
which they expect to incur losses. On the other hand, a mechanism operator cannot
continuously plough money into the mechanism.
Classic mechanism design is reflected in Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms.
VCG mechanisms are direct-revelation mechanisms that are individually rational,
allocatively efficient, and strategy-proof. However, VCG mechanisms are prone to
cause considerable overpayments that must be subsidized by the mechanism in or-
der to retain individual rationality. In other words, VCG mechanisms are not budget
balanced, which brings about severe issues as to the mechanism’s practical applica-
tion, implicating a constant financial burden for the mechanism operator. Originat-
ing from the class of VCG mechanisms, classic mechanism design, or mechanism
design in the narrow sense is closely connected to incentive compatibility.
Classic mechanism design also seeks for efficient outcomes, therefore requiring
that agents reveal their private information truthfully. It is possible to construct inef-
ficient, but incentive compatible mechanisms [235]. However, allocatively efficiency
inherently requires incentive compatibility [260].
3According to the revelation principle, truthfulness comes “for free” and does not have an influence
on the impossibility of simultaneously achieving allocative efficiency, budget balance, and individ-
ual rationality.
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Another fact speaking for incentive compatible mechanisms is, from a designer’s
perspective, to be found in terms of the desired result. Designing a mechanism,
one is to choose the set of possible strategies and the allocation and transfer func-
tion in a way that the agents’ behavior, though self-interested, is predictable for the
mechanism operator. An incentive compatible direct-revelation mechanism M im-
plements the social choice function f (θ) = m(θ). Thus, in an incentive compatible
mechanism, the outcome rule equals the preferred system-wide solution, which dis-
cernably facilitates predictability [257].
However, as Parkes et al. [260] argue, second-best mechanism design or non-
incentive compatible mechanism design as a mechanism design approach in the broader
sense can actually be useful, although truthful bidding is not an equilibrium strategy
for agents and thereby, allocative efficiency is also sacrificed. Certainly, mechanism
design in the narrow meaning does not allow for, or – formulated more precisely –
does not require such a variation. In theory, non-incentive compatible mechanisms
can be subsumed under the class of incentive compatible ones. According to the
revelation principle, any social choice function realized (in equilibrium) with a non-
incentive compatible mechanism can be transformed into an equivalent incentive
compatible mechanism where any agent directly “plays” its true type as its action
[131, 234, 236]. However, and this is the crux, computational assumptions of the rev-
elation principle are not realistic. First, it assumes that agents in the non-incentive
compatible mechanism are capable of computing any of their equilibrium strategies.
This is an implicit worst-case assumption of mechanism design on agents’ strategic
abilities, which implies that agents can always compute and exploit all opportunities
for manipulation present in the considered mechanism. Second, for the submission
of agents’ strategies and the computation of the outcome by the mechanism opera-
tor, the revelation principle postulates unlimited computational resources [205, 258].
Yet, in selected applications and from an economic standpoint, it might not be
the ultimate goal to achieve a truthful revelation of the agents’ types “at any cost”.
Sacrificing incentive compatibility in favor of other properties can be reasonable
in order to obtain a “good (enough)” result. Even if incentive compatibility is not
given, the agents’ behavior can still be predictable in a sense that the social choice is
met in a broader sense. On the other hand, if incentive compatibility is to be enforced,
inefficient solutions might be the result – and such inefficiency can be enormous as
incentive compatible and budget balanced as well as individually rational mecha-
nism implementations give proof of (cp. e.g. [217, 25]). Yet, it is possible to achieve
less inefficient allocations without insisting on truthful information revelation [260].
Generally speaking, the design of a mechanism obviously depends on the over-
all goal pursued featuring an inherent trade-off between design desiderata. There-
fore, not every mechanism design approach ultimately longs for achieving incen-
tive compatibility. For instance, Parkes et al. [260] seek to implement budget bal-
ance and individual rationality in a combinatorial auction setting by sacrificing in-
centive compatibility (and therefore allocative efficiency) to different degrees. Blau
[45] proposes a VCG-based mechanism to allocate multidimensional service offers,
however, counteracts the overpayments by introducing an extension that sacrifices
incentive compatibility in favor of budget balance.
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3.1.5 Computational Mechanism Design
The origin of algorithmic or computational mechanism design is that classic mechanism
design largely ignores the complexity of solving optimization problems. Pioneered
by Nisan and Ronen [244], this notion has considerably changed by bringing to-
gether mechanism design and algorithmic issues, incorporating computational fea-
sibility.
Classic mechanism design implicitly follows two major assumptions. On the one
hand, agents are able to compute and to communicate their complete preferences.
On the other hand, the mechanism itself has the capacity to compute the correct
outcome, taking into account the complete and relevant information within the sys-
tem. One can distinguish several sources of complexity, however, with respect to
quasi-linear mechanisms, the determination of the allocation rule o(·) and the trans-
fer function t(·) is usually referred to as the weightiest criterion [245, 257]. Such
complexity might clash with the practical application of mechanisms if resources
for computation are limited.
Theoretical computer science yields well-established concepts to measure com-
plexity by basically differentiating between algorithms that belong to the class P,
which can be computed in polynomial time, and algorithms that are assigned to the
class NP, which are subject to exponential complexity. These complexity considera-
tions can be transferred to mechanism design as stated in the following definitions
[245].
Definition 3.15 [POLYNOMIAL MECHANISM]. A mechanism is polynomial if its out-
come rule m (o(·), t(·)) can be computed in polynomial time.
Definition 3.16 [NP-COMPLETE MECHANISM]. A mechanism is said to be NP-complete
if at least one element of its outcome rule m(·) exhibits exponential complexity.
In real-word scenarios, computational tractability can be a desirable property, es-
pecially if the mechanism’s outcome rule needs to be determined at runtime [296].
Definition 3.17 [COMPUTATIONAL TRACTABILITY]. A quasi-linear mechanism is com-
putationally tractable if both o(·) and t(·) can be computed in polynomial time for all ω ∈Ω.
The tension between computational tractability and desirable game-theoretic
properties can be tackled differently. On the one hand, and analogue to the approach
of non-incentive-compatible mechanism design, by approximating o(·) and/or t(·),
the mechanisms’ tractability can often be restored at the price of breaking incen-
tive compatibility and therefore allocative efficiency [260]. That is, computational
mechanism design sacrifices economically efficient outcomes in order to guarantee
computational efficiency. On the other hand, alternatives to approximation are the
identification of polynomial special cases of the generally NP-complete problem, or
a deflection from centralized mechanisms to a distributed computation. The latter
requires a decentralized computation of a mechanism’s outcome where the mech-
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anism is no longer a distinct entity but rather spread over the agents [119]. This
approach suits decentralized applications such as peer-to-peer or grid computing
scenarios [91].
Computational mechanism design has been applied in a multitude of scenar-
ios. The following list of scholars is just a rough overview of the huge body of
work available. One of the most prominent applications of computational mecha-
nism design are routing problems. Feigenbaum et al. [119], Archer et al. [13] con-
sider cost-sharing algorithms for multicast transmission4 consulting approximation
techniques and distributed computing. Another NP-complete problem that has re-
cently been reviewed via distributed computation and specialization to polynomial
cases is interdomain routing, that is, routing of traffic between Internet domains
[295, 118, 120, 345]. Moreover, grid computing scenarios offer a vast application area
for distributed computing as shown, for instance, by Stösser [306], who presents a
heuristic scheduling algorithm to restore computational tractability in grid settings
by sacrificing incentive compatibility to a certain extent. However, not only Internet
applications trigger algorithmic mechanism design endeavors. Generally, several
scholars examine approximate truthful mechanisms for the (intractable) class of combi-
natorial auctions [206, 232, 204].
3.2 Cooperation & Network Design
As introduced in Section 3.1, mechanism design follows the approach of determin-
ing which rules a non-cooperative game needs to exhibit in order to achieve a cer-
tain system-wide preferred outcome, i.e. a cooperative solution [160]. While non-
cooperative game theory has to deal with opportunistic agents that act according to
their self-interest, cooperative game theory studies the interaction among coalitions
of agents5 and implies the possibility to exogenously enforce commitments between
them. The latter requires communication between agents. Such communication can
be either direct among the agents or indirect via a third party to which the agents
can commit themselves. Cooperative game theory yields several solution concepts
for coalition games that are concerned with the question of how to distribute a given
set of “coalition payoffs” to each of the contributing agents [289].
The term “coalition” is misleading in a sense that it does not mean that each
agent is agreeable and follows any kind of instruction [296]. Still, agents are selfish,
however, can only reach certain goals as a team. Therefore, the basic modeling unit
are groups of agents rather than individuals. Transferred to SVNs, it becomes ob-
vious that the provisioning of a complex service requires a joint effort (cp. Section
2.2). Thus, cooperative game theory should certainly be considered as a means to
include both individual and group incentives in the course of value creation [177].
Yet, cooperative game theory originally considers coalition structures, that is,
assumes that each of the agents can team up with any other agent or coalition of
4Multicast routing denotes an Internet packet transmission that addresses and delivers the same
packet to multiple destinations [93, 121].
5Cooperative game theory literature speaks of “players” rather than “agents”. In order to retain
consistency to Section 3.1, the term agent will be used further on in line with scholars that highlight
cooperative game theory from a computer science perspective [177, 296].
54 CHAPTER 3. ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS
agents. However, many real-world applications make it necessary to not only focus
on the identities of the agents, but also on how they are connected to each other.
This gap was bridged by Myerson [233] who transferred cooperative game theory
to network games, considering distinct linkages between agents. Since then, different
lines of research have been scrutinized to analyze network games, for instance, with
respect to network formation or value distribution (cp. e.g. [175, 170, 135, 173]).
This section continues with a discussion of solution concepts as put forth by
cooperative game theory and network games. Section 3.2.2 will give a brief intro-
duction to network formation. Finally, desirable properties of solution concepts in
cooperative game theory and networks games are outlined in Section 3.2.3.
3.2.1 Value Distribution in Cooperation and Network Games
Solution concepts in cooperative game theory are concerned with finding ways to
divide jointly created value among single agents [296]. Generally, such solution
concepts can take two fundamentally different approaches considering their type.
On the one hand, set-valued cooperative solution concepts such as the core [133] or
stable sets [241] assign a set of possible payoffs to agents (cp. Section 3.2.1.2). On
the other hand, single-valued solutions award a unique payoff to each agent.
3.2.1.1 The Representation of Cooperative Games
In order to discuss above-named solution concepts, a representation form of the
game shall be introduced. Let again I = {1, ...,n} be the set of n agents. LetK denote
the set of coalitions of agents in I such that K = {K | K ⊆ I}, |K|= P(I). At bottom,
cooperative game theory seeks to figure out to which extent a coalition K can reach
a jointly pursued goal without the contribution of the other agents in I that are not
a member of K [299]. To this end, for each coalition K ∈ K, a characteristic function
χ̃(K) ∈ R can be determined which maps a coalition of agents into real numbers
as initially introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern [241], thereby describing
the coalition’s value. X̃ shall denote the set of all generally possible characteristic
functions.
In this thesis, the discussion is restricted to games with transferrable utility.
Transferable utility denotes the assumption of an existing medium of exchange (e.g.
money) that can be transferred freely between the agents [149]. This assumption co-
incides with the transfer across agents in quasi-linear utility functions as used in
non-cooperative game theory (cp. Definition 3.4). Assuming transferable utility,
the characteristic function describes the characteristic function form of a game if
χ̃(∅) = 0 and superadditivity of the characteristic function are fulfilled.
Definition 3.18 [SUPERADDITIVITY]. A characteristic function is superadditive if the
value of the set union of two disjunct subsets of I is never less than the sum of the values of
these subsets. For all K, T ⊆ I
(3.6) χ̃(K ∪ T) ≥ χ̃(K) + χ̃(T), if K ∩ T 6= ∅
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Building on Definition 3.18, characteristic functions can be defined as follows
[279]:
Definition 3.19 [CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION]. A characteristic function χ̃ : K → R
maps any subset K ⊆ I to a real number χ̃(K) which represents the worth of the coalition
K in terms of how much value or utility the members of this coalition can divide among
themselves. χ̃ must be defined on all subsets of I, requiring χ̃(∅) = 0 and superadditivity.
In the words of Shubik [298], the characteristic function expresses the worth of
joint coordinated action of the agents within a coalition. Based on Definition 3.19, a coop-
erative game can be defined as a pair (I, χ̃) [334, 296].
Definition 3.20 [COOPERATIVE GAME]. A cooperative game, or a game in coalitional
form, is a pair (I, χ̃) in which I = {1, . . . ,n} defines a finite set of agents and χ̃ : P(I)→R
associates a payoff to each coalition K ⊆ I.
3.2.1.2 Set-Valued Solution Concepts
In this section, the core and the stable sets as the most prominent set-valued coop-
erative solution concepts are briefly introduced. Generally, the concepts assume
that the grand coalition, that is, the coalition including all agents in I, always cre-
ates the highest worth. For set-valued concepts, non-dominated payoff vectors
x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈Rn are of major importance. In more detail, a payoff vector x dom-
inates the payoff vector x′ via K (short: x dom x′ via K) if xi ≥ x′i for all i ∈ K and if
there is at least one i ∈ K with xi > x′i and ∑i∈K xi ≤ χ̃(K).
The core C(I, χ̃) can be interpreted as a solution that provides stable outcomes
if unrestricted coalitional interaction is assumed. In other words, the core assigns
a set of payoff vectors for the grand coalition that is not dominated by any other
coalition.
Definition 3.21 [CORE]. A payoff vector x is part of the core if and only if there is no
coalition K such that x′ dom x via K.
The core can both be ambiguous if more than one or several payoff vectors fulfil
Definition 3.21 and empty if every payoff vector in the game is dominated [289].
Example 3.1 [THE THREE-AGENT MAJORITY GAME]. Consider a game with
I = (1,2,3) where a majority of two agents suffices to decide upon how a certain amount of
money is divided among the three agents. So, χ̃(K) = 1 if |K| ≥ 2 and χ̃(K) = 0 if |K|< 2.
Obviously, C(I, χ̃) = ∅, since the game exhibits cyclic majorities: the vector x = ( 13 , 13 , 13) is,
for instance, dominated by x′ = (12 ,0,
1
2) for agents 1 and 3. In turn, x
′′ = (0, 13 ,
2
3) would be
preferred by agents 2 and 3. To close the cycle, agent 1 and 2 could now block x′′ by opting
for x′′′ = (12 ,
1
2 ,0), and so on.
The stable sets soften the idea of the core by suggesting “reasonable” allocations
of the worth held by the grand coalition [334]. There must not be any payoff vec-
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tor within the stable set that is dominated by another vector within the set (internal
stability). In addition, all payoff vectors outside of the stable set are to be at least
dominated by one vector from within the set (external stability). This means, how-
ever, that for a solution to exist, there can still be vectors found within the stable set
which are dominated by a vector outside the set.
Definition 3.22 [STABLE SETS]. The stable set S(I, χ̃) includes payoff vectors x that are
both (i) internally stable, that is there is no coalition K such that ∃x′ ∈ S : x′ dom x via K,
and (ii) externally stable, that is, for all x′′ /∈ S there is a coalition K such that ∃x ∈ S :
x dom x′′ via K.
Example 3.2 [THE THREE-AGENT MAJORITY GAME (CONT.)]. Again consider the
game introduced in Example 3.1. In contrast to the core, the stable set is non-empty, yield-
ing S(I, χ̃) = {(12 , 12 ,0), (0, 12 , 12), (12 ,0, 12)}. None of these vectors is dominated by another
vector within S . That is, the set is internally stable. Furthermore, any vector x′ /∈ S must
exhibit two out of the three vector components smaller than 12 if one component is larger than
1
2 , due to χ̃. In this case, two out of the three agents would always prefer one of the vectors
x ∈ S over x′. Therefore, S is also externally stable.
The stable set solution concept makes allowances to accept solution vectors that
are “less instable” than others – at the price of usually having more than one, often-
times an infinite number of feasible payoff vectors [160]. But still, the stable set can
also be empty as shown by Lucas [211].
3.2.1.3 Single-Valued Solution Concepts
Set-valued solution concepts actually do capture the complexity of a cooperative
game, however, they are not well determined due to their ambiguity and the possi-
bility of them being empty. This issue is tackled by single-valued cooperative solu-
tion concepts that grant a single, unambiguous award to each agent.
The Shapley value
In analogy to set-valued solution concepts, the Shapley value [292] assumes that the
set of all agents I, that is, the grand coalition is to create the highest value. However,
the Shapley value dramatically differs from the above-mentioned approaches by
always providing a unique solution which is based on the average marginal contri-
bution an agent yields to each coalition K⊆ I [292, 280]. In other words, the Shapley
value can be formulated as a unique function of the agents I and a given character-
istic function χ̃. Hence, the Shapley value can be interpreted as the average power
or significance of an agent i ∈ I relative to I.
Definition 3.23 [SHAPLEY VALUE]. The Shapley value assigns a unique set of payoffs
ΦSV : K × X → Rn to be distributed to the agents i ∈ I. Agent i’s Shapley value φSV(χ̃)
is based on its marginal contribution to each coalition it is a member of. Referring to a
single coalition K ⊆ I, the marginal contribution of an agent i ∈ I is the change of value
χ̃(K) − χ̃(K \ {i}) that occurs if i leaves K. In order to single out a random coalition K
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containing i, the marginal contribution is weighted by the probability of K to form assuming
that all n! orders of agents are equally likely. Extended to all coalitions i is a member of, the
Shapley value evolves as
(3.7) φSVi (χ̃) = ∑
K⊆I|i∈K
(
(|K| − 1)! · (n− |K|)!
n!
)







is the payment vector assigned to all n agents in I.
The term of Equation (3.7) that refers to the worth is intuitively clear: whenever
an agent is pivotal to a certain coalition, it accounts for an increase in value. There-
fore, its Shapley value rises, weighted by the combinatoric part of Equation (3.7),
which always refers to the set I of all agents. It can be understood as the (|K| − 1)!
different possible orders of agents that were already present when i enters the coali-
tion and the remaining (n− |K|) orders of agents that will follow. In total, referring
to K, there are (|K| − 1)! · (n− |K|)! different permutations in which the set of agents
K \ {i} precede and the set of agents I \ K antecede agent i. This interpretation of
the combinatorics of the Shapley value is not meant to be a literal model for coali-
tion formation, however, it is useful to understand the idea and computation of the
solution [279]. The combinatorics rather denote the average marginal contribution
of agent i, singling out different orders of agents [296], that is, they “place all of the
agents on the same footing” [341]. The following example adapted from Myerson
[233] illustrates how the Shapley value is assembled.
Example 3.3 [COMPUTATION OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE]. Consider a game I = (1,2,3)
with χ̃(K) = 0 for all single-agent coalitions, χ̃({1,3}) = χ̃({2,3}) = 3, and χ̃({1,2}) =
χ̃({1,2,3}) = 6. n = 3 agents account for 6 permutations of I to be considered. For a small
set of agents, the Shapley value can be calculated intuitively without fully referring to Equa-
tion (3.7) as shown in Table 3.1 [160]. The table elements denote the marginal contribution
χ̃(K)− χ̃(K \ {i}) added by the agents i ∈ {1,2,3} if the permutation indicated in the first









sum of the marginal values agent i accounts for divided by the total of permutations.
Table 3.1: Computation of the Shapley value
Possible permutations i = 1 i = 2 i = 3
(1,2,3) 0 6 0
(1,3,2) 0 3 3
(2,1,3) 6 0 0
(2,3,1) 3 0 3
(3,1,2) 3 3 0
(3,2,1) 3 3 0








In addition to the solution presented in Table 3.1, φSVi is exemplarily computed for agent
i = 1 according to Equation (3.7). Agent 1 can be member of the coalitions {1}, {1,2},
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(0− 0) + 1! · 1!
3!
(6− 0) + 1! · 1!
3!
(3− 0) + 2! · 1!
3!
(6− 3) = 5
2
Computations for agents 2 and 3 can be conducted analogously.
The Shapley value is not only a single-point valued solution, but also a normative
approach. That is, the value is set up axiomatically with the following four axioms to
be fulfilled: symmetry, efficiency, additivity, and the dummy axiom [149, 279, 289].
Symmetry denotes equal treatment of substitutive agents, efficiency refers to the
distribution of the full yield of the game, additivity states that values for agents ag-
gregate if two independent games are summed up, and finally, the dummy axiom
requires that agents which do not add any worth to any coalition receive a zero pay-
ment. The axioms proposed by Shapley [292] can be interpreted as fairness axioms
[340, 149, 74, 334, 289]. In Section 3.2.3, these axioms will be discussed in depth.
Theorem 3.2 [AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE]. A
unique value exists that satisfies the axioms symmetry, efficiency, additivity, and the dummy
player axiom – it is the Shapley value.
Example 3.4 [THE THREE-AGENT MAJORITY GAME (CONT.)]. Once more, referring
to Example 3.1, due to the chosen characteristic functions, the agents are fully symmetric.
That is, they must be treated equally by the Shapley value. Therefore, φSVi =
1
3 , i ∈ {1,2,3},
can be trivially derived from the axioms that characterize ΦSV .
The solution derived in Example 3.4 is not part of the core (cp. Example 3.1). The
Shapley value sacrifices the stability property of the core for its universal applicabil-
ity. It always yields a fair and unique result while the core can be both empty and
ambiguous [296]. As Hart [149] points out, the Shapley value is an a priori measure
evaluating a game before it is actually played. Unlike the set-valued cooperative so-
lution concepts defined earlier, the Shapley value does not need to provide a stable
result in a sense of the core or the stable sets require it and may be interpreted as the
expectation or average of the set-valued solutions [278].
Variations of the Shapley value
Ever since Shapley’s seminal contribution to cooperative game theory, his value has
constantly been varied on. Follow-ups to Shapley [292] that are important in respect
of this thesis will be sketched very briefly in the follwing.
A useful and intuitive variation is the weighted Shapley value that was actually
introduced by Shapley [291], and later built upon by several other scholars (cp. e.g.
[253, 185, 75, 247]). The weighted Shapley value allows for assessing agents in con-
trast to generally treat them equally. Its simple but handy assumption is that sym-
metry as required in Theorem 3.2 is not always desirable, for instance, if the agents’
sizes significantly differ, or if some agents dedicate much more effort in the coalition
than others which cannot be expressed via the characteristic function. The weighted
Shapley will be revisited in Section 8.2.2.
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The Shapley value has also been studied in large games where negligibility of
single individuals can be assumed as for example the case in competitive economics
or voting scenarios. Such games are called non-atomic and were firstly connected to
the Shapley value by Aumann and Shapley [17]. More recently, the Shapley value
has been connected to non-cooperative game theory. Among others, Gul [141], Win-
ter [333], Hart and Mas-Colell [151], Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [266] have im-
plemented bargaining procedures that exhibit the Shapley value as non-cooperative
equilibrium outcome.
Finally, two classic fields of applications have led to slight adaptions of the Shap-
ley value. On the one hand, the Shapley value can be applied to simple (voting)
games by restricting the characteristic function to the values 0 (denoting a “los-
ing coalition”) and 1 (denoting a “winning coalition”). This solution is known as
Shapley-Shubik index [293] (and was implicitly applied in Example 3.4). It can be
interpreted as an agent’s probability of being a pivotal agent that makes a losing
coalition a winning one and vice versa. On the other hand, if the characteristic func-
tion is interpreted as a total cost function, the Shapley value and its axioms can
easily be transformed such that joint costs can be allocated in a fair manner [298].
Cost allocation via Shapley-style payments has been applied in several domains, as
for example in telecommunication billing [42], airport fees [208, 209], and multicast
routing [119, 230] in general (cp. also Section 4.3), or in more specialized applica-
tions such as wireless ad hoc routing [61].
Other single-valued solution concepts
Besides the Shapley value, other single-valued indices have been introduced in
academia. Although focussing on simple voting games akin to the Shapley-Shubik
index as introduced in the paragraph above, their fundamental ideas can also be
transferred to more complex characteristic functions and are, therefore, worth being
discussed. As such, the Banzhaf-Penrose index [261, 24] and the Deegan-Packel in-
dex [92] are analyzed. Just like the Shapley-Shubik index, these indices must tackle
the issue of assigning value to “a priori coalitions” and their members [161].
The Banzhaf-Penrose index is clearly focused on political and voting power; the
number of “swings”, each of them denoting that an agent has the power to make
a winning coalition a losing one when leaving it, is a central concept of the index.
Other than the Shapley value, the Banzhaf-Penrose index merely considers coali-
tions instead of permutations [160].
Definition 3.24 [BANZHAF-PENROSE INDEX]. The (normalized) Banzhaf-Penrose in-
dex φBPi of an agent i ∈ I sets the number of swings accounted for by i in proportion to the
total number of swings in the game.
(3.8) φBPi (χ̃) =
Number of swings of i ∀ K ∈ K
∑j∈I Number of swings of j ∀ K ∈ K
The Deegan-Packel index is also closely connected to political applications, how-
ever, only accounts for minimal winning coalitions, that is, each and every agent
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that is a member of such a minimal winning coalition must have the power to
make it a losing one when opting out. A minimal winning coalition is defined as
Kmin = {K|χ̃(K) = 1 and χ̃(T) = 0 ∀ T ⊂ K, K ∈ K}.
Definition 3.25 [DEEGAN-PACKEL INDEX]. The Deegan-Packel index φDPi of an agent
i ∈ I only accounts for coalitions in which agent i and any other member are pivotal in
terms of making a winning coalition worthless. Each of such a minimum winning coalition
is included with the same weight.





3.2.1.4 Adapting Cooperative Game Theory to Network Games
As introduced in Sections 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.3, a basic assumption in a coalition is that
any agent i ∈ I is able to cooperate with any other agent j ∈ I. In connection with
the grand coalition always providing the highest worth, the act of cooperation is
assumed to be totally successful [289]. This does not hold true, though, for networks
where due to functional or strategic restrictions, links between agents are of prime
importance. So, the value that is generated by a set of agents does not only depend
on the agents’ very identities themselves (i.e., the coalition structure), but also on
how they are linked (i.e., the network structure) [170].
Myerson [233] was the first scholar to extend a cooperative solution concept, the
Shapley value, to games in graph function form by additionally taking care of the in-
formation about agents’ connections. This extension of the Shapley value to graphs
was henceforward called Myerson value.
In this respect, Myerson [233] introduced graphs on I as unordered pairs of dis-
tinct members of I. Such a link between agents i and j shall be denoted by i; j. The
complete graph is denoted by gI = {i; j | i ∈ I, j ∈ I, i 6= j}, the set of all graphs of I
can then be introduced as G̃ = {g | g ⊆ gI}. A single element g ∈ G̃ therefore fully
describes a distinct graph structure that could be present in the game. The graph
structure determines which coalitions can function and which ones are infeasible.
Now, the Myerson value implies that agents are eligible for cooperation whenever
they are connected via an end-to-end connection, no matter if directly or indirectly
across other agents. As Slikker and van den Nouweland [299], Jackson [172] point
out, this situation can be interpreted rather as a communication game than as a net-
work game. Communication games rest on the premise that agents that are able to
communicate can also cooperate.
In a three-agent setting, for instance, one should differentiate between a graph
g′ = ({1;2},{2;3}) and gI . In g′, agents 1 and 3 can communicate, however, do not
exhibit a direct link whereas all possible links are established in gI . In real-world sce-
narios, such a direct relation could, for example, result in higher costs, or in benefits
through direct communication. This issue is not fully reflected in communication
games. Network games should, therefore, capture the difference between indirect
communication and a direct cooperation relation. Such a class of network games,
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where the value generated directly depends on the network topology and direct
linkages therein, was introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky [175]. They show that
the Myerson value can be directly extended from communication games to network
games.
That is, the coalition concept on the one hand and the network game structure on
the other need to be melted. Given any K⊆ I, let K|g = {i; j | i; j ∈ g and i ∈ K, j ∈ K}
denote coalitions restricted by the given network topology, i.e. only existing links in
the network are considered. In this connection, the notion of the characteristic func-
tion needs to be altered in favor of a richer object that includes the network struc-
ture besides coalitions and communication lines. Such functions were introduced as
value functions, incorporating costs and benefits [175, 170]. A value function evolves
as χ : G̃ → R. Let X denote the set of all possible value functions. Based on these
adaptations, network games can be introduced.
Definition 3.26 [NETWORK GAMES]. A network game is a pair (g,χ) in which g defines
the set of agents I = {1, . . . ,n} and their their connections as specified by g ∈ G̃, as well as
the values χ ∈ X that are associated to each coalition K ⊆ I subject to g.
Based on Definition 3.26, the Myerson value can be defined for network games.
Definition 3.27 [MYERSON VALUE (IN NETWORK GAMES)]. The Myerson value ex-
hibits a corresponding solution in network games as an extension to the Myerson value in
communication games and the Shapley value. It assigns a unique and fair payoff vector
ΦMV : G̃ × X → Rn to the set of agents I, while the range of possibilities to cooperate is
reduced to a given network topology g. For each agent i ∈ I the Myerson value evolves as
follows:
(3.10) φMVi (g,χ) = ∑
K⊆I|i∈K
(




)− χ(K|g \ {i}
))
The Shapley value is obviously a special case of the Myerson value – it is the
situation in which the underlying network structure is that of a complete, nondirec-
tional graph, i.e. ΦMV(gI ,χ) = ΦSV(I, χ̃).
Example 3.5 [COMPUTATION OF THE MYERSON VALUE]. Consider a game similar to
the one introduced in Example 3.3 with I = (1,2,3), g = ({1;2},{2;3}), and the value
functions χ(K|g) = 0 for all single-agent coalitions, χ({2,3}|g) = 3, and χ({1,2}|g) =
χ({1,2,3}|g) = 6. The Myerson value can be computed analogously to Example 3.3 as
shown in Table 3.2.
One sees that, compared to Example 3.3, due to the no longer existing link 1;3, both agents
1 and 3 suffer a loss in favor of agent 2.
An assumption within the Myerson value inherited from the former use of char-
acteristic functions is superadditivity (cp. Definition 3.18). But what if a smaller
cooperation of agents is able to obtain a certain goal as efficient as a larger one? The
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Table 3.2: Computation of the Myerson value
Possible permutations i = 1 i = 2 i = 3
(1,2,3) 0 6 0
(1,3,2) 0 6 0
(2,1,3) 6 0 0
(2,3,1) 3 0 3
(3,1,2) 0 6 0
(3,2,1) 3 3 0






application of superadditive characteristic or value functions does not cover this
issue. Jackson [170] picks up this quite intuitive application. Additionally, he crit-
icizes the fixed nature of the Myerson value, suggesting to move from value func-
tions χ to their monotonic covers χ̂. Their underlying assumption is that networks
are flexible – a given set of links can thus still flexibly be altered in the formation
process of a network. Additionally accounting for the fact that larger cooperations
might not generate any additional value compared to smaller ones, the value cre-
ated by the maximum over all possible networks which could potentially form with
respect to g and subsets g′ thereof is considered. Therefore, χ̂(g) = maxg′⊂g χ(g′)
holds. It is clear that, in order to account for all different potential combinations
of networks for each cooperation K, the complete network among the agents in K,
denoted gK = {j; l | j ∈ K, l ∈ K, j 6= l}, must be included in the value. These consid-
erations result in the player-based flexible network (PBFN) rule.
Definition 3.28 [PLAYER-BASED FLEXIBLE NETWORK ALLOCATION RULE]. The
player-based flexible network rule assigns a unique payoffs vector ΦPBFN : G̃ × X → Rn
to the set of agents I, implying that, at time of network formation, the decision on with
whom to cooperate and thus, on how to set the payoff vector, is still flexible and potentially
subject to change. For each agent i ∈ I, the PBFN rule is defined as follows:
(3.11) φPBFNi (g,χ) = ∑
K⊆I|i∈K
(













Besides referring to the superadditive value function, Jackson’s [170] fundamen-
tal criticism of the Myerson value is its fixed nature which does not allow for the
consideration of alternative networks that potentially arise by changing links within
the formation process. The fact that such criticism might not always be applicable
notwithstanding (cp. Section 4.2), the PBFN rule leads us to another relevant aspect
of network games, namely network formation.
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3.2.2 Network Formation
Network games connect different individual agents whose decisions on which links
to establish influence the formation and structure of the network [171]. Literature
suggests a general sub-division into social and economic networks [135, 173]. Net-
works in the social environment include, inter alia, different kinds of relationships
among individuals, such as the oftentimes referred to relation of social networks to
job opportunities [63, 64] or to scientific publications [136]. Network considerations
in economics have produced a huge body of work, too, be it in modeling trading
or exchange relationships [314, 198] or in the sharing of risk in common projects
according to given relationships [52].
In network games, there is generally some function φ′ : G̃ × X → Rn, howso-
ever calculated, which expresses the agents’ individual payoffs based on the rela-
tionships described by network g and the value function χ. Therefore, the payoff
granted to each agent i ∈ I is (at least partially) dependent on the links that i and
other agents have established. With respect to an agent’s own possibilities to form
or sever links, agents are supposed to act based on their self-interest analogue to
a fundamental assumption in non-cooperative game theory subject to the aware-
ness that teaming up with other agents may be necessary to create value. Modeling
the choice if or if not to maintain links, agents form or sever relationships accord-
ing to the utility that is connected with such an action. Jackson and Wolinsky [175]
introduced the notion of stable pairwise links. A network is pairwise stable, if (i)
establishing a missing link between two agents would lead to decreased utility of at
least one agent and (ii) the deletion of an existing link would at least hurt one of the
two included agents.
Definition 3.29 [PAIRWISE STABLE NETWORK]. A network is pairwise stable if existing
links cannot be deleted and missing links cannot be established without at least hurting one
of the concerned agent.
(3.12) ∀ i; j /∈ g : φ′i(g ∪ {i; j},χ) > φ′i(g,χ)⇒ φ′j(g,χ) > φ′j(g ∪ {i; j},χ)
and
(3.13) ∀ i; j ∈ g : φ′i(g,χ) ≥ φ′i(g \ {i; j},χ)⇒ φ′j(g,χ) ≥ φ′j(g \ {i; j},χ)
However, the notion of a pairwise stable network is only fully applicable and
substantial if approval to form or sever a links is required from both agents i and j.
Considering link formation, this is intuitively the case in several social and economic
contexts such as friendship ties, for instance, in web-based social networks such
as Facebook.6 With respect to trading links between buyers and sellers, both link
formation and deletion can be two-sided [135].
Other fields of application require the consideration of one-sided link formation
or deletion [21, 104]. This is mostly the case if relationships are directed, such as,
6A friendship relation between two persons in social networks such as Facebook (http://www.
facebook.com) must be proposed by one person and then confirmed by the other.
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for instance, when establishing links across Web pages, or sending christmas gifts
to business partners [135]. Economic applications of unilateral link formation do
also exist as will be outlined in Section 6.3. In addition, severing links is oftentimes
possible in unilateral fashion in both directed and non-directed networks unless pre-
vented by contracts or codes of conduct. Again, consider Facebook as an example:
the deletion of a friendship tie does not need to be confirmed by the counterpart. A
single-sided version of Definition 3.29 will be discussed in the subsequent section.
3.2.3 Network Design Objectives
When designing a payment scheme in networks that include a potential plurality of
value-creating agents, as present in service value networks, the rules of the “game”
need to align with the peculiarities of the environment to be captured.
The nature of such objectives is quite divergent. On the one hand, properties
from cooperative game theory can be adapted to network design. Oftentimes used
in axiomatic approaches, these can be phrased in concise, granular desiderata, thus
coinciding with desiderata in the narrow sense as formulated in classic mechanism
design (cp. Section 3.1.3). On the other hand, more generic target settings come into
play which cannot be expressed as fine-grained as a desideratum.
3.2.3.1 Properties from Cooperative Game Theory Adapted to Networks
Transferring coalition setups to network settings with agents teaming up into co-
operations7, one of the most important characteristics of a value distribution logic
should be fairness. If more than one agent contributes to the overall goal or activity
to be delivered, and at the same time, sophisticated contracts or bargaining proce-
dures are unrealistic, value allocation is required to be perceived as “fair” by the
participants in order to stimulate and support vigorous business activity. This is
especially the case if jointly created surplus cannot be precisely accredited to the
contributors.
Cooperative game theory yields a multitude of axioms to transcribe fairness.
Their origin is to be found in Shapley [292], using a set of properties, or axioms,
to account for a fair allocation rule that distributes generated value among partic-
ipating agents (cp. also Section 3.2.1.3 and Definition 3.23). In the following, the
fairness properties proposed by Shapley [292] will be discussed. To this end, recall
the basic notation introduced in Section 3.2.1: consider a set of n agents I = {1, ...,n}
that is acting in some network game (I,χ) in which χ ∈ X is defined as a value func-
tion. Let K denote the set of cooperations of agents in I such that K = {K | K ⊆ I}.
Network structures are denoted by g ∈ G̃. Further, φ′i(g,χ) denotes some payoff that
is assigned to agent i subject to the network structure.
The first fairness axiom requires that the full value generated by the network is
to be distributed to the participating agents such that “no money is left on the table”
[299].
7It is referred to cooperations rather than to coalitions to account for the underlying network structure
that determines which agents can cooperate.
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Definition 3.30 [EFFICIENCY]. Efficiency denotes that the maximum output of the game





Pareto optimality is a necessary property, however, it is not sufficient. The full
yield of the game can be distributed arbitrarily disproportional. Fairness also re-
quires symmetry: the payment scheme should treat agents equally that contribute
the same to each cooperation within the network. Symmetry can also be interpreted
as anonymity, stating that the names or identities of the agents can be changed with-
out altering their payoffs. The latter is only sensitive to how the value function rates
the agents’ presence in a cooperation, that is, to the agent’s structural role [279, 341].
Definition 3.31 [SYMMETRY]. Two agents i and j are symmetric regarding the game (I,χ)
if they yield exactly the same marginal contribution to each cooperation such that χ(K|g ∪
{i}) = χ(K|g ∪ {j}) for all K ⊆ I \ {i, j}. Such symmetric agents must receive identical
payoffs:
(3.15) φ′i(g,χ) = φ
′
j(g,χ)
The third property is expressed via the additivity axiom which requires that the
solution shall be an additive operator on the space of all games X. This property
states that payoffs to agents shall be the same whether two situations that consider
the same set I and the same cooperation structure g – however, subject to different
value functions – are evaluated jointly or separately [299, 334].
Definition 3.32 [ADDITIVITY]. Given any two games (I,χ) and (I,χ′), the solution to
the sum (χ + χ′) of the games must equal the sum of the two solutions to the single games
χ and χ′. For all i ∈ I
(3.16) φ′i(g,χ + χ




where the summed up game (χ + χ′) is defined by (χ + χ′)(K|g) = χ(K) + χ′(K|g) for all
K ∈ K.
The last property to describe fair solutions is the dummy axiom. The dummy (or
null) property sets that agents which add no value to every cooperation must not be
remunerated.
Definition 3.33 [DUMMY]. If an agent i ∈ I is a dummy, i.e. its marginal contribution to
every cooperation is null, it is assigned a zero payoff.
(3.17) φ′i(g,χ) = 0 if χ(K|g ∪ {i})− χ(K|g) = 0 ∀K ∈ K
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Fairness is the outcome of all these axioms taken together [292, 289]. Over the
years, the fairness axiomatization proposed by Shapley [292] has been subject to
variations to highlight different aspects of fairly distributed payoffs. A variety of
different axiomatizations has been proposed by different scholars (cp. e.g. [340,
341, 74, 150]). As these axiomatizations are equivalent to the one presented in this
section, further details are cautiously put aside in this thesis.8
Besides fairness, other related properties can be considered. Cooperational
monotonicity9 is akin to fair division of value as it requires that, if the underly-
ing structure of a game changes (which can be expressed via a change in the value
function), payoffs must also change in the same manner [298, 340]. This is a vital
property in order to retain competitive forces in the network: efforts of agents to in-
crease their efficiency in whatever way may not be punished by decreasing payoffs.
Definition 3.34 [COOPERATIONAL MONOTONICITY]. Cooperational monotonicity
states that if a particular cooperation T ∈ K increases its value while the value of all other
cooperations K ∈ K \ T remains fixed, none of the agents in T ia worse off than before. This
coherency can be re-formulated such that
(3.18) ∀ K = {K|i ∈ K} : χ(K|g) ≥ χ
′(K|g) ∧ ∀ K = {K|i /∈ K} : χ(K|g) = χ′(K|g)
⇒ φ′i(g,χ) ≥ φ′i(g,χ′)
The last property listed in this section is closely connected to the existence of set-
valued solutions in cooperative game theory (cp. Section 3.2.1.2). If a solution yields
a multitude of payoff possibilities for a single agent, value cannot be reasonably and
fairly distributed since the solution is ambiguous.
Definition 3.35 [UNIQUENESS]. The solution concept is unique for any game (I,χ) if
(3.19) ∀ i ∈ I : φ′i(g,χ) = x, x ∈R1
3.2.3.2 Properties from Network Games
Properties in network games can be both akin to fine-grained desiderata of network
games presented in the previous section and formulated more globally. Aberrant
from the general approach in this chapter, the target settings are not exclusively
stated neutrally but are partially elucidated by drawing on the service value net-
work context.
Link formation in the network
As introduced in Section 3.2.2, the formation of networks has been extensively dis-
cussed in economic theory. A standard objective pursued is stability. Depending on
8The interested reader may want to refer to the original references or to Winter [334] for a survey.
9In Young [340], this property is named coalitional monotonicity. This term is mapped to the underly-
ing network structure in network games.
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the links’ types and formation assumption, pairwise stability as introduced in Def-
inition 3.29 is a reasonable desideratum. With respect to networks with directed
relationships, individual stability is a more substantial than considering both linked
agents. Based on an individual agent i ∈ I who is in charge of forming or severing,
for instance, outgoing links, individual stability considers the set of any possible
networks Di(g) = {g′|g \ {i; j}∀ i 6= j, j ∈ I} ∪ {g′|g ∪ {i;k}∀ i 6= k, k ∈ I} the agent
can reach from a given network g ∈ G̃ by unilaterally choosing a linkage strategy
[104].
Definition 3.36 [INDIVIDUAL STABILITY]. A network g is said to be individually stable
if any agent i ∈ I cannot improve its payoff φ′i(·) by forming additional or severing existent
links that are at i’s command:
(3.20) φ′i(g,χ) ≥ φ′i(g′,χ)∀g′ ∈ Di(g), i ∈ I
Besides individual stability, which does not make any statements on the degree
of interconnectedness, other target settings with respect to link formation come into
consideration. If links are interpreted as interoperability, or integration relationships,
respectively, such as in the SVN environment (cp. Section 2.2.3), an as high as pos-
sible number of connections in the network can be a desirable goal. Links in SVNs
denote the linkage of complementary services. In this connection, aiming at a fully
intermeshed network that features all feasible links can be a design goal. If reach-
ing a complete network is unrealistic, a target setting that formulates the number of
integration relationships in relative terms is an alternative to above-mentioned mea-
sures. Such a relatively verbalized objective requires a comparison to benchmarks.
Network growth and incentives to join
Before discussing the means to evaluate network growth, one needs to identify the
type of network that shall be analyzed. Service value networks belong to the class of
two-sided markets. Two-sidedness implies that agents as introduced in this chap-
ter are subdivided into two classes – service customers and service providers. In
order to fully tap the potential of the market and establish a successful business,
both buyers and sellers need to be brought “on board” [274]. Both sides of the mar-
ket positively value the number of participants on the other market side. Service
consumers benefit from a larger number of service providers leading to variety and
competitive prices. However, sellers are only willing to register if they expect to
face many buyers in the market [62]. It is obvious that the key challenge is to find a
way to exploit the dependency of a network’s value and the number of participants
connected to it [290].
However, almost any strategic advice assumes that a captive installed base exists
on at least one side of the market. If a new market is established, its operator has
to decide on which side of the market demand should be stimulated first, or if there
is a strategy to be adopted that is able to attract both sides of the market simulta-
neously. Therefore, when designing a payoff rule for a network game, especially
in its launch phase, effective incentives for network participants to join and thereby
boosting network growth is a major challenge.
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The desired size of a network and its growth can hardly be formulated in terms
of a desideratum. Incentives to join the network are rather generated through a com-
plex system of different parameters when designing a network payoff rule. More-
over, network growth is barely measurable in absolute terms. Thus, this target set-
ting is likely to be stated in relative terms benchmarked to scenarios that use differ-
ent incentive schemes.
3.3 Summary
In Chapter 3, both economic foundations of mechanism design and cooperative
game theory were outlined. From the latter, approaches to strategic network forma-
tion, known as network games, have emerged [175]. This body of work merges ideas
inheriting cooperative solution concepts with explicit network structures, subject to
strategic behavior of agents within the network. Abstracting to a higher level, such
considerations suggest to also amalgamate design objectives from classic mecha-
nism design and network games when designing coordination rules for co-opetitive
environments such as service value networks.
Technically, mechanism design and normative solution concepts in cooperative
game theory exhibit the same procedural method. On the one hand, mechanism de-
sign is also referred to as inverse game theory [296]. Unlike most of the approaches
from non-cooperative game theory, mechanism design sets a certain outcome of a
game as its desired goal and subsequentially evaluates how to design rules such
that non-cooperative agents realize this outcome as a result of their self-interested
acting. This modus operandi is akin to the axiomatic approach taken by normative
concepts in cooperative game theory. In normative approaches, axioms prescribing
the objectives of the solution are set up and logical implications are derived [289].
In total, although stemming from the very counterparts of game theory, mechanism
design and normative solution concepts from cooperative game theory are unified
by their goal-driven character.
Picking up the insights from Section 2.2, environments that foster joint value cre-
ation as an outcome of specialization and modularization exhibit both competitive
and cooperative features. Such application scenarios particularly suggest above-
sketched fusion of concepts from non-cooperative and cooperative game theory.
The co-opetition mechanism as introduced in Chapters 4 and 5 is an effort to take
care of this hybrid environment and to coordinate participants that are related both
cooperatively and competitively.
Part II




Incentive Engineering in Service
Value Networks
T his chapter will merge the economic foundations presented in Chapter 3 withthe newly arising business governance structure of service value networks as
discussed in Chapter 2. In such environments, value creation is coordinated by
a platform operator for the most part, as conceivable in today’s leading service
platforms which can be considered as SVN forerunners. Among others, Sales-
force.com, Xignite, and StrikeIron operate marketplaces in order to offer compos-
ite Web services. Moreover, companies like Etelos.com with its SaaS Marketplace
Platform1, which offers to other companies frameworks to run Web service mar-
ketplaces around their core services, push into the market. A very similar concept
is successfully marketed by the Chinese PaaS provider Alisoft.com2. These market
dynamics indicate that competition between different service platforms and Web
service marketplaces is already in place and will further rise as the SVN concept
moves to mainstream. Companies that consider to launch an SVNs have to demon-
strate competitive and innovative business models – a high-potential strategy must
include an effective lever to sustainably attract market participants to the platform.
In this connection, an attractive service portfolio in terms of variety and quality
should be a result of the incentives given by the market.
The central research goal of this thesis is to identify and introduce such a novel
incentive scheme that is custom-made for service value networks. Designing it, de-
sired properties to be fulfilled have to be carefully evaluated, traded off, and finally
defined. This thesis’ approach is to consult mechanism design in a broader sense to
implement a preferred system-wide solution to a decentralized optimization prob-
lem. However, individuals at the seller side of the network cannot merely draw on
selfish behavior since their “fate” in terms of successful service delivery is directly
connected to other vendors [166]: service providers have to effectually indicate their
willingness to cooperate with distinct other service providers in a complex service
offering as a very foundation and requirement for value creation. Therefore, when
defining the social choice function of the mechanism, objectives from classic mecha-
nism design, cooperative game theory, and network design come into consideration.
1http://www3.etelos.com/etelos/platform/
2http://www.alisoft.com/
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In fact, as will be outlined in Section 4.1, the implementation of network-related
objectives is the center of the presented co-opetition mechanism, as it is henceforth
referred to it.
The essence of the co-opetition mechanism can be found in the power ratio (PR).
Recall that an SVN is formed upon specific customer request – any complex service
instance in the SVN is thus potentially able to create value. Even if non-allocated,
each and every service enriches the platform’s variety and makes a contribution to
the overall competitive situation and the long valley’s power of combinatorics. The
novel approach inherited by the power ratio is to compensate vendors also for their
readiness to deliver. In other words, the power ratio shall not only reward service
providers which are actually allocated in a complex service rendered at a time, but
also pay out sellers that are on standby, i.e. partners which are able to fulfill a cus-
tomer request and thereby support the network’s variety without actually contribut-
ing to the complex service executed. The latter shall thereby be also remunerated
for their efforts to design or adapt their services according to the requirements im-
posed by the SVN operator. The basic idea and novelty of the power ratio as well
as the reasons for its application are laid out in Section 4.2. Finally, in Section 4.3,
the co-opetition mechanism is differentiated from closely related literature, thereby
emphasizing the contribution of this work.
4.1 Environmental Analysis for Service Value Net-
works
This work will tackle the challenges brought up by service value networks from an
operator’s point of view. The role of the operator of the SVN coincides with the role
of the mechanism operator. That is, the mechanism is centralized, implying that it
is an individual and self-contained unit in the overall system. For the participating
agents, the mechanism is understood as an impartial component that enables com-
munication and directly connects the agents in the network [305]. Such centrality
in terms of operation can be assumed in service value networks: service offerings
are provided by decentralized vendors, however, are composed and offered to the
service customer via a central entity, as today’s SVN forerunners substantiate (cp.
Section 2.2.4).
As discussed in Section 3.2.3.2, the platform operator needs to attract service
providers and service customers with both sides valuing participants on the other
market side [62, 274]. With either market side being initially vacant, we face a typ-
ical chicken-egg-problem. If a new platform is to be launched, its operator needs
to decide which side of the market should be stimulated first in order to subse-
quently capture the other market side as well. In this thesis, an approach akin to
the divide-and-conquer approach in two-sided market theory is pursued [62]: par-
ticipation at one side of the market is cross-subsidized and recovered by the other
market side [115]. Additional payments are made to the service provider-side by
the service customer who is assumed to be willing to pay a premium for the value
proposition that is quintessential to SVNs, first and foremost, the radical cutback of
lock-in risks. Such lock-ins that prevent customers from using services of compet-
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ing companies cannot be held up anymore on a functional level. In SVNs, customers
can easily switch from one service to a substitutive one due to the services’ modu-
larity and compatibility with switching costs decreasing to a minimum [116]. In
the traditional software business that features large upfront investments in form of
long-term licences and maintenance agreements, the customer is particularly prone
to strong financial ties that hinder her to change software vendors – although others
might offer more suitable or cheaper solutions [103]. This “classic” lock-in situa-
tion has already diminished by the move towards software-as-a-service. SVNs take
this characteristic to extremes by additionally allowing for single switches even within
the complex service. This is certainly a severe source of risk for service providers as
they become replaceable, which increases the competitive pressure, in turn having
a positive effect on the service providers’ efficiencies in terms of costs and quality.
Service customers are likely to be willing to pay a premium for such reduction of
lock-in risk and variety of options to choose from, which makes them more indepen-
dent of unsteady quality of service or price variations. In the course of increasing
replaceability of service providers, for the service customer, the origin of the compo-
nent services comes second [100]: service providers’ identities take a back seat while
the services themselves are of prime importance. This statement is true as long as
functionality and quality meet the customer’s requirements, subject to a trustwor-
thy overall concept. Recent studies verify this trend by finding that at least small
enterprises increasingly tend to disregard providers’ identities as long as a certain
quality is plausibly guaranteed [102].
Thus, this thesis’ approach is to set up incentives for the service provider side,
which are then assumed to generate positive feedback upon the service customers
and vice versa.
4.1.1 Networked Mechanism Design
As argued earlier, operators of SVNs do not only need to design innovative and
elaborate business models but also have to hold effective incentive schemes ready.
The latter is crucial in order to pull participants onto the offered platform and to
make sure that they remain there. This is where mechanism design comes into play.
Its main question is not what will happen in a specific interaction of various agents,
but rather how to tackle the challenge of having a desired outcome in mind and to
comprehend which strategic interaction and which setting could lead to a course
of action that implements this very outcome [296]. An SVN operator has to deliber-
ately cogitate about this issue when starting a new platform. Besides making a profit
in the medium term, which short-term goals should be pursued to get a business up
and running? So, it is all about incentive engineering – and this is exactly what mech-
anism design can be ideally applied for. However, mechanism design in its classic
form does not always hit the target. This issue has been illustrated in approaches
that waive the classic mechanism design requirement of incentive compatibility, and
therefore, also sacrifice allocative efficiency, such as second-best mechanism design
[260] and computational mechanism design [245] (cp. Sections 3.1.4 and 3.1.5).
Building thereupon, the networked mechanism design (NMD) perspective is intro-
duced in this thesis. Unlike second-best mechanism design or non-incentive com-
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patible mechanism design, not only sacrifice classically applied desiderata are sac-
rificed in order to approximate other objectives. Networked mechanism design is
rather geared to sacrifice certain classic properties in order to achieve alternative
objectives that are closely connected to the networked scenario. NMD incorporates
the requirements that are imposed by newly arising networked scenarios where a
set of agents must co-operate to create value, however, competes when it comes to
distributing revenues that arise from the joint value creation. This area of conflict
is inherent to problem sets in networked scenarios such as incentive engineering in
SVNs. Yet, the herein included desired properties are disregarded in classic mecha-
nism design.
Two concrete consequences applying networked mechanism design must be
paid attention to. On the one hand, network design properties are potentially likely
to differ from traditional desiderata. While the latter are traditionally stated in a
highly granular format, the social choice in networked mechanism design might
pursue target settings rather than fine-grained desiderata. Such target settings can-
not be formulated in an absolute manner but must be stated in relative terms. In
this case, a comparison to a suitable benchmark is required. On the other hand,
akin to second-best mechanism design and computational mechanism design, clas-
sic mechanism design desiderata are likely to fall victim to the must-have goals
pursued. Other than in second-best mechanism design, the latter must not neces-
sarily be a consequence of impossibility theorems that constrain the design space
of mechanisms, but can also be owed to other, prioritized objectives of the desired
social choice (cp. Section 5.2.1).
4.1.2 Social Choice of the Co-Opetition Mechanism
Following networked mechanism design, in order to capture an SVN’s co-opetitive
nature, both aspects from classic mechanism design and from network design are
involved when defining a system-wide preferred goal. In the following, the require-
ments of a mechanism that is capable of supporting an SVN’s potential to economi-
cally exploit the long valley of complex services is set out and substantiated. As most
of the objectives were discussed in detail in Sections 3.1.3 and 3.2.3, their explana-
tion is kept brief while putting the emphasis upon the objectives’ qualification for
the SVN context.
Taking the platform operator’s view in the launch phase of an SVN, fueling ini-
tial business must be the main goal. The key objective is to define incentives that
activate network effects and open out into positive feedback loops that give rise to
self-reinforcing success: the more service providers join the SVNs with their ser-
vice offerings, the higher the value of the complex service portfolio experienced by
the customer. At the same time, this makes the network more attractive for new
vendors, which in turn draw in more customers [15, 290, 188]. Therefore, profit
maximization of the platform operator in an optimal auction-like approach is not a
primary aim at this stage of business and is therefore not pursued in this work. It
is rather important to support and activate a healthy and preferably rapid network
development.
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Two central and crucial objectives shape the proposed mechanism that stand
above profit making in the short run. First, it is the mechanism’s ability to set ef-
fective incentives for participants to join, thereby increasing the network’s overall
size. Second, such growth shall be sustainable. Therefore service providers should
be compensated for steadily offering their services in the network after their entry
to the SVN.
Waiving profit maximization does not mean that the platform operator needs
to exhibit altruistic features. Quite the contrary – once a critical mass is reached, a
different mechanism including, for instance, participation fees or variable commis-
sions can be implemented. The faster such a critical mass is achieved, the earlier a
platform is likely to become profitable [188]. Hence, the first two objectives of the
co-opetition mechanism can be stated as follows:
Requirement 4.1 [NETWORK GROWTH]. The co-opetition mechanism shall be able to
incentivize service providers to join the network. That is, it shall be able to foster network
growth (cp. Section 3.2.3.2).
Requirement 4.2 [READINESS TO DELIVER]. The co-opetition mechanism shall be able
to incentivize service providers to constantly and continuously keep ready their services in
the network. That is, service providers shall be rewarded for steadily being able to offer a
service.
Thus, Requirement 4.1 shall attract previously non-allocated service providers
while Requirement 4.2 is targeted on service providers that are already a part of the
SVN. Yet, the two requirements are interdependent in a way that the incentives for
being ready can and most probably will influence a service provider’s decision to
actually join the network.
If such readiness shall be compensated for by granting monetary means to more
than the allocated service providers in the SVN, the distribution logic must be fair.
On the one hand, it is obvious that service providers that make greater contributions
to the aggregate system’s overall value need to receive a greater share of it. On the
other hand, a distribution logic needs to be conceived as generally evenhanded by
participating providers in order to gain acceptance.
Requirement 4.3 [FAIRNESS]. The co-opetition mechanism shall distribute payoffs among
service providers as demanded by Requirement 4.2 in a fair manner. Fairness assembles from
the four specific properties efficiency, symmetry, additivity, and the dummy property (cp.
Definitions 3.30 – 3.33).
Further, uniqueness of the payoff rule is unwaivable, since every provider’s
share in the overall amount of money to be distributed must be distinct. Otherwise,
the mechanism shows features of a lottery and is deemed to fail.
Requirement 4.4 [UNIQUENESS]. The co-opetition mechanism shall distribute payoffs in
a unique manner (cp. Definition 3.35).
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Requirement 4.5 states a desirable incentive property: providers are incentivized
to make their services more efficient. Vice versa, cooperational monotonicity does
still allow for the following situation: an increase of one service’s efficiency does not
decrease other cooperation’s value functions, however, it can very well decrease the
other services’ payoffs. That way, competitive pressure is retained and reinforced.
Requirement 4.5 [COOPERATIONAL MONOTONICITY]. The co-opetition mechanism
shall be cooperationally monotonic. That is, a service provider within the network that is
able to increase its individual worth for the network must not be worse off in terms of its
payoff than before (cp. Definition 3.34).
Interconnectedness or integration of services is another highly important issue
in SVNs since complementarity can only be fully leveraged if the very interplay of
services is guaranteed in the first place [106]. Link formation is discussed in depth
in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.2. Transferred to service value networks, links, i.e. edges
eij in the network, indicate that services vi and vj are composable. Whether two ser-
vices are connected basically depends on two factors, namely functional and strate-
gic criteria. As functional interoperability is generally given due to the requirements
imposed by the platform, decisions on being linked or not mainly depend on strate-
gic considerations. In SVNs, links can be formed by individual decision since a
service provider cannot influence which other vendors use the output of its service.
Thus, we are located in the sub-field of one-sided link formation with individual sta-
bility (cp. Definition 3.36) as a possible design goal. Apart from the network being
stable, a high degree of interconnectedness is desirable for several reasons. As men-
tioned above, interconnectedness is the key enabler for complementarity: without
suitable incentives for link formation, cooperation between service providers that
offer complementary functionality is impaired. Secondly, customers are expected
to prefer purchasing services in networks yielding alternative, substitute offerings
such that other providers can dynamically pitch in if an allocated service goes out
of business. This is particularly true for critical business applications. Furthermore,
such a configuration dramatically decreases customer lock-in. Finally, promoting al-
ternative paths through the network leads to a more balanced network without sin-
gle providers having monopolistic positions. In such balanced networks, the plat-
form operator is no longer dependent on powerful service providers which could
impose pressure by bulling the market or by threatening the network with termina-
tion of membership. Therefore, a steadily reached high degree of interconnectedness
is a desirable goal in SVNs.
Requirement 4.6 [HIGH DEGREE OF INTERCONNECTEDNESS]. The co-opetition
mechanism shall account for a high degree of interconnectedness among services.
The network design related objectives notwithstanding, we must foremost keep
focus that we are working within the boundaries of mechanism design. Following
Parkes [257], the co-opetition mechanism is required to be budget balanced and
individually rational. Budget balance ensures financial viability in the mid-term
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since the platform operator does not need to subsidize transactions made via the
platform.3
Requirement 4.7 [BUDGET BALANCE]. The co-opetition mechanism shall be budget bal-
anced. Payments made to participants need to be fully refunded by payments made by other
participants. In order to comply with fairness (cp. Definition 3.30 and Requirement 4.3),
surplus funds must be entirely redistributed (cp. Definition 3.10).
Individual rationality is vital since participants are not willing to voluntarily par-
ticipate if they are at risk of incurring losses.
Requirement 4.8 [INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY]. The co-opetition mechanism shall be
individually rational. Participants should not be worse off by participating than by waiving
participation (cp. Definition 3.11).
Finally, the co-opetition mechanism needs to be capable of handling service com-
position and QoS characteristics as introduced in Section 2.2. For the former, it is not
enough to process bundles without considering the elements’ sequence [2, 287, 20].
As shown in Section 2.2.1, in SVNs it is essential to also account for the services’
order in the complex service, since value is only generated in the right sequence of
components. Further, the multiattributive nature of services needs to be considered
because non-price attributes play a crucial role when allocating a complex service
(cp. Section 5.1.1).
Requirement 4.9 [SEQUENCE-SENSITIVE SERVICE COMPOSITION]. The co-opetition
mechanism needs to be capable of handling well-defined sequences of service components in
order to allocate a feasible complex service.
Requirement 4.10 [QUALITY OF SERVICE SENSITIVITY]. The co-opetition mechanism
needs to account for multiple attributes that define the complex service’s QoS characteristics.
To summarize, the requirements made on the co-opetition mechanism can be
sub-divided into three classes as illustrated in Figure 4.1. First, desiderata and tar-
get settings from network design (Requirements 4.1 to 4.6) are required, some of
them inspired by cooperative game theory. Second, desiderata from mechanism
design come into play (Requirements 4.7 and 4.8) while other classic mechanism
design properties such as allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility are sacri-
ficed. This does, however, not mean that they can generally be neglected as will be
shown in Part III of this thesis. Third, Requirements 4.9 and 4.10 define the class of
applicability requirements.
3Certainly, costs for erecting and operating the platform including auxiliary services still need to
be borne. Such expenditures as well as the design of a pricing model including membership and
transaction fees are not considered in this thesis.
78 CHAPTER 4. INCENTIVE ENGINEERING IN SERVICE VALUE NETWORKS
Networked mechanism design













Figure 4.1: Social choice of the co-opetition mechanism
4.2 Introducing the Power Ratio
As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, the co-opetition mechanism’s cen-
tral concept is to compensate not only the set of allocated service providers, but all
available service providers that are able to fulfill a specific customer request. This
logic shall reflect the network design objectives erected in Requirements 4.1 to 4.6.
In the remainder of this thesis, the SVN-specific notation introduced in Section 2.2.3
will be consulted. Let further ∆ denote a monetary surplus that is tendered in order
to fund the above-stated compensation. δj indicates vj’s share in ∆. In general, such
a payment tj granted to each service vj ∈ V can be assembled as follows:
(4.1) tj :=
{
pij + δj, if vj is allocated via its link eij
δj, if vj is not allocated
Consequently, the payoff Th for a service provider nh that owns several service
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Example 4.1 [PAYOFF DISTRIBUTION]. Consider a complex service F1 that creates a
value of x, howsoever calculated. Now assume that there is a different path F2 exhibiting
a value of x − ε. If F1 was to go out of business, choosing F2 would only yield a loss of ε.
Therefore, the full payoff should not be ascribed to F1, but also consider any other complex
service Fl that has a positive value.
Example 4.1 shows that the idea of the payment introduced in Equations 4.1 and
4.2 directly takes on Requirement 4.2. By not only rewarding service owners whose
services are actually allocated in a specific service composition, but also potential
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creators of value, service providers that keep ready their resources are granted a
percentage of the overall surplus distributed. However, Requirement 4.1 is also ad-
dressed, albeit not as directly as readiness, which can be explained by a reduction
of risk in the highly agile SVN context. Service providers are likely to face initial
and specific investment costs when designing or adapting services that meet the
requirements imposed by the SVN as, for instance, is evident in salesforce.com’s
AppExchange or in TEXO (cp. Section 2.2.4). Such investments have to be made
prior to any transaction, enhancing or facilitating the value of the trade within the
platform, but being of considerable less value outside of the platform [109, 129].
These specific investments might prompt sellers not to join an SVN since future rev-
enues and transactions are too uncertain compared to the initial investments [276].
Knowing that there will be a recurring payment even if one’s service is not regularly
allocated might lower the entry barrier for service providers, somewhat providing
security through reconciliation of interests in the initial phase of the SVN. In order to
boost network growth and foster increasing returns, it is inevitable to attract a crit-
ical mass of participants. Speaking of service providers, these participants do not
necessarily have to be the most competitive ones - as long as the mass of vendors
attracted make sure that a sufficiently large number of customers enter the plat-
form. If the SVN is successful in attracting a “good” share of potential customers,
previously non-attracted providers might also feel impelled to join the SVN [290].
By rewarding all potential creators of value, not only the ones that are actually
allocated, service providers are not only likely to join the SVN, but also remain there
as their readiness to deliver is explicitly rewarded (cp. Requirement 4.2).
These payoffs as sketched in Equation (4.1) shall be realized by the power ratio.
The power ratio will be based upon Shapley-style calculus (cp. Definition 3.23).
Transfering the logic of the Shapley value to SVNs, the PR can be interpreted as the
average power or significance of a service vj ∈ V relative to G (cp. Section 3.2.1.3,
in particular Definition 3.23). Shifting the traditional notion of purely allocation-
based payoffs towards a redistribution among all vendors that are able to provide
value for the network is a radical step and necessitates fair distribution (cp. Re-
quirement 4.3). Such fairness is an inherent property of the Shapley value. Yet,
the market would be threatened by adverse selection [4] if the power ratio-based
payments were not aligned with the competitive environment (cp., in particular,
Requirement 4.5). By valuing marginal contributions, the Shapley value exhibits
appropriate characteristics. Transferred to the objective of SVNs, namely provid-
ing customers with complex service offerings, the PR needs to quantify a service
provider’s marginal contribution at the complex service level.
Besides above-mentioned properties, the Shapley value brings about another re-
quirement surveyed in Section 4.1: its solution is unique (cp. Requirements 4.4). By
this requirement, set-valued solution concepts as introduced in Section 3.2.1.2 are
directly ruled out. Other single-valued solution concepts, first and foremost, the
Deegan-Packel index (cp. Definition 3.25) and the Banzhaf-Penrose index (cp. Def-
inition 3.24) do not meet the fairness requirement. What is more, they do not fit
the characteristics of SVNs in other points either. In their original domain of simple
(voting) games, the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf-Penrose index are mono-
tonic with respect to the voting weights. That is, individuals with a higher voting
weight are assigned a greater or equal Shapley value, or Banzhaf-Penrose index, re-
80 CHAPTER 4. INCENTIVE ENGINEERING IN SERVICE VALUE NETWORKS
spectively. The Deegan-Packel index does not yield this property [161, 160]. When
it comes to judging voting power, this characteristic is said to be highly preferable
as it supports the intuition that more votes should not lead to a smaller value as in-
herently possible when applying the Deegan-Packel index [248, 123]. The Banzhaf-
Penrose index significantly differs from the Shapley-Shubik index (and therefore,
the Shapley value) in terms of its interpretation of a priori power [124]. The Banzhaf-
Penrose index reflects a clear probabilistic notion as it is an a prior probability of that
an individual is pivotal, that is, making a winning coalition a losing one and vice
versa [125]. In other words, it refers to an individual’s influence upon the decision
made by a coalition of agents. On the other hand, the Shapley value represents the
expectation of the share that an individual can take from the result of the coopera-
tive decision, yet based on its individual action. Again transferred to the scenario
at hand, the latter notion is preferable since it reflects the way joint value is actually
created and distributed in SVNs. Therefore, Shapley-style calculus is proposed as
the preferred underlying metric to the power ratio.
Due to the structure of SVNs, some variants of the originally presented Shapley
value [292] do not apply: neither do we face a game where the individual agent
can be neglected nor is it possible to install sophisticated bargaining procedures (cp.
Section 3.2.1.3). Particularly in the context of SVNs, the ad-hoc creation of rather
short-lived complex services is a key feature (cp. Section 2.2), such that bargaining
procedures (resulting in the Shapley value as a non-cooperative equilibrium out-
come) cannot be implemented. Further, due to the very importance of single ser-
vices in early SVNs, the non-atomic version of the Shapley value designed for large
populations is not applicable.
However, the Shapley value is originally defined on coalitions, that is as to SVNs,
a basic assumption would be that service providers are able to cooperate with any
other vendor in the network. This does not hold for SVNs due to their sequence-
sensitivity (as formally introduced in Section 2.2.3). As extensively discussed in
Section 3.2.1.4, Myerson [233] attached the Shapley value with an underlying net-
work structure (cp. Definition 3.27). Inherited from the Shapley value, the Myerson
value assumes superadditive value functions (cp. Definition 3.19). The application
of superadditive value functions in solution concepts cannot handle situations with
smaller cooperations obtaining a certain goal as efficient as or even more efficiently
than larger ones. The player-based flexible network rule (PBFN) presented by Jack-
son [170] overcomes this issue by introducing monotonic covers of value functions
(cp. Definition 3.28). However, other than the PBFN, the power ratio shall exclu-
sively include the SVN as it is made available to satisfy a specific customer demand
while the PRTF considers connections as they could potentially be formed. The focus
of the PR is limited to the linkage structure as present in G, that is, the allocated path
as well as actually available alternatives thereof.
In this connection, a valuation must always occur at a complex service level since
only complex services that include each functionality demanded by the customer are
able to create value. However, as stated in the cooperational monotonicity require-
ment (cp. Requirement 4.5), an increase in an individual’s efficiency must at least
provide the same or a higher PR transfer. The actual fulfillment of the latter needs
to be evaluated, the same holds for fairness: the original form of the Shapley and
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Myerson value are in fact fair and coalitionally monotonic4, yet the modifications
made in the power ratio require a reassessment of these properties.
4.3 Related Work
This section specifies research approaches which are closely related to the work at
hand and highlights their issues and shortcomings that are addressed in this thesis.
As academic research on service value networks is in its infancy, directly related aca-
demic contributions are scarce. However, the related work can be roughly classified
into four categories. First, mechanism design approaches in relevant domains, that
is, in environments that exhibit features of SVNs, are focussed on. Second, multi-
attribute procurement auctions are reviewed due to their fit in terms of the auction
type. Third, the co-opetition mechanism is distinguished from Shapley mechanisms
which are related as to their application of the Shapley value to mechanism design.
Finally, allocation rules from network design are related to the co-opetition mecha-
nism in terms of value distribution.
Mechanism design in the Web service domain
A line of research that is closely related to this approach is presented in Blau et al.
[48, 47, 46], Blau [45]. Basically, two different mechanisms to coordinate complex
service allocation and to determine their prices in service value networks are dis-
cussed. The Complex Service Auction (CSA) as an allocative efficient and dominant
strategy incentive-compatible VCG-based mechanism, is geared to fulfill the classic
mechanism design desiderata. The other side of the coin is its susceptibility to over-
payments, which can be severe. Further, the CSA disregards network requirements
such as growth or interconnectedness that are particularly important in the launch
phase of an SVN. The Interoperability Transfer Function (ITF) as an extension of the
CSA limits overpayments in order to satisfy budget balance constraints. By also set-
ting incentives for increasing interoperability of services, the ITF can be seen as a
first approach to network-related properties.
The sequence of service modules within a composite Web service is also con-
sidered in the combinatorial auction presented in Mohabey et al. [228]. As service
quality attributes are included as well, this mechanism allows for an allocation that
is based on the fit of the requester’s preferences and the quality level of the services.
Incorporating budget constraints, the mechanism sacrifices incentive compatibility.
However, Mohabey et al. [228] do not consider the peculiarities of co-opetitive en-
vironments such as SVNs.
Stösser [306] presents a double-sided market mechanism for trading Grid re-
sources which approximates the optimal solution in order retain computational
tractability. Two different pricing schemes are presented that deal with the trade-off
between strategic behavior and computational complexity, making the mechanism
applicable in large-scale settings. Due to its application area, the approach neither
4As mentioned in Requirement 4.5, this property is originally called “coalitional monotonicity” with
respect coalition-based cooperation structures [340].
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yields sequence-sensitive service composition support nor considers complex QoS
characteristics.
Schnizler [288] considers the trade of multiattribute Web service bundles in
a combinatorial auction. The MACE (Multi-Attribute Combinatorial Exchange)
mechanism allows for the bundled trade of infrastructure resources that can be de-
scribed via rudimentary service attributes. MACE does not support service compo-
sitions whose sequence must be considered as it is the case in SVNs. An extension
of MACE presented by Lamparter and Schnizler [203] introduces semantically de-
scribable quality attributes, thereby allowing for complex QoS support.
In total, the above-mentioned approaches do not reflect important properties to
be met in the formation phase of a service value network. An exception and first
step into the direction of networked mechanism design is the ITF in Blau [45] which
includes interoperability as an additional design goal.
Multiattribute procurement auctions
In terms of the applied methodology, reverse multiattribute auctions (procurement
auctions) should be classified the closest related type of mechanism.5 They allow
for the negotiation over non-price attributes that determine the optimal allocation.
Parkes and Kalagnanam [259] introduce models for iterative procurement auc-
tions that focus on classic mechanism design objectives. Moreover, efforts are put
into retaining some of the sellers’ private information. Building thereupon, Engel
and Wellman [112] propose a multiattribute mechanism that focusses on preference
elicitation and computational issues, allowing for an adequate expressiveness in
multiattribute applications and, at the same time, preserves the buyer’s privacy of
information. Both scholars put dedicated effort into limited information revelation.
Thus, these articles pursue different goals than the co-opetition mechanism. Further,
due to the very basic procurement scenario that is non-networked and non-service
related, the models neither support compositions and sequences of services nor net-
work objectives.
Bichler and Kalagnanam [38] discuss characteristic winner determination prob-
lems in multiattribute auctions. Akin to the co-opetition mechanism, their model
allows for configurable offers on seller-side. However, focus is put upon formulat-
ing and solving allocation problems from an operations research perspective. That
is, Bichler and Kalagnanam [38] deal with optimization and largely ignore mecha-
nism design issues.
Applying an optimal auction approach, Ronen and Lehmann [277] present a
mechanism that approximately maximizes the auctioneer’s utility in a two-stage
VCG-based approach while retaining computational tractability. Just like in the
above-listed procurement auction approaches, network design objectives as well as
an adaptation to the Web service domain do not play any role. On the same lines,
Beil and Wein [32] propose a multiround procurement auction that optimizes the re-
quester’s utility. Their approach shows a general shortcoming of procurement auc-
tion approaches in consideration of their application in SVNs: they assume sophis-
ticated, long-term relationship settings that may include several negotiation steps.
5In Section 5.1.1, procurement auctions are discussed in more detail.
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While the variety of attributes is also present in SVNs, relations are much more dy-
namic such that transactions are (i) likely to be non-recurring and (ii) their overall
value is usually too low to justify the implementation of complex iterative processes
that require increased communication efforts.
Shapley value mechanisms
The Shapley value mechanism as presented by Moulin and Shenker [230] is related
to this work in terms of its value distribution logic. The Shapley value mechanism
addresses a distinct problem: how to allocate a service (or similar) to a set of agents
with different valuations and how to distribute the costs of providing the service to
the agents? The most prominent application scenario of the Shapley value mecha-
nism is multicast cost sharing which allocates a transmission to a set of agents in a
network of costly links and determines the charges collected from the receivers (cp.
e.g. [119, 230, 212]). In more detail, the transmission flows through a multicast tree
whose links have associated costs c̃≥ 0 and whose nodes symbolize the potential re-
ceivers of the transmission. The latter exhibit a utility for receiving the transmission
[121].
The Shapley value mechanism can be seen as a special case of of the Shapley
value (cp. Section 4.2) as the cost of a link is shared adequately by all receivers who
are downstream of the link [119].6 Therefore, the Shapley value mechanism can be
classified as fair. Further, the mechanism is strategy-proof and budget balanced,
however, lacks efficiency. It is important to note that the links are assumed to be
obedient, that is, link costs are known and not subject to strategic behavior which
is only assumed at receiver-side. In this regard, the Shapley value mechanism does
not fit the application of the co-opetition mechanism.
Further, in contrast to a the co-opetition mechanism, the Shapley value mecha-
nism only includes allocated agents into the transfer function.
Solution concepts in network games
Apart from mechanism design approaches, solution concepts in network games deal
with the distribution of value or costs, respectively, without considering strategic
behavior regarding the participants’ types. Moreover, such solution concepts are
usually domain neutral, which is, for instance, reflected in very general underlying
network models. The network-based solution concepts presented by Myerson [233]
(Myerson value) and Jackson [170] were extensively discussed in Sections 3.2.3 and
4.2. Both solution concepts distribute value in networks based on Shapley-style cal-
culus and can be classified as fair. Therefore, the concepts by Myerson [233] and
Jackson [170] are highly relevant in terms of the co-opetition mechanism’s trans-
fer function since they allow for a distribution of value according to participants’
marginal contributions to the network’s value. However, they exhibit entirely dif-
ferent focal points: concentrating on how value in network games is assigned to
6In more detail, based on the reported utilities of the potential receivers, nodes are recursively pruned
whenever the charged price exceeds the agents’ utility. For more details on the algorithm, please
refer to Feigenbaum et al. [121], Shoham and Leyton-Brown [296].
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individuals, the mechanism design perspective does not apply. Further, there is no
provision for an application to a specific domain such Web services and SVNs.
Related to the listed solution concepts, Dutta and Jackson [104] give valuable
insights into link formation in one-sided networks which is highly relevant for the
interconnectedness which is required in this work. The focus of the paper is on
whether the incentives of individuals to add or sever links can lead to pareto effi-
cient networks, thereby applying different allocation functions. Other than that, no
specific points of contact to the co-opetition mechanism and its properties can be
stated.
Recapitulation
It is difficult to utilize the same measures to appraise the above-listed contributions
to literature since they come from entirely different starting points. While Blau et al.
[48], Blau [45] is certainly the closest related work, operating on the same formal-
ization of Web service markets as this thesis (cp. Section 2.2), other approaches
cannot be simply transferred to the SVN scenario, in which not only QoS (covered
by multiattribute procurement auctions), but also the component services’ sequence
plays a crucial role. What is more, none of the related work considers network de-
sign objectives to the extent that is required in the starting phase of a co-opetitive
environment. The literature demonstrates that the co-opetition mechanism’s main
distinguishing factor is its support of network design goals.
On top of the presented lines of research, service composition is also considered
from a technical perspective. Zeng et al. [344] account for both QoS characteristics
and sequence-sensitive service compositions, however, assume complete informa-
tion about the participants’ types. Their maximization approaches are based on
linear programming methods and do not account for any strategic behavior based
on individual utilities. Thus, the mechanism design perspective does not apply.
In Table 4.1, the most relevant related literature is listed and rated according to its
degree of satisfaction regarding the co-opetition mechanism’s requirements stated
in Section 4.1.7 Additionally, other requirements from classic mechanism design as
well as computational tractability are also inserted into the list. Requirements are
sub-divided into network design goals, classic mechanism design desiderata, and
applicability requirements.8 Note that it is not reasonably possible to classify each
of the above-mentioned approaches due to their heterogeneity.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, the basic idea of both the co-opetition mechanism and its novel con-
cept of value distribution – the power ratio – were discussed and accounted for in
detail. Taking a network operator’s point of view, it is essential to sustainably attract
participants in order to establish a functioning business. Thus, incentive engineer-
7Uniqueness as a quite straightforward requirement and cooperational monotonicity are deliberately
omitted in Table 4.1. The latter is closely related to fairness and is thus not listed separately.
8In Table 4.1, MD shall stand for mechanism design. Applic. abbreviates applicability requirements.
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Table 4.1: Requirements satisfaction degree of related approaches ( = fully sat-














































































































s Blau [45] (CSA) # # # # #       
Blau [45] (ITF) # # # G#   G# G#    
Mohabey et al. [228] # # # #   # #   #
Stösser [306] # # # #   G# # # #  
Schnizler [288] # # # #   # # # G# #
Lamparter and Schnizler [203] # # # #   # # #  #
Parkes and Kalagnanam [259] # # # #   G# G# # G# G#
Moulin and Shenker [230] # #  #    # # #  
Myerson [233] # #  #  # # # # # #
Jackson [170] # #  #  # # # # # #
Zeng et al. [344] # # # #  # # #    
This work       G# G#   #
ing plays a crucial role. Mechanism design can tackle this challenge. However, the
SVNs as a particularly co-opetitive and networked environment requires a modifi-
cation of the classic mechanism design notion towards a networked variant called
NMD in which objectives from network design and cooperative game theory take a
central role, partly eclipsing classic economic desiderata.
This notion is reflected in the social choice of the co-opetition mechanism. The
bulk of requirements to be fulfilled are owed to the networked environment and its
co-opetitive nature (cp. Requirements 4.1 to 4.6). Applicability requirements shall
insure a perfect fit to SVNs. Summed up, these objectives lead to a partial constric-
tion of classic mechanism design desiderata. While budget balance and individual
rationality are retained in order to make the mechanism viable in practice, incen-
tive compatibility and allocative efficiency are not explicitly aimed at, however, in
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selected network configurations, the degree of strategic manipulation is clearly lim-
ited as will be shown in Section 7.1.
The essence of the power ratio can be summarized as follows: payments are
not only granted to service owners whose services are actually allocated in a spe-
cific complex service, but also to potential creators of value. Thereby, the PR grants
a percentage of the overall value to be distributed to service providers that keep
ready their resources. The payment is based upon Shapley-style calculus, contain-
ing elements from the extension of the Shapley value to networks. By definition, the
PR inherently meets Requirements 4.2 (Readiness) and 4.4 (Uniqueness) as will be
taken up in Chapter 5.
Based on a comprehensive overview on related work, the co-operation mecha-
nism can be mainly differentiated from four partly heterogeneous fields of research,
three of which are related to mechanism design. First, academic literature recently
started to deal with mechanism design in the relevant field of Web service markets.
Second, multiattribute procurement auctions are related in terms of the auction type
applied. Third, Shapley value mechanisms incorporate the same concept of value
(or cost) distribution. However, most of the approaches ignore network design goals
and applicability for composed and sequence-sensitive service mashups. The forth
line of related research, network games that evolved from solution concepts from
cooperative game theory, fit in terms of the Shapley-style distribution of value and
the coinciding fairness property, yet mechanism design issues and application to
service networks are not part of their scope.
Finally, it remains to be noticed that, in Chapter 4, two of the research questions
of this thesis were addressed. Firstly, in conjunction with the mechanism and net-
work design foundations given in Sections 3.1.4 and 3.2.3, classic mechanism design
was mapped to networked objectives, resulting in the networked mechanism design
perspective (cp. Research Question 2). Secondly, based on Sections 3.1.3 and 3.2.3,
the design objectives of the co-opetition mechanism tailored to suit the requirements




W einhardt et al. [329] and Neumann [240] state that there is no general mech-anism available to fit any possible market setting. In accordance with this
well-established principle, it is necessary to present a suitable mechanism designed
to fit the underlying field of application. The adequacy of a mechanism depends,
amongst others, on the properties of the trading objects. In SVNs, the latter are
modular Web service components as well as the composed complex services result-
ing thereof. There characteristics were discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
Recall that mechanism design is a subfield of game theory that takes over an
engineering perspective [243]. The goal of the mechanism is manifested in a social
choice function that reflects the design objective. The work at hand is concerned
with establishing a functioning business in an early formation phase of a service
value network. In a comprehensive environmental analysis (cp. Section 4.1), re-
quirements for SVNs in their launch phase were set out.
Section 5.1.1 will briefly describe why an auction mechanism is particularly suited
to tackle complex service coordination in distributed environments. Delving deeper,
there are three fundamental components in the design of an auction mechanism
[242, 257]. The bidding language (cp. Section 5.1.2) provides an instrument to for-
malize pieces of information that are exchanged between the mechanism and its
participants (service customer and service providers). Participants in the SVN are
decentralized and act opportunistically according to their self-interest subject to the
necessity to engage in joint value creation. Both parties in SVNs, service customers
and service providers, hold private information on their type – the former in respect
of their preferences for the specific service requested, and the latter concerning their
costs and ability to provide services at a certain quality level.
The information objects disclosed via the bidding language are exchanged dur-
ing the conduction of the auction which consists of the allocation function (cp. Sec-
tion 5.2.2) and the transfer function (cp. Section 5.2.3). The allocation function mainly
comprises an algorithm to determine the component services that are included in
the complex service according to a defined maximization rule. In other words, the
mechanism operator has to solve the problem of allocating a path that connects se-
lected service offers within the SVN, thereby maximizing a predefined goal function.
Money flows exchanged between participants of the mechanisms, which compen-
sate service providers for their actual costs and set incentives that enable the system
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to obtain a “good enough” solution, are determined by the mechanisms’ transfer
function.
After presenting the core mechanism, the co-opetition mechanism’s realization
in terms of algorithmic implementation rounds off this chapter. Section 5.3 also
includes a complexity consideration and the architecture of the agent-based simula-
tion tool that will be applied to evaluate the mechanism in Part III of this thesis.
5.1 Service Selection Via Auctions
As we have seen in Section 2.2.4, forerunners of SVNs are already in their starting
blocks. However, neither current pricing models nor the fashion of service coordi-
nation reflect the agile and distributed nature of the environment the services are
traded in. Generally, pricing is static for the most part, at best allowing for price
discrimination, for instance, with respect to the volume of services traded.1 Such
static pricing does not include situational preferences of service providers.
In related domains, companies have already discovered the potential of auction-
ing their offerings. Auctions are said to perform particularly well in settings where
heterogenous and intangible trading objects are exchanged [300]. For instance, this
potential is taken advantage of by Google with its advertising service AdWords2. In
order to price and allocate ad space, they apply a generalized second-price auction
which incorporates a quality score to classify advertisements [322]. According to
Edelman et al. [107], this ad auction generated 98% of Google’s 2005 revenues.
Recently, the auctioning of services has gained mainstream acceptance with
Amazon’s EC2 Spot Instances3. EC2 Web service capacity that is not directly sold
via Amazon’s traditional price model can be bought at an auction. As long as a
customer’s bid exceeds the current spot price, the EC2 instance can be run. The
spot price changes periodically based on actual supply and demand. Certainly, ter-
mination of used instances is rather unpredictable, however, the model supports
customers that are flexible in terms of execution time. This is a remarkable exam-
ple of how service providers exploit (one-sided) auction settings in order to catch
quickly changing demand, in Amazon’s case, optimizing their capacity utilization.
Section 5.1.1 will focus on an analysis of the applied auction setting in SVNs,
namely multiattribute reverse auctions, thereby cautiously forgoing a general
overview on auction theory.4 Customized to our setting, Section 5.1.2 presents the
bidding language that is designed for the co-opetition mechanism. Further, the auc-
tioning process of the co-opetition mechanism is briefly sketched in Section 5.1.3.




4A comprehensive overview on auction theory can be found in Klemperer [189], Milgrom [227].
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5.1.1 Procurement Auctions in Service Markets
As introduced in Section 2.2, customers approach the service value network with
the objective of procuring a complex service that is tailored to their requirements.
While it maybe possible to procure simple kinds of services “off-the-shelf” by only
negotiating along one dimension – the price – without specifying any attributes that
configure and fix quality of service, this is certainly not true for the kind of complex
services traded in service value networks. Therefore, the trading in SVNs should be
described by means of a multiattribute procurement auction.
In single-sided reverse procurement auctions, a single buyer (the service customer)
receives bids from multiple competing sellers [37, 178, 189]. Multiattributivity, as
introduced to auction design by Che [70] and Branco [53], allows for the negotiation
over non-price attributes by referring to multiple features of a single unit [331].
In Web service scenarios, multiattribute approaches that allow for the negotia-
tion over various non-price attributes that constitute a service’s configuration is of
crucial importance. Particularly in SVNs, where complex services are assembled
from complementary service offerings, a multitude of different service configura-
tions must be handled and aggregated, adding up to a potentially great variety of
complex services offering different QoS. For each of these configurations, the buyer
has a (most likely different) valuation. On this basis, procurement auctions deter-
mine which service providers are to win the auction, which service configuration
has to be provided by them, and which payment has to be made by the service
customer. Importantly, multiattribute procurement auctions allow different service
providers to compete over both attribute values and price. This is a particularly im-
portant feature in the service world where quality has become the main differentia-
tor thanks to quickly decreasing ICT costs and harsh price competition [216, 90, 256].
Due to their complexity, procurement negotiations on multiple services and on
services with multiple attributes have traditionally been conducted manually as re-
quest for quotes (RFQ) or via phone negotiations [41]. However, in the last decade,
electronic auctions in procurement settings have emerged and proven to suit the
problem set remarkably well: today powerful computer networks have brought up
electronic marketplaces that can handle the procurement of multiattribute services
through automated negotiation and the determination of the winning complex ser-
vice [39, 68, 41].
Beall [31] surveyed that by as early as 2002, electronic reverse auctions were
used for an average of approximately 4% of the polled companies’ total spend.
Larger companies already use procurement auctions for more than 25% of their
spend. These numbers were expected to exhibit distinct growth in the following
years. Currently, procurement auctions are mainly applied by companies that seek
to optimize their procurement activities, relying on commercial software as for ex-
ample provided by Ariba5 or i2 Technologies6. Thus, the mechanism operator, or
auctioneer, respectively, and the buyer coincide. However, with emerging market-
places such as SVNs and due to the power of combinatorics of modular Web services
and the effects of the long valley, a procurement mechanism offered to “third party
5http://www.ariba.com/about/
6http://www.i2.com/
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buyers” becomes more and more interesting as a rule set and framework to enable
transactions. Such third party buyers are customers interested in procuring complex
services via a service marketplace.
Academia and practice have brought up different variants of procurement auc-
tions. Besides the multiattribute character, procurement auctions can either be de-
signed for single-unit or for multi-unit settings. In the latter, sellers bid for bundles
and/or are given the possibility to negotiate over volumes [39, 68]. This is not the
case in SVNs where quality, not quantity is in focus: service customers request only
one complex service that is technically interpreted as a single item. That is, the winning
complex service is in fact assembled from the offerings of diverse service providers,
yet the set of required service components and its sequence is fixed. Exactly one
component service out of each candidate pool will be chosen to add up to the com-
plex service requested. Different customer valuations for bundles of services, for
instance, one bundle comprising a service from candidate pools Y1 and Y2 and a
second bundle including services from Y2 and Y3, are not applicable since the buyer
will only procure a complex service that includes a defined sequence of services (e.g.
consisting of the candidate pools Y1, Y2, and Y3, in exactly this sequence), otherwise
its valuation is zero. Thus, a variety of different services is available in the same
market, however, the customer’s valuation and its bidding language is less compli-
cated than in a typical combinatorial auction setting.7 Transferred to SVNs, multi-
attribute auctions allow for expressing preferences over configurations of a specific
complex service rather than over bundles of services as supported by combinatorial
approaches [113].
In general, the reverse character of procurement auctions with multiple units be-
ing allocated can lead to situations where the valuation on the buyer-side (i.e., the
service customer in the SVN setting) is less than the total payments to be made to
the sellers (i.e., service providers) [195]. Parkes and Kalagnanam [259] state that
the multiattribute allocation problem with a single buyer belongs to settings with
two-sided private information. This complicates the determination of the allocated
service providers since, besides the private seller types, market clearance addition-
ally depends on the revealed preferences of the buyer. Therefore, this setting can
be interpreted as a generalization of a single unit, one buyer and one seller bargain-
ing setting [195]. In such a setting, the Myerson-Satterthwaite [239] impossibility
theorem (cp. Therorem 3.1) holds.
In the next section, a bidding language for both service customer and service
provider is introduced which fully captures the multiattribute nature of negotiating
the procurement of complex services in SVNs.
5.1.2 Bidding Language
During auction conduction, information needs to be exchanged between the in-
volved parties. In the following, a bidding language is introduced that is based
on bidding languages for products with multiple attributes [113]. The formalization
is aligned to recent work in multiattribute auction theory [259, 277]. Further, it as-
7Combinatorial auctions are not assessed in more detail in this thesis. For a comprehensive overview
of this kind of auction setting, please refer to Cramton et al. [88].
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sures compliance with the WS-Agreement specification to enable a realization in the
Web [11].
The consumer’s request is not only represented by the very service function-
ality demanded, but also by the service configuration AFl of the complex service
Fl ∈ F.8 The configuration AFl of the complex service is the aggregation of all m̃
attribute values of contributing services in Fl such that AFl = (A1Fl , . . . ,AmFl , . . . ,Am̃Fl)
with AmFl = ⊕vj∈Wl amj . The aggregation operation ⊕ of attribute values depends on
the characteristics of the respective non-functional property. Different exemplary
aggregation functions for service attributes are presented in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Attribute-dependent aggregation functions
Attribute type Aggregation function
Response time (rt) ∑vj∈Wl a
rt
j
Availability (av) ∏vj∈Wl a
av
j
Reputation (rp) 1|Y| ∑vj∈Wl a
rp
j
Throughput (tp) minvj∈Wl a
tp
j
Response time is the time that elapses between service invocation and response
after having successfully completed the task. Since component services within a
complex service are built upon each other, the sum operator needs to be consulted.
Availability is defined as the probability that a service is accessible. Therefore, these
values have to be multiplied in order to computeAavFl . Reputation can be interpreted
as the ranking of a complex service which is typically specified by averaging the
reputation of the involved component services [344]. Throughput is the measure
for the amount of data that can be processed by a service per time unit, therefore
the component service yielding minimal throughput is usually the bottleneck with
respect to the complex service.
The list of aggregation operations in Table 5.1 is not intended to be exhaustive.
As shown in Blau [45], the bidding language also supports more complex aggrega-
tion operations such as logical connectives. The attribute “encryption” is a simple
example, which is aggregated via conjunctions. Assuming that services can exhibit
different encryption algorithm types while the requester demands a special format,
semantic subsumption can be consulted to asses which service components, and
consequently, which complex services fit the customer’s request. Such complex QoS
aspects are briefly covered in Section A.1. In excess thereof, the interested reader is
referred to Lamparter [201], Blau [45].
Basically, the customer defines the very functionality demanded and the ser-
vice attributes of interest to be included.9 Comparability of attribute values
from different attribute types is ensured by introducing a mapping function Ψ
to normalize the attribute values AmFl to an interval [0;1]. Such a normaliza-
tion is required to assess the degree of correspondence of Fl to the service con-
8Recall from Section 2.2.3 that complex services are defined as a tuple Fl := (Wl , E(Wl)).
9For example, by choosing from a range of possible attributes to be factored into the complex service
allocation via an appropriate interface (cp. also Section 8.3).
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sumer’s request. The service customer specifies lower and upper boundaries Γ =(
(γ1B,γ
1










for each attribute type m. γmB denotes the value
of attribute m that results in a zero valuation whereas γmT represents the value of at-
tribute m that yields a maximum fit of 1. If AmFl ≥ γmT , then Ψ(AmFl) = 1. Vice versa,
Ψ(AmFl) = 0 if AmFl ≤ γmB . Ψ(AmFl) is typically assumed to be linear between the upper
and lower boundary, yet could also take any other kind of coherency. Importantly,
the valuation takes place on a complex service level, the customer is not interested
in the performance of a single service, but merely in the QoS of the complex service
requested.
Further, the customer-specific weighting Λ = (λ1, . . . ,λm, . . . ,λm̃), ∑m̃m=1 λm = 1
is reported, defining the requester’s preferences for each attribute type. This co-
herency is depicted in the requester’s scoring function Q which includes all non-
monetary dimensions of the service and maps them onto a single value [16]. That







The customer’s maximum willingness to pay for a perfect complex service α
is the last piece missing in order to fully describe the offered services’ fit to the
customer’s preferences. α is the reservation price for a complex service yielding a
score of 1. Altogether, α, the defined weighings Λ, and the customer-specific lower
and upper boundaries Γ for each service attribute type constitute the customer type
θ ∈ Θ with θ = (α,Γ,Λ).
Definition 5.1 [MULTIATTRIBUTE SERVICE REQUEST]. A multiattribute service re-
quest for a complex service is a vector defined as follows:
(5.2) SR := (YSC,α,Γ,Λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ
)
YSC represents the desired functionality of the service stated in a suitable format specified by
the platform. The maximum customer’s willingness to pay for an optimal service configu-
ration is denoted by α. Γ stands for the lower and upper boundary for each attribute type.
Finally, Λ represents the requester’s preferences for the relevant service attributes.
For simplicity, assume that the service customer states the requested functional-
ity YSC in the form of the previously introduced candidate pools (Y1, . . . ,Yk, . . . ,Yk̃),
with the order of the elements in YSC indicating the order of the services included in
the complex service demanded. Of course, the format specified by the platform can
be different, however, is then to be mapped to the candidate pool logic introduced in
Section 2.2.3. α multiplied by Q(·) defines the substitution rate between a complex
services’ configuration and the requester’s preference.
As soon as the requested functionality has been submitted to the platform in-
termediary, potential services belonging to the respective candidate pools are con-
tacted. As a response, service providers willing to participate in the bidding submit
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their service offers to the intermediary.10 Service offers consist of a service config-
uration Aj and a price bid submitted for a service vj as successor of vi. In other
words, service providers bid to be included in the complex service dependent on
the respective preceding service vi.
Definition 5.2 [MULTIATTRIBUTE SERVICE OFFER]. A multiattribute service offer sub-
mitted by a service provider nh with respect to one of its services vj, σ̄(vj) = nh, consists of
an offered functionality Yk and a bid bij ∈ B with bij = (pij(eij),Aj), vj ∈ Yk, vi ∈ Yk−1,
k ∈ {1, . . . , k̃}:
(5.3) SOij := (Yk, pij(eij),Aj︸ ︷︷ ︸
bij
)
A service provider nh can submit more than one service offer: both interoperabil-
ity with more than one service predecessor and the ownership of more than one ser-
vice that fits the service request result in a set of service offers SOh = {SOij|σ̄(vj) =
nh, vj ∈ Yk, vi ∈ Yk−1, k ∈ {1, . . . , k̃}}. The set of all service offers submitted (that
lead to the customer-specific SVN G including each of the requested functionalites
YSC) shall be denoted as SOG.
To summarize, the multiple service attributes are known a priori and are uncor-
related. As supported by the customer’s upper and lower boundaries Γ of consid-
ered attribute values and the mapping function Ψ(·), each attribute can take an in-
dividual value from a domain of possible values for the attribute, both on customer-
and on provider-side [68]. In total, the multiattribute support of the bidding lan-
guage and the integration of rule-based semantic description techniques11 allows
for the specification, aggregation, and management of complex quality of service
requirements and offerings.
Example 5.1 [BIDDING LANGUAGE AND SCORING FUNCTION]. The following ex-
ample illustrates how different attribute types are aggregated along a path of composed ser-
vice offers in SVNs. It further shows how the set of weights Λ and the upper and lower
boundaries Γ are processed in the calculation.
Consider a mid-size company named uServ which seeks to purchase a “service request
and order management service” that supports its complex customer relationship business
process. The company therefore approaches an SVN, inquiring a solution that (i) handles
service requests and orders in a first step (Y1) and (ii) afterwards confirms the orders (Y2).
Further assume that, besides this very functionality YSC, uServ is mostly concerned with
the availability (av) of the service and its throughput (tp), valuing both attributes equally
(Λ = {0.5,0.5}). Additionally, uServ defines upper and lower boundaries for av and tp
in a certain unit, in this example, assume Γ = ((0.98,1), (75,125)), with γ1 being mea-
sures in percentage, i.e. 0.98 equals 98% availability, and γ2 being measured in Megabits-
per-second (Mbit/s). As uServ is willing to pay α = 100 Euros for a defined amount of
10A more detailed description of the information exchange taking place between the involved parties
can be found in Section 5.1.3.
11Cp. also Section A.1 and Blau [45].
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The platform operator processes uServ’s service request as illustrated in Figure 5.3, re-
sulting in five service offers SOG. Exemplarily, service provider n3’s set of service offers
SO3 assembles as SO3 = (SO13,SO23) with SO13 =
(
Y2,20,{0.998,110}) and SO23 =(


























































































Figure 5.1: Numerical example of a service value network
G yields three instantiations: service v1 combined with service v3 as the first possibility,
service v2 and service v3 as the second alternative, and finally a composition of service v2 and
service v4. So, the set of paths F is defined by F = (F1, F2, F3) with F1 = ({v1,v3},{es1, e13}),
F2 = ({v2,v3},{es2, e23}), and F3 = ({v2,v4},{es2, e24}).
As stated earlier and illustrated in Figure 5.2, it is assumed that the mapping function




as follows for each complex service Fl ∈ F.
(5.4)







Equation (5.4) yields the normalized service configuration. Incorporating Λ, the score
Q(AFl) can finally be computed, which peaks for F3 (cp. Equation 5.5).
(5.5)
Ψ(AF1) = {0.40,0.60} → Q(AF1) = 0.5 · 0.40 + 0.5 · 0.60 = 0.50
Ψ(AF2) = {0.65,0.50} → Q(AF2) = 0.5 · 0.65 + 0.5 · 0.50 = 0.58
Ψ(AF3) = {0.50,0.80} → Q(AF3) = 0.5 · 0.50 + 0.5 · 0.80 = 0.65












(a) uServ’s mapping function













(b) uServ’s mapping function
for different levels of
throughput (tp)
Figure 5.2: Mapping functions for different attribute types
5.1.3 Auction Process Model
In the preceding sections, details of the auction process and the information ex-
change between the involved parties were omitted. In this section, the process is
shown in more detail. Three generic roles as discussed in Section 4.1 are involved.
The service consumer initiates the formation of a specific SVN while the service
providers, formerly registered in the pool of available vendors, bid to be included
in a customer-driven SVN. Those two sides are brought together to conduct busi-
ness by the platform operator. The latter takes over the sub-roles of an auctioneer,
mechanism operator, and service coordinator.
According to Nisan and Ronen [245], two basic auction phases can be distin-
guished - the declaration phase and the execution phase. In the declaration phase, the
necessary information to be exchanged among the participants is gathered. These
information objects represent the participants’ types which are reported in a direct
fashion to the intermediary. To be more precise, the service request submitted by
the service customer is processed by the platform operator which reasons about po-
tentially fitting services from the pool of registered services, for instance, relying on
semantically supported service discovery [249]. Having defined the set of poten-
tial services to participate in the mechanism phase, the service intermediary is able
to plan and form the actual topology of the SVNs and thereupon sends out a call
for bids including additional information on preceding services in order to facilitate
context-dependent bidding (cp. Section 2.2.3). This step concludes the prepara-
tional activities of the declaration phase and lays the basis for the actual matching –
the execution phase.
The execution phase is initiated by the multiattribute service offer submitted by
the owners of candidate services which accepted the call for participation. These
service offers along with the customer’s service request serve as an input for the co-
opetition mechanism. An automated search for the optimal path through the net-
work according to the allocation function introduced in Section 5.2.2 is followed by
the calculation of the transfers among network participants by means of the power-
96 CHAPTER 5. THE CO-OPETITION MECHANISM































fi#ing the SR from 
pool of registered 
services (on a 
functional level)






Figure 5.3: Auction process model: Declaration and execution phase.
Adapted from Blau [45]
ratio based transfer function (cp. Section 5.2.3). After solving the coordination prob-
lem, participants are notified and the actual service delivery (as defined in Section
2.1.2) can be launched. During service delivery (which is cautiously put aside in
the process model), monitoring techniques can be applied such that the platform
operator can cross check the actual outcome and the reported types of the allocated
service providers [283] (cp. also Assumption 5.4 and Section 8.3).
A slight modification of the process shown in Figure 5.3 can be useful in larger
networks. As will be shown in Section 5.3.1, the co-opetition mechanism is in-
tractable. This characteristic can be reduced to the transfer function, while the com-
puting the actual allocation and the price charged for the “winning” complex is only
a matter of seconds (cp. Table 5.3). Therefore, in order to optimize service delivery,
this information may be send out before actually computing the power ratios.
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5.2 Mechanism Implementation
Based on the requirements of the social choice defined in Section 4.1, a mechanism is
introduced that shall reward service providers based on their marginal contribution
to network formation. The mechanism allocates the component services that consti-
tute the winning complex service and distributes payoffs in a manner that is in line
with the social choice. This problem shall be solved by the co-opetition mechanism.
As the mechanism implementation is based on the abstract model of an SVNs
as introduced in Section 2.2.3 and on the bidding language as presented in Section
5.1.2, the co-opetition mechanism is capable of processing service components with
due regard for the complex service’s sequence (cp. Requirement 4.9) and its QoS
characteristics (cp. Requirement 4.10).
5.2.1 Assumptions of the Mechanism
Before presenting the co-opetition mechanism’s implementation, its basic underly-
ing assumptions are stated. First, the co-opetition mechanism shall be centralized.
That is, the entire communication is directed via the mechanism which connects all
agents and is understood as a self-contained (impartial) entity [305].
Assumption 5.1 [CENTRALITY OF THE MECHANISM]. The service customer and all
participating service providers are directly connected to the co-opetition mechanism via a
fault- and tap-proof communication channel.
Second, let us consider the customer-side of the mechanism. In line with a com-
mon assumption in literature (cp. e.g. [195, 259, 45]), a straightforward service cus-
tomer is assumed that will truthfully announce its type to the mechanism. Therefore
strategic acting of the customer is not considered.
Assumption 5.2 [STRAIGHTFORWARD CUSTOMER]. Strategic acting on the customer-
side is faded out.
By the simplifying assumption that the customer reports truthful bids, Theorem
3.1 does not apply any more. That is, if budget balance and individual rationality
are to hold, allocative efficiency must not necessarily be given up.
Assumption 5.3 is located at the service provider-side. Since the power ratio dis-
tributes payoffs to more than the allocated service providers, free-riding becomes
an issue. Service providers could publish “dummy services” which are merely de-
signed to skim power ratios. Therefore, it is required that the services registered
with the platform undergo some verification process before they are eligible for in-
clusion in customer-specific SVNs.
Assumption 5.3 [NO DUMMY SERVICES]. Service provider cannot publish dummy or
mock services that do not exhibit the indicated functionality.
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Finally two general assumptions on the transactions are made. First, consider
quality of service. Technically, an agreement between service provider and service
consumer about the quality to be delivered must be founded on a legal basis, which
is done by specifying a service level agreement (SLA). An SLA is a contract that de-
fines mutual understandings and expectations of a service between service provider
and service consumer [180]. As service providers bid their service configuration
which is aggregated over the service attributes’ values by each service included in a
complex service, the resulting QoS denotes the predefined goal to be fulfilled – that
is, the service level agreed on. Other than in Blau [45], the co-opetition mechanism
does not include an explicit service level enforcement term. It is therefore required
that the platform operator can monitor the delivery of a complex service and is able
to effectively penalize mal- or non-performance with respect to the SLAs made. That
is, service providers that register services with the platform commit themselves to
offering the services at the quoted price and quality and can thus legally be “forced”
to deliver the stated service configuration. For instance, the monitoring concept ap-
plied in TEXO shall be capable of backtracking the responsible services if SLAs are
not met (cp. Section 2.2.4.3).
Assumption 5.4 [SERVICE LEVEL ENFORCEMENT]. Quoted service configurations can
effectively be monitored and penalized in case of mal- or non-performance.
It is further assumed that the volume of trade is not restricted. Other than in rev-
enue management in which consumer behavior is anticipated in order to maximize
profits subject to limited and perishable resources [310], capacity constraints are not
in the focus of the co-opetition mechanism and are deliberately disregarded.
Assumption 5.5 [UNLIMITED SERVICE CAPACITY]. The volume of trade is unrestricted
in the co-opetition mechanism.
5.2.2 Allocation Function
In this vital step of the mechanism, the auctioneer has to solve the problem of allocat-
ing a path F∗ ∈ F that is in line with the desired outcome.12 Let again ∆ = ∑vj∈V δj
be the monetary surplus that is distributed to the set of service providers via the
power ratio. Building upon Section 4.2 (in particular, Equation 4.1), the aggregated
surplus USPF∗ of all service providers owning services in the SVN at hand assembles
as the sum of the utility USOF∗,o of service offers included in F∗ and the utility USOF∗,ō of
services that are not a part of F∗.
Definition 5.3 [AGGREGATED SERVICE PROVIDER UTILITY]. The utility experienced
by the set of service providers contributing to the SVN is assembled by the sum of the utility
USOF∗,o attached to allocated service service offers and the sum of the utility USOF∗,ō attached
to non-allocated service offers. For allocated services, USOF∗,o is the sum of all price bids and
power ratio-based payments net the cost for service provision. Non-allocated services receive
12Again, let F∗ be defined as a tuple F∗ := (W∗, E(W∗)).
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their power ratio-based share only.









Let PF∗ = ∑eij∈E(W∗) pij represent the sum of the price bids submitted by the ser-
vice providers for the inclusion of their component services into the allocated com-
plex service F∗. If PFl was the price of the complex service Fl to be charged from
the customer, its utility would evolve as the service configuration-adapted willing-
ness to pay net of the sum of the submitted prices for the edges included in Fl, i.e.
ŨSCFl = α · Q
(AFl
)−PFl . ŨSCFl is called the service customer’s interim utility that is
created by Fl.
As already argued in Section 4.1, the total payment is collected from the buyer
side. That is, it is assumed that the service customer carries the power ratio-based
surplus.13
Therefore, reserving PF∗ to compensate owners of allocated services for their
costs, at the same time keeping budget balance according to Requirement 4.7 in
mind, monetary resources that amount to ŨSCF∗ are available for a power ratio-based
distribution ∆.





δj = α · Q (AF∗)− ∑
eij∈E(W∗)
pij
Therefore, ŨSCFl can be interpreted as the value or utility UFl complex service Fl
creates in the system, that is, in the customer-specific SVN G.
Definition 5.4 [COMPLEX SERVICE’S UTILITY IN THE SVN]. The utility UFl that a
complex service Fl creates in the SVN is the surplus ∆ it would account for in case of alloca-
tion.





Given an allocated service F∗, the actual welfare W in the system is assembled
by the sum of the customer utility USCF∗ and the aggregated service provider utility
USPF∗ with respect to the allocated complex service F∗. Due to the fact that the co-
opetition mechanism is budget balanced, the platform is neutral in terms of utility
since it neither ploughs money into the network nor withdraws any means from
13From a practical point of view, this is a realistic scenario: the SVN enables the customer to purchase
a tailored complex service according to its multiattribute service request. In addition, the SVN of-
fers dramatically reduced lock-ins, variety, and resilience due to the potential multitude of possible
complex service instances. For a further discussion, please refer to Section 4.1.
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it. Therefore, the utility of the platform operator U POF∗ leaves the welfare unchanged
(and is thus not reflected in W).
















USOF∗ ,ō︸ ︷︷ ︸
USPF∗
From Equation (5.7) and Equation (5.9), we get the following equation:
W =α · Q (AF∗)− ∑
eij∈E(W∗)






=α · Q (AF∗)− ∑
eij∈E(W∗)
cij
However, in line with the standard mechanism design assumption, the mecha-
nism operator that collects the service request and service offers does not have ac-
cess to the allocated service providers’ internal costs as this is private information.
In order to allocate the path to maximize the expected sum of service customer and
provider utility W̃ = Ē(USCF∗ + USPF∗
)
, the platform operator must equalize internal









= α · Q (AF∗)− ∑
eij∈E(W∗)
pij
Based on Equation (5.11), the allocation function o : B ×Θ → F can be formu-
lated as a maximization problem that maps service providers’ bids and the service
customer’s type to a feasible and optimal path F∗ ∈ F. In order to determine this
optimal path, the complex service that maximizes the expected overall utility of the
mechanism participants shall be chosen. W̃ equals the expected service provider and
service customer utility as well as the platform operator utility. The last two utilities
equal zero.
Definition 5.5 [ALLOCATION FUNCTION]. The allocation function o : B×Θ→ F maps
the service providers’ bids and the service customer’s request to a feasible complex service









s.t. UFl ≥ 0 ∀ Fl ∈ F
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If two paths create the same maximum value, one of them is arbitrarily chosen,
that is, ties are arbitrarily broken. The constraint UFl ≥ 0 ∀ Fl ∈ F is required to
guarantee individual rationality of the customer and budget balance at the same
time (cp. Definitions 3.11 and 3.10): if UFl < 0 ∀ Fl ∈ F and an allocation was yet to
be made, either the customer utility would drop below zero or the platform operator
would have to subsidize the transaction.
Example 5.2 [ALLOCATION OF A COMPLEX SERVICE IN THE SVN]. Let us go back
to the exemplary service value network requested by uServ as depicted in Figure 5.1, which
consists of the three service offers F1, F2, and F3. uServ’s preferences and upper and lower
boundaries shall be the same as in Example 5.1. Applying Equations (5.5) and (5.8) the
overall utility provided by each of the three services can be computed.
(5.13)
UF1 = 100 · 0.5− (10 + 20) = 20,UF2 = 100 · 0.58− (10 + 33) = 15,
UF3 = 100 · 0.65− (10 + 30) = 25
According to Equation (5.12), the mechanism will then allocate o = F∗ =
argmax{UF1 ,UF2 ,UF3} = F3. The underlying overall utility UF∗ = UF3 = 25 of the best
path equals the surplus ∆ to be distributed via the power ratio (cp. Example 5.5).
5.2.3 The Power Ratio-based Transfer Function
After defining the allocation function o(·), this section sets the monetary transfers
that will be distributed to the involved service providers. The core idea of the pay-
ment function t(·) to be applied is both a purely allocation-based component t1 and
a component that takes account of the overall contribution of each service to the
specific customer-driven SVN – the power ratio t2. t1 is directly associated with the




pij, if eij ∈ E(W∗)
0, otherwise
The power ratio t2 is the part which shall implement the bulk of the requirements
of the social choice function, capturing and monetizing each service provider’s con-
tribution to the overall customer-specific SVN. More precisely, t2 shall implement
the network design goals formulated in Requirements 4.1 to 4.6. As the power ratio
is based on solution concepts from cooperative game theory, the concept of coali-
tions will be used and adapted in order to measure each service’s marginal contri-
bution to the SVN. As we are working within the bounds of service value networks,
coalitions must must not only be considered as a set of agents, but also and impor-
tantly the network structure needs to be incorporated [170]: coalitions are replaced
by cooperations (cp. Section 3.2.3).
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With respect to a given SVN, S := {S1, . . . ,Sm, . . . ,S|P(V)|}with Sm := (Vm, E(Vm))
denotes the set of all theoretically possible internal cooperations.14
Definition 5.6 [INTERNAL COOPERATION]. Given the set of all service offers SOG that
comprise the links that are present in a customer-specific SVN, the set of internal cooper-
ations S is defined by the power set of V and their respective attached links. Each of the
P(V) = 2|V| elements in S consist of a set Vm of services attached with their actual links
E(Vm).
Example 5.3 [INTERNAL COOPERATIONS]. Again, refer to the SVN G illus-
trated in Figure 5.1. As |V| = 4 services are included in G, 16 internal co-
operations are present. These are assembled as follows: S1 = ∅, S2 = ({v1}),
S3 = ({v2}), S4 = ({v3}), S5 = ({v4}), S6 = ({v1,v2}), S7 = ({v1,v3},{es1, e13}),
S8 = ({v1,v4}), S9 = ({v2,v3},{es2, e23}), S10 = ({v2,v4},{es2, e24}), S11 =
({v3,v4}), S12 = ({v1,v2,v3},{es1, es2, e13, e23}), S13 = ({v1,v2,v4},{es2, e24}),
S14 = ({v1,v3,v4},{es1, e13}), S15 = ({v2,v3,v4},{es2, e23, e24}), S16 = G =
({v1,v2,v3,v4},{es1, es2, e13, e23, e24}).
Since only cooperations that include complete paths are able to generate value,
the set F of complex services shall play a central role when assigning a value to a
cooperation. To this end, the concept of characteristic functions from cooperative
game theory (cp. Section 3.2.1.4) is, in analogy to Jackson [170], adopted and ex-
tended to value functions χ : S →R that represent costs as well as benefits.
First, it is essential that a cooperation Sm that does not include a feasible path is
assigned a value χ(Sm) = 0. Second, as soon as a cooperation yields more than one
path, the path providing the highest value is decisive for the calculation of the value
function. Thus, the assumption of superadditive value or characteristic functions
(as required in the Shapley value and the Myerson value) must be waived in favor
of a weaker constraint. χ((V1 ∪ V2, E(V1) ∪ E(V2))) < χ(S1) + χ(S2), S1,S2 ∈ S is
accepted as long as χ((V1 ∪V2, E(V1)∪ E(V2))) is not smaller than the most valuable









Example 5.4 [ADDED VALUE IN INTERNAL COOPERATIONS]. Consider a random ser-
vice vj that is added to a cooperation S1 with V1 ⊇ W1, S1 ∈ S, F1 ∈ F. Assume that vj
does not account for an additional complex service in (V1 ∪ {vj}, E(V1) ∪ E(vj)). There-
fore vj does not provide any additional value to S1. On the other hand, if vj is added
to a cooperation S2 with V2 ⊇ W2, S2 ∈ S, F2 ∈ F, thereby accounting for a cooperation
S3 = (V2 ∪ {vj}, E(V2) ∪ E(vj)) which yields an additional complex service F3 ∈ F with
χ(F2) < χ(F3), then χ(S3) = max{χ(F2),χ(F3)} = χ(F3).
14Recall from Section 2.2.3 that E(Vm) :=
{
eij ∈ E|vi,vj ∈ Vm ∪ {vs}
}
. E(vj) ⊂ E(Vm) was defined as
the set of incoming links that are reasonably associated to a service vj within Vm.
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In line with Definition 5.4, the value function χ of a complex service Fl ∈ F is set
as the service configuration-adapted willingness to pay of the service customer net
of the sum of the submitted internal prices for the edges included in Fl:





Thus, the customer service request SR and the service providers’ offers SOG are
fully included into the value that is generated by Fl. This gives rise to a third require-
ment for the value function: if a cooperation Sm yields one or more complex services,
however, each of them generates a customer utility less than zero, χ(Sm) = 0 shall
hold. Thus, such a cooperation and cooperations which do not yield any path are
treated equally by χ.
Based on Equations (5.15) and (5.16), the value function χ ∈ X for any internal
cooperation Sm ∈ S can be precisely defined. X denotes the set of all possible value
functions.
Definition 5.7 [VALUE FUNCTIONS OF COOPERATIONS IN THE SVN]. The value
function χ : S → R maps any Sm ∈ S to the real numbers, representing the worth of the
internal cooperation in terms of how much value or utility this cooperation creates for the
system. χ must be defined on G and any of its subsets Sm ∈ S, requiring χ(∅) = 0, χ(Sm) =
0 if Vm 6⊇Wl ∀Fl ∈ F, χ(Sm) = 0 if UFl < 0 ∀Wl ⊆Vm, Fl ∈ F, and χ(Sm) = maxWl⊆Vm UFl







UFl , if ∃Wl ⊆ Vm, Fl ∈ F,Sm ∈ S ∧ UFl ≥ 0
0, if 6 ∃Wl ⊆ Vm, Fl ∈ F,Sm ∈ S
0, if UFl < 0 ∀Wl ⊆ Vm, Fl ∈ F,Sm ∈ S
In order to determine the power ratio of each of the |V| services in the SVN G ∈G,
a function φ : G× X→Rn with φj(G,χ) ∈R is defined for each service vj ∈ V. Each
service that generates a positive value, i.e. α · Q(AFl
)
> PFl holds for at least one
complex service the respective service is a part of, is considered vital in at least one
instantiation of the customer request.
Incorporating Equation (5.17) and the concept of considering each sub-network
Sm ∈ S of G into Equation (3.7), or Equation (3.10), respectively, Equation (5.18)
yields the power ratio of service vj.
For all internal cooperations Sm ∈ S a service vj can (theoretically) be part of, the
rightmost term takes a positive value whenever vj is pivotal to Sm. It measures the
service’s marginal contribution to the considered internal cooperation. This value is
weighted by the probability γSm of the underlying cooperation to form consulting
the logic introduced by Shapley [292].15
15For a detailed interpretation and exemplary calculations of the combinatorics in Equation (5.19),
please refer to Section 3.2.1.3.
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(|Vm| − 1)! · (|V| − |Vm|)!
|V|!
S−jm denotes the tuple in which vj and E(vj) are excluded from Sm. That is, S
−j
m =
(Vm \ {vj}, E(Vm) \ E(vj)). Recall from Section 2.2.3 that the set of all reasonable
linkages of a service vj within a cooperation Sm ∈ S is denoted E(vj). As soon as a
service vj is included in a cooperation Sm, E(vj) is also added.
Consequently, each of the services vj ∈ V is compensated amounting to their
power ratio as the second component of the transfer function:
(5.20) Φ(G,χ) := (φ1, ...,φn)
Definition 5.8 [TRANSFER FUNCTION]. The power ratio-based transfer function (PRTF)
for any vj ∈ V consists of a directly allocation-dependent component t1j and a component t2j
that accounts for the overall network view based on Shapley-style calculus:




pij + φj, if vj ∈W∗, eij ∈ E(W∗)
φj, otherwise
Transferred to the service provider level, Equation (5.21) consequently evolves














In case of an SVN that offers feasible paths, yet none of them provides a positive
utility (i.e. χ(Sm) = 0 ∀ Sm ∈ S), each of the service providers receives a payment
Th = 0. In such a case, we face a trivial game [74].
It is important to note that one basic difference between the Myerson value and
the power ratio is the configuration of the value function (cp. Equations 5.15 and
5.17). For the reader’s convenience, the path-oriented computation of the value
function shown in Equation (5.17) is not defined as a variant of χ, as for instance
done in Jackson [170] by introducing monotonic covers of the value function, but is
directly included in χ ∈X. This circumstance must be kept in mind when evaluating
the co-opetition mechanism in Part III of this thesis: the specialized χ ∈ X as defined
in this section differs from the general value function introduced in Section 3.2.1.4.
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Example 5.5 [CALCULATION OF TRANSFER FUNCTION]. Again, reconsider Examples
5.1 and 5.2. Since F∗ = F3, its involved services v2 and v4 are both compensated amounting
to their bid prices in the first place (cp. Equation 5.14). Additionally, ∆ = χ(F3) = 25 is dis-
tributed via the power ratio. Equations (5.18) and (5.19) yield Φ = (3.75,8.75,6.25,6.25).
Exemplarily, the computation of φ4 is shown in detail. Service v4 can be part of eight internal
cooperations (cp. Example 5.3) as listed in the equation below.
φ4 =
[(































































It is obvious that service v4 is pivotal in four of a total of eight internal cooperations
it is part of. For instance, v4 is pivotal for S15, decreasing its value from χ(S15) = 25
to χ(S−415 ) = χ((V15 \ {v4}, E(V15) \ E(v4))) = 15, when “leaving” it, that is, in other
words, if v4 was not present. This difference is then weighted by the cooperation’s probability
to form. The calculation of the other services’ power ratios is carried out analogically.
Altogether, applying Equation (5.21), the owners n2 and n4 of the allocated services v2
and v4 receive their price bid and their PRTF, mounting up to T2 = t2 = 10 + 8.75 = 18.75
Euros and T4 = t4 = 30 + 6.25 = 36.25 Euros, respectively. Non-allocated services (and
thus, their owners) only receive their PRTF share, i.e. service provider n1 is granted a pay-
ment of T1 = t1 = 3.75 Euros and vendor v3 obtains T3 = t3 = 6.25 Euros. Consequently,
uServ is charged ps2 + p24 + χ(F3) = 65 Euros for the requested complex service.
5.3 Realization
As this work is primarily on networked mechanism design, its focus is not put upon
computational issues. Nevertheless, computational complexity can become a prob-
lem in terms of the applicability of a mechanism, particularly in settings where the
outcome needs to be determined at runtime [245]. To this end, both the allocation
and the transfer rule of the co-opetition mechanism are evaluated with respect to
their complexity and potential for optimization in Section 5.3.1. In this connection,
their algorithmic implementations are illustrated. Section 5.3.2 gives an overview of
the agent-based simulation tool which will be utilized in Part III of this thesis.
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5.3.1 Outcome Rule: Algorithms & Complexity
As stated in Section 3.1.5, complexity may have diverse sources. The weightiest
determinants of the co-opetition mechanism’s complexity are the computation of
the winning path, that is, the allocation of a complex service (cp. Section 5.3.1.1),
and the calculation of payments made to each of the |V| services in the SVN, that is,
the transfer function (cp. Section 5.3.1.2).
As a preparation for the following complexity analyses and proposed optimiza-
tion possibilities, recall the definitions of polynomial and NP-complete mechanisms
given in Section 3.1.5 (Definitions 3.15 and 3.16).
5.3.1.1 Allocation Function
This section gives an overview of the allocation algorithm and indicates its complex-
ity. In order to extract the path that maximizes the allocation function (cp. Definition
5.5), the set of all available complex services F, that is, paths within the SVN, need
to be found and attached with their value functions χ(Fl) for all Fl ∈ F. To this end,
depth-first search (DFS) [313] is applied. Figure 5.4 illustrates how the concept of
DFS is applied to the procedure of extracting the set of all available paths F of an
SVN, thereby (i) finding the best path F∗ and (ii) attaching a value function χ(Fl) to
each determined path Fl.
Assume that |V| = n and an equal number of services |Yk| for all k ∈ {1, . . . , k̃}
per candidate pool Yk. For notational simplicity, let |Yk| = x and |Y| = y. In a fully
intermeshed SVN, the total number of paths to be extracted evolves as follows:
(5.23) |F| = xy
In line with Korf [194] and analogically true for SVNs as the underlying graph,
the complexity of DFS is in O(xy). Since the space used by DFS grows only as the
logarithm of the time required, in practice DFS is time-critical rather than space-
critical [194]. Other than purely allocation-based transfer functions, the power ratio
requires the value function for each and every path in the SVN. Therefore, the com-
putation of prices and service configurations cannot be cut short in case of unam-
biguously “dominated” paths as for example possible when the DFS is applied to
search for distinct nodes, using procedures such as the Dijkstra algorithm [96].16
5.3.1.2 Transfer Function
In order to analyze the PR-based transfer function’s complexity, focus is put upon
the power ratio, which is obviously the most severe source of complexity within the
transfer function. The distribution of t1 does not yield any additional complexity as
its recipients were already determined in the allocation function.
16Note that the Dijkstra algorithm in conjunction with the aggregation of service attributes would
yield suboptimal results in case of non-monotonic aggregation types such as min, max, or Boolean
operations. Such aggregation cannot be decomposed into sub-problems and optimized partially
according to Bellman’s Principle of Optimality [33]. However, since cutting dominated (partial)






Set vs as CurrentNode. 
(CurrentPath starts with sink
node)
Select a previously non-visited 
subsequent node of CurrentNode. 
Set it as CurrentNode and add it 
to CurrentPath






Remove CurrentNode from CurrentPath and 
set the next node as CurrentNode




CurrentNode = vs ?
false
true
Set BestPathValue = 0
CurrentPathValue >
BestPathValue ?









Set CurrentPathValue = 0
Figure 5.4: Application flow of the co-opetition mechanism’s allocation function.
The diagram is aligned to the flowchart notation.
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Let us at first consider the complexity of the PR calculations in case of naively
discovering each possible internal cooperation Sm ∈ S with |S| = P(V). Assuming
that |V| = n, the PR can be computed as follows:
(PR1’) The set of internal cooperations needs to be assembled and valued according
to the value function. The complexity of this computation evolves as follows:
(5.24) |S| = P(V) = 2n
(PR2’) Based on (PR1’), the power ratio for each of the n services is computed.
Equation (5.24) shows that, applying the power ratio disregarding the underly-
ing network structure, the identification of cooperations and the allocation of a value
function for each of them requires 2n operations. Since (PR2’) is linear in its input,
only requiring n steps, the complexity of the PR computation adds up toO(2n). This
complexity equals the complexity of the calculation of the Shapley value, originat-
ing from finding and valuing all possible coalition that can be formed – without any
restrictions in respect of underlying network topologies.
However, when computing the PR, it is possible to harness the structure of ser-
vice value networks. Only cooperations that include at least one service out of each
candidate pool can create a positive value (cp. Figure 5.5). Therefore, in the course
of creating the set of internal cooperations, the ones that would be assigned a zero
value – that is, those which entirely lack at least one candidate pool’s service – can
be neglected. The flowchart depicted in Figure 5.6 shows the algorithm of the com-
putation of the PR.
Set of internal 
cooperations S
Set of internal co-
operations Svalue that 
include at least one path
Set of paths F
Figure 5.5: Interrelation of the set of internal cooperations, value creating internal
cooperations, and paths
Again assume |Yk| for all k ∈ {1, . . . , k̃} per candidate pool Yk and |Yk|= x, |Y|=
y. Further assume a worst case scenario with respect to complexity, that is a fully
intermeshed SVN (cp. Section 2.2.3). From the allocation function, the set of all
|F| = xy available complex services F and their value functions χ(Fl) for all Fl ∈ F
are available.
(PR1) According to Equation (5.18), not only paths need to be attached with value
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(cp. Figure 5.4)
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Select next network node and set it 
as CurrentNode
Select an internal cooperation Sm that 
contains CurrentNode and contains at 
least one path
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Figure 5.6: Application flow of the power ratio computation. The diagram is
aligned to the flowchart notation.
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= (2x − 1)y
The detailed calculation of |Svalue| can be found in Section A.3. Based on the
allocation function, the value functions for the set Svalue are computed.
(PR2) Based on (PR1), the power ratio for each of the n services is computed.
Thus, the identification of value-creating cooperations in Equation (5.25) is the
most severe source of complexity, yielding O((2x − 1)y). For a rising number of ser-
vices per candidate pool, O((2x − 1)y) → O((2x)y) = O(2x·y). Since n = x · y, the
PR is in the same complexity class than the naive calculation of the PR (cp. Equa-
tion 5.24): it also exhibits exponential complexity in the number of service offers.
Still, by singling out zero-value cooperations at runtime, noticeable differences in
the computation of the PR compared to the complexity of Shapley value computa-
tions in networks that do not exhibit the SVN characteristics can be observed. The
reduction of required operations heavily depends on the parameterizations of x and
y. Table 5.2 summarizes the results for different configurations.
Table 5.2: Savings in the number of computations if zero-value cooperations are
singled out at runtime compared to the computation of every possible coopera-
tion
Configuration y=2,x=2 y=2,x=4 y=2,x=6 y=3,x=3 y=4,x=4 y=5,x=5
|S| 16 256 4096 512 65536 33554432
|Svalue| 9 225 3969 343 50625 28629151
Savings 43.8% 12.1% 3.10% 33.0% 22.8% 14.7%
Thus, by singling out zero-value cooperations at runtime, savings concerning
the number of cooperations to be determined can be realized, which in turn affects
the algorithm’s runtime. However, with rising x, the complexity of the algorithm
quickly approaches O(2x·y) =O(2n).
5.3.1.3 Implications for the Mechanism Implementation
Merging the complexity of the allocation function O(xy) and of the transfer func-
tion O(2n), the mechanism implementation exhibits exponential complexity and is,
therefore, intractable. This result is in line with Deng and Papadimitriou [94] who
state that Shapley-style calculations involve all subsets of the considered agents,
or services, respectively, and are therefore NP-complete. Simplified variants of the
Shapley value, as proposed by Deng and Papadimitriou [94], which only consider
17∑xi=1 (
x
i ) sums up the number of different combinations of services within one candidate pool, at
least including one service and without considering duplicates and the sequence of services. This is
done for all |Y| candidate pools to make sure that at least one service per candidate pool is available
in each cooperation.
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coalitions of two agents, can be computed in polynomial time, yet are not trans-
ferrable to SVN environments.
Applying the Shapley value and its derivates in environments with scarce com-
putational resources, approximation methods come into play. In this connection,
two major criteria must be considered: speed and the approximation error [117].
The multilinear extension of the Shapley value provided by Owen [254] turns out
to be quite weak in terms of its error. Fatima et al. [117] recently presented a dif-
ferent approximation algorithm based on randomization whose complexity is also
linear, yet the approximation error is, on average, lower than in Owen [254]. Both
algorithms are designed for voting games, that is, the simplest form of the Shapley
value [293]. Such voting games usually include a large number of individuals such
that the computation of the exact Shapley value can quickly become infeasible in
terms of required computation time [117].
In this thesis, computational issues are cautiously put aside based on the as-
sumption of a quite small number of services per candidate pool in the initial phase
of an SVN. Analyzing the variety of service components available at AppExchange
approximately five years after it was launched, this assumption seems to be realistic:
for instance, by May 2010, AppExchange listed 15 Web services that are concerned
with project management, which would be likely to again split into different candi-
date pools as to their variational functionality.18
In such smaller sets of available services, the computational effort of determining
the power ratio of all contributing services is within reasonable limits. To conclude
with, a runtime analysis is performed that tests the allocation and transfer algo-
rithms in various network configurations, assuming the presence of four service at-
tribute types with different underlying aggregation functions analogue to Table 5.1.
On the other hand, a rather undemanding customer is modeled such that preferably
every path in the network exhibits a positive value.19 Moreover, the test is run in a
fully intermeshed SVN. Both aspects lead to situation that is close to the worst case
assumption. All simulations were run on an Intel Core 2 processor (2.33 GHz) with
2 GB RAM, Windows Vista and Java 1.6. Table 5.3 lists the computation time aver-
aged over 100 runs for allocation and transfer function subject to different network
configurations, which are the driver of complexity.
From the results shown in Table 5.3, the exponential complexity of the PR calcu-
lation becomes apparent once again – compared to that, the runtime of the allocation
function is negligible. In smaller topologies such as (2,5), (3,3), or (4,3) the average
computation time of the PR for all services in the network remains within the small
digits of seconds. However, in larger topologies, the computation of the PR for all
services quickly advances to the time scale of minutes, e.g. 4.8 min in case of (2,10).
Therefore, an accurate approximation of the power ratio – and thereby a computa-
tional mechanism design approach as introduced in Section 3.1.5 to the co-opetition
mechanism is certainly a relevant field of further research (cp. also Section 8.2). In
18http://sites.force.com/appexchange/results?type=Apps&filter=
a0L30000001Qp82EAC&sort=6, accessed at 05/22/2010.
19That is, the customer exhibits a high willingness to pay and low upper and lower boundaries for
service quality attributes (cp. Section 5.1.2).
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particular, it will be challenging to achieve tractability and at the same time retain
the co-opetition mechanism’s desirable properties.
5.3.2 Architecture of the Agent-Based Simulation Tool
To conclude the realization part of this work, the architecture of the agent-based
simulation tool is presented. This Java-based program was specifically designed
and implemented to evaluate the co-opetition mechanism’s properties whenever an
analytic approach is not applicable due to a multitude of variable factors. As a rem-
edy, numerical simulations provide a useful means to analyze particular properties
of a mechanism through the random generation of multiple problem sets. Especially
if agents face large strategy spaces, which dramatically complicates the determina-
tion of theoretical solutions, the assignment of agent-based simulations has proven
to be a promising approach to solve complex, real-world problems [179, 50? ].
The class diagram depicted in Figure 5.7 shows the high-level infrastructure of
the simulation tool. In general, the architecture can be divided into five components
which are again twofold. On the one hand, as a foundation for the agent-based sim-
ulation, the Repast 3 toolkit is consulted.20 Applying Repast, each active component
in the evaluated system can be modeled as an agent whose actions can be specified
individually in order to simulate their interplay [246]. On the other hand, four com-
ponents were specifically designed and implemented in order to provide a tailored
architecture for the simulation-based analysis of desired properties in service value
networks.
The Repast component supports the basic functions of the simulation. The class
DefaultNode is used to implement a node in a graph, that is, an agent, while De-
faultEdge creates relations between them. SimpleModel initializes and coordinates
























Figure 5.7: Architecture of the agent-based simulation tool
the simulation. BasicAction is the abstract base class for any action of agents to be
modeled in the simulation.
The Simulation component defines the core of the simulation part of the architec-
ture. In NetworkModel, the settings of the simulation to be conducted are config-
ured. NodeAction includes the concrete action sets that are attached to the agents. In
this thesis, such actions are the choice of a distinct market to enter and the bidding
strategy of an agent. In this connection, the Fitness class is responsible to handle
learning algorithms if applicable. Therein, computerized agents can learn their sur-
roundings and the space of feasible solutions subject to an implemented learning
behavior.
The Network component of the architecture defines and concretizes the SVN
structure. MultiEdge and MultiNode extend the Repast basic classes DefaultEdge
and DefaultNode. Here, agents are defined with respect to their service configura-
tion and their costs. The nodes and egdes (that is, the service providers and their
linkages) are saved in the Graph class, which must at least contain source vs and
sink v f . Using the GraphFactory, different SVN network configurations defined by
the respective input parameters can be set. For instance, the number of candidate
pools and included services, the degree of linkage, or the customer’s type is deter-
mined here. Finally, NetworkPath saves all relevant information on complete paths,
that is, complex services within the initialized SVN.
The actual co-opetition mechanism calculations are done in Allocation & Transfer
Function. PRCalculator is the main class of the calculator component (cp. Figure 5.6),
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the calculation of the value of available paths and the determination of the winning
complex service is done via depth-first search in the AllocationPathValue class (cp.
Figure 5.4).
Finally, the output of the simulation is created in the Output component. The
class DataRecord defines the output format of the simulation data. Among trivial
settings as for instance places after the comma, further consolidation on the data is
made within this component if applicable.
The above-introduced agent-based simulation tool is applied in two major eval-
uation efforts in this thesis. On the one hand, Section 6.4 utilizes an agent-based
simulation in order to evaluate the co-opetition mechanism’s ability to foster net-
work growth and to set incentives for service providers to join the SVN. On the
other hand, the classic mechanism design properties allocative efficiency, incentive
compatibility, and individual rationality are analyzed numerically (cp. Chapter 7).
5.4 Summary
Chapter 5 introduced the co-opetition mechanism implementation, thereby repre-
senting the central part of this thesis. The concrete allocation and transfer function
of the co-opetition mechanism, designed in order to fulfill the requirements imposed
in a thorough environmental analysis, addressed the central research question of
this work:
Research Question 4 ≺IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CO-OPETITION MECHANISMÂ.
How can the co-opetition mechanism be implemented to meet both requirements from net-
work design and from classic mechanism design subject to its ability to handle multiattribute
and sequence-sensitive complex services?
As a solution to Research Question 4, the power ratio was introduced as the key
of the co-opetition mechanism, which shall set suitable incentives to enable the re-
alization of the network design goals. The PR embodies the vision of distributing
value in commercial service networks by rewarding all potential value creators, not
only the “best” ones. Based on the formalization of SVNs, a multiattribute bidding
language aligned with recent approaches put forth by procurement auction liter-
ature [259, 277], and facilitating an integration of rule-based semantic description
techniques [201, 45], the co-opetition mechanism is capable of processing sequence-
sensitive composite services and of handling complex QoS aspects.
An analysis of the core algorithms and their complexities found that the co-
opetition mechanism is intractable. However, the scope of application and some
points of optimization enable an application in SVNs notwithstanding the exponen-
tial complexity that is inherent to the transfer function.
Theoretic results that directly follow from the mechanism implementation in
terms of the social choice shall be conclusively recapitulated below.
• Requirement 4.2 is directly reflected by the power ratio: service providers
are rewarded for standing by with their service offer – even if non-allocated.
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Thereby, the availability of incentives for service providers to be continuously
prepared for service delivery is secured.
• Moreover, Requirement 4.4 can be confirmed after introducing the co-opetition
mechanism: as it is based upon Shapley-style calculus, a clearly defined
allocation-based component, and an exact computation of the outcome rule,
uniqueness is universally guaranteed.
• By design, the co-opetition mechanism also fulfills budget balance (cp. Re-
quirement 4.7). Generally, a mechanism is budget balanced if allocation and
transfer rule can be realized without external subsidies. This is the case in the
co-opetition mechanism: the payment made by the service customer is entirely
distributed to the set of service providers. The first component of the transfer
function assures that allocated service providers receive their price bids pij
while the service customer pays ∑eij∈E(W∗) pij (cp. Definition 5.8). Addition-
ally, the power ratio grants ∆ = α · Q (AF∗)−∑eij∈E(W∗) pij among all services
vj ∈ V. This surplus is also fully distributed by the construction of the PR as
will be shown in Section 6.1.1. Since this premium is also borne by the ser-
vice customer, additional payments to back up the monetary flows between
the two market sides are not required.
• Eventually, as already stated above, Requirements 4.9 and 4.10 that are neces-
sary to ensure the applicability of the mechanism in SVNs are also met by the
underlying model (cp. Section 2.2) and bidding language (cp. Section 5.1.2).








T his chapter evaluates the network design objectives that take up the largestpart of the co-opetition mechanism’s social choice (cp. Figure 4.1). The eval-
uation of network design objectives will both consult formal proofs and numerical
simulations. The latter are consulted if analytic approaches are not reasonable due
to the transfer function’s complexity.
Focussed on the power ratio, Section 6.1 analytically shows that the co-opetition
mechanism is fair in a game theoretic sense, thereby proving efficiency, symmetry,
additivity, and the dummy property (cp. Requirement 4.3). As a direct result from
fairness [340], Section 6.2 briefly shows that cooperational monotonicity is fulfilled as
well (cp. Requirement 4.5). The third analytical proof given in Section 6.3 reveals
that the co-opetition mechanism does not only induce a fully intermeshed SVN,
which is the highest possible degree of interconnectedness (cp. Requirement 4.6), but
also retains these linkages as an individually stable result, that is, as a Nash equilib-
rium.
Recall that above-listed properties are considered given the characteristics of
value functions in SVNs as introduced in Section 5.2.3: for each internal coopera-
tion Sm ∈ S, the complex service Fl ∈ F that maximizes UFl accounts for Sm’s value
function χ(Sm) ∈ X. Fairness, cooperational monotonicity, and interconnectedness
of services shall be understood subject to value functions out of the set X that comply
with this requirement.1 That is, subject to the application scenario of SVNs, network
games (G,χ) with G ∈G and χ ∈ X will be analyzed.2
Finally, Section 6.4 thoroughly studies the co-opetition mechanism’s ability to
foster network growth on service provider side (cp. Requirement 4.1). To this end,
an agent-based simulation is set up which shows that the co-opetition mechanism
efficiently incentivizes vendors to join the SVN. This evaluation is conducted by
comparing the power ratio-based transfer function to an appropriate benchmark
that equally distributes the generated value among allocated service providers.
Note that the two remaining network design objectives, namely readiness to de-
liver (cp. Requirement 4.2) and uniqueness (cp. Requirement 4.4) are fulfilled by the
very construction of the power ratio which was shown in Section 5.4.
1Cp. also Equation (5.15).
2Cp. also Definition 3.26.
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The proofs and simulations conducted in this chapter consult (i) the notation
of the SVN formalization introduced in Section 2.2.3 and (ii) the bidding language
and further notation used for defining the co-opetition mechanism’s allocation and
transfer function (cp. Sections 5.1 and 5.2).3
6.1 Fairness
Requirement 4.3 states that the co-opetition mechanism shall be fair in a game theo-
retic sense. Due to the application of the power ratio, which was discussed in detail
in Sections 4.2 and 5.2.3, a fair distribution of value plays a weighty role: since the
rewarded service providers constitute a superset of the allocated ones, transfers are
required to be perceived as fair by all participants in order to kiss awake their very
willingness to join the SVN.
As discussed in Section 3.2.3.1, cooperative game theory put forth plenty of ax-
ioms whose combination results in a fair value distribution. Such a set of properties
was proposed by Shapley [292], comprising efficiency, symmetry, additivity, and the
dummy axiom (cp. Definitions 3.30 to 3.33), which, taken together, sum up to fair-
ness [340, 149, 74, 289]. The originally postulated forms of the Shapley value and
the Myerson value are in fact fair, however the modifications made in this thesis to
construct the power ratio require a reassessment of the fairness properties.4
Recall from Definition 5.8 that the transfer function t of the co-opetition mech-
anism is sub-divided into two components: t1 accounts for compensating the allo-
cated service providers for their costs and is therefore – via the allocation function –
only indirectly dependent on the value functions that are assigned to cooperations.
It is the power ratio t2 which accounts for a distribution of monetary means to those
service providers that have their offering ready. The worth of this readiness is quan-
tified by the monetized marginal contribution of services to available cooperations.
Therefore, value functions are directly referred to, which allows for a restriction of
the fairness evaluation to t2. This restriction will be revisited in Section 6.1.5.
In the current section, the fairness properties as named above will be analytically
evaluated.
6.1.1 Efficiency
As introduced in Definition 3.30, efficiency requires the full yield of the game to
be distributed [292]. Transferred to service value networks, the value of the game
equals max
Fl∈F






3In particular, recall that Sm = (Vm, E(Vm)) and S
−j
m = (Vm \ {vj}, E(Vm) \ E(vj)).
4Cp. Section 5.2.3, in particular, Definition 5.7.
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Theorem 6.1 [EFFICIENCY OF THE POWER RATIO]. The power ratio is efficient in any
network game (G,χ), that is, the value available in the network is precisely redistributed.
Proof 6.1. Considering the cooperation that equals the full SVN G, we can directly conclude




since G must necessarily include the most valuable complex service F∗ ∈ F with χ(F∗) =













The power ratio, based on Shapley-style calculus, fulfills such efficiency by construction.
This can be nicely shown by consulting a slightly different interpretation of the Shapley-style
calculations akin to Examples 3.3 and 3.5: in order to clarify the logic of the Shapley value,
scholars oftentimes refer to an intuitive way of its calculation that bases on considering all
|V!| possible permutations Π = {π1, . . . ,πr, . . . ,πr̃} of V = {v1, . . . ,vj, . . . ,vn}, r̃ = |V|!,
with the underlying assumption that each of these permutations is equally likely [278, 160].
Thereby, f j(πr) shall denote the marginal contribution that vj yields to πr.
Table 6.1: Efficiency of the power ratio
v1 . . . vn V
π1 f1(π1) . . . fn(π1) ∑vj∈V f j(π1) = χ(G)
... . . . . . . . . . . . .
πr̃ f1(πr̃) . . . fn(πr̃) ∑vj∈V f j(πr̃) = χ(G)
Sum ∑
πr∈Π
f1(πr) . . . ∑
πr∈Π
fn(πr) r̃ · χ(G)
φj(·) 1|V|! ∑
πr∈Π
f1(πr) . . . 1|V|! ∑
πr∈Π
fn(πr) 1|V|! · r̃ · χ(G) = χ(G)
Looking at the rightmost column of Table 6.1, it is obvious from the design of the value
function (cp. Equation 6.2) that each of the permutations must be assigned χ(G) regardless
of the sequence of services within V. Akin to the normalization of the sum of single service’s
marginal contribution by |V|! = n! = r̃, the sum of the aggregated services’ contributions
must also be normalized, which equals the result demanded in Equation (6.3).
Let us consider this logic analytically: by rearranging Equation (5.19), the left-hand side
of Equation (6.3) can be rewritten as follows:
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γ∗Sm ∈N+ denotes the factor that relates internal cooperations to permutations by multi-
plying marginal contributions Sm that include vj by their number of occurrence in different
permutations πr ∈ Π. Since, in this case, the marginal contribution is not indexed via in-
ternal cooperations, but via all possible permutations Π as shown in Table 6.1, the value
function needs to be updated to a function that is able to process different sequences of V. As
introduced above, this function is denoted f j(πr). Thus, based on Equation (6.4),





In Equation (6.5), the sums can be switched since they are not interrelated.







By Equation (6.2), the marginal contributions of all services equal χ(G), since the best
path is included by any means. Thus, Equation 6.6 can be simplified as shown in Equation
(6.7) and yields the desired result.
(6.7) φj(G,χ) = 1|V!| |V!| · χ(G) = χ(G)
¤
6.1.2 Symmetry
The symmetry characteristic requires that if two services exhibit perfectly substitu-
tive roles, i.e. contribute the exact same value to each of the cooperations, they need
to be granted the same share of the distributed value (cp. Definition 3.31). More
formally, two services vi ∈ V and vj ∈ V are symmetric regarding the network game
(G,χ) if they yield exactly the same marginal contribution to each cooperation:
χ((Vm∪{vi}, E(Vm) ∪ E(vi))) = χ((Vm ∪ {vj}, E(Vm) ∪ E(vj)))(6.8)
∀ Sm ∈ S : {vi,vj} 6⊂ Vm, {E(vi), E(vj)} 6⊂ E(Vm)
In the narrow sense, symmetric services in SVNs must thus offer the same func-
tionality, configuration, and prices.5 As a result, vi and vj are required to receive the
same payoff. Only looking at the power ratio, it follows that:
5This statement is bound to the requirement that symmetric services yield exactly the same marginal
contribution to each internal cooperation. Still, in fully intermeshed SVNs that, for example, in-
clude only services that offer the very same price and quality, each and every service technically is
symmetric, although not offering the same functionality (cp., for instance, Theorem 6.7).
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(6.9) t2i = t
2
j ⇔ φi(·) = φj(·)
Theorem 6.2 [SYMMETRY OF THE POWER RATIO]. The power ratio is symmetric in any
network game (G,χ), yielding φi(G,χ) = φj(G,χ) for any two symmetric services vi ∈ V
and vj ∈ V.
Proof 6.2. By symmetry, based on Equation (6.8), the following equation holds:
χ(S−im1) =χ(S
−j
m2) ∀ Sm1 ∈ S : vi ∈ Vm1 , E(vi) ∈ E(Vm1)(6.10)
∧∀ Sm2 ∈ S : vj ∈ Vm2 , E(vj) ∈ E(Vm2)
By Equation (6.8), |{Sm1 ∈ S|vi ∈ Vm1 , E(vi) ∈ E(Vm1)}| = |{Sm2 ∈ S|vj ∈
Vm2 , E(vj) ∈ E(Vm2)}|, and thus, each of the elements of the set {Sm1 ∈ S|vi ∈Vm1 , E(vi) ∈
E(Vm1)} has a corresponding element in {Sm2 ∈ S|vj ∈Vm2 , E(vj) ∈ E(Vm2)} with γSm1 =

















As introduced in Definition 3.32, additivity considers two different games (G,χ)
and (G,χ′) that involve the same SVN G, but different value functions χ ∈ X and
χ′ ∈ X. Aggregating these two games to a single game (G,χ + χ′) in which each
cooperation Sm ∈ S is assigned a value function χ(Sm) + χ′(Sm) by adding those
of the two separate games, services must be granted the same payoffs than in the
separate games if the power ratio is additive [296]. For all vj ∈ V,
(6.12) φj(G,χ + χ′) = φj(G,χ) + φj(G,χ′),
where the value function of the summed up game is defined by (χ + χ′)(Sm) =
χ(Sm) + χ′(Sm) for all Sm ∈ S.
Due to the characteristics of network games and applied value functions therein,
additivity is replaced by weak additivity [170].6
6Definition 6.1 is adapted to the SVN formalization.
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Definition 6.1 [WEAK ADDITIVITY]. A solution is weakly additive if the following two
equations hold for any monotonic χ and χ′, and scalars q ≥ 0 and r ≥ 0:
(6.13) φj(G,qχ + rχ′) = qφj(G,χ) + rφj(G,χ′),
and
(6.14) φj(G,qχ− rχ′) = qφj(G,χ)− rφj(G,χ′)
Since monotonicity of the value function is a prerequisite for weak additivity
(cp. Definition 6.1), the value function applied in the co-opetition mechanism as
introduced in Definition 5.7 must be monotonic in order to make statements on the
additivity of the power ratio. Jackson [170] defines monotonicity as follows:7
Definition 6.2 [MONOTONICITY OF THE VALUE FUNCTION]. A value function χ ∈ X
is monotonic if χ(Sk) ≥ χ(Sl) whenever Vl ⊂ Vk for all Sl,Sk ∈ S.
Corollary 6.1 [MONOTONICITY OF THE CO-OPETITION MECHANISM’S VALUE
FUNCTION]. The value function as applied in the co-opetition mechanism is monotonic.8
Proof 6.1. For all Sl,Sk ∈ S with Vl ⊂ Vk, monotonicity requires that χ(Sk) ≥ χ(Sl) (cp.
Definition 6.2).
The value function in the co-opetition mechanism requires that the value of the set union
of x cooperations must be greater or equal than the value of the most valuable component







E(Vm))) ≥max(χ(S1), . . . ,χ(Sx))
If Vl ⊂ Vk, it is obvious that Sk can be rewritten as follows:
(6.16) Sk = (Vk ∪ {vi}, E(Vk) ∪ {ehi}) with vh,vi ∈ Vk and ehi ∈ E(Vk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Ŝ
Ŝ can either be another internal cooperation out of S or an arbitrary combination of
services and linkages.9 Therefore, by Equation (6.15),
(6.17) χ(Sk) ≥max(χ(Sl),χ(Ŝ))
7Definition 6.2 is adapted to the SVN formalization.
8The value functions are restricted as explained in the introduction to this chapter.
9The links included in Ŝ must not necessarily be reasonable as specified in Section 2.2.3.
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If χ(Sl) ≥ χ(Ŝ), Equation (6.17) simplifies to
(6.18) χ(Sk) ≥ χ(Sl)
If χ(Sl) ≤ χ(Ŝ), Equation (6.17) can be rewritten as
(6.19) χ(Sk) ≥ χ(Ŝ) ≥ χ(Sl)
Equations (6.18) and (6.19) yield the desired result.
¤
Resulting from the monotonicity of the value function applied in the co-opetition
mechanism (cp. Corollary 6.1), Theorem 6.3 can be formulated as follows:
Theorem 6.3 [WEAK ADDITIVITY OF THE POWER RATIO]. The power ratio is weakly
additive for any monotonic value function χ ∈ X.
Proof 6.3. Consider any two monotonic value functions χ and χ′ that follow Equations
(5.15) and (5.17) and any scalars q≥ 0 and r ≥ 0; then qχ + rχ′ is monotonic. If the power
ratio is additive, Equation (6.13) holds. φj(G,qχ + rχ′) can be written as follows:
φj(G,qχ + rχ′) = ∑
Sm∈S|vj∈Vm
(γSm · (qχ(Sm)− qχ(S−jm ))(6.20)
+γSm · (rχ′(Sm)− rχ′(S−jm )))





(γSm · q(χ(Sm)− χ(S−jm )) + γSm · r(χ′(Sm)− χ′(S−jm )))
= ∑
Sm∈S|vj∈Vm
(γSm · q(χ(Sm)− χ(S−jm )))
+ ∑
Sm∈S|vj∈Vm
(γSm · r(χ′(Sm)− χ′(S−jm )))(6.21)
=qφj(G,χ) + rφj(G,χ′)
By Equations (6.20) and (6.21), Equation (6.13) can be approved.
10The value function applied in the co-opetition mechanism is not strictly monotonic (cp. Corollary
6.1 and Equation 6.15), however, weak monotonicity is a sufficient precondition for the power ratio
to be weakly additive.
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Analogously, assume that qχ− rχ′ is monotonic. If the power ratio is additive, Equation
(6.14) holds. Again, in analogy to Equation (6.20), φj(G,qχ− rχ′) can be rewritten as:
φj(G,qχ− rχ′) = ∑
Sm∈S|vj∈Vm
(γSm · (qχ(Sm)− qχ(S−jm ))(6.22)
−γSm · (rχ(Sm)− rχ(S−jm )))




(γSm · q(χ(Sm)− χ(S−jm ))− γSm · r(χ′(Sm)− χ′(S−jm )))
= ∑
Sm∈S|vj∈Vm
(γSm · q(χ(Sm)− χ((S−jm )))
− ∑
Sm∈S|vj∈Vm
(γSm · r(χ′(Sm)− χ′(S−jm )))(6.23)
=qφj(G,χ)− rφj(G,χ′)
This is, again, the desired conclusion.
¤
6.1.4 Dummy Property
Recall from Definition 3.33 that services which do not add value to any of the present
cooperations must receive a zero payment. In other words, if a service’s marginal
contribution to the overall SVN is always zero, it is worthless with respect to the
variety valued by the customer and does not yield an acceptable alternative in case
of failure of other services. Therefore, from a fairness perspective, it shall not be
granted a share of the power ratio. For all vj ∈ V,
φj(G,χ) = 0 if χ((Vm ∪ {vj}, E(Vm) ∪ E(vj)))− χ(Sm) = 0(6.24)
∀Sm ∈ S : (Vm \ {vj}, E(Vm) \ E(vj)
Theorem 6.4 [DUMMY PROPERTY OF THE POWER RATIO]. Services that do not con-
tribute any value to a specific customer-requested SVN must not receive a share of the mon-
etary means that are distributed via the power ratio.
Proof 6.4. Theorem 6.4 can easily be shown by considering the value function applied (cp.
Equation 5.17) and the logic of the power ratio (cp. Equation 5.18). A service can be part of
a “worthless” cooperation Sm in two different cases: either if (i) there is no path included in




0, if 6 ∃Wl ⊆ Vm, Fl ∈ F,Sm ∈ S
0, if UFl < 0
If Equation (6.25) holds for every cooperation Sm a service vj is part of, by the mono-
tonicity of the value function (cp. Corollary 6.1), the following implication must hold:
(6.26) χ(Sm) = 0 ⇒ χ(S−jm ) = 0
For a service vj ∈ V that does not contribute any value to any internal cooperation,
Equations (6.25) and (6.27) imply that
(6.27) φj(G,χ) = ∑
Sm∈S|vj∈Vm
γSm · (χ(Sm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−χ(S−jm )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
) = 0
By Equation (6.27), it is shown that a service vj that does not provide any value for the
system receives a zero PR payment. This is the desired result as asked for in Equation (6.24).
¤
6.1.5 Summary & Implications
In Section 6.1, the fairness properties of the power ratio were confirmed. With re-
spect to the additivity property, some restrictions to the original additivity axiom
consulted by Shapley [292] were necessary: the value function as applied in the PR
is not strictly monotonic, however, satisfies monotonicity in its weaker form (cp.
Corollary 6.1). Therefore, additivity was relaxed to weak additivity.
As a further result it remains to be noticed that the fairness properties hold for
the PR only. While efficiency (cp. Section 6.1.1) and the dummy property (cp. Sec-
tion 6.1.4) obviously still hold when taking t1 into consideration, symmetry and
additivity do not.
In more detail, symmetry as shown in Section 6.1.2 can only be mapped to the
overall transfer function in case of non-allocation of services (since then, t1 = 0). If
two symmetric services are situated on the best path, it is obvious that there must
be (at least) two paths that maximize the allocation function. As stated in Section
5.2.2, ties are arbitrarily broken in such a case. Thus, if two symmetric services vi
and vj exist – and maximize the goal function – symmetry in the narrow sense is
violated since one service, say vi, is picked and receives ti = t1i + t
2
i while vj only
receives t2j . If truthful revelation of the services’ types is assumed, the profit from
t1 equals zero for both services. Replacing the transfers by the utility as indicator
for symmetry, ui = uj and thus, symmetry holds again. As will be shown in Section
7.1, the co-opetition mechanism is approximately incentive compatible in several
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network configurations. Nevertheless, technically, non-truthful bidding disrupts
symmetry.
Weak additivity (cp. Section 6.1.3) of the overall transfer function cannot be
confirmed due to the different counts of complex service allocations in the sepa-
rate games (G,χ) and (G,χ′) compared to the merged game (G,χ + χ′). In fact,
the power ratios of the separate games are additive, however, component t1 of the
transfer function is not. To be more precise, there is one complex service to be al-
located in the merged game while in the two separate games one path per game
is picked. Thus, a service vj that is allocated in both games receives tj = t1j + φj in
(G,χ) and tj = t1j + φ′j in (G,χ′), while in the merged game, the payoff amounts to
tj = t1j + φj + φ
′
j. It is obvious that t
1




j 6= t1j + φj + φ′j. Again, if assuming
truthful revelation of the services’ types, the there is no profit to be made out of t1.
Replacing transfers by the utility in Equation (??), weak additivity holds regardless
of the allocation.
In total, the co-opetition mechanism is fair with respect to the power ratio com-
ponent in the transfer function and subject to the revealed types of the services.
Since the PR accounts for remunerating each and every value-creating service, i.e.
not only the allocated ones, it is important that fairness holds for this component.
Only if the logic of revenue distribution is perceived as evenhanded by the service
providers, they will be willing to actually take part in the mechanism. In turn, such
acceptance entailing the service providers’ very willingness to participate is crucial
for the platform operator to get its business up and running. This is, again, a prereq-
uisite for other requirements of the co-opetition mechanism’s social choice as stated
in Section 4.1.2, for instance, network growth and a high degree of interconnected-
ness.
Assuming truthful revelation of the services’ costs and quality attributes, and
replacing transfers by the services’ utilities, fairness can be extended to the entire
transfer function. Section 7.1 will show that the co-opetition mechanism is approx-
imately incentive compatible for some, but not for every network configuration.
Therefore, technically, the co-opetition mechanism as a whole does not fully meet
the fairness property. Yet, its manipulation robustness allows for an approximation
of fairness with respect to the overall mechanism. This discussion will be picked up
in Section 7.1.4 once again.
6.2 Cooperational Monotonicity
In this section, cooperational monotonicity of the power ratio as stated in Require-
ment 4.5 is evaluated. Recall from Definition 3.34 that cooperational monotonicity
shall set particular incentives in terms of competitive service offers. Although value
in SVNs is measured on a complex service level, a service’s individual contribution
shall be incorporated in a way that an increase in its (individual) efficiency must at
least lead to an identical or to a larger payoff. An increase of efficiency can either
denote a decrease of the internal costs that lowers the bid price or a higher quality
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offered at a constant price.11 By cooperational monotonicity, service providers are
incentivized to make their offerings more efficient notwithstanding the cooperative
aspects of the co-opetition mechanism.
Assume that service vj ∈ V has increased its efficiency in the above-mentioned
fashion. Further let F̂ ⊂ F denote the set of complex services which include vj. Def-
inition 3.34 can be mapped to SVNs as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.5 [COOPERATIONAL MONOTONICITY]. The power ratio is cooperationally
monotonic. That is, if an arbitrary service vj ∈ V that is part of a certain set of complex
services F̂ ⊂ F increases its efficiency in whatever way ceteris paribus, vj may not be worse
off in terms of its power ratio than prior to the increase in efficiency.
Proof 6.5. Let (G,χ) denote the previous game and (G,χ′) the updated game with vj being
more efficient (i.e., offering a lower price or higher quality ceteris paribus). Let further denote
¬F̂ = F \ F̂, that is, the set of complex services that does not include vj. It directly follows
that
(6.28) χ′(Fh) = χ(Fh) ∀Fh ∈ ¬F̂
and
(6.29) χ′(Fl) ≥ χ(Fl) ∀Fl ∈ F̂
By Equations (6.28) and (6.29), the following coherency can be stated for all Fh ∈ ¬F̂
and Fl ∈ F̂:
(6.30) χ′(Fl)− χ′(Fh) = χ′(Fl)− χ(Fh) ≥ χ(Fl)− χ(Fh)
By Equation (6.30) and the computation of the value function for internal cooperations




γSm · (χ′(Sm)− χ′(S−jm )︸ ︷︷ ︸





γSm · (χ(Sm)− χ(S−jm )) = φj(G,χ)
¤
11In this case, the lower costs are assumed to affect each of the incoming edges of the respective
service.
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Akin to Theorems 6.2 and 6.3, cooperational monotonicity can only be expres-
sively accepted for the PR, not for the entire transfer function. Replacing the payoff
by the utilities and assuming that types are truthfully reported, cooperational mono-
tonicity again holds for the co-opetition mechanism in general.12
6.3 Interconnectedness
This section’s focus is put upon the co-opetition mechanism’s ability to foster in-
terconnectedness of services in an SVN. As introduced in Section 2.2, different ap-
proaches to SVNs concerning minimum requirements imposed on the services’ in-
terconnectedness, which translates to interoperability in a more technical sense, are
likely to be pursued. On the one hand and from a idealistic point of view, such re-
quirements should be as low as possible in order to grant access for a great variety of
services to a platform. As postulated in Section 2.2.1, such a lightweight approach is
embodied by RESTful Web services that encapsulate functionality and put them be-
hind clearly defined interfaces based on HTTP. However, with respect to valuable,
interoperable business applications, composition is not as simple as that. According
to Petrie and Bussler [263], asking for such minimal requirements is quite quixotic.
Both salesforce.com’s AppExchange and current research endeavors such as TEXO
rely on open, but proprietary standards in order to enable seamless composition and
compatibility of service modules from a technical point of view (cp. Section 2.2.5).
Regardless of the approach followed, services need to be implemented accord-
ing to the imposed requirements – in AppExchange’s case enabled by a common
implementation via Force.com requiring Apex and Visualforce, the same holds true
for TEXO with its unified development environment ISE workbench (cp. Section
2.2.4). That is, interoperability reduces to strategic considerations of service providers
within the SVN and their decision of how to link their services to other services in
the network in order to maximize their own utility.
Turning to strategic considerations, one way to ensure interconnectedness may
be that the operator of an SVN “simply” forces each participating service provider
to guarantee full interconnectedness of its services to each other service in the net-
work. However, it is quite shortsighted to rely on such a constraint. The co-opetition
mechanism shall ascertain a high degree of intermeshing as a result of actions taken
by self-interested service providers subject to the SVN’s inherent requirement to
form cooperations as the very foundation for value creation. In the next section, ba-
sic considerations on interconnectedness in SVNs are made, followed by analytical
results with respect to the degree of network interconnectedness and stability. Thus,
this section refers to economic properties and equilibria of the network in respect of
the service providers’ link formation strategies. The service providers’ bidding strategy
will be evaluated in Section 7.1.
12Please refer to Section 6.1.5 for an analogous discussion.
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6.3.1 Preliminary Considerations
A high degree of interconnectedness is desirable to the platform operator for sev-
eral reasons. First, it increases the potential of an SVN to satisfy different customers’
needs and tastes which provides a multitude of feasible complex service instances to
requesters. Such variety is supposed to be valued by customers. In this connection,
as a second reason for interconnectedness, customers are expected to prefer pur-
chasing services in adaptive environments in which other providers are raring to go
if an allocated service fails to meet a customer’s satisfaction for whatever reason.
Such dynamic switching is particularly important if critical business applications
are offered. Third, a high degree of interconnectedness reduces the probability of
single providers becoming too powerful.
To summarize, in connection with the huge potential of the long valley (cp. Sec-
tion 2.2.1), an increasing choice of services does not only meet requirements that
have previously been unheard, but also cultivates new tastes. With respect to the
requirement of network growth, a high degree of interconnectedness, and thus, va-
riety, is especially important for SVNs in their early stage of development. It attracts
various customers and thus, in turn, leads to a growth of rich candidate pools (cp.
Section 6.4).
Recall that in the SVN model, edges eij ∈ E(V) in the network G indicate that
services vi ∈ V and vj ∈ V are linked with each other.13 As a matter of network
design, links in SVNs are formed by individual decision. Owners of services can in
fact decide on which other services’ outputs to process, yet they cannot keep tabs
on which other services use their own outputs. Thus, transferred to network games,
we are concerned with the economics of a special case of one-sided link formation.
With respect to a link eij between services vi and vj, only the service that controls
the incoming link (that is, vj) can decide upon deleting it. Analogously, if there is no
connection between vi and vj although the customer request would allow for one,
it is again only vj to form it. In other words, the owners of services are to choose
with which services from the preceding candidate pool their own services shall be
interconnected.
This peculiarity owed to the SVN structure distinguishes the one-sidedness of
link formation considered in this work from the classic one-sided link formation in
network games as applied by Bala and Goyal [21], Dutta and Jackson [104]. In their
models, each agent can unilaterally decide to which other agents it wishes to be
linked. Therefore, transferred to the notation above, vi could decide to establish a
link with vj and vice versa. Yet, this characteristic does not apply to SVNs.
Given the PRTF, it seems favorable for providers to link their services to as many
other services as possible. By increasing its intermeshing, a service is located on
more paths through the network. Consequently, having more connections, a service
is also more often a vital one when it comes to cooperation formation. However, is it
possible that services with a powerful standing in the SVN might not want to have
a link established to services whose status is unclear – simply in order to strengthen
their own position in the SVN? Since the surplus distributed via the services’ power
13A detailed discussion on link formation in network games can be found in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.2.
Recall from Section 2.2.3 that G is defined as a tuple G := (V, E(V)).
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ratios is obviously a limited resource, can link formation result in the strengthening
of others, in turn leading to a decrease in one’s own expected utility?
In the following, it is yet to show if the PRTF sets suitable incentives such that
a high degree of interconnectedness is met as a stable and/or efficient equilibrium.
Interconnectedness can be measured in the network’s density d which denotes the
ratio of actual links and all possible edges in the SVN. Gd=1 shall denote a fully
intermeshed network, subject to the restrictions made on SVNs. For details on the
formalization of SVNs and the restrictions made to the set of allowed links, please
refer to Section 2.2.3.
6.3.2 Analytic Results
Let Ē(uj) denote the expected utility of a service vj in a market that implements the
co-opetition mechanism. probj(o) shall denote the allocation probability of vj.
Ē(uj) =probj(o) ·
(
pij − cij + φj
)






If one prescinds from the service providers’ bidding strategies, which are not in
the focus here, (pij − cij) can be set to some value x ∈ R and vj’s utility reassembles
as follows:
(6.33) Ē(uj) = φj + probj(o) · x
After a customer request has arrived and has been processed by the platform
operator, participating service providers are to decide to which preceding services
they want to establish a link (cp. Section 5.1.3 and Figure 5.3). That is, the action
space of each service in this preparative step is the set of all possible combinations
of links to services of the preceding candidate pool. In other words, we consider
a network game in which each service simultaneously selects the list of the other
services from the preceding candidate pool to which it wishes to be linked based on
its individual expected utility. Individual stability as outlined in Definition 3.36 then
corresponds to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game [104]. The formation
process defined above is based on Myerson [238]. It is frequently consulted and
well-established in network formation approaches [267, 105, 22].14
Transferring Definition 3.36 to SVNs, individual stability is the state in which
there is no service vj ∈ V whose utility can be improved by forming an additional
link or by severing an existing link that is at vj’s command. In more detail, for each
service vj ∈ Yk, k ∈ {1, . . . , k̃}, individual stability includes the set of any possible
SVN Dj(G) ∈ G the respective service vj can reach based on a given network G ∈ G
by unilaterally choosing a linkage strategy:
14Thus, the network formation process is not dynamic in a sense that it evolves over several decision
rounds as, for instance, in Watts [328], Jackson and Watts [174], Goyal and Vega-Redondo [137].
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(6.34)
Dj(G) = {G ′ ∈G|E(V) \ {eij}∀ vi ∈ Yk−1}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ddelj (G)
∪{G ′ ∈G|E(V) ∪ {ehj}∀ vh ∈ Yk−1}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Daddj (G)
As shown in Equation (6.34), Dj(G) can be decomposed into the networks
Ddelj (G) that evolve by deleting one or more links from G and the networks Daddj (G)
that form by adding one or more links to G.
Let Ē(uGj ) denote the utility of service vj subject to network G. Transferring Equa-
tion (3.20) to SVNs, a network is individually stable if the following equation holds:
(6.35) Ē(uGj ) ≥ Ē(uG
′
j ) ∀G ′ ∈ Dj(G)
Resulting from Equations (6.33) and (6.34), and keeping x constant, Theorem 6.6
is postulated:
Theorem 6.6 [LINK FORMATION IN SVNS]. For any constellation of participating ser-
vices in a customer-specific SVN, the co-opetition mechanism incentivizes every participat-
ing service to form every possible link at its command as a Nash equilibrium (i.e., as an
individually stable outcome). Considering all services in the SVN, this outcome corresponds
to a fully intermeshed SVN.
Proof 6.6. In the following it is to show that, based on every possible graph G ∈ G, the
fully intermeshed SVN is the only individually stable outcome. Generally, two cases with
two sub-cases each need to be considered. First, an arbitrary service vj ∈ Yk deletes a link
between vj and vi ∈ Yk−1. Second, vj forms an additional link to some service vh ∈ Yk−1.
According to Equation (5.18), vj’s power ratio assembles as
(6.36) φj(G,χ) = ∑
Sm∈S|vj∈Vm
γSm · (χ(Sm)− χ(S−jm ))
Recall that for each internal cooperation Sm ∈ S (cp. Definition 5.6), the term (χ(Sm)−
χ(S−jm ) is greater than zero if vj adds any additional value to Sm.
1. Now assume that vj deletes a link eij from the given network G, resulting in a network
G ′ ∈ G. The number of internal cooperations |Sm| with vj ∈ Vm obviously remains
unchanged.
(a) Assuming that some eij controlled by vj is part of one or more value-creating
complex services, the value of one or more internal cooperations Sr ∈ S switches
from χ(Sr) > 0 to χ(Sr) = 0 since the deletion of eij inevitably leads to the ex-
tinction of at least one path that was available in G. The values χ(St), St ∈ S
of internal cooperations that are not affected by the deletion of eij remain un-
changed. The term γ for the cooperations does not change in any way since it
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is only dependent on services, not on their links (cp. Equation 5.19).15 Note
that {Sm ∈ S|vj ∈ Vm}= {Sr ∈ S|vj ∈ Vr} ∪ {St ∈ S|vj ∈ Vt}. Thus, after the
deletion, Equation (6.36) evolves as follows:


















Since the deletion of a link cannot increase vj’s probability of allocation, vj’s
utility must decrease. Therefore, Ē(uG
′
j ) < Ē(u
G
j ) ∀G ′ ∈ Ddelj (G).
(b) Now assume that vj does not own any edge eij that creates a value for the sys-
tem. Then, Ē(uGj ) = 0 and does not change through deletion of links. Therefore,
Ē(uG
′
j ) = Ē(u
G
j ) ∀G ′ ∈ Ddelj (G). vj is then indifferent between retaining and
deleting controlled links. Taking (1a) and (1b) together, it is a weakly dominant
strategy for vj to retain all of its controlled links given a network G.
2. Now assume that vj adds a link eij to a given network G resulting in G ′ ∈ G. Again,
the number of internal cooperations |Sm| with vj ∈ Vm remains unchanged.
(a) Assume that vj ∈ Yk can create one or more value-creating complex services
by forming a link ehj to service vh ∈ Yk−1. Analogue to the argumentation in
(1a), one or more internal cooperations Sr ∈ S with vj ∈ Vr increase their value
χ(Sr) induced by the newly emerging valuable paths that were not available in
G. All other values χ(St), St ∈ S of internal cooperations that are not affected
by adding ehj remain unchanged. γ again stays constant. After adding a link,
Equation (6.36) evolves as follows:


















Since the creation of a link cannot decrease vj’s probability of allocation, vj’s
utility must, in total, increase. Therefore, Ē(uG
′
j ) > Ē(u
G
j ) ∀G ′ ∈ Daddj (G).
15This is also true if the deletion of eij “isolates” vi, that is, after deletion, vi does not have any out-
going link. Technically, isolated services can remain in the SVN without changing the distributed
power ratios.
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(b) By the same argumentation than in (1b), services that cannot add any value cre-
ating paths are indifferent between doing nothing and adding new links. Taking
(2a) and (2b) together, it is thus a weakly dominant strategy for vj to add possible
links to a given network G.
Taking the result of (2), it is obvious that the fully intermeshed SVN Gd=1 evolves as a
result of the services’ (weakly) dominant strategy to add any possible link to a given network.
Once the fully intermeshed SVN is reached, according to (1), none of the services wants to
delete a link. Therefore, Gd=1 is (weakly) individually stable:
(6.39) Ē(uG
d=1
j ) ≥ Ē(uG
′
j ) ∀G ′ ∈ Dj(Gd=1).
¤
It follows directly from Proof 6.6 that it is a strictly dominant strategy for all value-
creating service providers to establish each link that is at their command, since
agents as described in (1b) and (2b) do not add any value to the system.
(6.40) ∀ vj ∈ V with ∃ Vm 3 vj ∧ χ(Sm) > 0 : Ē(uGd=1j ) > Ē(uG
′
j ) ∀G ′ ∈ Dj(Gd=1)
Note that the service providers are not equipped with full information about
the other services types – one of the basic assumptions in mechanism design is the
private information character of preferences. Rather, service providers are likely to
have some prior about the other agents’ type distribution. However, theoretically
assessing the link formation scenario, it is always a dominant strategy for service
providers to opt for the formation of each possible link. Assuming that a service
provider offers one service vj ∈ V, this strategy is strictly dominant as long as the
service provider’s prior about the other services’ types results in an expected posi-
tive power ratio (Ē(φj) > 0). This is a quite reasonable assumption.
Notwithstanding the fact that the choice of link formation strategies is a simulta-
neous process in reality, Example 6.1 provides an illustration of Theorem 6.6 that is
structured step-by-step to show that adding links is beneficial to all services. More-
over, as above-stated, service providers do not have full information about the other
services’ offerings as implicitly assumed in Example 6.1. Exact utilities are consulted
to show that forming every link at a service’s command is in fact the “best answer”
to any possible link formation strategy played by the other services.
Example 6.1 [LINK FORMATION AND DELETION: IMPACT ON SERVICES’ UTILI-
TIES]. Assume that the SVN G = {{v1,v2,v3,v4},{es1, es2, e14, e23}} represents the “start-
ing point” for network formation (cp. Figure 6.1).16 Further assume that each service is
owned by a different service provider. Without loss of generality, let the types of services be
merely determined by prices.
16In reality, the starting point is always the (degenerated) SVN which does not include any link. The
example at hand is consulted to exemplify the development of the services’ utilities in different
networks.






















































Figure 6.1: Link formation: A simple example
Assume that the customer’s willingness to pay is α = 8. Again keeping pij − cij = xj
constant (cp. Equation 6.33), G yields the utilities u1 = 1 + x1, u2 = u3 = 0.5, and u4 =
1 + x4.
While v1 and v2 cannot add any link17, v3 can form e13 and v4 may add e24. Assume that
p13 = p24 = 4. The decision of link formation can be formulated as a strategic-form game.
In total, v3 can choose from four actions: “delete e23”, “do nothing”, “add e13”, and “delete
e23, add e13”. v4’s action set is assembled analogously: “delete e14”, “do nothing”, “add
e24”, and “delete e14, add e24”. The utilities of v3 and v4 are shown in the matrix depicted
in Figure 6.2 for each of the possible actions.




























































































Figure 6.2: Link formation: Actions and resulting utilities as a strategic-form game
The game exhibits a unanimous pure-strategy Nash equilibrium: it is for both services
to add the missing link e13 and e24, respectively. Note that for v3, given any other action of
v4, adding e13 is always the best response. Likewise, v4 always wants to add e24 regardless
17We do not consider v1’s and v2’s possibilities to delete their links since this action would isolate the
services and inevitably turn their expected payoffs to zero.
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of v3’s action. Thus, both agents hold a dominant strategy regardless of the other agents’
actions.
The resulting fully intermeshed SVN Gd=1 is individually stable – none of the services
can improve its expected utility by unilaterally deviating from Gd=1 (that is, by deleting a
link).
6.3.3 Summary & Implications
The result of this section is highly favorable for two reasons. First, Requirement 4.6
which demands a preferably high degree of interconnectedness of participating ser-
vices in a specific SVN is perfectly met. Regardless of the actual bidding strategies
of the participating service providers concerning their prices and attributes, the co-
opetition mechanism ensures that every service provider’s link formation strategy
is to add every possible link. Second, as the fully intermeshed network is individ-
ually stable, that is, a Nash equilibrium, this result is guaranteed to be sustainable.
None of the participating service providers has an incentive to unilaterally delete
links from the fully intermeshed SVN since it does not increase its expected utility.
Taking these results together, the SVN is guaranteed to provide the maximum va-
riety of complex services to the customer. Assuming an equal count of services |Yk|
in each of the |Y| candidate pools, the co-opetition mechanism assures an offering
of |Yk||Y| complex services – this is the number of paths through a fully intermeshed
SVN. In practice, this means that more different instances of the complex service
demanded can be offered, possibly ranging from cheap, low-quality to high-priced
premium quality services, thereby offering complex services for a multitude of cus-
tomer types. In particular, an SVN applying the co-opetition mechanism is guaran-
teed to yield the most suitable complex service for a customer given the available
component services since link formation is not distorted by strategic considerations.
In the face of the most striking feature of SVNs, namely the power of combinatorics
induced by the long valley of Web services, the co-opetition mechanism assures an
optimal exploitation of their potential. Economides [106] puts it in a way that cuts
to the core: it is compatibility that makes complementarity actual.
From a more global point of view, the co-opetition mechanism is designed to
meet the characteristics of an environment in which competition and cooperation
are present at the same time. This is strikingly made clear by the result of this sec-
tion. From an arbitrary service’s perspective, services in the same candidate pool
are competitors since they directly compete for being allocated. Services in all of the
other candidate pools are complements and inevitable partners in terms of satisfy-
ing a specific customer request. Applying the co-opetition mechanism, for service
providers it is always preferable to form every possible link to complementary ser-
vices (that is, to the services in the preceding candidate pool). It is an important
result that the co-opetition mechanism is able to fully support the co-opetitive na-
ture of SVNs and thereby fosters the postulated power of combinatorics in the long
valley (cp. Section 2.2).
Other than in purely competitive transfer functions, the formation of each possi-
ble link turns into a strictly dominant strategy for all services that potentially (expect
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to)18 create value for the system (cp. Equation 6.40). Coupled with the co-opetition
mechanism’s ability to retain competitiveness and offer payments to non-allocated
services at the same time (cp. Section 6.2), the explicit incentives for link formation
are quite unique. As Blau [45] showed in a simulation-based approach for his com-
plex service auction with interoperability transfer function extension (ITF)19 subject
to similar assumptions, first and foremost, neglected investment costs for link for-
mation, interoperability expressed in the network density settles down to approx-
imately 67.6%. The ITF is particularly designed to foster interconnectedness. A
transfer function proposed by Parkes et al. [260] that equally distributes additional
value to allocated service providers (cp. also Section 6.4.1) reaches a degree of inter-
connectedness of 66.7% on average [45]. As a striking result, the degree of intercon-
nectedness of allocated service offerings amounts to 77.1% when applying the ITF
and to 75.7% in case of resorting to the above-named benchmark. For non-allocated
services, this number is considerably smaller (65.3% vs. 64.4%). The co-opetition
mechanism yields a fully intermeshed SVN as a result of the services’ equilibrium
link formation strategies, that is, a degree of interconnectedness of 100%, no matter
if a service is allocated or not.
This result would certainly change in absolute terms if introducing investment
costs for link formation. However, due to the requirements imposed by the platform
(cp. e.g. the ISE workbench in the TEXO Service Management Platform), additional
investment costs reflecting the degree of similarity of the interfaces of the services to
be connected are unlikely to occur. Services interfaces within the SVN should ide-
ally be compatible to other services in the candidate pool, that is, work seamlessly
with other service components. Yet, if investment costs are to be considered, they
will both occur for SVNs applying the co-opetition mechanism and for any tested
benchmark in the same proportion. Thus, starting from a fully intermeshed SVN,
the co-opetition mechanism is still likely to account for a higher degree of intercon-
nectedness than, for instance, above-listed benchmarks whose degree of intercon-
nectedness is clearly lower than 100%, even if investment costs for link formation
equal zero.
6.4 Network Growth
In this section the co-opetition mechanism’s ability to incentivize service providers
to join the service value network as postulated in Requirement 4.1 is analyzed. It
is essential to attract participants in order to establish a running business in the
launch phase of an SVN. Only if a platform operator succeeds in establishing a large
enough base of participants, that is, a critical mass, network effects can kick in and
bring about positive network effects [188].20
Network growth is nearly impossible to measure in absolute terms: network
growth is not a desiderata in terms of classic mechanism design. It would be quite
18As stated in Section 6.3.2, this is a quite reasonable assumption for each service that takes part in a
call for participation and call for bids (cp. Section 5.1.3).
19Please refer to Section 4.3 for a more detailed discussion.
20For a more detailed introduction into network growth as a design goal in networks, please refer to
Sections 3.2.3.2 and 4.1.2.
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blurry to specify some absolute number of desired services on the platform as a tar-
get figure to be reached within a given time frame. Likewise, taking some targeted
market share as an output size is unrealistic – potential competitors can hardly be
classified in terms of their portfolio.
For instance, as shown in Section 2.2.4.2, the number of registered services at
salesforce.com’s AppExchange platform increased from virtually zero in 2005 to
around 900 in May 2010. However, taking these numbers as a benchmark does not
suit the problem at hand. The environment of AppExchange with salesforce.com’s
already existent and successful core service Salesforce CRM created a huge poten-
tial for network effects since the customers as one side of the market have already
been in place. Moreover, through the inherent link to the “main service” Salesforce
CRM, later renamed into Sales Cloud 2, the example AppExchange is generally “bi-
ased” with respect to the variety offered. For the concept of SVNs that underlies
this thesis, such restrictions are not made. In total, the growth property needs to be
evaluated in relative terms which requires the consultation of a suitable benchmark
as introduced in the next section. Section 6.4.2 will prepare the simulative main part
of the evaluation (cp. Section 6.4.3) by pointing out some analytic considerations.
6.4.1 Benchmark: The Equal Transfer Function for Allocated Ser-
vices
In order to benchmark the results yielded by the co-opetition mechanism with re-
spect to properties that cannot be evaluated analytically, a comparison to other
mechanisms or transfer functions, respectively, is required. Importantly, to re-
tain comparability, the focus is put upon a payment rule that distributes the same
amount of money to service providers. That is, both price bids of allocated ser-
vices and an additional surplus ∆ = UFl shall be distributed (cp. Sections 5.2.2 and
5.2.3). Moreover, the allocation function introduced in Definition 5.5 is adopted to
the benchmark as it stands. That is, the benchmark introduced in the following in-
cludes the same allocation rule o(·) as the co-opetition mechanism, however, differs
in how transfers are distributed.
Compared to the PRTF, a “conservative” payment scheme shall be consulted that
(i) does not distribute payments to non-allocated service providers and (ii) does not
set particular incentives besides the ones for allocation. To this end, the payment
rule tE1 (·) is consulted that distributes ∆ equally among all allocated services ana-
logue to the Equal Rule utilized by Parkes et al. [260].
Definition 6.3 [EQUAL TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR ALLOCATED SERVICES
(ETF-1)]. The ETF-1 distributes the system’s surplus ∆ in equal shares to each allocated
service vj with eij ∈ E(W∗):
(6.41) tE1j =
{
pij + 1|Y|∆, if vj ∈W∗, eij ∈ E(W∗)
0, otherwise
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The ETF-1 represents a “neutral” payment scheme compared to the PRTF as it
equally distributes the same surplus, however, does not implement particular in-
centives besides its inherently included competitive element [260]: other than using
the PRTF, the ETF-1 exclusively rewards allocated service providers. That is, the
ETF-1 can certainly be interpreted as a more competitive payment scheme than the
PRTF.
Therefore, as a suitable benchmark to evaluate the growth incentives imple-
mented by a market using the PRTF (denoted as mPRTF = (o, tPR)), a market
mETF−1 = (o, tE1) is consulted which implements the ETF-1.21
6.4.2 Analytical Considerations
In order to show that the PRTF incentivizes participants to join the SVN, and there-
fore, creates the basis to initiate network effects and positive feedback loops, a
comparison of expected payoffs for service providers when deciding upon enter-
ing mPRTF or mETF−1 is required. In the remainder of this section it is assumed
that each service provider nh owns exactly one service vj, that is, σ(nh) = {vj} and
σ̄(vj) = nh.22 Both mechanisms allow for an expected utility greater or equal zero
for any service provider given truthful revelation of their types. Thus, subject to
their preferences, service providers expect to be never worse off compared to non-
participation. In this evaluation, vj’s decision solely depends on the utility Ē(umj )
it expects to gain in each market m. Let ζ j denote the percentage of the surplus ∆
that is distributed to vendor vj according to the PR. This percentage is independent
from the actual allocation.23 The probability probj(o) indicates the probability of ser-
vice vj being allocated, while (1− probj)(o) denotes the probability of the respective
service being not allocated.
(6.42) Ē(uPRTFj ) = probj (o) ·
(
pij + ζ j∆− cij
)










+ (1− probj(o)) · 0
In the following, it is assumed that costs cij equal the bid price pij. For a detailed
analysis of service providers’ bidding strategies, please refer to Section 7.1. A major
result of this analysis is that the co-opetition mechanism does not allow for major
deviation from truth-telling in the tested scenarios which depict realistic SVNs in
their launch phase (cp. Section 7.1.4). Therefore, the simplifying assumption of
holding bid prices constant at the services’ true types is acceptable for the analysis
21For the reader’s convenience, mechanism and market will be used interchangeably. Generally, the
term market embraces a lot more than just the mechanism [240]. For the analysis in Section 6.4, a
differentiation is not required since service providers base their decision solely upon the utility that
is generated by the allocation and transfer function, that is, the mechanism.
22Therefore, the terms service and service provider can be used interchangeably.
23In order to analyze specific parts of the transfer function, its illustration slightly differs from the
notation consulted in Section 6.3.2. Here, φj is replaced by a relative consideration ζ j · ∆.
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of network growth capabilities. That way, bidding strategies are not variable such
that this section’s evaluation can be concentrated on the markets’ attractiveness to
potential vendors.
Further assume that an arbitrary service provider vj can choose which market to
enter without additional investment or switching costs. That is, each service vj ∈
V can choose from two actions zj = {mPRTF,mETF−1} out of its strategy space Zj.
This strategy space is identical for each service. Including the simplification made
in terms of the price bid, vj realizes a utility which can be simplified to ζ j · ∆ in
case of zj = mPRTF. Accordingly, choosing mETF−1, its payment amounts to 1|Y| · ∆ if



































Figure 6.3: Market choice: Action space of an arbitrary service provider
An analytical comparison of PRTF and ETF-1 is not trivial: due to the complexity
of the power ratio computation24 and the multitude of included parameters, formal
proofs are only reasonable to a limited extent including a large number of restric-
tions as exemplarily shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.7 [EQUAL EXPECTED UTILITY IN BOTH MARKETS]. Assuming a fully in-
termeshed network25 which features exactly |Yk| service providers in each candidate pool
and identical prices and qualities (i.e. pij = µ, Aj = η ∀ vj ∈ V), the expected utility for
an arbitrary service provider vj in mPRTF equals the expected payoff in mETF−1, that is
Ē(uPRTFj ) = Ē(u
ETF−1
j ).
Proof 6.7. Since all services in the SVN are alike, their allocation probabilities are directly
connected with the number of service providers |Yk| present in each candidate pool Yk as




Hence, the probability of not being allocated assembles as follows:
24The calculation of the set of internal cooperations as required in Equation (5.18) yields exponential
complexity as shown in Section 5.3.1.2.
25Links are only permitted between adjoining clusters according to the rules stated before (cp. Sec-
tion 2.2.3).
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(6.45) probj(ō) = 1− probj(o) = |Y
k| − 1
|Yk|
Taking Equations (6.44) and (6.45) as a basis, the expected utility in mPRTF can be
calculated. The power ratio is identical for all present services since they take over symmetric
roles in the SVN (cp. Section 6.1.2).














According to Equation (6.41), the ETF-1 leads to the following expected payoff:











But how do the payoffs evolve in case of different prices or quality attributes?
Consider two simple variations of the assumptions made in Theorem 6.7:
1. Let service provider vj bid a price pij = µ + ε, ε > 0, with all other services
ceteris paribus. That is, vj creates less utility than any other service in the
SVN. Thus, probj(o) = 0. Nevertheless, in the PR-based market, vj is pivotal to
certain cooperations as long as paths including vj yield a positive utility. Based
on Equations (6.42) and (6.43), this service is granted the following expected
payoffs in mETF−1 and mPRTF:
(6.48) Ē(uETF−1j ) = 0 < Ē(u
PRTF
j ) = (1− probj)(o) · ζ j∆
2. On the other hand, consider a situation in which a service vj offers a price bid
of pij = µ− ε, ε > 0 ceteris paribus. In this case, probj(o) = 1 since vj creates a
utility that is higher than the utility created by any other service. This leads to








According to the service’s contribution to the network, i.e. in this case, depen-
dent on ε, ζ j ∈ [ 1n ,1) can be either greater or less than 1|Y| , such that a compari-
son of Ē(uETF−1j ) and Ē(u
PRTF
j ) is not possible by implication.
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Considerations for changes in the bid quality attributes can be made analogously
to Equations (6.48) to (6.50).
In general, it is clear that applying the PRTF must lead to a decreasing utility of
(at least) some allocated service providers compared to the ETF-1 since ∆ is redis-
tributed from merely allocated services to all services that are potentially valuable
for the system. In the remainder of Section 6.4 this issue will be picked and it will
be evaluate how utilities of different types of service providers evolve in both of the
considered markets.
6.4.3 Simulation-Based Approach
Generally, the analytic considerations made in the previous section still include var-
ious restrictive assumptions such as, for instance, a fully intermeshed network and
(nearly) identical prices and quality attributes. A relaxation of these assumptions
leads to a multitude of dependencies within the analytical considerations which do
not allow for formal proofs within reason. Therefore, a numerical approach to study
the effects of a PR-based transfer function is presented. That way, more general re-
sults shall be created that also allow for strategic recommendations. In particular,
different types of service providers and their strategies with respect to choosing a mar-
ket are the focal point of the following evaluation.
Thus, the objective of this section is to numerically compare an SVN that imple-
ments the PRTF to an ETF-1-based service market. The basic claim is that the design
of the co-opetition mechanism, in particular the application of the PRTF, fosters the
attraction of more service providers to an SVN than a market implementing a trans-
fer function based on a purely competition-oriented distribution of payoffs. Such a
recurring payment granted in the initial phase of the SVN, even if the offered service
is not regularly allocated, may not only lower the entry barrier for potential service
providers by partly compensating their sunk investments, but also countervail the
risk of uncertain revenues in the newly entered environments. In the following
evaluation, the effect of the PRTF with respect to services that have already been
designed for the SVN at hand is considered, thereby assuming a decision of service
providers to either enter mPRTF or mETF−1 with both markets relying on the same
minimal requirements.
Therefore, the hypothesis to be tested in this section is derived as follows:
Hypothesis 6.1 [NETWORK GROWTH]. The co-opetition mechanism that implements
power ratio-based transfers attracts a greater number of service providers than a mecha-
nism that applies the equal transfer function for allocated service providers ceteris paribus.
6.4.3.1 Simulation Model & Settings
The following simulation model, its settings, and its results underly the assumption
that different types of service providers, that is, service providers offering different
levels of QoS and different prices, appear in a uniformly distributed fashion when
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bidding for the inclusion into a customer request. The problem is approached in an
agent-based simulation, modeled as an n-person game. Purpose of the numerical
approach is to relax the restrictions made in the analytic considerations. That way,
previously fixed parameters such as the network configuration, cost structures of
service providers, their service configurations, and customer types can be varied.
As indicated in Section 6.4.2, the network topology (|Y|, |Yk|) is of crucial impor-
tance when analyzing the co-opetition mechanism’s ability to incentivize network
growth. Through the topology, the number of candidate pools |Y| and the number
of services per candidate pool |Yk| is expressed. By |Yk|, the competition to be in-
cluded in the allocation is determined. n = |Y| · |Yk| denotes the total of services
included in the SVN and therefore indicates the level of overall competition for a
share in ∆.
In the simulation, complex services including |Y|= 2, |Y|= 3, |Y|= 4, and |Y|= 5
candidate pools are considered. It is argued that 2 ≤ |Y| ≤ 5 depicts the average
service mashup in terms of features functionalities. Analyzing business-related
mashups listed at ProgrammbleWeb.org, the average of included service compo-
nents in the category CRM amount, for instance, to 2.626. Finance mashups include
on average 2.3 services per mashup.27 Without loss of generality, an identical count
of services |Yk| per candidate pool Yk is assumed. As the fully intermeshed SVN
evolves as a stable state from service providers’ link formation strategies (cp. Sec-
tion 6.3.2), the network’s density is set to d = 1.0 for all network topologies.
Out of the above-listed parameters, selected network configurations shown in
Table 6.2 will be examined. In the evaluation of the simulation results, focus is
primarily put upon on network configurations that feature a smaller number of ser-
vices per candidate pool as the are assumed to be realistic in the launch phase of an
SVN. However, in order to get an indication on how results change with rising |Yk|,
the configurations (2,8), (2,10), (3,5), and (3,6) are additionally tested (cp. Section
B.1).
Table 6.2: Network growth: Tested network configurations
|Y| = 2 |Y| = 3 |Y| = 4 |Y| = 5




In respect of the service providers’ types, prices pij are randomly drawn from
U(0;1.0]. For simplicity and without loss of generality, it is assumed that the config-
uration only consists of one service attribute that is denoted as “service quality” (sq).
Therefore, Aj = {asqj }. On a complex service level, sq is aggregated via the average
operator, that is, AFl = 1|Y| · ∑vj∈Wl a
sq
j . The values for sq are also drawn uniformly,
i.e. asqj ∈U(0;1.0].
Not only on provider-side, but also on customer-side, different types are ran-
domly drawn. In more detail, the customer type assembles from two arguments.
26http://www.programmableweb.com/tag/crm, accessed on 2010/05/24.
27http://www.programmableweb.com/tag/finance, accessed on 2010/05/24.
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First, the customer’s preferences for the service quality which are formalized by








and second, its willingness to pay α.
Three different preferences for sq are considered, denoted by R = {r1 = low,r2 =
medium,r3 = high}. These preferences translate into Γ as follows: Γr1 = (0, 12),
Γr2 = (0,1), and Γr3 = ( 12 ,1). A linear coherency Ψ
r(AFl) between upper and lower
boundary is assumed that allows for the computation of the customer’s idiosyn-










































(c) Valuation for Γhigh
Figure 6.4: Different customer types’ valuation for service quality
Thus, a complex service offering Fl which exhibits AFl = 23 is valued Ψr1(AFl) =
1, Ψr2(AFl) = 23 , and Ψr3(AFl) = 12 , respectively, by the different customer types.
r1 = low represents a rather undemanding customer whereas r3 = high represents a
customer demanding premium services. r2 = medium is obviously situated right in
the middle of r1 and r3 and shall thus model a customer with an average preference
for service quality. It is argued that the tested customer types represent a cross
section of customers that realistically approach the SVN.
Additionally, the customer’s willingness to pay α is randomly drawn from
U(0;2.0 · |Y|). α is stated relative to the number of candidate pools in order to retain
comparability between different network configurations. For instance, a customer
with α = 0.5 · |Y| is willing to pay the mean price of a (perfectly fitting) complex
service. This is a quite low (i.e. competitive) willingness to pay. α = 1 · |Y| denotes a
willingness to pay of the maximum price that can be set in the SVN, however, valid
for a complex service with a service fit of 1. By the argument of equal price and cost,
α = 1 can be interpreted a quite reasonable value (which is also the expected value
of α). On the other hand, α = 2 denotes a customer with a quite high willingness to
pay, however, again, only for a perfectly fitting service. α and Γ put together assem-
bles the customer’s type in the underlying simulation model. Table 6.3 summarizes
the simulation settings for the network growth simulation.
In sum, for each network configuration, the simulation includes SR = 20,000
rounds. In each round, prices and service qualities as well as the customer’s type
are drawn randomly as pointed out above. Then, in each round, an arbitrary service
provider vj is chosen. This service provider is classified in one of the nine classes
{$1, ...,$9} according to its service quality and its price as depicted in Table 6.4.
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(2,2), (2,5), (3,2), (3,3), (3,4), (4,3), (4,4),
(5,3). In Section B.1: (2,8), (2,10), (3,5), (3,6)
Network density d = 1.0
Service providers
Prices of services pij ∈U(0;1]
Service configuration asqj ∈U(0;1]
Service customers
Lower and upper boundaries
for service quality
Γlow = (0, 12 ), Γ
medium = (0,1), Γhigh = ( 12 ,1)
Willingness to pay α ∈U[0;2 · |Y|]
Table 6.4: Network growth: Classification of service provider types
Price bid / Service quality qj ∈ (0; 13 ] qj ∈ ( 13 ; 23 ] qj ∈ ( 23 ;1]
pij ∈ (0; 13 ] $1 = (low, low) $2 = (low,med) $3 = (low, high)
pij ∈ ( 13 ; 23 ] $4 = (med, low) $5 = (med,med) $6 = (med, high)
pij ∈ ( 23 ;1] $7 = (high, low) $8 = (high,med) $9 = (high, high)
After classifying the arbitrarily chosen service provider according to Table 6.4, its
(hypothetical) utilities for both markets uPRTFj and u
ETF−1
j are calculated as shown in
Figure 6.3 in each of the 20,000 simulation rounds.28 Figure 6.5 depicts the stepwise
procedure of the simulation.
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Figure 6.5: Market choice: Simulation model
Note that SVNs underlie quickly changing preferences and types of participants.
Thus, it is assumed that each auction setting is different from the preceding one
which makes learning from past situations impossible and each game can therefore
be treated as a one-shot game. That is, the simulation of multiple rounds relying on
partially unchanged parameters is done for statistical reasons, not in order to be as
close as to reflecting reality. Due to the large number of transactions, interdepen-
dencies are likely to be canceled out sufficiently [268, 285, 56].
28In order to grasp a sufficiently large amount of simulation data for each service provider class sub-
ject to other varied parameters, a quite high number of simulation rounds is required. A sensitivity
analysis was performed for selected configurations which tested both 10,000 simulation rounds and
30,000 as well as 50,000 simulation rounds. All of these simulations’ results did not significantly
differ from the results of the simulation that consults 20,000 rounds.
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6.4.3.2 Simulation Results
As above-stated, it is assumed that services out of each of the nine classes {$1, . . . ,$9}
are uniformly distibuted. Therefore, Hypothesis 6.1 translates into nine sub-
hypotheses stating that mPRTF attracts a greater number of service providers than
mETF for each of the agent classes. Technically, Hypothesis 6.1 can be reformulated
as follows:
Hypothesis 6.2 [AVERAGE SHARE OF SERVICE PROVIDER CLASSES OPTING FOR
mPRTF AND mETF−1]. For each of the service provider classes $h, the share of service
providers opting for the PRTF-based market is higher than the share of service providers
opting for mETF−1.
Hypothesis 6.2 can be measured via a comparison of the utilities uPRTFj and
uETF−1j of the arbitrarily chosen service provider vj in each round. vj chooses m
PRTF
if uPRTFj > u
ETF−1




j , none of the markets is
chosen. The number of market choices can then be summed up and set into rela-
tion with the total number of rounds played within each provider class. However,
the mere count of choices can be misleading since absolute utility values are not ac-
counted for. If, for instance, one market is chosen in nine out of ten rounds based
on a marginal difference, however, the other market is preferred once based on a
considerably larger utility, market one is quite clearly preferred in 90% of the cases,
yet in terms of utility, the result would most probably be not significant. Therefore,
Hypothesis 6.1 is alternatively restated as follows:
Hypothesis 6.3 [UTILITY OF SERVICE PROVIDER CLASSES IN mPRTF AND mETF−1].
For each of the service provider classes $h, the utility of service providers in the PRTF-based
market is higher than the utility of service providers in the market which implements the
ETF-1.
Analogously to the approach sketched above, uPRTFj and u
ETF−1
j are compared in
each simulation round. However, subject to the absolute values that can be recorded
in each round, the sub-hypotheses can be tested by dint of a one-tailed matched-
pairs t-test as the large number of observations assures robustness of the t-test to
violations of the normality assumptions.
As stated in the previous section, the simulation is mainly per-
formed for the network configurations listed as follows: (|Y|, |Yk|) =
{(2,2), (2,5), (3,2), (3,3), (3,4), (4,3), (4,4), (5,3)}. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the
results of the simulation runs for each of the tested network configurations an-
alyzing the relative number of service providers opting for mPRTF and mETF−1
(cp. Hypothesis 6.2). Tables 6.7 and 6.8 show the results for each of the tested
configurations in terms of service provider utilities. In more detail, each round’s
utilities uPRTFj and u
ETF−1
j of service provider vj are aggregated to an expected
utility Ē(um$ ) for each market mPRTF and mETF and for each service provider class
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$h. Additionally, the results for larger networks in terms of |Yk| are to be found in
Section B.1 in tabular form and will briefly be discussed in the following.
As a first step to approach Hypothesis 6.1, the relative number of the service
provider classes that prefer mPRTF over mETF−1 is compared. Tables 6.5 and 6.6
provide quite clear results. In at least six out of nine classes, mPRTF is preferred over
mETF−1. For (2,5), (3,4), (4,4), and (5,3), and also for the configurations tested in
Table B.1, the PRTF-based market is chosen more often than the market applying
ETF-1 in each of the service provider classes. That is, based on these results, Hypothesis
6.2 can be accepted. However, as above-stated, this result may be distorted by the
absolute utility values which need to be considered in order to eventually accept or
decline Hypothesis 6.1.
Table 6.5: Average share |m|rel of service providers opting for mPRTF and mETF−1
(1). |m|rel per $h does not add up to 100% – the remaining share denotes the state
in which service providers are indifferent between choosing mPRTF and mETF−1.
|m|rel , (2,2) |m|rel , (2,5) |m|rel , (3,2) |m|rel , (3,3)
PRTF ETF− 1 PRTF ETF− 1 PRTF ETF− 1 PRTF ETF− 1
$1 43.2% 28.4% 70.5% 10.6% 47.0% 31.0% 58.4% 21.4%
$2 33.1% 44.4% 66.5% 24.3% 39.0% 46.9% 52.5% 37.3%
$3 26.0% 52.1% 53.8% 41.8% 37.9% 51.8% 46.7% 47.4%
$4 48.1% 13.8% 56.3% 2.77% 50.2% 23.3% 61.4% 13.6%
$5 40.0% 32.5% 66.3% 11.0% 47.0% 36.2% 60.7% 24.7%
$6 36.7% 37.8% 63.3% 24.5% 43.9% 44.3% 56.4% 34.7%
$7 39.4% 7.97% 27.8% 0.40% 52.5% 15.2% 59.8% 6.53%
$8 49.4% 15.5% 43.2% 2.33% 53.3% 23.8% 61.5% 14.7%
$9 42.9% 25.3% 55.4% 7.95% 52.7% 33.5% 61.5% 23.4%
Absolute utilities of a service provider when deciding upon entering mPRTF or
mETF−1 are tested in Hypothesis 6.3 for every service provider class $h as shown in
Tables 6.7 and 6.8. The asterisks indicate that the expected utility Ē(uPRTF$ ) of ser-
vice providers in the PRTF market is significantly higher that their expected utility
Ē(uETF−1$ ) in the ETF-1 market.
Assuming that service provider types are equally likely, the underlying simu-
lation shows that at least 66.7% of the service providers significantly prefer mPRTF
as shown in the lowermost row of Tables 6.7 and 6.8 (since Ē(uPRTF$ ) > Ē(uETF−1$ )).
For all tested network configurations, either six or seven out of nine service provider
classes opt for the PRTF-based market. In larger network configurations as shown
in Table B.1, the tendency towards choosing mPRTF rises; in (2,8) and (2,10), 88.9%
of the service provider classes would opt for it, only the very “best” class $3 prefers
mETF−1.
The evaluation of the data brings about another characteristic of the PRTF: in
network configurations that feature less service providers per candidate pool, less
service provider classes are attracted in general while in configurations with a larger
number of services per candidate pool, statistical tests turn out to be more distinct
in terms of the tested hypotheses. That is, there is a trend to be observable towards
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Table 6.6: Average share |m|rel of service providers opting for mPRTF and mETF−1
(2). |m|rel per $h does not add up to 100% – the remaining share denotes the state
in which service providers are indifferent between choosing mPRTF and mETF−1.
|m|rel , (3,4) |m|rel , (4,3) |m|rel , (4,4) |m|rel , (5,3)
PRTF ETF− 1 PRTF ETF− 1 PRTF ETF− 1 PRTF ETF− 1
$1 68.1% 14.3% 63.3% 23.1% 72.4% 15.9% 66.1% 24.4%
$2 61.6% 29.4% 54.3% 37.6% 64.4% 28.6% 58.6% 36.0%
$3 52.8% 41.2% 47.4% 47.7% 54.3% 41.0% 49.7% 47.1%
$4 67.3% 6.77% 65.8% 13.8% 70.4% 9.59% 67.5% 15.2%
$5 65.9% 18.3% 63.6% 23.6% 70.0% 18.9% 66.1% 24.1%
$6 64.5% 27.1% 58.7% 33.6% 65.7% 27.3% 59.5% 33.9%
$7 59.8% 2.84% 61.8% 8.93% 67.9% 3.54% 66.3% 9.93%
$8 63.5% 8.23% 62.9% 13.5% 70.6% 8.75% 68.2% 15.6%
$9 63.6% 17.2% 61.6% 24.9% 70.3% 16.4% 64.1% 24.1%
a significant attraction of more service provider classes in network configuration
with a higher |Yk| (cp. also Section B.1). On the other hand, the absolute average
utility of service providers declines in larger networks due to the larger number of
service providers potentially receiving a slice of the PR cake. Applying the ETF-1,
the surplus is always distributed among allocated service providers. While the ab-
solute amount of money granted to service providers remains unchanged, service
providers’ expected utilities also decrease when applying the ETF-1 due to a gener-
ally decreasing probability of allocation.
To summarize, both Hypothesis 6.2 and Hypothesis 6.3 can be accepted. There-
fore, Hypothesis 6.1 also applies subject to the assumptions made in this simulation.
Generally, it is clear that not all of the service providers can be attracted. This
result is straight forward since both PRTF and ETF-1 distribute the same surplus
∆ = UF∗ . Therefore, if some of the service providers receive a larger share of it, others
must be worse off. It is obvious that the most competitive service providers, roughly
represented by price-quality combinations with pij < qj expect a higher payoff in
mETF−1 than in mPRTF. However, service providers with intermediate price and
quality tend to choose the PRTF market, likewise vendors that offer higher prices
but lower quality. The latter class of agents can still be beneficial to an SVN as long
as service providers attached to it make valuable contributions to the overall sys-
tem. Furthermore, such providers contribute to the variety of the network, making
it more attractive for service customers. It can be concluded that the PRTF system-
atically fosters healthy network growth – all kinds of service providers that yield a
positive value to the network shall be remunerated. That way, variety and stability,
which is valued and honored by customers when deciding on which market to enter
[76], is increased. A continuously granted surplus to such service providers has the
potential to ensure that they will also remain in the network.
By the sheer number of attracted service providers, the PRTF-based market is
more likely to cover the whole range of functional and non-functional requirements
that meet the request made by the customer. On the other hand, it is consider-
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Table 6.7: Expected utilities of service provider classes in the PRTF and the ETF-1
market subject to different network configurations (1). * denotes significance at
the level of p=0.1, ** denotes significance at the level of p=0.01. ARPRTF stands
for attraction rate of the PRTF-based market.
Ē(um$ ), (2,2) Ē(um$ ), (2,5) Ē(um$ ), (3,2) Ē(um$ ), (3,3)
PRTF ETF− 1 PRTF ETF− 1 PRTF ETF− 1 PRTF ETF− 1
$1 0.304** 0.288 0.130** 0.110 0.305* 0.297 0.212* 0.204
$2 0.474 0.536 0.226 0.241 0.409 0.498 0.309 0.372
$3 0.606 0.711 0.329 0.427 0.496 0.601 0.397 0.500
$4 0.217** 0.148 0.069** 0.029 0.253** 0.216 0.172** 0.123
$5 0.365** 0.346 0.132** 0.098 0.363* 0.349 0.243* 0.232
$6 0.432* 0.424 0.205* 0.195 0.422 0.454 0.317 0.324
$7 0.146** 0.075 0.025** 0.005 0.220** 0.143 0.119** 0.051
$8 0.245** 0.160 0.051** 0.022 0.283** 0.224 0.178** 0.126
$9 0.326** 0.256 0.083** 0.041 0.343** 0.312 0.231** 0.197
ARPRTF 77.8% 77.8% 66.7% 66.7%
Table 6.8: Expected utilities of service provider classes in the PRTF and the ETF-1
market subject to different network configurations (2). * denotes significance at
the level of p=0.1, ** denotes significance at the level of p=0.01. ARPRTF stands
for attraction rate of the PRTF-based market.
Ē(um$ ), (3,4) Ē(um$ ), (4,3) Ē(um$ ), (4,4) Ē(um$ ), (5,3)
PRTF ETF− 1 PRTF ETF− 1 PRTF ETF− 1 PRTF ETF− 1
$1 0.160** 0.147 0.227* 0.214 0.177** 0.161 0.244* 0.234
$2 0.245 0.290 0.297 0.364 0.239 0.294 0.295 0.357
$3 0.321 0.422 0.369 0.484 0.301 0.405 0.354 0.475
$4 0.115** 0.061 0.176** 0.127 0.135** 0.088 0.186** 0.133
$5 0.185** 0.161 0.237** 0.214 0.191** 0.172 0.239** 0.215
$6 0.241* 0.232 0.305 0.305 0.240* 0.229 0.296 0.295
$7 0.075** 0.025 0.139** 0.080 0.087** 0.029 0.141** 0.089
$8 0.113** 0.068 0.166** 0.124 0.118** 0.063 0.186** 0.139
$9 0.163** 0.117 0.227** 0.195 0.159** 0.106 0.220** 0.180
ARPRTF 77.8% 66.7% 77.8% 66.7%
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ably more uncertain if a customer request can be accomplished by the two to three
remaining classes of service providers that did not opt for mPRTF in the first place.
This is especially true for rather small networks. Therefore, as stated above, it can be
assumed that customers prefer larger, more variable networks over networks offer-
ing highly efficient services, however, lack functionality. Assuming that customers
opt for the market that is more variable, previously non-attracted service providers
may be likely to be “forced” to also join mPRTF due to the larger customer base.
6.4.4 Summary & Implications
Network growth is a key factor to establish a sustainable business. The SVN con-
nects two market sides, service customers and service providers. Each of the two
market sides benefit from participants joining the other network side [14]. Not only
the quantity of customers will boost the success of the network, but also the quantity
and complementarity of sellers as well as the quality of their offerings. Both sides
of the market positively value the number of participants on the other market side.
Service customers benefit from a larger number of heterogenous service providers
leading to increased variety. However, sellers are only willing to register if they
expect to face many customers in the market [62].
A result from the previous section was that, as a matter of the same surplus
distributed in both the PRTF and the ETF-1 market, some of the service provider
classes must be worse off when operating in mPRTF than when selling their services
in mETF−1. From a bird’s eye view, attracted service providers do not necessarily
have to be the most competitive ones as long as the mass of attracted vendors assure that
a sufficiently large number of customers enter the platform. As shown in Section 6.4.3.2,
the co-opetition mechanism induces intensified growth on provider-side in each of
the tested network configurations. The quantity of attracted service providers is
likely to lead to the attraction of service customers that base their decision to enter
a market upon the expected future size of the network [187]. Thereby, they activate
network effects which provide additional value for vendors, that is, increase their ex-
pected utilities for joining the network and actively participate in it. This effect may
also include service providers that were not attracted by the mPRTF in the first place.
That way, the above-described circle of increasing utility for both market sides can
be fueled.
6.5 Summary
Each of the presented properties are of particular importance in SVNs. The pre-
sented fairness property in connection with cooperational monotonicity fundamentally
enables the implementation of transfers granted to a set of service providers that
also includes non-allocated participants. On the one hand, cooperative aspects in
SVNs are considered via the assignment of value functions on a path level and the
very remuneration of alternative service offers based on their contribution to the
overall network. By valuing not only allocated paths, but also alternatives that
would also create utility if the best path was not in place, the PRTF also accounts
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for the service providers’ readiness to continuously keep ready their services for de-
livery. Fairness ensures that these payoffs are generally perceived evenhanded by
service providers which is a prerequisite for their participation. On the other hand,
competition is retained by rewarding individual contributions to the network. Co-
operational monotonicity thereby ensures that an increase in a service provider’s
individual efficiency must be rewarded with an at least identical or a larger pay-
off. That way, effective incentives to improve and innovate services in the SVN are
given.
Inducing a fully intermeshed SVN as a stable state, the co-opetition mechanism
fosters interconnectedness in the network, which is a prerequisite for complementar-
ity: the more alternative links connect available services, the greater the variety of
complex service instances that can be offered. Therefore, incentives for link forma-
tion can be interpreted as the key enabler for complementarity. Transferring this
result from a single, customer-requested SVN to the whole pool of services reg-
istered with an SVN, the long valley’s exponentially growing number of possible
service offerings is optimally fueled (cp. also Section 2.2). Thereby, the co-opetition
mechanism supports one of the key value propositions of SVNs and the long valley.
The co-opetition mechanism’s ability to foster network growth was shown by
comparing the power ratio-based transfer function to an allocation-based payment
scheme based on Parkes et al. [260] that does not set particular incentives besides its
emphasize on competition. By setting incentives for the bulk of service providers,
the co-opetition mechanism is likely to provide the variety of services that is de-
manded by the customer. Thereby, increasing returns for service providers can be
initiated – even if the most effective service providers are not incentivized to join
an PRTF-based SVN in the first place. Their participation may be caught at a later
stage after a certain network size is reached due to increased valuation for larger
networks owed to their larger customer base.
Recall that the network design goals discussed in this chapter account for the
”downgrading” of some classic mechanism design goals as second-tier properties.
The PR-based transfer function is not particularly designed to fulfill incentive com-
patibility – and therefore, inevitably dismisses allocation efficiency to a certain ex-
tent (cp. Section 3.1.4). Nevertheless, as for instance shown in Section 6.1.5, in-
centive compatibility is connected to fairness properties in terms of the extensibil-
ity of fairness from the PR to the entire transfer function. Thus, although being a
second-tier-property, incentive compatibility still remains in the close focus and will
be evaluated in detail as the core contribution of the next chapter.
Chapter 7
Classic Mechanism Design Objectives
T he network mechanism design perspective centers on objectives that arise fromnetwork design (cp. Section 4.1.1). Such objectives may overbalance some clas-
sic mechanism design desiderata in the first place, however, this does not mean that
the latter can simply be neglected. On the one hand, budget balance and individ-
ual rationality as classic properties are essential in order to guarantee a sustainable
business. On the other hand, incentive compatibility and allocative efficiency are
not systematically targeted by the PR-based payments. Incentive compatibility was
traditionally seen as a requirement rather than a desideratum in mechanism design,
in itself being technically achievable in every mechanism according to the revelation
principle [131, 234]. This notion has changed with the awareness that the revelation
principle may be quite complex to implement and that “good enough” results, ei-
ther in terms of economic or computational efficiency [260, 245], may be achieved
without enforcing truth-telling. Networked mechanism design takes the same line,
with “efficiency” being attributed to a healthy network evolution.
Nonetheless, it would be quite shortsighted to design a mechanism that com-
pletely loses track of incentive compatibility and allocative efficiency – for several
reasons: first, incentive compatibility is linked to fairness in the broader sense (cp.
Section 6.1.5). Second, a high degree of allocative efficiency is certainly desirable in a
way that it allocates those network participants that assign the highest value to their
inclusion in a transaction, thereby remunerating their high performance, especially
as the collective of service providers is already adorned with the PR payoffs.
As shown in Sections 5.4 and 6.1.1, budget balance is fulfilled by design: the co-
opetition mechanism collects and disburses the same amount of money from and
to the platform participants. Individual rationality as a second required property
accounting for voluntary participation of service providers will be discussed in Sec-
tion 7.2, based on the simulatively acquired results on service providers’ optimal
bidding strategies (cp. Section 7.1). The latter are primarily scrutinized in a series of
agent-based simulations in order to shed light on the co-opetition mechanism’s vul-
nerability to strategic manipulation with respect to the service providers’ types. In
addition, effects on allocative efficiency caused by such deviation from truth-telling
will be explored.
Again, the analytic and numerical evaluations conducted in the current chapter
are based on both the notation of the SVN formalization (cp. Section 2.2.3) and the
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bidding language and further notation used for defining the co-opetition mecha-
nism’s allocation and transfer function as introduced in Sections 5.1 and 5.2).
7.1 Incentive Compatibility & Allocative Efficiency
According to Definition 3.12, a mechanism is said to be incentive compatible if it is
a direct-revelation mechanism and the participants want to reveal their true prefer-
ences in equilibrium. Obviously, as noted in Section 5.4, the co-opetition mechanism
directly reveals agents’ types – no matter if truthful or not in the first place. How-
ever, as will be shown in the current section, truth-telling in equilibrium cannot be
stated in an analytical sense. If incentive compatibility is not met, the co-opetition
mechanism also loses allocative efficiency as a guaranteed property by definition
(cp. Section 3.1.4).
This section scrutinizes the co-opetition mechanism’s vulnerability to strategic
behavior at the service provider-side. Due to the variety of parameters and the com-
plexity of the underlying transfer function – the complexity of calculating the power
ratio for n services is in O(2n) – analytic considerations are only possible to a very
limited extent. In such interwoven environments, the complex analytical appara-
tus oftentimes impedes theoretical evaluations that properly include the variety of
interrelations [192]. Thus, in numerical simulations, restricting assumptions made
as a remedy to calculate theoretic solutions can be relaxed in order to reproduce in-
teractions in SVNs more realistically [6, 315]. In this thesis, a series of agent-based
simulations will be consulted to analyze the degree of bid manipulation that is ben-
eficial to service providers. Extracting possible equilibrium strategies from the bid-
ding strategy evaluation, a comparison of outcomes and their overall utility with
and without manipulation is conducted in order to review the co-opetition mecha-
nism’s degree of allocative efficiency.
The remainder of this section is structured as follows: Section 7.1.1 will both for-
mally and exemplarily show that the co-opetition mechanism is not incentive com-
patible, followed by considerations on allocative efficiency. The degree of manipu-
lation robustness will be assessed in an agent-based simulative approach outlined
in Sections 7.1.2 and 7.1.3: different simulation series are run in order to approach
the equilibrium strategies of service providers and to be able to make statements on
the level of efficiency that can be reached by the co-opetition mechanism.
7.1.1 Analytic Considerations
The distribution of value according to the power ratio combined with the allocation-
based component is generally not designed to extract truthful bids from service
providers. A counterexample is provided in Example 7.1. Applying the revelation
principle as one of the most striking results of mechanism design, any mechanism
can be transformed into an equivalent incentive compatible direct-revelation mech-
anism. However, as indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the revelation prin-
ciple, per se, is a theoretic result: the construction of the equivalent mechanism can
become arbitrarily complex. Moreover, although the resulting mechanism will be
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direct in contrast to, for instance, an ascending auction, it can still require multiple
iterations. This is not desirable for the co-opetition mechanism in which complex
negotiation protocols counteract the dynamics of SVNs and the long valley. The
settlement shall be made directly after the service customer and the set of service
providers have submitted their one (and single) bid.
Thus, the co-opetition mechanism in its presented form shall remain unchanged,
thereby accepting vulnerability to manipulation.
7.1.1.1 Bidding Strategies
This section includes an analysis of service providers’ bidding strategies as they are
articulated in their bids bij ∈ B, taking the service customer’s preferences as given
(cp, Assumption 5.2). The following analytical evaluation considers price bids only:
the quasi-linear structure of the scoring function as introduced in Equation (5.1)
allows for a substitution of quality-related bids and price bids under quite weak
assumptions. Subject to the simplifying assumption that the utility granted by a
service provider to the system is monotonically increasing with a higher quality
offered and monotonically decreasing when the offered quality is lower, strategies
for setting prices and quality attributes can be substituted.1
For both allocated and non-allocated service providers, transfers must be inde-
pendent of their bidding strategy in order to be indifferent between any other strategy and
truth-telling [140, 257]. In case of truth-telling, we can set pij = cij and the utility uk











That is, assuming truth-telling, the service providers’ utilities are solely com-
prised of their power ratios. The following analysis shows that both allocated and
non-allocated service providers’ utilities are dependent on their own price bids.
Thus, analytically, truth-telling cannot be a weakly dominant strategy. For simplic-
ity, it is assumed that each service provider nk owns exactly one service vj, that is,
σ(nk) = {vj} and σ̄(vj) = nk.
1. vj /∈ W∗ : uj = φj. vj’s power ratio is assembled by its weighted marginal
contribution to all internal cooperations Sm ∈ S. If φj > 0, vj is a part of at
least one complex service Fl ∈ F, which again determines the value functions
of internal cooperations. Since UFl = ∑eij∈E(Wl) pij for vj ∈ Wl, eij ∈ E(Wl), uj
depends on the service’s price pij.
2. vj ∈W∗, eij ∈ E(W∗) : uj = pij − cij + φj. The price bid is included proportion-
ally in the service’s power ratio and therefore does not cancel out the actual
1This simplification will be made in some places of Section 7.1 in order to handle the complexity of
the conducted evaluations.
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price bid received from t1j . In more detail, φj can be subdivided into the over-
all amount of money to be distributed via the PR (∆ = UF∗) and vj’s relative
share in ∆, denoted as ζ j ∈ [0;1]. Then,
uj =pij − cij + ζ j · ∆(7.2)










·(α · Q(·)− ∑
elk∈E(W∗)\{eij}
plk)− cij
Therefore, other than, for instance, in a second-price-sealed-bid auction , devi-
ation from truth-telling can be beneficial [199]. For example, the complex service
auction (CSA) as presented in Blau [45] does not allow for beneficial deviation on
the service provider-side (cp. Section 4.3).2
Getting back to the co-opetition mechanism, Figure 7.1 illustrates the service
providers’ manipulation strategies and corresponding utilities in more detail, com-
paring each of them to a truth-telling strategy. utruthj shall denote vj’s utility in case
of truth-telling while udevj stands for vj’s utility when stating a price other than the
actual costs.
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Figure 7.1: Bidding strategies of an arbitrary service provider
Focussed on a single service provider to deviate from truth-telling, two fundamental
cases need to be considered in order to evaluate the result of different strategies.
First, vj is allocated via one of its links if reporting its cost truthfully in the price
bid. Second, playing a truth-telling strategy, vj is not part of the allocated complex
service.
2However, in Blau [45], this statement only holds if assuming no strategic behavior of the customer
(cp. also Assumption 5.2).
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1. Playing a truth-telling strategy, vj is allocated via its link eij.
(a) In this case, overstating the value can lead to both a profit or a loss. If,
after deviating, vj is still allocated, its profit or loss depends on the impact
of the PR. By overstating, vj would realize a profit from t1j since pij > cij,
however, incur a loss from t2j since a higher price diminishes the utility of
the complex services that include eij and therefore decreases the PR. This
effect is exemplarily illustrated in Example 7.1 (cp. Table 7.2). If vj drops
off the allocation after increasing its price, utruthj > u
dev
j will definitely hold
due to a decreased PR whilst simultaneously the utility from t1j remains
unchanged.
(b) Undercutting the true costs also leads to an ambivalent result. pij < cij
will lead to a loss in t1j , however, t
2
j will rise due to the lower price com-
pared to truth-telling.
2. Playing a truth-telling strategy, vj is not allocated via its link eij
(a) Overstating the value would inevitably lead to a decreased utility since
it is not possible to be allocated with a higher price if not being allocated
before. t2j would additionally decrease due to the higher price.
(b) Undercutting the true costs again yields an ambiguous utility. If under-
cutting leads to a situation in which vj is allocated, pij < cij will lead to a
loss in t1j . It is not clear if this loss can be compensated for via the rising
PR (cp. Example 7.1, Table 7.3). On the other hand, if a decreased price
does not trigger an allocation, udevj > u
truth
j will definitely hold.
Example 7.1 [DEVIATION FROM TRUTH-TELLING]. Consider the exemplary, simplified
SVN with |Y| = 2 and |V| = |N| as displayed in Figure 7.2.3 Assume a customer’s will-
ingness to pay of α = 5 and bid prices of the involved service providers as shown in Figure
7.2.
If all service providers reveal their internal costs truthfully as bid prices, the complex
service F1 = F∗truth = ({v1,v3},{es1, e13}) with PF1 = 3 is allocated and ∆truth = 2 is dis-
tributed via the power ratio. Payoffs and utilities assemble as shown in Table 7.1 according
to Equation (5.21):
Table 7.1: Bidding strategies: Transfers and utilities in case of truth-telling
v1 v2 v3 v4
tj = t1j + t
2
j 1+0.75 0+0.25 2+0.75 0+0.25
utruthj (1+0.75)-1=0.75 0.25 (2+0.75)-2=0.75 0.25
Now assume that service provider n1 deviates from its true costs, charging ps1 = 1.5
for its service v1. F1 is still allocated, however, due to the increased price PF1 = 3.5, only
∆ = 1.5 is left to be distributed via the PR. The new transfers and profits evolve as shown in
Table 7.2 and can be compared to the results in case of truth-telling.
3As shown in Section 6.3, the fully intermeshed SVN is a stable result. Example 7.1 is deliberately
simplified so that effects of manipulated bids can easily be tracked.
















































Figure 7.2: Bidding strategies: A simple SVN example
Table 7.2: Bidding strategies: Transfers and profits in case of unilateral deviation
– gaining through overbidding
v1 v2 v3 v4
tj = t1j + t
2
j 1.5+0.5 0+0.25 2+0.5 0+0.25
uj (1.5+0.5)-1=1 0.25 (2+0.5)-2=0.5 0.25
Two basic results can be observed. First, v1 increases its utility when deviating from
truth-telling (utruthj < u
dev
j ). Second, v3’s utility is decreasing although v3 itself did not
manipulate. Therefore, a service provider’s strategy is also heavily dependent on its assump-
tions on what the other vendors choose to do.
For a different outcome, again consider the SVN as introduced in Figure 7.2. This
time assume that service provider n2 deviates from its true costs, charging ps2 = 0.5 for
its service v2. Thus, the allocated complex service switches from F1 = F∗truth to F∗ = F2 =
({v2,v4},{es2, e24}). Due to the lower price PF2 = 2.5, ∆ increases to 2.5. Transfers and
utilities evolve as shown in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3: Bidding strategies: Transfers and profits in case of unilateral deviation
– losing through underbidding
v1 v2 v3 v4
tj = t1j + t
2
j 0+0.5 0.5+0.75 0+0.5 2+0.75
uj 0.5 (0.5+0.75)-1.5=-0.25 0.5 (2+0.75)-2=0.75
In this example, v2 decreased its utility by deviating from truth-telling and switching
from being non-allocated to being allocated. Interestingly, in this case, v4’s utility increased
as a result of v2’s changing action.
7.1.1.2 Allocative Efficiency
As incentive compatibility in equilibrium is not met, allocative efficiency cannot
be guaranteed either. Therefore, the degree of allocative efficiency reached by the
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co-opetition mechanism is based on the strategies played by the service providers.
Recall that a mechanism is defined as allocatively efficient if its choice, that is, trans-
ferred to the SVN scenario, the allocated complex service F∗ ∈ F, maximizes the
total valuation over all agents. Since USCF∗ = 0 and due to the neutrality of the plat-
form operator, efficiency considerations can be pooled to the service provider-side.




uj(θj, F∗, tj) ≥ ∑
vj∈V


















Again, only consider prices and costs are considered as argued for in the pre-
ceding section. According to Section 3.1.3, assuming quasi-linear preferences, it is
sufficient to consider the valuations ∑vj∈V τi(·). According to Definition 3.4 and di-
rectly following from Equation (7.4),
(7.5) ∑
vj∈V
uj(θj, F∗, tj) = ∑
vj∈V
τj(θj, F∗) + ∑
vj∈V
tj(θj)
If every service provider states its true type for owned services, the cheapest path
o = F∗truth is allocated. That is,
(7.6) ∑
vj∈V
























∀F′ ∈ F, F∗truth 6= F′
Therefore, truth-telling of service providers leads to the allocative efficient
choice. Based thereupon, one can show that the allocation function picks the effi-
cient path whenever the cheapest path is allocated – regardless of service providers devi-
ating from truth-telling or not. In more detail, as long as a deviation of participants
does not lead to a change in the allocated complex service F∗truth, the welfare W of
the system (cp. Equation 5.9) remains unchanged. Transfers are merely reallocated
amongst service providers with their total staying the same. This result is in line
4Note that θj denotes vj’s type as opposed to the notation in Chapter 5, where θ symbolizes the
customer’s preferences.
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with a theoretical result which states that all efficient choices of a quasi-linear mech-
anism need to involve the same allocation and may only differ in how transfers are
distributes [296].
Consider a situation in which truth-telling allocates o = F∗truth. Further, ∆truth
shall denote the distributed surplus via the PR, while W truth shall be the welfare
that is generated, both assuming truth-telling.
1. First, consider a situation in which deviation from the true type does not
change the allocated path, that is, o = F∗truth still holds.
(a) Assume that some of the allocated services decrease their prices, letting
∆truth increase, which leads to ∆′ = (1 + x) · ∆truth. Then, the deviating
allocated services realize a loss from t1 in the amount of x · ∆truth which
in sum exactly cancels out the overall increase in t2: W ′ = (1 + x) ·∆truth−
x · ∆truth =W truth.
(b) Now assume that some of the allocated services increase their prices,
letting ∆truth decrease, which leads to ∆′′ = (1 − x) · ∆truth. Then, the
deviating allocated services realize a profit from t1 in the amount of
x · ∆truth which in sum exactly cancels out the overall decrease in t2:
W ′′ = (1− x) · ∆truth + x · ∆truth =W truth.
2. Now assume that deviation from the true type changes the allocated path to
o = F′ 6= F∗truth.
(a) If some of the previously allocated service providers increase their prices,
thereby causing a switch of the allocated path from F∗truth to F′, the PR-
based payments decrease to ∆′′′ ≤ ∆truth, since UF′ ≤ UF∗truth . As t2 of
the providers that dropped off the allocated path must have decreased,
W ′′′ ≤W truth must necessarily hold.
(b) Assume that some of the previously non-allocated services decrease their
price which lets a different path F′′ 6= F∗truth be allocated. Then, the PR-
based payments increase to ∆(4) ≥ ∆truth since UF′′ ≥ UF∗truth . Obviously,
the deviating allocated services realize a loss from t1 which must be at
least as high as ∆(4) − ∆truth. Therefore, W (4) ≤W truth must hold.
7.1.1.3 Conclusion
To summarize the considerations on bidding strategies: even if service providers
definitively knew if they were allocated or not, three of four branches in the decision
tree shown in Figure 7.1 would not yield a distinct strategy implication. Besides ser-
vice providers’ own competitiveness and the other service providers’ prices5, four
other parameters directly influence the bidding strategy.
5This statement holds for the simplified setting that only considers prices. Analogously, the service
configuration influences the bidding strategy if the simplifications above are not made.
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• First, the customer’s willingness to pay determines the absolute amount of
money ∆ distributed via the PR (cp. Equation 5.7).6 In case of a high willing-
ness to pay, PR-based payments can also be high, thereby overcompensating
losses incurred by undercutting the true costs, and vice versa.
• Second, the number of services per candidate pool is a crucial factor for services to
be allocated or not.
• Third, the overall number of candidate pools and included services determines the
global competition for ∆.
• Finally, the density d of the network, which denotes the ratio of actual links and
all possible edges in the SVN, determines the number of available complex
service instances. Thereby, the probability of allocation as well as the service
providers’ shares in ∆ are potentially influenced.
These parameters are proprietary knowledge of the platform operator and can-
not be fully extracted by service providers from the bits of information that cir-
culate in the SVN during the auction process (cp. Section 5.1.3). Therefore, service
providers can only have an expectation of which SVN to form and a prior of which re-
quester type is present. In order to grasp such different scenarios, strategic behavior
of service providers within the co-operation mechanism is analyzed in a simulation-
based approach.
For the following evaluation, keep in mind that the co-opetition mechanism
yields an allocative efficient result whenever o allocates the complex service that
maximizes UFl for all Fl ∈ F given true types of the services. That is, allocative effi-
ciency on service provider-side cannot only be stated in case of a truth-telling strat-
egy played by each of the service providers, but also in case of deviating, as long as
the best path given true types is allocated, that is









However, allocative efficiency is universally guaranteed if and only if partici-
pants opt for a truth-telling strategy.
7.1.2 Simulation-based Assessment of Bidding Strategies
In analogy with Parkes et al. [260], two related simulations are conducted in order
to analyze the service providers’ strategies in the co-opetition mechanism. Firstly it
is assumed that one service provider nk ∈ N unilaterally deviates from revealing its
true type with respect to service vj ∈ V with σ̄(vj) = nk while all other service offers
are submitted truthfully (cp. Section 7.1.2.2). Secondly, in Section 7.1.2.3 the simula-
tion settings are varied to a situation which includes symmetric bidding strategies.
6This statement holds true for the simplified setting that only considers α. Analogously, the other
elements of the customer’s type analogously influence ∆ if the simplifications above are not made.
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That is, it is assumed that if service provider nk deviates from truth-telling by x%
regarding all incoming links of vj ∈ V with σ̄(vj) = nk, then every other service
provider also manipulates all its bids by x%.
For simplification and without loss of generality, |V| = |N| shall hold such that
service providers and services can be referred to interchangeably. Further, the anal-
ysis is restricted to bid prices since service configurations are fully monetized via
the customer’s willingness to pay and the scoring function.7
7.1.2.1 Benchmark: The ETF-2
In order to benchmark the results yielded by the co-opetition mechanism with re-
spect to its robustness to manipulation and its allocative efficiency, it is compared
to other mechanisms. On the one hand, the ETF-1 as introduced in Section 6.4.1 is
consulted.
A second benchmark shall be a payment scheme that does not only reward ser-
vice providers that are actually allocated, but also service providers on standby.
Based on the egalitarian rule [340, 175], a scheme that distributes ∆ equally among
all services in the customer-specific SVN G, henceforth named ETF-2, shall serve
as such a benchmark. Analogue to the ETF-1, the allocation function introduced in
Definition 5.5 is adopted to the ETF-2.
Definition 7.1 [EQUAL TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR ALL PARTICIPATING SERVICES
(ETF-2)]. The ETF-2 distributes the system’s surplus ∆ in equal shares to all participating
services vj ∈ V:
(7.9) tE2j =
{
pij + 1|V|∆, if vj ∈W∗, eij ∈ E(W∗)
1
|V|∆, otherwise
Thus, the ETF-2 covers the cooperative element in SVNs, however, does not set
any direct incentives for competition since each service provider receives an equal
share of ∆, no matter if it is competitive or not. That is, while the PRTF could be
tagged as somewhat social, the ETF-2 shows distinct tendencies of a socialistic scheme
that rewards agents regardless of their productivity – with exception of the transfers
made to allocated services accounting to their bids. In contrast, the ETF-1 is a com-
petitive payment scheme which has a component that rewards allocated services in
equal shares.
The ETF-2 thus represents a payment scheme that mandatorily must come off
worse than the PRTF in terms of manipulation robustness. Consequently, the ETF-2
must be beaten by the PRTF as stated in the following hypothesis.8
7Subject to the simplifying assumption that the utility granted by a service provider to the system
is monotonically increasing with a higher quality offered and monotonically decreasing when the
offered quality is lower, strategies for setting prices and quality attributes can be substituted.
8Hypothesis regarding the comparison PRTF vs. ETF-1 are not stated. The ETF-1 is consulted in
order to learn how the PRTF performs against a purely competition-oriented payment rule. If, or in
which cases the PRTF performs better than the ETF-1, cannot be stated reliably in advance.
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Hypothesis 7.1 [MANIPULATION ROBUSTNESS]. The PRTF is more robust against ma-
nipulation than the ETF-2.
In other words, the PRTF needs to allow for lower profitable manipulation rates
than the ETF-2. Hypothesis 7.1 will be analyzed by comparing the degree of manip-




In the current simulation, the following parameters that influence service providers’
strategies as listed in Section 7.1.1.3 are varied.
• 3 different levels of the customer’s willingness to pay α, defined relatively to
the number of candidate pools |Y|, are considered. These are α1 ∈U[0.5 · |Y|;1 ·
|Y|], α2 ∈ U[1 · |Y|;2 · |Y|], and α3 ∈ U[2 · |Y|;4 · |Y|]. U[x1; x2] denotes that a
value is uniformly drawn from the interval [x1; x2].
• Complex services including |Y| = 2, |Y| = 3, and |Y| = 4 candidate pools are
considered.
• Without loss of generality, an equal count of services |Yk| per candidate pool
Yk is assumed, setting |Yk| ∈ {2,3,4,5}.
• Finally, the network density is set to d = 1.0 as this is the equilibrium value
for the co-opetition mechanism (cp. Section 6.3.2). This does not necessarily
hold for the benchmarks. However, as full intermeshing reflects the ideal con-
cept of service value networks and the long valley, d = 1.0 must also be the
performance benchmark for the ETF-1 and the ETF-2.9
Each of the above-introduced scenarios, or network configurations, can be inter-
preted as an independent simulation. As argued for in Section 6.4.3, the number of
candidate pools and service per candidate pool reflect a realistic situation in early
SVNs. A configuration is denoted by the triple (|Y|, |Yk|,αi), indicating the number
of considered candidate pools, the number of services per candidate pool, and the
level of the customer’s willingness to pay. All in all, 27 configurations are tested as
listed in Table 7.4.
Table 7.4: Bidding strategies: Tested network configurations. i ∈ {1,2,3}





9In addition, the SVN’s density was tested by means of a preceding sensitivity analysis, yielding that
the density does not significantly influence the simulation result.
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The tested topologies shall cover a variety of different real-world situations. The
customer’s willingness to pay varies from comparably low (α1) to very high (α3).
The upper boundary of α3, 4 · |Y|, reflects an unrealistically high willingness to pay
in order to also capture “extreme” situations. Combined with the number of services
per cluster, different market situations evolve: on the one hand, (2,2,α3) depicts a
situation that lacks competition in either way while (2,5,α1) can be interpreted as
a highly competitive situation with both harsh competition to be allocated and a
customer whose willingness to pay is close to the fair market value.
For each of these configurations, a network topology G is generated, where costs
cij are drawn randomly as follows: a mean µk ∈ U(0;1.0] for each candidate pool
Yk is drawn using a uniform distribution. For each candidate pool Yk, the costs per
link associated to each vj ∈ Yk are taken from a Gaussian distribution N (µk, σ̂). The
standard deviation σ̂ ∈ [0.05;0.25] assures realistic price spreads.10 After initializing
the network configuration (cp. Section 5.3.2), a service offer vj ∈ V in the SVN is
randomly drawn. At first, its utility utruthj is computed, assuming that vj truthfully
reports its costs to the mechanism (cij = pij). Subsequently, the bid prices pij for all
incoming links of vj are manipulated from +100% (which equals a manipulation
rate of r = 1.0) to −95% (r = −0.95) in steps of 5 percentage points. In each of the
steps, the utility urunij yielded by the manipulation of pij by the rate runi is calculated





If Rrunij > 1, deviation at runi is beneficial to vj. Note that, applying unilateral
strategies, any other service vi ∈ V besides vj is offered at true costs. Despite of
the various different configurations, the number of variable parameters and their
interdependencies are still high. To counteract high volatility and statistical noise in
the simulation model, 5000 different topologies are evaluated within one configu-
ration.11 In each of them, a random service is picked and evaluated in terms of its
bidding strategy. In order to identify the range in which deviating from truth-telling
is beneficial for service providers, the statistical significance of the aggregated result
over 5000 topologies is tested via a one-tailed matched-pairs t-test. The test analyzes
the alternative hypothesis stated as follows: Service providers benefit from manipula-
tion at manipulation rate r while all other agents reveal their true type. That is, for vj,
urunij − utruthj > 0 ⇒ Rrunij > 1 must be significantly met. Figure 7.3 depicts the step-
wise procedure of the simulation.
10The interval for σ̂ still allows for considerable variance in the costs for the services. As quality issues
are faded out, σ̂ ∈ [0.05;0.25] conservatively represents real-world price differences for substitutive
services.
11Compared to the simulation conducted in Section 6.4.3, services are not classified in different cate-
gories which justifies the smaller number of simulation rounds in this simulation. Further, a sensi-
tivity analysis for selected network configurations showed that both 2500 and 10,000 rounds yield
results that do not significantly differ from the results created by the simulation settings at hand.
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Figure 7.3: Bidding strategies: Simulation model (unilateral deviation)
From the utility ratios one can not only extract the manipulation rates that sig-
nificantly increase a service provider’s utility, but also the manipulation rate that in
average maximizes uj for each SVN configuration.
Due to the large size of analyzed topologies for each manipulation rate, interde-
pendencies are likely to be canceled out and robustness of the t-test to violations of
the normality assumption can be affirmed [268, 285, 56].
Simulation Results
In the following, selected results of the simulation are shown. First, the aggregated
results for a minimal configuration with a high willingness to pay (2,2, a3) are dis-
cussed. In more detail, for each payment rule (PRTF, ETF-1, and ETF-2) and at each
manipulation level r, Table 7.5 outlines the mean absolute utilities AU, the mean
utility ratio UR of single manipulating service providers, and the standard devia-
tion SD of the mean absolute utility. The row that includes the data for truth-telling
is highlighted in gray.
Table 7.5: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming unilateral manipula-
tion in (2,2,α3). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
1.00 0.448 0.826 0.222 0.273 0.500 0.518 0.540 0.996 0.189
0.95 0.453 0.835 0.221 0.276 0.506 0.520 0.541 0.998 0.189
0.90 0.457 0.842 0.219 0.280 0.512 0.523 0.541 0.998 0.188
0.85 0.463 0.852 0.218 0.287 0.524 0.528 0.543 1.000 0.187
0.80 0.467 0.861 0.217 0.293 0.536 0.532 0.543 1.002* 0.187
0.75 0.471 0.868 0.215 0.299 0.547 0.537 0.543 1.002* 0.186
0.70 0.477 0.879 0.214 0.306 0.559 0.541 0.545 1.004** 0.186
0.65 0.482 0.888 0.212 0.313 0.574 0.545 0.545 1.006** 0.185
0.60 0.488 0.899 0.211 0.329 0.603 0.553 0.547 1.010** 0.183
0.55 0.493 0.907 0.209 0.333 0.609 0.554 0.547 1.009** 0.182
0.50 0.498 0.916 0.207 0.341 0.624 0.558 0.548 1.011** 0.182
0.45 0.504 0.928 0.206 0.357 0.654 0.565 0.550 1.014** 0.181
0.40 0.509 0.938 0.204 0.368 0.673 0.570 0.551 1.016** 0.180
0.35 0.514 0.948 0.202 0.380 0.696 0.574 0.551 1.016** 0.179
0.30 0.520 0.958 0.200 0.401 0.735 0.581 0.552 1.018** 0.178
0.25 0.525 0.967 0.197 0.418 0.765 0.586 0.552 1.018** 0.176
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Table 7.5: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming unilateral manipula-
tion in (2,2,α3). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
0.20 0.531 0.978 0.195 0.439 0.804 0.590 0.553 1.019** 0.175
0.15 0.536 0.987 0.191 0.464 0.849 0.592 0.553 1.019** 0.173
0.10 0.540 0.994 0.188 0.494 0.905 0.594 0.551 1.015** 0.172
0.05 0.542 0.998 0.186 0.516 0.944 0.594 0.547 1.009** 0.172
0.00 0.543 1.000 0.000 0.546 1.000 0.000 0.542 1.000 0.000
-0.05 0.542 0.998 0.184 0.577 1.057** 0.587 0.535 0.986 0.175
-0.10 0.539 0.992 0.185 0.599 1.096** 0.581 0.525 0.969 0.180
-0.15 0.532 0.981 0.188 0.635 1.162** 0.573 0.512 0.945 0.186
-0.20 0.523 0.963 0.194 0.666 1.219** 0.558 0.496 0.914 0.195
-0.25 0.513 0.946 0.200 0.687 1.256** 0.548 0.479 0.883 0.204
-0.30 0.502 0.924 0.206 0.700 1.282** 0.537 0.460 0.848 0.213
-0.35 0.489 0.901 0.213 0.717 1.312** 0.525 0.440 0.811 0.223
-0.40 0.477 0.879 0.219 0.728 1.332** 0.515 0.420 0.775 0.232
-0.45 0.461 0.850 0.227 0.740 1.353** 0.502 0.397 0.731 0.242
-0.50 0.448 0.826 0.234 0.745 1.364** 0.492 0.376 0.693 0.252
-0.55 0.433 0.797 0.240 0.754 1.379** 0.481 0.352 0.649 0.261
-0.60 0.418 0.771 0.247 0.754 1.379** 0.474 0.330 0.608 0.270
-0.65 0.407 0.750 0.253 0.755 1.381** 0.470 0.310 0.572 0.279
-0.70 0.393 0.724 0.258 0.752 1.376** 0.465 0.288 0.531 0.287
-0.75 0.379 0.699 0.263 0.752 1.377** 0.460 0.267 0.491 0.295
-0.80 0.366 0.674 0.268 0.751 1.374** 0.456 0.245 0.452 0.303
-0.85 0.353 0.650 0.272 0.749 1.370** 0.453 0.223 0.412 0.310
-0.90 0.337 0.621 0.278 0.740 1.354** 0.452 0.199 0.368 0.320
-0.95 0.323 0.594 0.283 0.734 1.343** 0.450 0.177 0.326 0.327
Configuration (2,2,α3) represents a setting that induces very little competition
due to the low number of service providers per candidate pool and the high α affect-
ing the surplus to be distributed. The results show that, using ETF-1, undercutting
down to r = −0.95 significantly increases vj’s utility. Generally, applying ETF-1,
undercutting becomes a profitable strategy in configurations with a high surplus
since losses incurred by being allocated with a price that is lower than the costs are
likely to be overcompensated by a high absolute share in ∆. The ETF-2 gives rise
to significant manipulation gains from overbidding up to r = 0.8. Rising prices do
not affect the relative share in ∆, therefore overbidding is not effectively penalized.
Both of these effects can generally be observed throughout all tested configurations
(cp. Figure 7.4). The PRTF only allows, if at all, for profitable manipulation in an
infinitesimal vicinity of r = 0 that cannot be captured by the simulation. Table 7.6
shows the simulation results for the configuration (3,3,α1)
Table 7.6: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming unilateral manipula-
tion in (3,3,α1). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
1.00 0.005 0.772 0.019 0.005 0.782 0.025 0.006 0.922 0.018
0.95 0.005 0.795 0.020 0.005 0.807 0.026 0.006 0.944 0.018
0.90 0.005 0.805 0.020 0.005 0.815 0.026 0.006 0.952 0.019
0.85 0.005 0.820 0.020 0.005 0.825 0.026 0.006 0.964 0.019
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Table 7.6: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming unilateral manipula-
tion in (3,3,α1). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
0.80 0.005 0.819 0.020 0.005 0.820 0.026 0.006 0.963 0.018
0.75 0.005 0.831 0.020 0.005 0.829 0.026 0.006 0.972 0.018
0.70 0.005 0.849 0.020 0.005 0.855 0.027 0.006 0.985 0.018
0.65 0.005 0.870 0.021 0.005 0.875 0.027 0.006 1.004 0.019
0.60 0.005 0.875 0.020 0.005 0.877 0.027 0.006 1.001 0.018
0.55 0.005 0.895 0.021 0.005 0.894 0.027 0.006 1.017 0.019
0.50 0.006 0.901 0.021 0.005 0.892 0.027 0.006 1.018 0.019
0.45 0.006 0.914 0.021 0.005 0.914 0.027 0.006 1.029* 0.018
0.40 0.006 0.941 0.021 0.006 0.956 0.028 0.007 1.054** 0.019
0.35 0.006 0.967 0.021 0.006 0.978 0.028 0.007 1.072** 0.019
0.30 0.006 0.976 0.021 0.006 0.978 0.028 0.007 1.070** 0.019
0.25 0.006 0.983 0.021 0.006 0.984 0.028 0.007 1.074** 0.018
0.20 0.006 1.002 0.021 0.006 1.015 0.028 0.007 1.077** 0.018
0.15 0.006 1.012* 0.021 0.006 1.028* 0.028 0.007 1.079** 0.018
0.10 0.006 1.015** 0.021 0.006 1.026* 0.028 0.007 1.062** 0.017
0.05 0.006 1.012** 0.020 0.006 1.013* 0.027 0.006 1.037** 0.016
0.00 0.006 1.000 0.000 0.006 1.000 0.000 0.006 1.000 0.000
-0.05 0.006 0.962 0.020 0.006 1.003 0.027 0.006 0.938 0.016
-0.10 0.006 0.909 0.019 0.006 0.953 0.027 0.005 0.849 0.016
-0.15 0.005 0.789 0.021 0.005 0.831 0.027 0.004 0.693 0.018
-0.20 0.004 0.591 0.023 0.004 0.660 0.028 0.003 0.447 0.021
-0.25 0.002 0.350 0.027 0.002 0.389 0.032 0.001 0.154 0.027
-0.30 0.000 -0.012 0.034 0.000 0.022 0.037 -0.002 -0.273 0.035
-0.35 -0.003 -0.450 0.042 -0.003 -0.428 0.045 -0.005 -0.783 0.045
-0.40 -0.007 -1.110 0.053 -0.007 -1.113 0.055 -0.010 -1.533 0.057
-0.45 -0.012 -1.890 0.065 -0.011 -1.911 0.067 -0.015 -2.418 0.070
-0.50 -0.018 -2.962 0.080 -0.018 -3.037 0.081 -0.023 -3.604 0.086
-0.55 -0.026 -4.324 0.097 -0.027 -4.454 0.099 -0.032 -5.101 0.104
-0.60 -0.034 -5.583 0.111 -0.035 -5.765 0.113 -0.041 -6.517 0.120
-0.65 -0.045 -7.407 0.130 -0.046 -7.654 0.133 -0.053 -8.515 0.141
-0.70 -0.058 -9.444 0.149 -0.059 -9.768 0.152 -0.067 -10.757 0.161
-0.75 -0.071 -11.666 0.169 -0.072 -12.053 0.173 -0.082 -13.210 0.182
-0.80 -0.086 -14.126 0.188 -0.088 -14.627 0.192 -0.099 -15.933 0.203
-0.85 -0.102 -16.749 0.208 -0.104 -17.407 0.213 -0.118 -18.849 0.225
-0.90 -0.122 -19.897 0.229 -0.124 -20.683 0.235 -0.139 -22.321 0.249
-0.95 -0.144 -23.488 0.252 -0.147 -24.447 0.259 -0.164 -26.260 0.273
In this setting, deviation from truth-telling applying the PRTF is significantly
beneficial up to a manipulation rate of r = 0.15, which equals the profitable deviation
in case of the ETF-1. With respect to ETF-2, r = 0.6 still significantly improves service
providers’ utilities. Generally, as the data in Figure 7.4 shows, the PRTF performs
evenly well in all settings with |Y| = 2.12 In settings with |Y| ∈ {3,4}, a low and
medium customer’s willingness to pay abets increased manipulation (cp. Figure
7.4).13 Table 7.7 exemplarily shows the simulation results for a setting with four
12An exception is (2,5,α3). Due to the high degree of competition as to the services’ allocation,
allocation probability decreases and, at the same time, the high level of α fosters an undercutting
strategy resulting in a maximum profitable deviation of r = −0.15.
13Additional detailed simulation data is provided in Section B.2.1.
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candidate pools (4,2,α1), which increases the competition for receiving a share of ∆,
while |Yk| = 2 represents a rather high probability of allocation.
Table 7.7: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming unilateral manipula-
tion in (4,2,α1). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
1.00 0.001 0.928 0.009 0.001 0.939 0.010 0.001 1.006 0.009
0.95 0.001 0.947 0.009 0.001 0.953 0.011 0.001 1.020 0.009
0.90 0.001 0.938 0.009 0.001 0.941 0.010 0.001 1.010 0.009
0.85 0.001 0.948 0.009 0.001 0.957 0.010 0.001 1.014 0.009
0.80 0.001 0.939 0.009 0.001 0.945 0.010 0.001 0.998 0.009
0.75 0.001 0.930 0.009 0.001 0.932 0.010 0.001 0.988 0.008
0.70 0.001 0.949 0.009 0.001 0.945 0.010 0.001 0.999 0.008
0.65 0.001 1.015 0.009 0.001 1.042 0.011 0.001 1.055 0.009
0.60 0.001 1.028 0.009 0.001 1.056 0.011 0.001 1.060 0.009
0.55 0.001 1.043 0.009 0.001 1.065 0.011 0.001 1.076* 0.009
0.50 0.001 1.026 0.009 0.001 1.043 0.011 0.001 1.094** 0.009
0.45 0.001 1.087* 0.010 0.001 1.096* 0.011 0.001 1.105** 0.009
0.40 0.001 1.159** 0.010 0.001 1.170** 0.012 0.001 1.162** 0.010
0.35 0.001 1.145** 0.010 0.001 1.149** 0.012 0.001 1.160** 0.010
0.30 0.001 1.118** 0.010 0.001 1.116* 0.011 0.001 1.140** 0.009
0.25 0.001 1.143** 0.009 0.001 1.132** 0.011 0.001 1.152** 0.009
0.20 0.001 1.166** 0.009 0.001 1.169** 0.011 0.001 1.164** 0.009
0.15 0.001 1.150** 0.009 0.001 1.143** 0.011 0.001 1.149** 0.008
0.10 0.001 1.131** 0.008 0.001 1.136** 0.010 0.001 1.136** 0.008
0.05 0.001 1.075** 0.008 0.001 1.079** 0.010 0.001 1.078** 0.007
0.00 0.001 1.000 0.000 0.001 1.000 0.000 0.001 1.000 0.000
-0.05 0.001 0.905 0.007 0.001 0.904 0.009 0.001 0.907 0.007
-0.10 0.001 0.765 0.007 0.001 0.773 0.009 0.001 0.757 0.007
-0.15 0.001 0.554 0.008 0.001 0.560 0.009 0.001 0.541 0.007
-0.20 0.000 0.292 0.009 0.000 0.295 0.010 0.000 0.268 0.009
-0.25 0.000 -0.079 0.012 0.000 -0.056 0.012 0.000 -0.108 0.012
-0.30 -0.001 -0.490 0.014 -0.001 -0.420 0.014 -0.001 -0.529 0.014
-0.35 -0.002 -1.395 0.020 -0.001 -1.221 0.020 -0.002 -1.412 0.020
-0.40 -0.003 -2.212 0.024 -0.002 -1.988 0.024 -0.003 -2.233 0.025
-0.45 -0.004 -3.510 0.032 -0.004 -3.257 0.032 -0.004 -3.521 0.033
-0.50 -0.006 -4.906 0.039 -0.006 -4.595 0.039 -0.006 -4.897 0.040
-0.55 -0.008 -7.113 0.049 -0.008 -6.650 0.049 -0.009 -7.048 0.051
-0.60 -0.011 -9.191 0.059 -0.010 -8.628 0.059 -0.011 -9.087 0.060
-0.65 -0.013 -11.678 0.069 -0.013 -11.006 0.070 -0.014 -11.553 0.072
-0.70 -0.017 -14.727 0.080 -0.017 -13.942 0.081 -0.018 -14.558 0.083
-0.75 -0.021 -18.374 0.094 -0.021 -17.494 0.095 -0.022 -18.138 0.097
-0.80 -0.026 -22.372 0.107 -0.026 -21.375 0.108 -0.027 -22.073 0.111
-0.85 -0.032 -28.214 0.125 -0.033 -27.008 0.126 -0.034 -27.765 0.129
-0.90 -0.038 -33.182 0.139 -0.038 -31.757 0.140 -0.040 -32.667 0.144
-0.95 -0.047 -40.995 0.159 -0.048 -39.328 0.161 -0.050 -40.255 0.165
In the case of (4,2,α1), the PRTF allows for increased profitable manipulation up
to r = 0.45. The purely competitive benchmark ETF-1 does not perform better, also
allowing for profitable deviation of r = 0.45. In case of the ETF-2, a manipulation
rate up to r = 0.55 increases the utility of an average service provider. To summarize,
in Figure 7.4 the manipulation rates that significantly improve a service provider’s
utility are depicted for all tested configurations.






































































































































(b) Network configurations with |Y| ∈ {3,4}
Figure 7.4: Manipulation rates which significantly increase a service provider’s
utility assuming unilateral deviation
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It is not only interesting to evaluate the maximum manipulation rate that sig-
nificantly increases the utility of service providers, but also the manipulation rate
that maximizes the profit ratio. In Figure 7.5 the relative utility gain (or loss) from
manipulation by x% subject to any other service provider reporting its true type is
plotted for selected configurations in which the PRTF does not allow for profitable
deviation of more than r = |0.05|. Figure 7.6 shows exemplary configurations in
which the PRTF is prone to more severe beneficial manipulation of a single service
provider.
An illustration of manipulation rates that maximize the service providers’ utilities
in different configurations analogue to Figure 7.4 can be found in Section B.2.1 (cp.
Figure B.1). Moreover, detailed simulation data in tabular form for additional net-
work configurations that were not shown in Tables 7.5 to 7.7 can be found in Tables

















































































(d) Utility ratios in (4,3,α3)
Figure 7.5: Utility ratios of different manipulation rates applying unilateral
strategies (selected configurations): The PRTF only allows for profitable devia-
tion in a negligible range












































































(d) Utility ratios in (4,3,α2)
Figure 7.6: Utility ratios of different manipulation rates applying unilateral
strategies (selected configurations): The PRTF allows for more severe profitable
deviation
Summary
The simulation data shows the peculiarities of the three transfer functions in the
scenario that assumes unilateral deviation of one service provider subject to all oth-
ers revealing their true type. The observations made above are summarized in the
following.
• The PRTF turns out to be quite balanced over all configurations. A small num-
ber of candidate pools (|Yk| = 2 and |Yk| = 3) generally favors truthful revela-
tion. Only (2,5,α3) allows for intermediate manipulation due to (i) the quite
high competition for allocation and (ii) the high ∆. The former decreases the
probability of allocation, which provokes a higher tendency to an undercut-
ting strategy. This effect is strengthened by the high willingness to pay which
can potentially overcompensate losses from undercutting and being allocated
(cp. also ETF-1). Quite the contrary applies for (3,2,α1), (3,2,α2), and (3,3,α1):
service providers tend to overstate their costs due to the low competition for
being allocated. In the configurations (3,3,α3) and (3,4,αi), i ∈ {1,2,3}, the un-
dercutting effect is mitigated by the competition that both evolves from more
candidate pools and a high number of services therein. In configurations with
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|Y|= 4, intermediate overstating is advantageous – the higher allocation prob-
ability seems to overcompensate decreasing power ratios.
• Particularly in settings with a high willingness to pay of the customer, the
ETF-1 is prone to severe undercutting as discussed above. In this case, the
distributed ∆ has a very strong impact since it is only granted to |Y| service
providers. Therefore, service providers want to be allocated and accept losses
through undercutting in return for the profits from participating in ∆. If the
probability of allocation is higher and, at the same time, α is lower, a reversed
effect can be observed. In configurations with a low number of services, ma-
nipulation does not pay off in general. With a rising number of candidate
pools, intermediate overstating becomes profitable for the same reason than in
the PRTF case.
• The ETF-2 always distributes ∆ equally to all services in each of the candidate
pools. Obviously, service providers never have an incentive to undercut their
costs. Such an action would not change their share in ∆. Vice versa, overstating
the true costs is always favorable since, if allocated, profits can be made. The
level of upwards variations heavily depends on the network configuration.
In summary, Figure 7.4 gives a first indication that the PRTF performs better than
the ETF-2 in every of the tested configuration. Moreover, the PRTF outperforms the
ETF-1 in several configurations, particularly in settings with a high willingness to
pay of the customer.
Solely scrutinizing unilateral bidding strategies does, however, not suffice to
make founded statements on the manipulation robustness of the co-opetition mech-
anism. Therefore, the following section analyzes a situation in which all agents
simultaneously manipulate their bids by x%.
7.1.2.3 Symmetric Strategies
Simulation Model
In a second simulation model, the simulation described in Section 7.1.2.2 is exactly
reproduced except for the service providers’ manipulation strategies. While the for-
mer setting simulates unilateral deviation from truth-telling with all other agents
revealing their true costs, the current simulation model assumes symmetric manip-
ulation strategies rsym. In other words, if the considered service provider manip-
ulates prices by x%, every other agent also chooses to deviate by x% from its true
valuation [260]. Therefore, the updated utility ratio Rrsymj for an arbitrary service




Accordingly, the applied one-tailed matched-pairs t-test analyzes the following
hypothesis: Service providers benefit from manipulation at manipulation rate r while all
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other agents also manipulate by r. That is, ursymj − utruthj > 0⇒ R
rsym
j > 1 must be signif-
icant.
Simulation Results
Other than when applying unilateral strategies, symmetric deviation is in average,
if at all, only significant in a very close range to r = 0 subject to the tested con-
figurations. This is true for the PRTF and for both benchmarks. This behavior is
exemplarily illustrated via two characteristic configurations, (3,2,α1) and (3,3,α3).
In configurations with a small α, symmetric deviation quite rapidly leads to a
decreasing utility ratio in either direction as shown in Table 7.8. Again, for each pay-
ment rule and at each manipulation level r, the mean absolute utilities ursymj (AU),
the mean utility ratio Rrsymj (UR) of a service provider with all others also manipulat-
ing by r, and the standard deviation (SD) of the mean absolute utility are outlined.
Table 7.8: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming symmetric manipula-
tion in (3,2,α1). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
1.00 0.002 0.305 0.019 0.002 0.319 0.020 0.002 0.300 0.018
0.95 0.002 0.364 0.021 0.002 0.377 0.022 0.002 0.357 0.020
0.90 0.002 0.401 0.022 0.002 0.415 0.022 0.002 0.395 0.021
0.85 0.002 0.407 0.021 0.002 0.420 0.022 0.002 0.405 0.021
0.80 0.002 0.443 0.022 0.002 0.454 0.023 0.002 0.438 0.021
0.75 0.002 0.460 0.022 0.002 0.469 0.023 0.002 0.454 0.021
0.70 0.003 0.485 0.022 0.003 0.493 0.023 0.003 0.483 0.021
0.65 0.003 0.504 0.022 0.003 0.511 0.023 0.003 0.503 0.021
0.60 0.003 0.516 0.022 0.003 0.522 0.023 0.003 0.520 0.020
0.55 0.003 0.564 0.022 0.003 0.569 0.023 0.003 0.568 0.020
0.50 0.003 0.593 0.022 0.003 0.597 0.023 0.003 0.593 0.020
0.45 0.003 0.631 0.022 0.003 0.635 0.024 0.003 0.625 0.020
0.40 0.004 0.676 0.023 0.004 0.681 0.024 0.004 0.663 0.020
0.35 0.004 0.701 0.022 0.004 0.705 0.024 0.004 0.696 0.020
0.30 0.004 0.747 0.022 0.004 0.750 0.024 0.004 0.740 0.020
0.25 0.004 0.807 0.023 0.004 0.810 0.024 0.004 0.787 0.020
0.20 0.005 0.875 0.023 0.005 0.878 0.025 0.005 0.850 0.020
0.15 0.005 0.926 0.023 0.005 0.927 0.025 0.005 0.897 0.020
0.10 0.005 0.964 0.022 0.005 0.965 0.025 0.005 0.952 0.019
0.05 0.005 0.989 0.022 0.005 0.988 0.024 0.005 0.974 0.018
0.00 0.005 1.000 0.000 0.005 1.000 0.000 0.005 1.000 0.000
-0.05 0.005 0.985 0.021 0.005 0.985 0.024 0.005 0.998 0.018
-0.10 0.005 0.935 0.021 0.005 0.931 0.025 0.005 0.938 0.019
-0.15 0.004 0.815 0.023 0.004 0.807 0.027 0.004 0.812 0.021
-0.20 0.003 0.646 0.026 0.003 0.636 0.029 0.003 0.640 0.026
-0.25 0.002 0.318 0.032 0.002 0.303 0.034 0.002 0.327 0.033
-0.30 -0.001 -0.115 0.039 -0.001 -0.136 0.041 -0.001 -0.106 0.041
-0.35 -0.005 -1.032 0.053 -0.006 -1.065 0.053 -0.005 -1.002 0.055
-0.40 -0.011 -2.056 0.067 -0.011 -2.105 0.066 -0.011 -2.001 0.071
-0.45 -0.018 -3.320 0.083 -0.018 -3.384 0.079 -0.018 -3.260 0.088
-0.50 -0.028 -5.340 0.104 -0.029 -5.437 0.098 -0.028 -5.258 0.109
-0.55 -0.041 -7.653 0.126 -0.041 -7.790 0.117 -0.041 -7.569 0.132
-0.60 -0.054 -10.191 0.149 -0.055 -10.365 0.136 -0.054 -10.086 0.155
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Table 7.8: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming symmetric manipula-
tion in (3,2,α1). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
-0.65 -0.068 -12.748 0.172 -0.069 -12.966 0.155 -0.068 -12.633 0.179
-0.70 -0.076 -14.273 0.191 -0.077 -14.532 0.168 -0.076 -14.152 0.198
-0.75 -0.082 -15.465 0.210 -0.084 -15.771 0.179 -0.082 -15.329 0.216
-0.80 -0.085 -15.853 0.226 -0.086 -16.203 0.187 -0.084 -15.717 0.231
-0.85 -0.084 -15.837 0.240 -0.086 -16.227 0.192 -0.084 -15.703 0.244
-0.90 -0.084 -15.821 0.254 -0.086 -16.250 0.197 -0.084 -15.689 0.257
-0.95 -0.084 -15.805 0.269 -0.086 -16.274 0.202 -0.084 -15.676 0.270
In case of a higher α, losses from overstating or undercutting true valuations
become smaller. In some configurations, manipulation in both directions yields ap-
proximately the same utility ratio than truth-telling. Yet, deviation does not signif-
icantly increase the service providers’ utilities: stating a price in close proximity to
r = 0 is still an at least weakly dominant strategy. Table 7.9 exemplarily shows this
behavior for (3,3,α3).
Table 7.9: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming symmetric manipula-
tion in (3,3,α3). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
1.00 0.189 0.886 0.254 0.191 0.881 0.349 0.188 0.882 0.215
0.95 0.192 0.899 0.247 0.194 0.894 0.348 0.191 0.895 0.209
0.90 0.195 0.915 0.241 0.198 0.910 0.348 0.195 0.913 0.203
0.85 0.198 0.927 0.235 0.200 0.922 0.347 0.197 0.925 0.195
0.80 0.200 0.937 0.227 0.203 0.933 0.345 0.200 0.937 0.187
0.75 0.202 0.946 0.219 0.204 0.942 0.344 0.202 0.946 0.180
0.70 0.204 0.954 0.211 0.206 0.950 0.343 0.203 0.954 0.171
0.65 0.206 0.964 0.202 0.208 0.960 0.342 0.205 0.964 0.163
0.60 0.207 0.970 0.193 0.210 0.967 0.340 0.207 0.970 0.155
0.55 0.209 0.976 0.184 0.211 0.973 0.339 0.208 0.976 0.146
0.50 0.210 0.982 0.174 0.213 0.979 0.338 0.209 0.982 0.137
0.45 0.211 0.986 0.165 0.213 0.983 0.337 0.210 0.987 0.128
0.40 0.212 0.990 0.155 0.214 0.987 0.336 0.211 0.991 0.120
0.35 0.212 0.994 0.146 0.215 0.991 0.335 0.212 0.994 0.112
0.30 0.213 0.997 0.136 0.216 0.994 0.334 0.212 0.996 0.104
0.25 0.213 0.999 0.127 0.216 0.996 0.333 0.213 0.999 0.096
0.20 0.214 1.000 0.118 0.217 0.998 0.333 0.213 1.000 0.090
0.15 0.214 1.001 0.110 0.217 0.999 0.332 0.213 1.001 0.085
0.10 0.214 1.001 0.103 0.217 0.999 0.332 0.213 1.001 0.081
0.05 0.214 1.000 0.097 0.217 1.000 0.332 0.213 1.000 0.079
0.00 0.214 1.000 0.000 0.217 1.000 0.000 0.213 1.000 0.000
-0.05 0.214 1.000 0.089 0.217 1.000 0.332 0.213 1.000 0.079
-0.10 0.213 0.999 0.088 0.217 1.000 0.333 0.213 0.999 0.082
-0.15 0.213 0.999 0.088 0.217 1.001 0.333 0.213 0.999 0.086
-0.20 0.213 0.998 0.090 0.217 1.001 0.334 0.213 0.999 0.091
-0.25 0.213 0.998 0.094 0.217 1.001 0.335 0.213 0.998 0.097
-0.30 0.213 0.998 0.099 0.217 1.001 0.335 0.213 0.998 0.104
-0.35 0.213 0.997 0.106 0.217 1.001 0.336 0.213 0.998 0.112
-0.40 0.213 0.997 0.113 0.217 1.002 0.337 0.213 0.998 0.121
-0.45 0.213 0.996 0.122 0.217 1.002 0.339 0.213 0.997 0.129
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Table 7.9: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming symmetric manipula-
tion in (3,3,α3). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
-0.50 0.213 0.996 0.131 0.217 1.002 0.340 0.213 0.997 0.139
-0.55 0.213 0.996 0.140 0.218 1.002 0.342 0.212 0.997 0.148
-0.60 0.213 0.995 0.151 0.218 1.002 0.343 0.212 0.996 0.158
-0.65 0.212 0.995 0.161 0.218 1.003 0.345 0.212 0.996 0.168
-0.70 0.212 0.994 0.172 0.218 1.003 0.347 0.212 0.996 0.178
-0.75 0.212 0.994 0.183 0.218 1.003 0.349 0.212 0.995 0.188
-0.80 0.212 0.993 0.194 0.218 1.003 0.351 0.212 0.995 0.198
-0.85 0.212 0.993 0.206 0.218 1.003 0.353 0.212 0.995 0.209
-0.90 0.212 0.993 0.217 0.218 1.004 0.355 0.212 0.995 0.219
-0.95 0.212 0.992 0.229 0.218 1.004 0.358 0.212 0.994 0.230
The differences between configurations with a low ∆ and configurations where
a high surplus is distributed can be explained as follows: in contrast to unilateral
deviation, symmetric deviation by x% impacts the overall result much more severely
due to the fact that all providers manipulate. On the one hand, overstating bears the
risk of a reduction of paths due to resulting prices that lie above the customer’s
willingness to pay – leading to no allocation at all in the worst case. On the other
hand, by symmetric undercutting, new paths that were originally too expensive also
“pretend to” create a positive value for the system since the impact on the overall
price is much higher if each and every price is decreased than in the unilateral case.
In this case, due to the low ∆, allocated services are likely to considerably lose from
t1 (cp. also Figure 7.1). In case of a high ∆, both undercutting and overstating do
not change the service providers’ utilities since above-described risks are hindered
by the high customer’s willingness to pay.
This behavior is illustrated in more detail in Figure 7.7, showing the trend of the


































(b) Utility ratios in (3,3,α3)
Figure 7.7: Utility ratios of different manipulation rates applying symmetric
strategies (selected scenarios) (1)
A continuing analysis of symmetric bidding strategies will be provided in Sec-
tion 7.1.2.4. In addition, a set of another four configurations is exemplarily illus-
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trated via tables (cp. Tables B.11 to B.14) and diagrams (cp. Figure B.4) in Section
B.2.2 in order to back up the statements on symmetric manipulation made in this
section.
7.1.2.4 Implications and Further Analysis
The results of the simulation considering unilateral deviation of single service
providers show that in the tested scenarios with two candidate pools, a variable
number of services, and different levels of α, the PRTF does, in average, not allow for
a profitable deviation of more than 5% (except for (2,5,α3)). In conjunction with the
simulation results assuming symmetric deviation that yield the same results, it can
be stated that misreporting their true valuation is not beneficial to service providers
in these configurations. Consequently, as reported types and true types are likely to
approximately coincide, the mechanism also exhibits a high degree of allocative effi-
ciency at provider-side for configurations (2, |Yk|,αi), except for (2,5,α3) (cp. Figure
7.4a).
A similar implication can generally be stated for several other configurations: In
(3,2,α3), (3,3,α2), (3,3,α3), (3,4,αi) with i ∈ {1,2,3}, and (4,3,α3), service providers
cannot significantly improve their utility when deviating from their true type by
more than 5%, both in case of unilateral and symmetric strategies.
Although the co-opetition mechanism is not incentive compatible in an ana-
lytical sense and counterexamples can be constructed as shown in Section 7.1.1,
strategic behavior of service providers is substantially reduced and thus, the co-
opetition mechanism exhibits a high manipulation robustness averaged over all ser-
vice providers. This statements holds true for the above-named network configu-
rations. In all of these cases, the co-opetition mechanism is also likely to be able to
reach a high degree of allocative efficiency since, as shown in Section 7.1.1.2, truth-
telling also implicates the allocative efficient outcome.
For the other configurations that were not mentioned in the previous paragraph
(cp. also Table 7.11), service providers can increase their utility by unilateral de-
viation moderately to intensely, however, symmetric deviation does only allow for
deviations in a negligible range. In respect of the PRTF,founded statements on equi-
librium strategies cannot be made: if all service providers apply symmetric strate-
gies, truth-telling would maximize the expected utility. However, if there is no other
agent to deviate, unilateral deviation from the true type would again be beneficial.
A detailed consideration of symmetric strategies
Let us first have a closer look at the strategies in case of symmetric deviation. Again
assume that F∗truth is allocated if every service provider reveals its true type. In
case of symmetric deviation, the allocated path remains unchanged as long as an
allocation is possible.14 In total, W truth remains unchanged, however, transfers are
redistributed. Further assume a minimally intermeshed SVN configuration with
14Yet, if all service providers increase their price, the system can run into a situation in which α >PFl ,
and thus, the allocation function does not pick any complex service.
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strictly disjunctive paths (cp e.g. Figure 7.2).15 In other words, each service is only
located on one single path. Gains and losses evolve as follows:
1. Assume symmetric deviation by rsym = x, x > 0, that is, increasing prices. As
long as a complex service is generally allocated, allocated service providers
are better off than in a symmetric truth-telling situation: let again ζtruthj de-
note service vj’s relative PR share in ∆truth. As every service provider devi-
ates in relative terms, services on the non-allocated paths are getting more
expensive in absolute terms than the allocated services, which affects their
power ratios. Therefore, for a service vh /∈ W∗, ζxh < ζtruthh . Vice versa,
the allocated services’ relative shares in the PR-based payment rise subject
to symmetric deviation. By playing rsym = x, allocated services withdraw
x · ∑vj∈W∗ cij from the PR-based surplus compared to truth-telling, resulting
in ∆′ = ∆truth − x · ∑eij∈E(W∗) cij with ∆′ < ∆truth. Since x · ∑eij∈E(W∗) cij is ex-
clusively taken by the allocated services, for each allocated vj the following
equation holds:
(7.12) ζxj · ∆′ > ζtruthj · ∆truth
Therefore, compared to truth-telling, allocated services gain from a symmetric
price increase while non-allocated services lose.
2. Analogously, assume symmetric deviation by rsym = −x, 0 < x < 1, that is,
decreasing prices. In this case, services on the non-allocated paths are getting
cheaper than the allocated services in absolute terms, affecting the PR in the
opposite direction than above: ζ−xh > ζ
truth
h ∀ vh /∈W∗. Vice versa, the allocated
services’ relative shares in the PR-based payment decrease. Playing rsym =−x,
allocated services lose x ·∑vj∈W∗ cij as they undercut their actual costs. The PR-
based surplus increases to ∆′′ = ∆truth + x ·∑eij∈E(W∗) cij with ∆′′ > ∆truth. Since
∆′′, which also includes the losses incurred by allocated services, is distributed
amongst all services, for each allocated vj the following equation holds:
(7.13) ζ−xj · ∆′′ < ζtruthj · ∆truth
Therefore, compared to truth-telling, allocated services lose from a symmetric
price decrease while non-allocated services gain.
Recall that this analysis is only valid for SVNs with disjunct paths. If, for in-
stance, a service vj is located at the best path and on several other paths exhibiting
higher costs, symmetrically decreasing costs can be beneficial if the decrease in util-
ity via the allocated edge is overcompensated by the increasing utility endowed by
non-allocated edges.
Thus, in order to review if the analytic result for disjunctive paths can be gener-
alized to any set F, the following simulation is conducted: for a distinct manipula-
tion rate rsym ∈ {−0.95,−0.5,−0.1,0.1,0.5,1.0}, 10,000 rounds are simulated where
15This situation is not a stable state as shown in Section 6.3 and and thus, technically, also excluded
from the simulation setting (cp. Section 7.1.2.3). However, this easy-to-comprehed SVN helps to
illustrate dependencies in a simplified manner.
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in each of these rounds (i) a topology (|Y|, |Yk|,α) with density d = 1.0 out of the set
presented in Table 7.4 and (ii) a customer’s willingness to pay α ∈ [0.5 · |Y|;4.0 · |Y|]
are randomly drawn. In each round, a service vj that is allocated in a truth-telling
scenario is randomly picked. Then, the chosen manipulation rate rsym = x is applied
and the utilities utruthj and u
x
j are computed.
For each of the applied manipulation rates, the aggregated data is tested via a
one-tailed matched-pairs t-test. For r < 0, the test analyzes the alternative hypothe-
sis stated as follows: Allocated service providers suffer from manipulation at manipulation
rate r while all other service providers also manipulate by r. Vice versa, for r > 0, the test
analyzes the following alternative hypothesis: Allocated service providers benefit from
manipulation at manipulation rate r while all other service providers also manipulate by r.
Table 7.10 shows the aggregated simulation results.
Table 7.10: Logic of gains and losses applying symmetric bidding strategies “Avg
of” denotes the average of the sum over all 10,000 data points, both for truth-
telling and rsym = x. * denotes significance at the level p = 0.01.









The null hypotheses can be rejected in each simulation except for rsym = 1.0. An
analysis of the simulation data shows that, in this extreme case, deviating leads to no
allocation at all in the bulk of rounds which definitely sets u1.0j = 0 < u
truth
j . However,
generally one can state that, if overstating the true costs does not lead to a situation
where there is no path to be allocated, the results from the analysis of disjunctive
paths can be generalized to any set of F, given the network configurations at hand
(cp. Table 7.4).
To summarize, applying symmetric strategies, the service providers’ interests are
conflicting depending on them being allocated or not. This conflict can be consulted
as an explanation for the results of the symmetric manipulation simulations. On
average, the service providers’ strategies seem to cancel out, leading to the results
presented in Section 7.1.2.3.
Service providers’ strategies modeled as a game in strategic form
The insights gained from the preceding paragraph can be applied to a more gen-
eral setting, abandoning symmetric strategies. Either interest group (allocated and
non-allocated service providers) risks to switch its group: previously non-allocated
services are more likely to be allocated when decreasing the price and allocated ser-
vices are prone to fall off the best path through a price increase. Certainly, such a
switch would in turn bring about a switch in the optimal bidding strategy. In the
following, based on the results provided in Sections 7.1.2.2 and 7.1.2.3, individual
bidding strategies are analyzed by dint of a simplified game in strategic form con-
sidering two (average) agents (cp. Figure 7.8).
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As outlined in Section 7.1.2.3, there is a strong indication that the utility ratio
A of symmetric deviation is smaller than the utility ratio 1 of truth-telling if the
customer’s willingness to pay is rather small, thus resulting in A < 1. From Section
7.1.2.2, we know that unilateral deviation can be beneficial in several configurations,
which is also assumed in this analysis. Therefore, B > 1 holds. From B > 1 it follows


























Figure 7.8: Service providers’ bidding strategies as a simplified two-agent strate-
gic form game
In order to determine the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game depicted in
Figure 7.8, three different cases must be distinguished given the assumptions made
above.
1. A > C: The utility ratio A of an agent in case of symmetric deviation is higher
than the utility ratio C if playing truth-telling and the other agent playing
deviate. Thus, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium is (deviate,deviate). (devi-
ate,deviate) is a Nash equilibrium although it is not pareto optimal: both agents
could improve their utilities by playing (truth,truth). Therefore, if A > C, the
game is an instance of the prisoner’s dilemma [215].
2. A < C: The utility ratio A of an agent in case of symmetric deviation is less
than the utility ratio C if playing truth-telling and the other agent playing de-
viate. Thus, there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria: (deviate,truth) and
(truth,deviate).
3. A = C: The utility ratio A of an agent in case of symmetric deviation equals
the utility ratio C if playing truth-telling and the other agent playing devi-
ate. Thus, there are three pure strategy Nash equilibria: (deviate,deviate), (devi-
ate,truth) and (truth,deviate).
In total, the strategic form game depicted in Figure 7.8 shows that a final state-
ment on manipulation robustness, and thus, on the co-opetition mechanism’s de-
gree of allocative efficiency, cannot be made solely based on unilateral and symmet-
ric bidding strategies.
Summary
As listed in Table 7.11, applying the PRTF, several network configurations only al-
low for manipulation rates in a negligible range of runi ≤ |0.05| considering individ-
ual services. At the same time, these scenarios do not allow for profitable deviation
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if all participating service providers in the SVN manipulate their bids symmetri-
cally. In more detail, regarding these network configurations, applying unilateral
bidding strategies, the PRTF allows for an average of |r|PRTF,uni = 0.028, whereas the
ETF-2 allows for a profitable average manipulation rate of |r|ETF-2,uni = 0.486. Signifi-
cance to a level of 1% can be stated via a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.16 The second
simulation setting testing symmetric manipulation generally found that this kind
of deviation is profitable under none of the applied transfer functions, resulting in
|r|PRTF,sym = |r|ETF-2,sym = 0 for each tested topology. Obviously, since the data of the sec-
ond simulation literally cancels out, it can be stated that the PRTF is more robust
against manipulation than the ETF-2, and therefore, Hypothesis 7.1 holds for the
network configurations outlined in the first row of Table 7.11
In order to analyze bidding strategies for the configurations that did not yield
clear results in Sections 7.1.2.2 and 7.1.2.3, individual, yet simultaneous bidding
strategies need to be considered (cp. Section 7.1.3).
Table 7.11: Network configurations and their manipulation robustness: Intermediate results
r Network configurations
r ≤ |0.05| (2,2,α1), (2,2,α2), (2,2,α3), (2,3,α1), (2,3,α2), (2,3,α3), (2,4,α1), (2,4,α2),
(2,4,α3), (2,5,α1), (2,5,α2), (3,2,α3), (3,3,α2), (3,3,α3), (3,4,α1), (3,4,α2),
(3,4,α3), (4,3,α3)
r > |0.05| (2,5,α3), (3,2,α1), (3,2,α2), (3,3,α1), (4,2,α1), (4,2,α2), (4,2,α3), (4,3,α1),
(4,3,α2)
7.1.3 Simultaneous and Individual Strategies & their Impact on
Allocation Efficiency
While for several configurations deviation is only beneficial in a negligible range,
others are prone to beneficial mal-reporting of the services’ true costs (cp. Table
7.11). The latter need to undergo a closing investigation.
7.1.3.1 Simulation Model and Settings
The problem is modeled as an n-person game with each node representing a ser-
vice offer. Again, without loss of generality, each service provider owns exactly
one single service offer within the SVN. Furthermore, the consideration of the
bidding strategies is restricted to price bids only.17 An independent simulation
for each of the tested network configurations is conducted; within this simula-
tion, an initial network topology is randomly generated analogously to the simu-
lations conducted in Section 7.1.2. In each of the simulation rounds, each service
16A Wilcoxon signed-rank test must be applied since the data is not normally distributed (tested
by means of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) and the number of observations is too small to assume
normally distributed data.
17Subject to the simplifying assumption that the utility granted by a service provider to the system
is monotonically increasing with a higher quality offered and monotonically decreasing when the
offered quality is lower, strategies for setting prices and quality attributes can be substituted.
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vj ∈ V has to choose a strategy, that is, an action r out of its action set Rj. The
action set is identical for each service, consisting of discrete manipulation steps
r ∈ {−0.5,−0,4,−0.3,−0.2,−0.1,0,0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5} that are applied to each in-
coming edge of vj.
Service provider vj’s utility usj,r resulting from playing action r in simulation
round s is, however, not only dependent on vj’s own action: no service provider
can offer a complex service by itself. Therefore, its utility additionally depends on
other providers’ actions, the network topology, and the service customer’s prefer-
ences.
In the simulation at hand, the strategies of the agents are determined in a rein-
forcement learning approach. Reinforcement learning is known as a goal directed,
trial and error learning procedure [309]. It is “a way of programming agents by re-
ward and punishment without needing to specify how the task is to be achieved”
[184]. That is, it can be used in a model-free situation. Agents learn from rewards,
that is, feedback received in the past with respect to certain performed actions. By
trial and error, agents explore their action space in order to determine the best strat-
egy subject to an interaction with the environment in order to achieve a particular
goal. Reinforcement learning is certainly not supportable for any given problem,
yet the methodology has proven to be a prudential approach to tackle model-free,
uncertain, and possibly dynamic environments [97].
Each node vj assigns a fitness value f sj,r to each possible action r ∈ Rj in each
simulation round. The fitness of the chosen action is updated at the end of each
simulation round according to the following update rule that depends on the feed-
back usj,r.
(7.14) f sj,r = β · f s−1j,r + (1− β) · usj,r
The learning rate β ∈ [0;1] controls the impact of the currently chosen action’s
fitness on the feedback that has been collected for this action in the previous rounds.
Actions are chosen according to a probability choice rule qsj,r based on the action’s






The first round of the simulation starts with the same probability choice rule qsj,r
for each action. Each service provider chooses an action according to the choice rule
and updates its fitness based on the feedback. This procedure is simultaneously
repeated 2000 times, considering the first 500 rounds as the training phase while the
following 1500 rounds’ data is consulted for the evaluation.18 To be more precise,
18The simulation data shows that as early as after 1000 rounds (including the training phase), the
simulation results do not significantly differ from the results after 2000 rounds anymore. Never-
theless, a sensitivity analysis was performed for selected network configurations which also tested
5000 and 10,000 rounds, yielding the same tendencies than the performed simulation with 2000
rounds.
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the data is aggregated in two steps. First, the fitness of each provider’s actions is
aggregated over the last 1500 rounds (cp. Equation 7.16). Thereafter, these node-
based average values are aggregated over all n service providers in the SVN (cp.
Equation 7.17).





(7.17) Ē( fr) = ∑
vj∈V
Ēj( f j,r)
Furthermore, the count of efficient complex service allocations is collected.
Whenever the allocated path minimizes the sum of participating services’ costs,
allocative efficiency can be approved. Moreover, the relative welfare ws of each
round’s allocation is computed by dividing the actual welfare W s by the maximum
welfareW∗. We can therefore state both the percentage of allocative efficient choices
and the relative achievement of welfare for each simulation.
Altogether, each simulation is conducted 30 times per configuration. Based on
the averaged data from each of these simulations, statements on the significance of
some actions being favored over others can be made. Figure 7.9 gives an overview
on the simulation model.
Generate random topology with 
Each agent vj chooses an 
action based on its fitness that 
determines its probability of 
choice:
Determine allocation o and 
transfers t based on agents’ 
strategies and compute agents’ 
utilities based on o and t.
Calculate welfare ratio of o:
Based on the feedback for 
each agents’ chosen strategy, 
the respective fitness is 
updated:
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Figure 7.9: Bidding strategies: Simulation model (simultaneous and individual strategies)
Importantly, above-described evaluation is not only conducted for the PRTF, but
also for the benchmark ETF-2. Note that the ETF-1 is not tested in this simulation
due to its distribution logic that does only include allocated services: services which
are close to never allocated receive zero payments which lets them play arbitrary
strategies: the action’s fitness values level off to zero. However, if, by a certain
combination of other provider’s actions, such a close-to-never-allocated service vj is
actually chosen, the fitness of vj’s played action in that round spurts upwards and
may not be balanced any more. Such events are likely to distort the resulting fitness
values.
Table 7.12 summarizes the simulation settings for the evaluation of the bidding
strategies focussing on the tested configurations. Note that the variable customer’s
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willingness to pay αi is not randomly chosen from an interval as done in Section
7.1.2. In order to restrict the influence of changing parameters and to retain compa-
rability of simulation rounds with respect to the feedback given to the agents and
the fitness of their actions, α ∈ {1 · |Y|,2 · |Y|,4 · |Y|} is set as a constant.
Table 7.12: Bidding strategies: Simulation settings (simultaneous and individual strategies)
Tested configurations (|Y|, |Yk|,α) {(2,5,8), (3,2,3), (3,2,6), (3,3,3), (4,2,4),
(4,2,8), (4,2,16), (4,3,4), (4,3,8)}
Network density 1.0
Number of simulation rounds 2000 (of which 500 are considered as
training phase)
Simulations per network configuration 30
7.1.3.2 Simulation Results
Before interpreting the resulting data of the simulation, it is certainly worth men-
tioning that the simulation model somewhat trivializes the interplay of strategic
actions. Equation (7.17) aggregates the fitness values of the available actions over
all participating services, thereby treating them equally regardless of their internal
cost structure. Nevertheless, the simulation can be used as an indicator, singling out
actions that are more profitable than others on average.
Incentive Compatibility
These aggregated results over all services and over all of the 30 conducted simula-
tions per configuration resulting in Ē( fr) for each manipulation step and for each
transfer rule are shown in Tables 7.13 and 7.14. In more detail, the tables output the





AFr is listed for each tested configuration (cp. Table 7.12) and for the PRTF and
the ETF-2. For each of the configurations and transfer rules, the manipulation rate
rmax, which yields the maximum fitness, is indicated in the bottom line of the ta-
bles. In other words, rmax is the action that accounts for the highest feedback over
the tested 1500 rounds, aggregated over all services. Within a configuration and a
transfer rule, the significance of rmax against other manipulation rates is tested via
a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.19 The following alternative hypothesis is tested: The
fitness value rmax is higher than the fitness values for each of the other manipulation rates
r ∈ R \ {rmax}. Such significance is indicated by the asterisks in the table row that
includes rmax for the PRTF.
19A Wilcoxon signed-rank test must be applied since (i) the data is not normally distributed which
was confirmed by means of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and (ii) the number of observations is too
small to assume normally distributed data.
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Table 7.13: Fitness of the services’ manipulation strategies applying simultaneous
and individual actions (1). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at
p = 0.01.
(2,5,8) (3,2,3) (3,2,6) (3,3,3)
r Ē( fr)PRTF ETF-2 PRTF ETF-2 PRTF ETF-2 PRTF ETF-2
-0.5 0.0902 0.0866 0.0656 0.0774 0.0866 0.0822 0.0655 0.0821
-0.4 0.0908 0.0876 0.0773 0.0831 0.0886 0.0839 0.0754 0.0868
-0.3 0.0912 0.0880 0.0911 0.0809 0.0902 0.0858 0.0853 0.0885
-0.2 0.0917 0.0886 0.0948 0.0878 0.0916 0.0864 0.0980 0.0915
-0.1 0.0921 0.0891 0.1027 0.0872 0.0925 0.0884 0.1019 0.0930
0 0.0918 0.0907 0.1043 0.0930 0.0928 0.0910 0.1057 0.0968
0.1 0.0914 0.0924 0.1013 0.0987 0.0927 0.0933 0.1072 0.0986
0.2 0.0910 0.0934 0.1004 0.0983 0.0924 0.0949 0.0989 0.0972
0.3 0.0906 0.0930 0.0917 0.1028 0.0917 0.0952 0.0928 0.1003
0.4 0.0901 0.0949 0.0890 0.0973 0.0911 0.0986 0.0870 0.0852
0.5 0.0893 0.0958 0.0818 0.0933 0.0899 0.1004 0.0823 0.0799
rmax -0.1* 0.5** 0** 0.3** 0* 0.5** 0.1** 0.3**
Table 7.14: Fitness of the services’ manipulation strategies applying simultaneous
and individual actions (2). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at
p = 0.01.
(4,2,4) (4,2,8) (4,2,16) (4,3,4) (4,3,8)
r Ē( fr)PRTF ETF-2 PRTF ETF-2 PRTF ETF-2 PRTF ETF-2 PRTF ETF-2
-0.5 0.0644 0.0817 0.0873 0.0832 0.0895 0.0832 0.0844 0.0846 0.0849 0.0833
-0.4 0.0740 0.0862 0.0887 0.0854 0.0895 0.0854 0.0873 0.0862 0.0872 0.0850
-0.3 0.0880 0.0849 0.0899 0.0856 0.0892 0.0858 0.0899 0.0869 0.0895 0.0857
-0.2 0.0931 0.0890 0.0911 0.0867 0.0911 0.0851 0.0918 0.0878 0.0914 0.0873
-0.1 0.0972 0.0892 0.0920 0.0874 0.0909 0.0879 0.0931 0.0889 0.0930 0.0884
0 0.1016 0.0929 0.0925 0.0908 0.0920 0.0908 0.0934 0.0913 0.0932 0.0911
0.1 0.1014 0.0956 0.0924 0.0945 0.0915 0.0939 0.0932 0.0935 0.0931 0.0940
0.2 0.0992 0.0964 0.0923 0.0947 0.0914 0.0955 0.0929 0.0941 0.0929 0.0951
0.3 0.0961 0.0973 0.0916 0.0942 0.0916 0.0937 0.0922 0.0942 0.0924 0.0948
0.4 0.0956 0.0953 0.0915 0.0977 0.0916 0.0976 0.0915 0.0958 0.0917 0.0972
0.5 0.0894 0.0914 0.0907 0.0999 0.0917 0.0995 0.0903 0.0967 0.0907 0.0980
rmax 0** 0.3** 0* 0.5** 0** 0.5** 0** 0.5** 0* 0.5**
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Evaluating the simultaneous data shown in Tables 7.13 and 7.14, the indications
given in Section 7.1.2 take shape: from the unilateral simulation we have learned
that the PRTF tends to an undercutting strategy of service providers in configura-
tions with a high ∆. In contrast, applying symmetric strategies, the utility of ma-
nipulation and of truth-telling was nearly identical (cp. e.g. Figure 7.7b). These
insights materialize in the fitness values for (2,5,8). For the PRTF, all fitness values
are rather balanced, however, showing a significant tendency towards rmax = −0.1
which coincides with the unilateral strategy analysis. AFr given the ETF-2 peaks at
rmax = 0.5.20 Compared to the (at least) weakly preferred truth-telling strategy in
the symmetric simulation setting (cp. Section 7.1.2.3), the simulation in this section
shows that manipulation seems to prevail after all in the ETF-2 case.21
For the PRTF, (4,2,4) yielded the highest profitable manipulation rate in the uni-
lateral case, therefore it is interesting to observe how strategies evolve in the simulta-
neous, individual simulation. In general, fitness values tend to be slightly higher for
overbidding compared to undercutting, however, the highest fitness is significantly
held by r = 0, that is, truth-telling. In ETF-2, service providers’ highest averaged
fitness values are to be found at r = 0.3.
For further detailed results, please refer to Tables 7.13 and 7.14. In summary,
the simulation shows that, applying the PRTF, manipulations are only beneficial in
a range up to r = |0.1| in average if service providers simultaneously play individ-
ual actions. In the ETF-2, overbidding by 30% and more is profitable. These results
complete the evaluation of Hypothesis 7.1 for the remaining network configurations
tested in this section, which can thus be affirmed for each of the network configura-
tion listed in Table 7.4.
Allocative Efficiency
In the last analysis of this section, allocative efficiency is investigated, looking at two
distinct indicators: relative welfare W rel and the efficient allocation ratio ARe f f . The
relative welfare ws of an allocation in round s is computed by dividing the round’s
actual welfareW s by the maximum possible welfareW∗. These values can be added
up to the overall relative welfare W rel = 1|s| ∑s ws.
As stated in Section 7.1.1, an allocation is efficient whenever the complex service
that maximizes the allocation function assuming truth-telling is chosen – regard-
less of the included services revealing their true type or not. This fact is impor-
tant to note with respect to the percentage of efficient allocations ARe f f compared
to all 1500 observed allocations per configuration. Again, for each configuration,
PRTF-based results and results yielded by applying the ETF-2 are compared via a
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The results are summarized in Table 7.15.
Obviously, both indicators are strongly interconnected: whenever an efficient
allocation is chosen, both W rel and ARe f f are positively affected. However, the
20The evaluation was conducted with a manipulation rate restricted to the interval [−0.5;0.5]. There-
fore, the manipulation rates rmax = 0.5 that result in some network configuration may even increase
if r > 0.5 are tested.
21In addition, in the symmetric case, several network configuration yielded nearly identical utility ra-
tios for undercutting, truth-telling, and overbidding (cp. e.g. Figure B.4). Therefore, the profitable
deviation observed in this section does not contradict the results from Section 7.1.2.3.
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Table 7.15: Evaluation of allocative efficiency: Comparing relative welfare and
efficient allocation ratio applying the PRTF and the ETF-2. * denotes significance
at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
W rel ARe f f
PRTF ETF-2 PRTF ETF-2
(2,5,8) 0.9539** 0.8580 87.75%** 75.92%
(3,2,3) 0.9494** 0.8716 85.13%** 78.45%
(3,2,6) 0.9808** 0.9045 91.10%** 84.33%
(3,3,3) 0.9470** 0.9011 86.38%** 83.85%
(4,2,4) 0.9379** 0.8769 84.77%** 80.41%
(4,2,8) 0.9656** 0.8688 90.54%** 78.20%
(4,2,16) 0.9834** 0.8410 91.83%** 73.25%
(4,3,4) 0.9619** 0.8395 89.86%** 72.46%
(4,3,8) 0.9905** 0.8478 92.35%** 73.92%
expressiveness of the two measures differs. While the relative welfare strongly de-
pends on the parametrization of the simulation, the efficient allocation ratio is more
insightful. Ranging from 92.35 % to 84.77% depending on the underlying network
configuration, allocative efficient paths are chosen significantly more often in the
PRTF case than when applying the ETF-2. Certainly, these investigations were only
made for some of the tested network configurations, however, their results in terms
of incentive compatibility suggest transferability to the other scenarios rated as ap-
proximately incentive compatible after the simulation series conducted in Section
7.1.2.
In summary, isolatedly looking at allocation efficiency does not suffice to make
statements on truthfulness whose importance with respect to other network design
properties will be discussed in Section 7.1.4. Untruthful bidding of service providers
can also lead to an efficient outcome, however, only truthfulness guarantees alloca-
tive efficiency in any case.
7.1.4 Summary & Implications
In Section 7.1, the co-opetition mechanism’s vulnerability to strategic bidding, and
in this course, also its degree of allocative efficiency was evaluated. Technically,
the power ratio-based transfer function is prone to profitable manipulation. On the
other hand, allocation efficiency holds both for truth-telling and for situations in
which service providers deviate from their true type, however, the same complex
service is allocated than if assuming truthful revelation of services’ types. In the
current section, several agent-based simulation series were conducted, eventually
showing that
• the co-opetition mechanism does, in average, reach a high degree of incentive
compatibility for several configurations and customer types, and does only
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allow for moderate deviation of services’ price bids in the range of -10% and
10%, and
• the co-opetition mechanism and its PR-based transfer function beats both more
competitive and less competitive alternative transfer functions (ETF-1 and
ETF-2) in several cases.
Table 7.16 summarizes the average expected bidding strategies in the co-
opetition mechanism that were collected by the different simulations presented in
Section 7.1, and thus, the range of expected average equilibrium strategies. In ad-
dition, the simulation-based results show that the co-opetition mechanism has the
potential to retain a high degree of allocation efficiency in the tested configurations,
thereby also performing significantly better than the tested benchmark ETF-2.
As stated in Section 4.1, incentive compatibility is a secondary property that is
not directly pursued by the design of the PRTF. However, incentive compatibility
indirectly brings about favorable effects for the fairness property of the co-opetition
mechanism: as summarized in Section 6.1.5, the symmetry and additivity character-
istics only apply for the co-opetition mechanism in a wider sense, that is, in respect
of the reported types and the power ratio component of the transfer function t2. Re-
placing transfers by the service providers’ utilities, fairness properties also apply for
the co-opetition mechanism in its entire scope if truth-revelation is an equilibrium
strategy. Since the PRTF does not allow for substantial deviation from the service
providers’ true types with respect to the tested configurations, the fairness property
can approximately be widened to the entire co-opetition mechanism.
Table 7.16: Network configurations and their manipulation robustness: Final re-




r ≤ |0.05| (2,2,αi), (2,3,αi), (2,4,αi), (2,5,α1), (2,5,α2), (3,2,αi),
(3,3,α2), (3,3,α3), (3,4,αi), (4,2,αi), (4,3,αi)
|0.05| ≤ r ≤ |0.1| (2,5,α3), (3,3,α1)
7.2 Individual Rationality
Individual rationality imposes the requirement to distribute, at least, their reser-
vation utilites to all mechanism participants. Utility can be measured in different
“intensities”: concentrating on the service provider-side, participation in the SVN
must be indicated and confirmed before the service providers actually know the
outcome. It is also dependent on the other participants’ types and strategies which
are unknown – a service provider can merely exhibit a prior about the distribution
of other agents’ types. Therefore, ex interim individual rationality as introduced
in Section 3.1.3 is appropriate in the setting at hand. Fixing the reservation util-
ity to zero, ex interim individual rationality denotes a situation in which service
providers, in average, do not lose by participating in the mechanism.
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(7.19) ∀ vj ∈ V : Ē(uj(F∗)) ≥ 0
As Parkes [257] points out, individual rationality is an important design goal to
make a mechanism sustainable: participants have to take part on a voluntary basis,
which is only given if Equation (7.19) holds. In general, a negative utility uj with
respect to a service vj offered is possible if and only if both of the following two
cases occur:
1. Recall that non-allocated services always receive a payment tj ≥ 0 since cij = 0.
Thus, E(uj(F∗))≥ 0 ∀ vj /∈W∗. Therefore, attention of the analysis of ex interim
individual rationality can be restricted to allocated services. That is, service vj
must be allocated via one of its links eij (with vj ∈ Yk, vi ∈ Yk−1, eij ∈ E(W∗)),
and
2. the service provider’s strategy with respect to vj is to undercut the true costs
cij. Only in this case, uj < 0 is possible at all. Recall that the utility of a service
is defined as uj = tj − cij = t1j − cij + t2j if vj is allocated via eij. Overstating cij
lowers the allocation probability, however, ensures a positive utility: the utility
from t1 must be positive since pij − cij > 0. Further, t2 ≥ 0 always holds (cp.
Equations 5.15 and 5.18). Analogically, if the service’s true type is revealed
(pij = cij), the utility from t1 is zero and, as stated above, the PR is always non-
negative. Only in case of undercutting, i.e. pij ≤ cij, uj can turn negative if the
losses incurred via t1 are not compensated by vj’s power ratio.22
Section 7.1 thoroughly demonstrated that equilibrium strategies in respect of the
agents bidding cannot be stated precisely, however, a strong indication of expected
average bidding strategies was given in Table 7.16. As ex interim individual ratio-
nality is based on the expected utilities, it is also appropriate to utilize the average
expected allocation probabilities. This is done by the multiple rounds included in
the simulations conducted in Section 7.1. In order to make statements on services’
utilities, the aggregated utility ratios Rrunij and R
rsym
j are consulted: as long as R
r
j ≥ 0
in average, service providers do not expect to incur losses by participating. Table
7.17 shows the manipulation rates rneg from Section 7.1.2 that turn Rrj into a nega-
tive value for both the unilateral and the symmetric case.
In configurations with a low α, unilateral and symmetric undercutting can
quickly lead to situations which lets service providers leave the transaction with
a negative utility. Losses from t1 cannot be compensated by t2. This is different if
a larger surplus is distributed: in the unilateral case, losses are still possible since
single providers are more likely to be allocated the lower their price bid is – again,
these losses cannot be compensated after a certain manipulation level is reached. In
the symmetric case, undercutting does not change the allocation, that is, the most
efficient services are still guaranteed to be picked by the allocation function. In set-
tings with a high α, allocated services are still likely to compensate losses from t1 by
22For a more detailed summary of the coherency between allocation and changes in the transfer
function in case of bid price manipulation, please refer to Section 7.1.1, in particular Figure 7.1.
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Table 7.17: Manipulation strategies accounting for an expected negative utility.
































the PR. A smaller α can actually lead to negative utilities if the share in the PR is too
low to compensate every service provider’s loss from undercutting.23
These results are compared to the average equilibrium bidding strategies of ser-
vice providers shown in Table 7.16. In none of the tested configurations, average
equilibrium bidding strategies are situated in a range of −0.95 ≤ r ≤ −0.25. What
is more, for the settings (|Y|, |Yk|,α1) that are more prone to negative utility, results
of Sections 7.1.2 and 7.1.3 suggest that undercutting is never a profitable strategy. In
some of the remaining settings slight tendencies to undercutting can occur in equi-
librium, however, they are far from approaching manipulation rates that actually
yield a negative utility ratio.
Therefore, based on the simulation results from Section 7.1, ex interim individual
rationality, that is, a utility that is in average non-negative in equilibrium, can be
stated for the co-opetition mechanism. That is, based on expected utilities of service
providers, Requirement 4.8 can be acknowledged.
23Please refer to 7.1.2.4 for a more detailed analysis of how strategies evolve in the symmetric simu-
lation case.
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7.3 Summary
Classic mechanism design objectives partly step back in favor of desired network-
related properties by the co-opetition mechanism. More precisely, as outlined in
Section 4.1, incentive compatibility, and therefore also allocative efficiency cannot
be directly targeted by the mechanism implementation as established in Chapter 5.
Nevertheless, on an implicit level, it becomes preferable that the co-opetition mech-
anism exhibits a certain robustness against strategic behavior of participants for sev-
eral reasons. First, truthful revelation of service providers’ types is the only strategy
profile that definitely assures a welfare-maximizing outcome. As shown in Section
7.1.1, an efficient allocation is also possible if service providers reveal their true type
– however, cannot be ensured as long as strategic manipulation is profitable. In this
connection, allocative efficiency, which is also not a part of the co-opetition mecha-
nism’s social choice, turns out to be desirable to some degree as the most efficient
service providers should be regularly allocated in order to benefit from their high
performance. Second, as discussed in Section 6.1.5, fairness-related requirements
only apply for the power ratio. Subject to some slight changes to the properties’
definitions, the fairness characteristics can approximately be transferred to the co-
opetition mechanism as a whole if incentive compatibility is fulfilled to a high de-
gree. Picking up the results from Section 6.1, fairness is a crucial property of the
co-opetition mechanism to induce the service providers’ very willingness to partic-
ipate in the SVN.
The core contribution of this chapter was to analyze the co-opetition mecha-
nism’s vulnerability to strategic manipulation of service providers’ bids. This ques-
tion was tackled by means of a series of agent-based simulations. Taking a multitude
of different scenarios including various configurations of approaching customers’
service inquiries, service offers, and competitive situations as a basis, most of them
exhibited strong tendencies towards service providers playing average equilibrium
strategies in close proximity to their true types. More precisely, profitable deviation
rates of 5% or less from true costs could be shown in more than 90% of all tested
network configurations.
Moreover, defined as requirement to enable a sustainable business in SVNs, bud-
get balance and and individual rationality are retained by the co-opetition mecha-
nism. While budget balance is fulfilled by design as shown in Sections 5.4 and 6.1.1,
ex interim individual rationality could be shown based on the above-named numer-
ical results. Since service providers do not expect to lose money by participating in
the co-opetition mechanism, per se, there is nothing to prevent their participation
assuming an outside option that yields a zero utility.
Summarizing the evaluation part of this thesis, it remains to be stated that Chap-
ters 6 and 7 addressed Research Question 5. By providing theoretical and numerical
approaches, it was (i) not only shown how the co-opetition mechanism can be eval-
uated regarding its properties but also (ii) substantiated that the co-opetition mech-
anism actually implements the social choice as installed in Section 4.1.2. Moreover,
although not particularly designed to fulfill incentive compatibility and allocative
efficiency, the co-opetition mechanism satisfies both of these classic mechanism de-






T his thesis was motivated by the tremendous changes observed in the soft-ware industry. While economic and technical issues arising from traditional
software vendors turning into service providers have already been picked up in
academia, another wave of innovation suggesting the creation of value-added com-
plex (Web) services as a joint, cross-organizational process has only been partly ad-
dressed by academic literature so far. Whereas scholars already dedicate intensified
research activity to technology-driven approaches enabling the composition of Web
services to complex and valuable business applications, economic considerations
are lagging behind. The latter aspect is where the work at hand is focussing on. It
yields a comprehensive mechanism design approach to coordinate service providers
that engage in cross-company value creation processes subject to both cooperative
and competitive relationships.
Section 8.1 will summarize the major contributions of this thesis by revisiting the
research questions outlined in Section 1.1. Section 8.2 will discuss limitations of the
approach followed by an elaboration of future research directions. Section 8.3 will
point out related research lines to complement the contributions made by this thesis.
8.1 Contribution
The work at hand is on designing a mechanism that is tailored to a special kind
of networked economy which includes both competition and cooperation as inher-
ent building blocks: service value networks (SVNs). More precisely, the network
operator’s viewpoint is held, seeking for a scheme that sets suitable incentives to
make SVNs attractive for participants in their launch phase and, at the same time,
induces a certain behavior of agents that is in line with the overall system objectives
pursued. Hence, the main contribution and major focus of this work is to imple-
ment a mechanism that coordinates service allocation and value distribution subject
to crucial design goals that are determined by the co-opetitve environment. This
challenge is addressed by Research Question 4:
Research Question 4 ≺IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CO-OPETITION MECHANISMÂ.
How can the co-opetition mechanism be implemented to meet both requirements from net-
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work design and from classic mechanism design subject to its ability to handle multiattribute
and sequence-sensitive complex services?
However, in order to provide an answer to this research question, several related
questions have to be addressed. On the one hand, they lead to the topic by dealing
with important prerequisites. On the other hand, they are required to top off Re-
search Question 4. Thus, several additional contributions to coalesce around the
implementation of the co-opetition mechanism are made in this thesis.
As a preparation for a theoretically sound mechanism design approach that can
be transferred to the application scenario at hand, both economic foundations and
the application environment have to be scrutinized and understood in detail. At
first, the characteristics of the surrounding environment of the co-opetition mech-
anism were analyzed. As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, classic ven-
dors turn into service providers, offering software “as-a-service” instead of selling
and installing software products at customer site. In order to understand the conse-
quences of this development, services and their importance for the economy were
discussed in Section 2.1. In more detail, services, electronic services, and Web ser-
vices were defined in a constructive approach in order to establish a common basic
understanding for the trading objects of the co-opetition mechanism: Web services.
According to the definition that was provided, this type of service also includes the
wide field of software-as-a-service (SaaS) offerings.
Web services in general exhibit beneficial features that can be exploited for ad-
vanced, cross-organizational value creation. First, Web services are oftentimes re-
quested with specific functional and non-functional requirements in mind. Second,
their modularity and Web-based communication protocol give rise to an automated
composition into complex, value-added services, which supports today’s trend to-
wards companies’ concentration on their core competencies. Complex services are
assembled from modules offered by diverse service providers, thereby creating cus-
tomized solutions that meet virtually any kind of customer demand. In Section 2.2,
it was argued that these characteristics entail the long valley of services, thereby ex-
tending the well-known long tail phenomenon by a third dimension “composition
depth”. At the same time, this focus on services overcomes ever-pled objections
that query the long tail’s general “value proposition”. The explicit elaboration of
the long valley effect is novel to academic literature, concluding that combinatorics
of constructible Web services are optimally exploited by a newly arising form of
networked organizations introduced as service value networks. In a comprehensive
effort to differentiate SVNs from related concepts, (i) automated on-demand service
composition, that is, an automatically performed search for an optimal1 complex
service, and (ii) the network orchestration platform’s universal accessability were
identified as distinctive characteristics of SVNs. In this course, Research Question 1
was addressed:
Research Question 1 ≺CHARACTERISTICS AND EMERGENCE OF SERVICE VALUE
NETWORKSÂ. How can service value networks be defined and which economic factors drive
their emergence?
1Herein, optimality can be defined in different ways according to the specified goal, which can, for
instance, be welfare maximization.
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A graph-based formalization of SVNs was presented that does not only capture
the presence of substitutive and complementary service components at the same
time, but also the importance of the sequence of service components in a com-
plex service. Each combination of services can potentially create a new customer-
demanded functionality, thereby stressing the long valley effect in SVNs. Current
closely related examples, for instance, TEXO as an ambitious research endeavor to
holistically grasp challenges of such networked service markets, rounded off Chap-
ter 2.2.
After thoroughly discussing the basics of the trading objects of the co-opetition
mechanism, closely related economic foundations were introduced in Section 3.
The SVN environment exhibits both components of competitive environments that
breed selfish behavior of participants and the requirement to cooperatively offer a
complex service as a joint value creation activity. Therefore, essential elements from
non-cooperative as well as cooperative game theory were scrutinized. On the one
hand, mechanism design was chosen and introduced as the general methodology
to be applied (cp. Section 3.1): mechanism design is not about what will happen
in a specific interaction of various agents, but rather tackles the issue of having a
desired outcome in mind and to comprehend which strategic interaction and which
setting could lead to a course of action that implements this outcome. The latter
shall be realized even if participants act opportunistically in order to maximize their
individual utility. Yet, mechanism design in its classic form is not ideally suited:
agents in SVNs are selfish, however, they can only reach certain goals as a team.
The provisioning of a complex service requires a joint effort. Therefore, the foun-
dations of value distribution in network-based, cooperative situations were intro-
duced in Section 3.2. The consolidation of these two fundamentals, mechanism de-
sign and cooperative as well as network games lead to the proposal of a novel form
of network-based incentive engineering approach called networked mechanism design
(cp. Research Question 2).
Research Question 2≺NETWORKED MECHANISM DESIGNÂ. How can classic mech-
anism design be mapped to networked mechanism design?
The merit of networked mechanism design is to accentuate alternative properties
that may prevail over traditional economic desiderata when designing a business in
a networked environment. Therefore, classic desiderata are queued up within novel
network-related targets to some extent. Design objectives of the co-opetition mech-
anism were raised in a thorough environmental analysis as presented in Section 4.1,
thereby addressing Research Question 3.
Research Question 3 ≺MECHANISM REQUIREMENTS IN SERVICE VALUE
NETWORKSÂ. Which are the design objectives of the co-opetition mechanism in order to
suit the requirements of early service value networks?
According to the environmental analysis, network growth, readiness to deliver,
fair, monotonic and unique payoffs, and interconnectedness were identified as de-
sirable properties of the co-opetition mechanism. Budget balance and individual
rationality as traditional economic properties shall be retained while incentive com-
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patibility and allocative efficiency step behind, however, must still be kept in focus.
Additionally, the ability to handle multiple quality of service attributes and the sup-
port of a service composition’s sequence are mandatory requirements to apply the
mechanism in SVNs.
These design objectives in turn laid the groundwork for the co-opetition mecha-
nism as presented in Section 5. Based on a brief introduction of the mechanism’s un-
derlying auction type, namely multiattribute reverse auctions, a bidding language
that suits the multiattribute character of Web services was presented. With a suitable
auction type and bidding language available, this thesis’ central Research Question
4 could be tackled. To this end, the power ratio (PR) was elaborated as the heart
of the co-opetition mechanism. Following a whole new direction of distributing
revenues in commercial services networks, the PR’s essence is not only to reward
allocated service providers, but also service providers on standby. That is, the cir-
cumstance that service providers in the SVN must not necessarily be the “best ones”
in order to create value for the system was included in the transfer payment logic.
To this end, a value function to express the value generated by the complex ser-
vice offered within the SVN was designed based on the multiattribute customer
request. The PR measures this monetized value contributed to the SVN by a single
provider in terms of its marginal contribution. The computation scheme is based on
the Shapley value and is applied to complex services as smallest value-creating unit.
By developing such a cooperative solution concept in a non-cooperative mechanism
design approach, the co-opetitive character of service value networks was mirrored.
The co-opetition mechanism as the focal deliverable of this thesis was designed
to fit the desired properties stated in Research Question 3. In a final step to round
off this work, these requirements were evaluated in both analytical and simulative
approaches outlined in Chapters 6 and 7:
Research Question 5 ≺EVALUATION OF THE CO-OPETITION MECHANISMÂ. How
can the co-opetition mechanism be (numerically and analytically) evaluated regarding its
properties?
In a theoretical analysis, fairness and cooperational monotonicity of the power
ratio were proven. Those properties are of prime importance with respect to the
fashion of value distribution: if revenues are granted to service providers that are
not allocated, fairness must be retained. By also fulfilling cooperational monotonic-
ity, the PR assures that individual contribution is incorporated in a way that an
increase in a service provider’s (individual) efficiency must at least lead to an iden-
tical or a larger payoff. Thereby, competitive forces in SVNs are amplified. Also
based on theoretical results, it was shown that the co-opetition mechanism induces
a fully intermeshed SVN as a stable result. In other words, each service provider
maximizes its utility by being fully linked. That is, being compatible with as many
complementary services as possible is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Full inter-
connectedness as a stable state is a strong result, which underscores the co-opetition
mechanism’s capacity to enhance complementarity. Since the co-opetition mecha-
nism induces incentives for service providers to continuously keep ready their ser-
vices (i.e., their readiness to deliver) and also yields a unique solution “by design”,
the last network-related property to be proven was network growth. Elaborated by
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means of a simulation-based approach, it was shown that the co-opetition mecha-
nism applying the power ratio-based transfer function (PRTF) implements stronger
incentives to join an SVN than an otherwise identical mechanism relying on an equal
transfer function (ETF-1) which distributes available surplus equally among allo-
cated service providers.
In terms of classic mechanism design goals, incentive compatibility and al-
locative efficiency were not deliberately included into the design goals for the co-
opetition mechanism, however, they must be kept track of due to their relation to
other desired properties such as fairness. By dint of a comprehensive agent-based
simulation approach, bidding strategies of service providers, and therefore, the
co-opetition mechanism’s vulnerability to profitable manipulation, were identified
subject to different scenarios. It could be shown that (i) strategic behavior is clearly
limited in realistic network and customer configurations and (ii) the co-opetition
mechanism applying the PRTF beats a transfer function (ETF-2) that equally dis-
tributes available surplus among all participating service providers, thereby hardly
setting competitive incentives. Concretizing the former finding, it could be numer-
ically indicated that the co-opetition mechanism can be classified as approximately
incentive compatible in more than 90% of the tested configurations, allowing prof-
itable deviation of 5% or less, which also retains allocative efficiency to a high de-
gree.2 The described simulation series could also be exploited to show that the
mechanism is ex interim individual rationality: service providers that take part in
an SVN which applies the co-opetition mechanism do not expect to suffer any loss
by being included in transactions, and thus are all set to voluntarily participate.
8.2 Limitations of the Approach& Future Work
This section discusses limitations of the approach in a critical appraisal and sketches
possible suggested solutions (cp. Section 8.2.1). Directly linked to these issues, Sec-
tion 8.2.2 raises open research questions that could no be addressed in the work.
8.2.1 Limitations of the Approach
In this Section, limitations to the approach presented in this thesis are summarized.
Transitions of open issues and limitation are inherently smooth, therefore, this sec-
tion is closely related to Section 8.2.2.
Straightforward customer and one-sided incentives
In this thesis, incentive engineering is focussed on the service provider side, trans-
lating into two basic assumptions. On the one hand, as stated in Assumption 5.2,
strategic behavior of the customer is faded out. It is assumed that a straightfor-
ward service customer will truthfully announce its type to the mechanism. On the
other hand, the customer’s utility is always fully “exhausted”. It is assumed that the
2Yet, note that the co-opetition mechanism is not incentive compatible in an analytic sense (cp. Sec-
tion 7.1.1).
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service customer is willing to pay a “premium” in return for being equipped with
a perfectly matching complex service.3 Both restrictions are commonly accepted
in literature [195, 259, 45]. Nevertheless, research efforts should continue with a
relaxation of the customer-related assumptions: how to extend the mechanism to
explicitly include incentives targeted at the customer-side?
An extended mechanism design could explore how and to which extent the
sum of power ratios ∆ = ∑vj∈V φj of service providers (SPs) can be reduced and re-
distributed to the service customer (SC). A first approach may be a linear customer-
provider ratio as exemplified in Equation (8.1):4
(8.1) ∆ = β · ∆︸︷︷︸
SPs share
+(1− β) · ∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
SC share
That way, budget balance is definitely retained. β ∈ [0;1] defines the factor to de-
termine the monetary share granted to either involved market side. Currently, the
co-opetition mechanism sets β = 1. If we set β < 1, the properties postulated in the
social choice need to be reassessed. Certainly, relaxing assumptions on customer-
side brings about additional properties which potentially have to be traded off
against the hitherto pursued objectives. In addition, strategic behavior of customers
is to be analyzed.
Alternatively, Assumption 5.2 can be relaxed by dropping budget balance. If the
surplus ∆ is borne by the platform, the allocation function maximizes both customer
and provider utility (cp. Section A.2). In this case, the price charged from the cus-
tomer reduces to the PF∗ for the allocated service F∗. The co-opetition mechanism’s
properties besides budget balance are retained, manipulation robustness in terms
of the customer should additionally be surveyed. The downside of this approach
is that overpayments are not controllable and can be arbitrarily high, depending on
the difference between a customer’s willingness to pay and PF∗ .
Therefore, a variation could be the relative power ratio which calculates the service
providers’ relative share in the system’s overall utility. It evolves as a direct exten-
sion of Equation (5.18) by normalizing the power ratio of each service vj ∈ V to the
maximum system utility:






Replacing the PR by its relative version, the platform operator can control the
amount of monetary means ∆̃ to be subsidized. Consequently, according to Equa-
tion (8.2), each service vj is granted a PR-transfer of φrelj (·) · ∆̃. Again, hitherto pos-
tulated components of the co-opetition mechanism’s social choice as well as strate-
gic acting on customer-side need to be reviewed. Besides losing budget balance,
3Technically, re-setting the surplus ∆ to be distributed via the PR to (∆− ε), with ε > 0 and ε→ 0, the
service customer strictly prefers participating in the co-opetition mechanism over non-participation.
4For the foundations and notational details, please refer to Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3.
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deficiencies have to be accepted in terms of the SVN’s interoperability: as shown
in Conte et al. [81], adding all available links is not a dominant strategy for ser-
vice providers anymore. For instance, a service provider can remove a connection
at the same time increasing its utility – it just requires that the link removal hurts
others more than the considered service provider itself. Such dependencies are pos-
sible due to the relative character of the payoff. The same holds true for coalitional
monotonicity (cp. Requirements 4.5). By normalizing to χ(G), the relative power
ratio does not solely base its payoff on a service’s own contribution, but explicitly
involves other services’ contributions to the network. As shown by Young [341],
such payoff rules may penalize individual initiative to improve efficiency.
These alternative concepts that explicitly include customer-side incentives into
the transfer rule show that a careful review is required to identify their strengths
and shortcomings and to set them into relation with existing and newly emerging
design properties. Related to such an extension, the customer-side should also be
an active agent in the simulations that evaluate network growth (cp. Section 6.4).
Simulation-based evaluation of the co-opetition mechanism’s properties
Although simulations often yield valuable results and implications, general limita-
tions of the approach must be conceded. Simulation models usually simplify reality
to a certain degree. In this thesis, two simulation-based approaches were consulted.
The first one was utilized in order to show the co-opetition mechanism’s ability to
foster network growth (cp. Section 6.4). It incorporates three major simplifications
as stated in the following: first, truthful revelation of service providers’ types was
assumed. While this assumption is acceptable for the co-opetition mechanism, the
applied benchmark (ETF-1) cannot be rated approximately truthful in each of the
tested network configurations. Second, taking in the latter, statements on perfor-
mance are partially based on benchmarks. The PRTF does beat the ETF-1, however,
it cannot be excluded that other, non-evaluated benchmarks outperform the PRTF.
Finally, network effects enjoyed by customers were assumed to be present without
explicitly simulating network growth on customer-side. More precisely, an increas-
ing number of service providers opting for the PRTF-based market was assumed to
create a larger customer base, again leading to a more valuable network for service
providers [15, 188]. Thus, in total, the suggested simulation model includes some
particular simplifications that may not allow to fully generalize the results. Still,
the data delivers valuable insights into how SVNs evolve subject to the co-opetition
mechanism as applied coordination scheme.
A second simulation-based model and setting was used to evaluate classic mech-
anism design properties in Chapter 7.1. Complexity and runtime were decreased
by limiting the agents’ strategy spaces to discrete actions, thereby sacrificing accu-
racy to a certain extent. Yet, by choosing quite small increments between possi-
ble actions, statements on the degree of strategic manipulations were kept within
reasonable limits. Further, the simulation model presented in Section 7.1.3 consid-
ered individual strategies that evolve over time by applying reinforcement learning.
This learning model has proven to suit certain model-free situations, however, its
appropriateness in the multi-agent environment cannot be undoubtedly affirmed.
Although van Dinther [97] showed that reinforcement learning performs well in a
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multi-agent bidding scenario, it cannot fully represent human behavior. Despite
such an inherent degree of distortion, the numerical approaches yielded useful and
coherent results whenever the multitude of parameters made theoretical analyses
too complex to handle.
In general, in order to back up the results of and implications from the agent-
based simulations, further research should take up the examined problem sets
and put the numerical results to a test: smaller SVNs can reasonably be repro-
duced in laboratory experiments, which is likely to shed light on the validity of
the simulation-based results.5
8.2.2 Future Work
Beyond the accomplishments in this thesis, there are several promising directions
in which this research can progress further. Such specific extensions are outlined
in the following, exemplified by sample research questions that are eligible to be
addressed in future.
Thoughts on fairness: the weighted power ratio
The power ratio itself treats any kind of service equally within a complex service.
Put differently, each candidate pool takes a neutral, homogenous role from the SVN
operator’s view in terms of its positioning (in a sense of “importance”) in the net-
work. That is, the power ratio is distributed to services without making a difference
between the candidate pools per se. This is certainly a desirable property if function-
alities are of similar complexity, for instance, indicated by approximately identical
costs.
Yet, such a symmetric distribution might be distorted if functionalities are to be
classified “on different levels”, that is, quite basic Web services are assembled to-
gether with more sophisticated on-demand applications that feature costs amount-
ing to a multiple of the basic services’ costs. Still, the power ratio treats them equally
in terms of their marginal contribution. Assume a degenerated SVN with two can-
didate pools which includes one service each. Applying the PR, the services would
always share the available surplus in equal parts, no matter if, for instance, one of
the services is a CRM application and the other one is a simple storage service.
From a theoretic side, this is straightforward since both services are required for
value creation. However, from the participating service providers’ side, this might
become an issue: a more sophisticated and therefore probably more expensive ser-
vice is likely to implicitly account for a large share of the customer’s willingness to
pay. This issue results in power ratios that may be perceived unfair by the provider
of the sophisticated service due to the comparatively higher effort put into the co-
operations – even though the PR is fair in a game theoretic sense (cp. Section 6.1).
Thus, such constellations may legitimate a variation of the power ratio and, thereby,
5Yet, differing results would not necessarily imply that the simulation-based results did not repro-
duce the theoretical solution properly. The assumption of rational agents cannot always be retained
in reality, so that analytically sound outcomes may not be the result of humans’ real world behavior.
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its fairness perception. It suggests itself to introduce weightings to capture this is-
sue. But how can such a variation be incorporated into the power ratio?
Cooperative game theory yields means to incorporate weightings. Shapley [291]
introduced a variant of his value that drops the symmetry axiom. In more detail, it
is a generalization of the symmetric variant that attempts to divide generated value
by assigning to each agent a weighted average of the marginal contribution it makes
to all possible coalitions [74].
Transferred to SVNs, these weightings replace the notion of symmetrically divid-
ing value within complex services. Let λ̄ = (λ̄1, . . . , λ̄n), ∑vi∈V λ̄i = 1 denote weights
for each of the |V|= n services available in an SVN G. Following Shapley [291], Kalai
and Samet [185], Monderer et al. [229], Dragan [101], the weighted power ratio φWPRj
for a service vj ∈ V can be computed as follows:6










λ̄ = 1n for each of the n services yields the power ratio as a special case [185].
Out of Equations (8.3) and (8.4), new questions arise: the weight is determined by
the sizes of cooperations and an exogenous parameter λ̄. How can we determine
such weightings for services? In case of different cost classes of services, appro-
priate weightings per candidate pool must be found that follow some logic that is
accepted by the participating service providers. In addition, an adaption of Equa-
tions (8.3) and (8.4) away from individual weightings to candidate pools must be
carried out. A different logic for setting the weights according to reputations of ser-
vices rather than to candidate pools is touched on in Section 8.3. Several scholars,
for instance, Kalai and Samet [185], Hart and Mas-Colell [150], Levy and McLean
[207], Nowak and Radzik [247], present alternative axiomatizations for the weighted
Shapley value that include different updated notions on fairness; these properties
should be reassessed for the weighted PR due to the modifications made. Moreover,
other properties of the co-opetition mechanism’s social choice must be reviewed in
terms of their transferability to the weighted power ratio.
Bundled and multi-functional service offers
In the present version of the co-opetition mechanism, the underlying SVN model as
introduced in Section 2.2.3 is limited to a k-partite graph. However, the co-opetition
mechanism’s allocation and transfer functions can easily be transferred to an SVN
model with relaxed assumptions on its structure, first and foremost, replacing ser-
vices’ strict categorization into candidate pools by a possibility of services covering
6Please refer to Sections 2.2.3 and 5.2 for notational issues.
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multiple functionalities in an integrated manner. This becomes a very interesting
issue from a strategic point of view, allowing service providers to bundle their ser-
vices.
Such strategic options give rise to further research questions, such as for exam-
ple: in which circumstances is it beneficial for service providers to merge services to
a bundled offer? On the one hand, assuming no additional costs for interconnect-
edness, it was shown in Section 6.3 that a fully intermeshed network maximizes the
agents’ utilities. It remains to be evaluated, in which cases, for two previously un-
bundled services, a bundling effort that withdraws links from the SVN will lower or
increase involved services’ expected utilities and how such bundling influences the
other services’ utilities and strategies. Even if the power ratio of the bundled service
is lower than the sum of the two services’ payoff if individually offered, bundling
might be advantageous for service providers if it cuts costs through collaboratively
relying on the same assets, for instance storage or computing resources. On the other
hand, in line with the potential of the long valley’s third dimension, namely compo-
sition depth, merging offerings decreases granularity of services. Thereby, service
providers deprive themselves of the opportunity to participate in as many diverse
combinations of offerings as possible. In other words, bundling removes possibili-
ties for combinatorics and reduces variability, that is, both possible service instances
and re-combinations decrease, and therefore, counteract the general ideology of
SVNs. In the medium term, this may also impinge upon service providers’ prof-
its. Thus, service provider’s strategies in terms of bundling or unbundling should
be analyzed as a part of future research.
A related line of research is the consideration of collusion. How does the co-
opetition mechanism perform if we switch from a one-shot-game consideration to
an iterated game? The latter implies that service providers have the possibility to
tacitly collude via their bidding strategy. Indications on how to approach such situ-
ations can be found in van Dinther et al. [98].
The co-opetition mechanism in large networks
The co-opetition mechanism is designed for SVNs in their launch phase. Some of
the properties of the mechanism’s social choice function are directly related to this
aim, first and foremost, network growth (Requirement 4.1) and readiness to deliver
(Requirement 4.2). Moreover, fairness as stated in Requirement 4.3 and coopera-
tional monotonicity (Requirement 4.5) are also owed to the logic of the power ratio,
i.e. distributing payments not only to allocated services, but also to services that are
generally able to create value for the SVN. This circumstance gives rise to further
research questions: in larger networks, these properties are not necessarily required
anymore and may be replaced. Which is the updated social choice in SVNs that have
reached a certain size? Which mechanism is suited best to fit this social choice? And
what is an optimal network size threshold to switch from the co-opetition mech-
anism applying the PRTF to a different mechanism that, for instance, restricts the
surplus to allocated services?
Updated design goals may be focussed on the classic desiderata incentive com-
patibility and allocative efficiency, which are only met to a high degree by the co-
opetition mechanism in the tested network configurations. In terms of an optimal
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threshold to switch the mechanism to alternatives that fulfill the above-listed prop-
erties, indications can be extracted from the simulations conducted in this thesis.
For the matter of incentive compatibility, the results from Section 7.1 suggest the
possibility that service providers tend to misreport their types in larger networks
if their power ratios decrease and approach those of the other services in absolute
terms.7 In this case, the PR-based payoffs are likely to not have an economically sig-
nificant impact anymore, revenues can only be made out of an overbidding strategy
(in terms of the bid price)8. Moreover, in larger networks, tractability requirements
from computational mechanism design that can tackle rising complexity caused by
an increased number of cooperations and paths within the SVN will definitely be-
come an issue (cp. Section 5.3.1.2, also refer to the next paragraph). Furthermore,
after being neutral in terms of revenue distribution in the launch phase of the SVN,
revenue maximization objectives of the platform operator may partly replace net-
work design goals. In this connection, fees collected from participants for their
membership in the SVN or per transaction come into question [274, 275]. Network
growth seems to be constantly observable, even more distinct in larger networks (cp.
Section B.1), however, measured in terms of expected utilities. Realized payments
are likely to equalize and become infinitesimally small in large networks when ap-
plying the PRTF. It is to be evaluated if such small payments set sufficient and viable
incentives to actually sustain network growth requirements.
Revisiting computational complexity
Putting computational constraints aside, mechanism design assumes that the correct
outcome can be determined as a result of the relevant decentralized information
provided within the system [257]. In other words, the typical underlying problem
of coordinating decentralized agents that hold private information converts into a
centralized scenario. This is also the case in the work at hand: Assumption 5.1 states
that the co-opetition mechanism connects all participating agents as a central entity.
As shown in Section 5.3, the computation of the power ratio makes the co-opetition
mechanism intractable. However, in smaller network scenarios that are realistic in
the launch phase of an SVN, the complexity and runtime of sample calculations can
be handled within reasonable limits. Still, the computational complexity of the co-
opetition mechanism brings about increased computational effort in medium sized
network configurations.
Therefore, further research efforts should be put into the approximation of the
power ratio. Literature on approximating Shapley-style calculus is quite scarce:
Mann and Shapley [214], Owen [254], Bachrach et al. [18], Fatima et al. [117] provide
related approaches, however, concentrate on simple voting games, i.e. the Shapley-
Shubik index. With respect to the PR, it is not only crucial to test the approximation
error of such approaches, but also their compliance with the co-opetition mecha-
nism’s social choice. Approximation techniques applied to the PR are virtually use-
less if they distort the properties of the co-opetition mechanism. Therefore, sample
research questions do not only comprise the adaption of existing techniques to the
7This is the case if the PR payments approximate payments as made by the consulted benchmark
ETF-2, which can be seen in detail in the simulation results provided in Section 7.1.
8Analogically, service providers may offer lower qualities at constant prices.
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PR, but also cover the design of alternative approximation approaches that retain
the co-opetition’s properties.
A parallelized computation of the PR may yield an alternative to approxima-
tion. How can the computation of the power ratio be decomposed into independent
sub-units such that the calculation of the payoffs can be distributed, for instance, by
reverting to computing services in the cloud (e.g. Amazon EC2)? Thus, an area for
further research may be the PR’s eligibility for decomposition and ways to distribut-
edly process such computation jobs.
8.3 Complementary Research
This section gives a summary of research directions which are not rated direct ex-
tensions to this thesis. They shall rather point the reader to aspects that are com-
plementary to SVNs and the co-opetition mechanism and may thereby be valuable
from a broader viewpoint.
Process-oriented service allocation and QoS aggregation
From a customer’s perspective, the requested complex service is most probably only
a part of a much bigger and more complex business process that depicts an overall
value-added process. Within this process, one or more on-demand complex services
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Figure 8.1: Customer’s business process including a heterogeneity of invoked services
As depicted in Figure 8.1, the customer’s process steps and the complex services
as offered in SVNs can be mapped differently. On the one hand, candidate pools
in the SVN could fulfill process steps exactly as they are (cp. Y1 and A, Y2 and B).
On the other hand, they may be available in a more granular fashion, such that,





and E). Further, the example shows a situation in which steps C and D
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are accomplished internally. It is obvious that, from the customer’s perspective, an
aggregation of QoS attributes does not (or not only) matter on the complex service
level, as interpreted in this thesis, but rather over the entire value-added process
at customer-side, including both external and internal services. Therefore, comple-
mentary research questions include the challenge of how to incorporate the whole
customer business process into a service request that is only intended to cover a
process fragment. That way, QoS is not optimized in terms of the SVN at hand, but
with respect to the entire customer process.
In this connection, complementary research questions also deal with a more de-
tailed consideration of the underlying process model. By including different, more
detailed process patterns besides service sequences – for instance, loops and paral-
lel or alternative process fragments – the aggregation of QoS attributes complicates
[176]: service attributes are subject to a different aggregation logic depending on the
underlying process pattern. A simple example is shown in Figure 8.2. The same
attribute maximum downtime (md) is treated differently in a process fragment includ-
ing a parallelization of two components (e.g., an AND Split) than in a sequential
process pattern. While the maximum downtime of the former workflow patterns
equals the maximum attribute value of the affected services (a1 = max{a4, a5} and
a3 = max{a6, a7}), the latter requires the sum operator due to the sequential execu-
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Figure 8.2: Different aggregation operators dependent on the process context
Both the number of possible process fragments and the variety of non-functional
service attributes to be included are potentially very high. Van der Aalst [1] showed
that each and every workflow pattern can be traced back to a few universally valid
basic types of patterns. Is it also possible to classify service attributes by the ap-
plicable aggregation operator, subject to them occurring in different process pat-
terns? Can such clustered service quality attributes and aggregation operations be
described (for, instance, in an ontology), such that automated aggregation of QoS at-
tributes is facilitated? First approaches to the above-mentioned line of research can
be found in Blake and Cummings [44], Unger et al. [319], Knapper et al. [191, 190].
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Enforcement of service levels
This field of complementary research is closely related to the one outlined above.
It reflects a quite common assumption in applied mechanism design approaches
(cp. e.g. [201, 288, 306]): after the mechanism has determined the choice (allocation
and payments), the market participants are assumed to adhere to it (cp. Assump-
tion 5.4). This simplifying assumption does always hit reality due to both technical
failures and strategic issues. In the work at hand, it is assumed that performance
of service providers can effectively be monitored and penalized, if necessary. As
soon as the delivery of services moves from “best-effort provisioning” to the provi-
sioning of a guaranteed service quality, monitoring becomes a crucial point of proof
for both providers and customers. A first approach to distributed contracting and
monitoring from a technical viewpoint has been presented by Spillner et al. [301].
An interesting field of further research is the question of how to penalize provider
effectively. Can a penalty term be included into the transfer function? Blau et al.
[48], Blau [45] present an extension to their complex service auction which compen-
sates customers in case of non- or mal-performance, such that strategic action on
provider-side is not beneficial. Rana et al. [269] investigate suitable penalty schemes
in a distributed grid environment. If such an enforcement is infeasible, is there a
way to include a dedicated attribute, for instance, reputation, into the service’s non-
functional properties such that mal-performance is sustainably cut back?
Inclusion of services’ reputations
Directly building upon the complementary research question raised above, reputa-
tion can be represented by aggregating performance of service providers from the
trading history. This way, trustworthiness of service providers is indicated and in-
terpreted as expected performance. The latter can be taken into account when de-
ciding upon an actual allocation and its pricing – and thus also impacts future allo-
cation and pricing decisions [142]. Does such a scheme incentivize service providers
to not overstate their QoS? In this case, it is not only important to identify suitable
aggregation logics to compute the actual reputation “score”, but also to put research
efforts into determining more sophisticated ways of including such reputation at-
tributes into the co-opetition mechanism. In addition, which is the right type of
reputation system to be implemented? First, one could rely on parties rating each
other in order to determine the reputation score.9 However, such user-driven rat-
ings must consider that the service customer will not be able to rate single service
components in the majority of cases. Therefore, ratings are likely to take place on a
complex service level. Second, if the platform operator imposes a central reputation
mechanism based on actual performance, effective monitoring systems are required
in order to compare quoted QoS and the quality of actually provisioned services.
This option allows for ratings on a component service level, yet brings about addi-
tional complexity.
Currently, centralized reputation mechanisms are almost always based on sin-
gle agents. This circumstance raises another, reciprocal field of complementary re-
search. For instance, Haller [144] presented a stochastic reputation system for virtual
9A detailed listing of current trust and reputation systems based on ratings created by the community
(i.e., in the case of this thesis, service customers and providers) can be found in Jøsang et al. [182].
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organization managers to identify trusted partners. If such approaches are trans-
ferred to a complex service level, that is, situations in which a composition of two
or more services are required to offer a value-creating outcome, how can reputation
scores be weighted and aggregated in order to obtain a reputation value on complex
service level or on a network level? Here, the relative power ratio (cp. Equation 8.2)
as a measure that outputs a value representing the percental marginal contribution
to the overall network at hand for each service may be consulted as a promising
metric [81].
Support for preference elicitation
A common assumption in mechanism design approaches is that agents are always
able to express their preferences to the mechanism. However, especially if trading
objects expose multiple dimensions – in the co-opetition mechanism’s case, QoS at-
tributes – participants find it difficult to actually elicit their preferences and thus, to
state their type. In case of complex services, not only multiple heterogenous quality
attributes, but also their aggregation over the whole process must be incorporated.
Surprisingly, as the elicitation of preferences is more or less a prerequisite of any ne-
gotiation situation, and auctions in particular, research on how to design the inter-
face between agents and the mechanism in order to facilitate preference elicitation
has received almost no attention so far [294]. A central research question of pref-
erence elicitation in mechanisms such as the one at hand can be stated as follows:
Is there a simple (and effective) way for participants to extract and express their
types correctly? Anandasivam [7] showed that traditional methodologies that have
been successfully applied in the field of marketing can generally be applied in the
service sector. However, they tend to be complex and time-consuming themselves.
For instance, a conjoint analysis approach [138] which asked customers to sort ser-
vice compositions with a multiplicity of different configurations according to their
preferences would be questionable in terms of efficiency. Bichler et al. [40] exper-
imented with user interfaces for the buyer side based on methodologies similar to
analytical hierarchical processing (AHP) and multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT)
[282, 78].10 Valuable complementary research efforts may involve a reassessment of
such decision analysis approaches applied to complex services, putting forth user
interfaces that ease preference elicitation. However, such research needs to tackle
the issue that above-mentioned methodologies tend to turn quite complex and te-
dious with increasing numbers of included service modules, service attributes, and
parameterizations thereof.
Revenue considerations under capacity restrictions
By Assumption 5.5, capacity constraints on provider-side are faded out. However,
customers are oftentimes not able to accurately foresee their own usage behavior of
Web services which leads to the inherent “on-demand characteristic” [26] – at the
same time being one of the most striking value propositions of Web services. There-
10Generally, such tool-based approaches are not only able to extract agents’ preferences, but also to
elicit their utility function. Recall that according to the bidding language presented in Section 5.1.2,
customer-stated upper and lower boundaries of attribute values exhibit a linearly coherency. Yet,
the co-opetition mechanism is also capable of handling other configurations.
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fore, providers’ resources might not suffice in peak times to serve all customers that
arrive in the SVN while lying idle in other time periods. Complementary research
questions may originate from different domains. On the one hand, time series anal-
ysis deals with the extraction of usage or demand statistics and patterns, resulting in
a more accurate prediction of workloads to support service providers in preparing
service delivery by, for instance, having available additional resources in estimated
peak times. Research challenges may involve the application of suitable approxima-
tion techniques that allow for an appropriate time series analysis in the Web service
market.
On the other hand, picking up the very idea of such usage pattern prediction,
revenue management approaches add an economic perspective by mapping antici-
pated customer behavior onto an optimization of resource allocation. How can cus-
tomers’ types and their behavior be anticipated in order to efficiently allocate lim-
ited and perishable service capacity? Depending on the actual capacity utilization,
should inquiries be declined awaiting a different type of customer that is willing to
pay a higher price? Is it profitable to freeze and queue running service instances in
favor of high priority inquiries that exhibit a higher willingness to pay? Ananda-
sivam and Neumann [8] show that the Web service market generally differs from
traditional revenue management domains such as the airline industry, however, es-
tablished concepts and methods can generally be adapted. Service value networks
may lift these approaches to a higher level: competition between services in iden-
tical candidate pools notwithstanding, is there an efficient way to conduct revenue
management on the network level, that is, from the platform operator’s perspective,
and thereby exploit interconnectedness? That way, given the incoming customer re-
quests and the available services, optimization of resources may be transferrable to
the overall network. In this context, optimal capacity allocation must take place
along complex services, that is, other than in current approaches, the sequence of
service modules to be invoked needs to be adhered to.
Extending the power ratio to generic service networks
Based on the constructive definition of services, electronic services, and Web ser-
vices as presented in Section 2.1, service value networks were defined as being com-
posed of Web services only (cp. Section 2.2). First and foremost, this restriction is
founded on two major SVN characteristics that are directly based on distinct Web
services properties. Web services’ public and well-defined interfaces give rise to
automated composition, while their transmission via Web protocols lets the compo-
sition take place on a universally accessible network – the Internet.
Promising complementary research includes the transfer of the power ratio to
other service domains. While other components of the co-opetition mechanism’s so-
cial choice may not be suitable to other domains, granting payments to an extended
set of service providers falls into place in several scenarios. For instance, critical
service processes in the health care domain oftentimes require both readiness to de-
liver and high availability which could be backed up by substitute services. Making
available such buffers, e.g. in hospital processes or in the chain of survival, involves
costs and, thus, must be effectively compensated. This work provides a measure, the
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power ratio, which is designed to account for such a remuneration of alternatives
on a process level.
Mobility and transportation is another promising application domain which may
allow for an analogous application of the PR: akin to the health care scenario, having
available buffers increases the system’s robustness against unexpected failures. This
is crucial if, for instance, in a logistics scenario, supply is guaranteed at a certain
quality level. It is obvious that such extra capacity lies idle if it remains unused. A
customer-driven request for a carriage of a defined set of items at a defined quality
can be transferred to the SVN perspective as to its layout of paths. The power ratio
may be well-suited for determining payments to reward alternative modules for






Appendix to Part II
A.1 Quality of Service Extensions
As thoroughly discussed by Blau [45], the mere consideration of basic quality at-
tributes may not suffice in practice. More sophisticated QoS characteristics that re-
quire additional semantic information, such as for instance, ownership rights or dif-
ferent types of encryption, need to be handled just as well as simple characteristics























Figure A.1: Security encryption ontology
Blau et al. [48]
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Such additional semantic information is usually stored in an ontology [308]
which, in turn, requires adequate knowledge representation formalisms, as for in-
stance, the Web Ontology Language (OWL) [218]. In order to tackle complex QoS
characteristics, semantic concepts can also be included in the co-opetition mecha-
nism. As exemplified by Blau [45], a customer requirement longing for a distinct en-
cryption type1 requires (i) a Boolean aggregation operator and (ii) additional knowl-
edge about how different encryption types can be combined. The latter information
can be efficiently stored in an ontology such as the security encryption ontology
shown in Figure A.1. An exhaustive numerical example illustrating the capabilities
of such QoS extensions in an SVN environment can be found in Blau [45].
A.2 Non-Budget Balanced Variant of the Co-Opetition
Mechanism
The allocation function of the co-opetition mechanism includes the assumption
that the customer’s utility is entirely redistributed to the service providers as the
unique source of money flows. In Section 8.2.1, a non-budget balanced alternative
is brought up to account for explicit incentives on customer-side. In this variant,
PF∗ = ∑eij∈E(W∗) pij will be charged to the customer for the allocated complex ser-
vice F∗.2
Therefore, the service customer’s utility USCFl when procuring a complex service
Fl is assembled by the service configuration-adapted willingness to pay net of the
sum of the submitted prices for the edges included in Fl.
(A.1) USCFl = α · Q
(AFl
)−PFl
The aggregated service provider utility assembles analogue to Definition 5.3. Let
again δj denote the monetary surplus that is distributed to vj. For the reader’s con-
venience, Equation (5.6) is reprinted as Equation (A.2).









Based on Equations (A.1) and (A.2), the actual system’s welfare assembles as
the sum of USCF∗ , USPF∗ , and the utility of the platform operator U POF∗ who grants the
subsidy with respect to the allocated complex service F∗. As the monetized added
value for the customer created by the SVN shall be the amount of money distributed
via the power ratio, the welfareWNB created in this non-budget balanced variant of
the co-opetition mechanism equals W :
1The customer can individually formulate its request via rules that can be interpreted by the ontology.
2This section draws on the notation introduced in Section 2.2.3.
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+(α · Q(AF∗)− ∑
eij∈E(W∗)









Analogue to Equation (5.11), the mechanism operator can calculate the expected
welfare W̃NB by equating the reported types with the revealed true types, which
equals W̃ :
(A.4) W̃NB = (α · Q(AF∗)− ∑
eij∈E(W∗)
pij) = W̃
As a result of Equation (A.4), the allocation function o : B ×Θ → F that chooses
the complex service that maximizes the reported system’s welfare equals the alloca-










s.t. UFl ≥ 0 ∀ Fl ∈ F
The basic difference to the allocation function as presented in Section 5.2.2 is that
Equation (A.5) does not only maximize the reported welfare, but obviously both the
customer utility (cp. Equation A.1) and the aggregated service provider utility (cp.
Equation A.2).
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A.3 Complexity of the Power Ratio










= 2x − 1
Basis: Show that the statement holds for x = 1.





Inductive step: Assume that Equation (A.6) is true for x. It then needs to be shown
































































































= 2 · (2x − 1) + 1
































Obviously, according to the result from Equation (A.8), Equation (A.6) also holds
for x + 1. Since the basis and the inductive step can be proved, Equation (A.6) is true
for all x ∈N.
¤
Appendix B
Appendix to Part III
B.1 Network Growth
Table B.1: Average share |m|rel of service providers opting for mPRTF and mETF−1
(3). The numbers do not add up to 100% – the remaining share denotes the state
in which service providers are indifferent between choosing mPRTF and mETF−1.
|m|rel , (2,8) |m|rel , (2,10) |m|rel , (3,5) |m|rel , (3,6)
PRTF ETF− 1 PRTF ETF− 1 PRTF ETF− 1 PRTF ETF− 1
$1 79.5% 3.56% 82.4% 2.21% 72.6% 10.5% 78.3% 7.80%
$2 77.8% 13.2% 80.5% 10.6% 68.0% 23.3% 73.5% 19.0%
$3 65.6% 30.1% 74.2% 21.2% 58.7% 37.6% 62.4% 33.0%
$4 55.2% 0.61% 49.8% 0.29% 68.8% 4.69% 69.5% 2.26%
$5 67.5% 2.69% 62.3% 2.30% 69.7% 12.5% 72.9% 8.61%
$6 66.8% 14.4% 67.7% 9.97% 66.9% 22.7% 70.6% 17.8%
$7 17.5% 0.00% 13.7% 0.00% 54.8% 1.37% 49.7% 0.14%
$8 32.0% 0.29% 31.3% 0.00% 63.4% 4.71% 55.9% 1.57%
$9 47.6% 3.01% 46.1% 1.51% 66.4% 11.0% 60.7% 8.61%
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Table B.2: Expected utilities of service provider classes in the PRTF and the ETF-1
market subject to different network configurations (3). * denotes significance at
the level of p=0.1, ** denotes significance at the level of p=0.01. ARPRTF stands
for attraction rate of the PRTF-based market.
Ē(um$ ), (2,8) Ē(um$ ), (2,10) Ē(um$ ), (3,5) Ē(um$ ), (3,6)
PRTF ETF− 1 PRTF ETF− 1 PRTF ETF− 1 PRTF ETF− 1
$1 0.074** 0.043 0.057** 0.037 0.126** 0.109 0.107* 0.089
$2 0.138* 0.128 0.114* 0.103 0.194 0.222 0.166 0.194
$3 0.221 0.290 0.181 0.229 0.276 0.372 0.230 0.312
$4 0.032** 0.005 0.021** 0.001 0.088** 0.041 0.067** 0.022
$5 0.060** 0.022 0.042** 0.015 0.140** 0.107 0.109** 0.073
$6 0.110** 0.086 0.084** 0.065 0.188** 0.169 0.154** 0.135
$7 0.007** 0.000 0.004** 0.000 0.047** 0.009 0.032** 0.002
$8 0.014** 0.003 0.008** 0.000 0.081** 0.033 0.048** 0.012
$9 0.032** 0.014 0.018** 0.006 0.116** 0.073 0.080** 0.045
ARPRTF 88.9% 88.9% 77.8% 77.8%
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B.2 Bidding Strategies
In addition to the data provided in Sections 7.1.2 and 7.1.3, this section includes
further statistics and illustrations to back up the results presented in Section 7.1.
B.2.1 Bidding Strategies: Unilateral Manipulation
For each payment rule (PRTF, ETF-1, and ETF-2) and at each manipulation level
r, the following Tables B.3 to B.10 outline the mean absolute utilities AU, the mean
utility ratio UR of single manipulating service providers, and the standard deviation
SD of the mean absolute utility.
Table B.3: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming unilateral manipula-
tion in (2,3,α1). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
1.00 0.017 0.680 0.041 0.015 0.633 0.060 0.021 0.834 0.041
0.95 0.017 0.692 0.042 0.015 0.647 0.060 0.021 0.844 0.041
0.90 0.017 0.708 0.043 0.015 0.663 0.061 0.021 0.857 0.042
0.85 0.018 0.724 0.043 0.016 0.680 0.062 0.022 0.870 0.042
0.80 0.018 0.735 0.044 0.016 0.687 0.062 0.022 0.881 0.042
0.75 0.018 0.750 0.044 0.017 0.722 0.064 0.022 0.896 0.042
0.70 0.019 0.770 0.045 0.017 0.742 0.064 0.023 0.913 0.043
0.65 0.019 0.781 0.045 0.018 0.753 0.065 0.023 0.919 0.043
0.60 0.019 0.793 0.045 0.018 0.760 0.065 0.023 0.926 0.042
0.55 0.020 0.805 0.045 0.018 0.775 0.065 0.023 0.935 0.042
0.50 0.020 0.820 0.045 0.018 0.792 0.065 0.024 0.946 0.042
0.45 0.021 0.839 0.046 0.019 0.816 0.067 0.024 0.958 0.042
0.40 0.021 0.854 0.046 0.019 0.832 0.067 0.024 0.965 0.042
0.35 0.021 0.874 0.046 0.020 0.845 0.067 0.024 0.976 0.042
0.30 0.022 0.891 0.046 0.020 0.858 0.067 0.025 0.985 0.041
0.25 0.022 0.916 0.046 0.021 0.892 0.068 0.025 0.998 0.041
0.20 0.023 0.942 0.047 0.022 0.929 0.069 0.025 1.010 0.041
0.15 0.024 0.966 0.047 0.022 0.957 0.069 0.026 1.021** 0.040
0.10 0.024 0.983 0.046 0.023 0.983 0.069 0.026 1.022** 0.040
0.05 0.024 0.995 0.046 0.023 0.998 0.069 0.026 1.020** 0.039
0.00 0.025 1.000 0.000 0.023 1.000 0.000 0.025 1.000 0.000
-0.05 0.024 0.992 0.045 0.023 0.990 0.068 0.024 0.962 0.038
-0.10 0.024 0.959 0.046 0.022 0.951 0.068 0.022 0.891 0.039
-0.15 0.022 0.878 0.048 0.021 0.902 0.070 0.019 0.770 0.042
-0.20 0.018 0.737 0.053 0.018 0.781 0.073 0.015 0.579 0.049
-0.25 0.014 0.563 0.060 0.014 0.614 0.078 0.009 0.339 0.058
-0.30 0.008 0.319 0.070 0.009 0.378 0.085 0.001 0.025 0.070
-0.35 0.001 0.028 0.081 0.002 0.096 0.094 -0.009 -0.350 0.084
-0.40 -0.009 -0.347 0.094 -0.006 -0.267 0.105 -0.021 -0.820 0.100
-0.45 -0.021 -0.840 0.111 -0.017 -0.750 0.121 -0.035 -1.413 0.118
-0.50 -0.035 -1.406 0.128 -0.031 -1.308 0.137 -0.052 -2.093 0.137
-0.55 -0.049 -2.004 0.145 -0.045 -1.917 0.154 -0.071 -2.819 0.156
-0.60 -0.065 -2.644 0.161 -0.060 -2.587 0.170 -0.090 -3.598 0.174
-0.65 -0.081 -3.314 0.177 -0.077 -3.279 0.186 -0.111 -4.418 0.192
-0.70 -0.101 -4.099 0.194 -0.096 -4.105 0.203 -0.134 -5.364 0.211
-0.75 -0.121 -4.924 0.210 -0.116 -4.971 0.220 -0.160 -6.363 0.228
-0.80 -0.148 -6.025 0.228 -0.142 -6.101 0.239 -0.192 -7.646 0.247
220 APPENDIX B. APPENDIX TO PART III
Table B.3: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming unilateral manipula-
tion in (2,3,α1). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
-0.85 -0.167 -6.790 0.240 -0.162 -6.931 0.252 -0.216 -8.608 0.261
-0.90 -0.192 -7.821 0.255 -0.186 -7.988 0.268 -0.247 -9.844 0.275
-0.95 -0.216 -8.810 0.268 -0.211 -9.040 0.283 -0.277 -11.047 0.289
Table B.4: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming unilateral manipula-
tion in (2,4,α2). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
1.00 0.068 0.687 0.072 0.055 0.559 0.166 0.089 0.901 0.070
0.95 0.069 0.694 0.072 0.055 0.560 0.166 0.090 0.906 0.070
0.90 0.069 0.701 0.072 0.055 0.566 0.167 0.090 0.913 0.069
0.85 0.070 0.710 0.072 0.056 0.567 0.167 0.091 0.917 0.069
0.80 0.071 0.717 0.072 0.055 0.566 0.166 0.091 0.921 0.068
0.75 0.073 0.733 0.073 0.057 0.587 0.168 0.093 0.933 0.068
0.70 0.074 0.746 0.074 0.062 0.629 0.176 0.093 0.942 0.068
0.65 0.075 0.755 0.073 0.061 0.627 0.175 0.094 0.948 0.067
0.60 0.076 0.765 0.073 0.062 0.631 0.175 0.095 0.954 0.066
0.55 0.077 0.776 0.073 0.062 0.629 0.175 0.095 0.958 0.065
0.50 0.078 0.793 0.073 0.064 0.652 0.177 0.096 0.970 0.064
0.45 0.080 0.811 0.074 0.067 0.685 0.182 0.097 0.982 0.064
0.40 0.082 0.829 0.075 0.069 0.700 0.183 0.098 0.991 0.064
0.35 0.084 0.851 0.076 0.075 0.765 0.190 0.100 1.003 0.063
0.30 0.086 0.865 0.075 0.075 0.762 0.190 0.099 1.003* 0.062
0.25 0.087 0.882 0.075 0.076 0.779 0.190 0.100 1.005* 0.061
0.20 0.090 0.913 0.076 0.080 0.813 0.192 0.101 1.019** 0.061
0.15 0.092 0.932 0.075 0.081 0.826 0.193 0.101 1.016** 0.060
0.10 0.095 0.957 0.074 0.083 0.852 0.194 0.101 1.018** 0.058
0.05 0.097 0.982 0.074 0.090 0.923 0.199 0.101 1.015** 0.057
0.00 0.099 1.000 0.000 0.098 1.000 0.000 0.099 1.000 0.000
-0.05 0.100 1.010** 0.073 0.106 1.082** 0.209 0.096 0.972 0.058
-0.10 0.098 0.991 0.073 0.111 1.133** 0.211 0.092 0.930 0.061
-0.15 0.098 0.988 0.076 0.115 1.175** 0.211 0.085 0.856 0.069
-0.20 0.092 0.929 0.084 0.120 1.231** 0.213 0.073 0.739 0.083
-0.25 0.085 0.863 0.095 0.118 1.207** 0.213 0.060 0.606 0.100
-0.30 0.074 0.747 0.110 0.119 1.217** 0.220 0.041 0.417 0.121
-0.35 0.064 0.647 0.122 0.114 1.170** 0.223 0.024 0.238 0.140
-0.40 0.049 0.496 0.139 0.108 1.102** 0.227 0.000 0.003 0.162
-0.45 0.030 0.302 0.155 0.108 1.106** 0.240 -0.028 -0.281 0.182
-0.50 0.018 0.179 0.167 0.099 1.008 0.245 -0.049 -0.498 0.199
-0.55 0.005 0.050 0.177 0.096 0.980 0.253 -0.072 -0.726 0.215
-0.60 -0.014 -0.146 0.190 0.087 0.894 0.263 -0.101 -1.023 0.232
-0.65 -0.029 -0.294 0.203 0.077 0.788 0.273 -0.127 -1.277 0.248
-0.70 -0.048 -0.481 0.214 0.067 0.687 0.284 -0.156 -1.571 0.263
-0.75 -0.061 -0.619 0.224 0.059 0.602 0.294 -0.180 -1.820 0.278
-0.80 -0.076 -0.769 0.232 0.050 0.510 0.302 -0.206 -2.081 0.292
-0.85 -0.090 -0.912 0.239 0.044 0.455 0.313 -0.232 -2.337 0.303
-0.90 -0.107 -1.084 0.244 0.037 0.383 0.323 -0.260 -2.624 0.314
-0.95 -0.122 -1.230 0.251 0.027 0.274 0.331 -0.286 -2.886 0.325
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Table B.5: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming unilateral manipula-
tion in (3,2,α1). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
1.00 0.005 0.859 0.026 0.005 0.894 0.030 0.006 0.975 0.025
0.95 0.006 0.881 0.027 0.005 0.919 0.030 0.006 0.997 0.025
0.90 0.006 0.887 0.027 0.006 0.921 0.030 0.006 1.002 0.025
0.85 0.006 0.891 0.026 0.005 0.920 0.030 0.006 1.007 0.025
0.80 0.006 0.896 0.026 0.006 0.921 0.030 0.007 1.011 0.024
0.75 0.006 0.925 0.027 0.006 0.948 0.030 0.007 1.035* 0.025
0.70 0.006 0.941 0.027 0.006 0.970 0.030 0.007 1.054* 0.025
0.65 0.006 0.948 0.027 0.006 0.977 0.030 0.007 1.057* 0.025
0.60 0.006 0.949 0.026 0.006 0.971 0.030 0.007 1.058** 0.024
0.55 0.006 0.956 0.026 0.006 0.971 0.030 0.007 1.062** 0.024
0.50 0.006 0.956 0.026 0.006 0.964 0.029 0.007 1.060** 0.024
0.45 0.006 0.962 0.026 0.006 0.973 0.029 0.007 1.063** 0.024
0.40 0.006 0.976 0.026 0.006 0.989 0.029 0.007 1.070** 0.023
0.35 0.006 1.000 0.026 0.006 1.014 0.029 0.007 1.084** 0.023
0.30 0.006 1.018* 0.026 0.006 1.044* 0.029 0.007 1.092** 0.023
0.25 0.007 1.029** 0.026 0.006 1.048** 0.029 0.007 1.094** 0.023
0.20 0.007 1.041** 0.025 0.006 1.056** 0.029 0.007 1.095** 0.022
0.15 0.007 1.038** 0.025 0.006 1.048** 0.028 0.007 1.081** 0.022
0.10 0.007 1.032** 0.025 0.006 1.036** 0.028 0.007 1.064** 0.021
0.05 0.006 1.023** 0.024 0.006 1.025** 0.027 0.007 1.043** 0.021
0.00 0.006 1.000 0.000 0.006 1.000 0.000 0.006 1.000 0.000
-0.05 0.006 0.952 0.023 0.006 0.972 0.026 0.006 0.937 0.019
-0.10 0.006 0.875 0.023 0.005 0.880 0.026 0.005 0.839 0.019
-0.15 0.005 0.777 0.024 0.005 0.779 0.027 0.005 0.714 0.020
-0.20 0.004 0.572 0.027 0.003 0.559 0.029 0.003 0.477 0.024
-0.25 0.002 0.241 0.032 0.001 0.233 0.033 0.001 0.113 0.030
-0.30 -0.001 -0.098 0.037 -0.001 -0.110 0.038 -0.002 -0.265 0.036
-0.35 -0.003 -0.542 0.044 -0.003 -0.564 0.045 -0.005 -0.760 0.045
-0.40 -0.007 -1.144 0.054 -0.007 -1.192 0.055 -0.009 -1.412 0.055
-0.45 -0.012 -1.905 0.066 -0.012 -2.034 0.067 -0.014 -2.237 0.069
-0.50 -0.018 -2.837 0.080 -0.018 -3.048 0.081 -0.021 -3.243 0.083
-0.55 -0.025 -3.921 0.094 -0.025 -4.196 0.095 -0.028 -4.417 0.098
-0.60 -0.033 -5.144 0.109 -0.033 -5.503 0.110 -0.037 -5.733 0.114
-0.65 -0.041 -6.446 0.123 -0.041 -6.895 0.125 -0.046 -7.140 0.130
-0.70 -0.050 -7.950 0.139 -0.051 -8.509 0.141 -0.056 -8.764 0.147
-0.75 -0.063 -9.913 0.159 -0.064 -10.637 0.161 -0.070 -10.849 0.167
-0.80 -0.077 -12.102 0.180 -0.078 -13.022 0.182 -0.085 -13.186 0.189
-0.85 -0.095 -15.040 0.203 -0.096 -16.139 0.206 -0.105 -16.276 0.213
-0.90 -0.113 -17.891 0.224 -0.115 -19.192 0.228 -0.124 -19.290 0.236
-0.95 -0.130 -20.495 0.243 -0.132 -22.038 0.248 -0.142 -22.088 0.256
Table B.6: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming unilateral manipula-
tion in (3,2,α3). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
1.00 0.244 0.831 0.150 0.172 0.583 0.310 0.292 0.994 0.137
0.95 0.246 0.837 0.150 0.173 0.584 0.310 0.292 0.994 0.136
0.90 0.248 0.845 0.149 0.174 0.589 0.310 0.293 0.997 0.136
0.85 0.251 0.855 0.150 0.178 0.602 0.314 0.294 1.001 0.136
0.80 0.253 0.862 0.149 0.179 0.606 0.314 0.294 1.002 0.135
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Table B.6: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming unilateral manipula-
tion in (3,2,α3). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
0.75 0.255 0.869 0.149 0.181 0.612 0.315 0.295 1.004* 0.134
0.70 0.258 0.880 0.149 0.185 0.627 0.318 0.296 1.008** 0.134
0.65 0.262 0.891 0.149 0.190 0.642 0.321 0.298 1.013** 0.134
0.60 0.265 0.902 0.149 0.194 0.658 0.324 0.299 1.016** 0.134
0.55 0.268 0.911 0.149 0.199 0.673 0.326 0.299 1.019** 0.133
0.50 0.271 0.922 0.148 0.203 0.688 0.328 0.300 1.022** 0.133
0.45 0.275 0.936 0.149 0.211 0.715 0.332 0.302 1.028** 0.133
0.40 0.277 0.945 0.147 0.216 0.730 0.333 0.302 1.029** 0.132
0.35 0.281 0.957 0.146 0.222 0.751 0.335 0.303 1.032** 0.130
0.30 0.285 0.970 0.145 0.233 0.789 0.340 0.305 1.037** 0.130
0.25 0.287 0.979 0.144 0.240 0.813 0.341 0.304 1.036** 0.128
0.20 0.289 0.986 0.142 0.247 0.838 0.343 0.304 1.033** 0.127
0.15 0.292 0.994 0.140 0.256 0.868 0.343 0.303 1.030** 0.125
0.10 0.293 0.999 0.138 0.265 0.896 0.343 0.301 1.024** 0.124
0.05 0.295 1.003** 0.135 0.283 0.959 0.343 0.299 1.017** 0.122
0.00 0.294 1.000 0.000 0.295 1.000 0.000 0.294 1.000 0.000
-0.05 0.291 0.990 0.134 0.306 1.035** 0.338 0.287 0.975 0.125
-0.10 0.285 0.970 0.136 0.317 1.073** 0.334 0.276 0.940 0.130
-0.15 0.277 0.944 0.139 0.324 1.095** 0.329 0.264 0.898 0.137
-0.20 0.268 0.913 0.145 0.327 1.108** 0.324 0.250 0.849 0.146
-0.25 0.257 0.875 0.153 0.327 1.106** 0.320 0.233 0.793 0.157
-0.30 0.243 0.827 0.162 0.326 1.105** 0.316 0.213 0.726 0.170
-0.35 0.227 0.773 0.172 0.325 1.100** 0.313 0.192 0.652 0.183
-0.40 0.210 0.714 0.183 0.323 1.094** 0.312 0.168 0.572 0.197
-0.45 0.194 0.659 0.193 0.318 1.076** 0.313 0.146 0.497 0.209
-0.50 0.176 0.598 0.204 0.306 1.037** 0.315 0.122 0.414 0.224
-0.55 0.156 0.532 0.215 0.296 1.003 0.317 0.096 0.326 0.236
-0.60 0.140 0.477 0.223 0.284 0.962 0.320 0.073 0.249 0.248
-0.65 0.124 0.421 0.232 0.272 0.922 0.324 0.050 0.170 0.260
-0.70 0.105 0.357 0.241 0.261 0.885 0.328 0.024 0.083 0.271
-0.75 0.086 0.294 0.250 0.248 0.839 0.334 -0.001 -0.003 0.283
-0.80 0.069 0.236 0.257 0.235 0.797 0.340 -0.025 -0.084 0.293
-0.85 0.052 0.178 0.264 0.223 0.756 0.346 -0.049 -0.165 0.303
-0.90 0.034 0.114 0.271 0.208 0.703 0.353 -0.074 -0.252 0.313
-0.95 0.017 0.056 0.277 0.194 0.656 0.359 -0.098 -0.334 0.323
Table B.7: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming unilateral manipula-
tion in (3,3,α2). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
1.00 0.038 0.735 0.058 0.035 0.676 0.099 0.048 0.927 0.055
0.95 0.038 0.741 0.058 0.036 0.681 0.099 0.048 0.932 0.055
0.90 0.039 0.753 0.059 0.036 0.695 0.100 0.049 0.942 0.055
0.85 0.039 0.762 0.059 0.037 0.703 0.100 0.049 0.950 0.055
0.80 0.040 0.771 0.059 0.037 0.711 0.100 0.050 0.958 0.055
0.75 0.040 0.781 0.060 0.038 0.719 0.101 0.050 0.968 0.055
0.70 0.041 0.788 0.059 0.038 0.721 0.101 0.050 0.971 0.054
0.65 0.041 0.802 0.060 0.038 0.735 0.101 0.051 0.983 0.055
0.60 0.042 0.811 0.060 0.039 0.744 0.102 0.051 0.987 0.054
0.55 0.043 0.825 0.060 0.039 0.754 0.102 0.052 0.997 0.054
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Table B.7: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming unilateral manipula-
tion in (3,3,α2). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
0.50 0.043 0.837 0.061 0.040 0.767 0.103 0.052 1.005 0.054
0.45 0.044 0.850 0.061 0.041 0.777 0.103 0.052 1.009* 0.054
0.40 0.045 0.872 0.062 0.042 0.806 0.105 0.053 1.024** 0.054
0.35 0.046 0.889 0.062 0.043 0.817 0.106 0.053 1.029** 0.054
0.30 0.047 0.902 0.062 0.043 0.825 0.106 0.053 1.031** 0.053
0.25 0.048 0.927 0.062 0.045 0.852 0.107 0.054 1.044** 0.053
0.20 0.049 0.949 0.062 0.046 0.874 0.107 0.054 1.049** 0.052
0.15 0.050 0.971 0.062 0.048 0.909 0.108 0.055 1.052** 0.051
0.10 0.051 0.985 0.061 0.049 0.938 0.109 0.054 1.042** 0.050
0.05 0.052 0.997 0.060 0.050 0.961 0.109 0.053 1.027** 0.049
0.00 0.052 1.000 0.000 0.052 1.000 0.000 0.052 1.000 0.000
-0.05 0.051 0.985 0.059 0.053 1.010 0.110 0.049 0.949 0.048
-0.10 0.049 0.945 0.060 0.053 1.009 0.110 0.045 0.865 0.051
-0.15 0.045 0.872 0.063 0.052 0.995 0.112 0.039 0.744 0.057
-0.20 0.039 0.758 0.071 0.047 0.907 0.114 0.030 0.571 0.068
-0.25 0.032 0.613 0.080 0.042 0.794 0.118 0.019 0.362 0.081
-0.30 0.022 0.423 0.092 0.033 0.632 0.124 0.005 0.100 0.097
-0.35 0.012 0.223 0.103 0.025 0.472 0.132 -0.009 -0.181 0.113
-0.40 -0.001 -0.018 0.117 0.014 0.268 0.142 -0.026 -0.508 0.130
-0.45 -0.014 -0.276 0.131 0.001 0.019 0.153 -0.045 -0.860 0.149
-0.50 -0.029 -0.569 0.146 -0.013 -0.252 0.165 -0.065 -1.254 0.167
-0.55 -0.047 -0.915 0.161 -0.030 -0.579 0.179 -0.088 -1.705 0.185
-0.60 -0.067 -1.291 0.177 -0.048 -0.908 0.194 -0.114 -2.195 0.203
-0.65 -0.086 -1.659 0.192 -0.065 -1.249 0.210 -0.139 -2.683 0.220
-0.70 -0.107 -2.079 0.206 -0.087 -1.657 0.225 -0.167 -3.228 0.237
-0.75 -0.127 -2.453 0.219 -0.106 -2.034 0.239 -0.193 -3.732 0.253
-0.80 -0.148 -2.872 0.233 -0.128 -2.457 0.254 -0.222 -4.286 0.268
-0.85 -0.170 -3.291 0.245 -0.150 -2.875 0.268 -0.251 -4.845 0.283
-0.90 -0.192 -3.717 0.255 -0.173 -3.298 0.281 -0.281 -5.417 0.296
-0.95 -0.211 -4.081 0.266 -0.192 -3.675 0.294 -0.307 -5.931 0.309
Table B.8: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming unilateral manipula-
tion in (3,4,α2). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
1.00 0.032 0.750 0.046 0.030 0.729 0.091 0.040 0.930 0.041
0.95 0.032 0.754 0.046 0.031 0.734 0.092 0.040 0.932 0.041
0.90 0.032 0.758 0.046 0.031 0.735 0.092 0.040 0.936 0.041
0.85 0.033 0.767 0.046 0.031 0.744 0.093 0.040 0.945 0.041
0.80 0.033 0.774 0.046 0.031 0.751 0.093 0.040 0.950 0.041
0.75 0.033 0.780 0.046 0.032 0.756 0.094 0.041 0.955 0.041
0.70 0.034 0.790 0.047 0.032 0.765 0.094 0.041 0.961 0.041
0.65 0.034 0.798 0.047 0.032 0.770 0.094 0.041 0.967 0.041
0.60 0.034 0.809 0.048 0.032 0.778 0.095 0.041 0.975 0.041
0.55 0.035 0.821 0.048 0.033 0.788 0.095 0.042 0.984 0.041
0.50 0.036 0.837 0.049 0.034 0.808 0.096 0.042 0.995 0.041
0.45 0.036 0.849 0.049 0.034 0.818 0.096 0.043 1.000 0.041
0.40 0.037 0.860 0.049 0.034 0.823 0.097 0.043 1.004 0.041
0.35 0.037 0.877 0.049 0.035 0.843 0.098 0.043 1.012** 0.041
0.30 0.038 0.893 0.050 0.036 0.860 0.098 0.043 1.019** 0.041
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Table B.8: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming unilateral manipula-
tion in (3,4,α2). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
0.25 0.039 0.910 0.050 0.036 0.874 0.099 0.044 1.025** 0.040
0.20 0.040 0.930 0.050 0.037 0.894 0.099 0.044 1.029** 0.039
0.15 0.041 0.957 0.050 0.039 0.940 0.101 0.044 1.037** 0.039
0.10 0.042 0.974 0.049 0.040 0.960 0.101 0.044 1.032** 0.038
0.05 0.042 0.992 0.049 0.041 0.983 0.101 0.044 1.024** 0.037
0.00 0.043 1.000 0.000 0.042 1.000 0.000 0.043 1.000 0.000
-0.05 0.042 0.996 0.048 0.043 1.033** 0.102 0.041 0.959 0.037
-0.10 0.041 0.969 0.049 0.044 1.045** 0.103 0.038 0.884 0.040
-0.15 0.039 0.914 0.052 0.043 1.031* 0.103 0.033 0.774 0.046
-0.20 0.035 0.822 0.058 0.041 0.991 0.105 0.026 0.618 0.056
-0.25 0.029 0.670 0.068 0.037 0.895 0.109 0.017 0.390 0.070
-0.30 0.021 0.492 0.078 0.033 0.784 0.114 0.005 0.127 0.086
-0.35 0.009 0.214 0.094 0.023 0.547 0.123 -0.011 -0.250 0.106
-0.40 -0.003 -0.063 0.109 0.013 0.304 0.132 -0.027 -0.638 0.124
-0.45 -0.017 -0.397 0.126 0.000 -0.005 0.146 -0.046 -1.094 0.145
-0.50 -0.034 -0.801 0.144 -0.016 -0.377 0.161 -0.069 -1.630 0.166
-0.55 -0.051 -1.193 0.160 -0.031 -0.753 0.175 -0.092 -2.166 0.185
-0.60 -0.069 -1.613 0.175 -0.048 -1.152 0.190 -0.116 -2.740 0.204
-0.65 -0.090 -2.114 0.191 -0.067 -1.606 0.206 -0.145 -3.405 0.223
-0.70 -0.112 -2.633 0.206 -0.088 -2.118 0.222 -0.174 -4.098 0.241
-0.75 -0.133 -3.123 0.219 -0.109 -2.609 0.236 -0.203 -4.772 0.258
-0.80 -0.154 -3.624 0.231 -0.129 -3.100 0.251 -0.232 -5.466 0.273
-0.85 -0.175 -4.104 0.242 -0.150 -3.591 0.265 -0.261 -6.146 0.287
-0.90 -0.195 -4.570 0.252 -0.170 -4.077 0.278 -0.290 -6.817 0.301
-0.95 -0.216 -5.080 0.262 -0.191 -4.585 0.290 -0.321 -7.540 0.313
Table B.9: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming unilateral manipula-
tion in (4,3,α1). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
1.00 0.001 0.942 0.010 0.001 0.847 0.010 0.002 1.129* 0.009
0.95 0.001 0.938 0.009 0.001 0.837 0.010 0.002 1.117* 0.009
0.90 0.001 0.940 0.009 0.001 0.834 0.010 0.002 1.113* 0.009
0.85 0.001 0.952 0.009 0.001 0.844 0.010 0.002 1.117* 0.009
0.80 0.001 0.947 0.009 0.001 0.833 0.010 0.002 1.110* 0.009
0.75 0.001 0.943 0.009 0.001 0.822 0.010 0.002 1.102* 0.008
0.70 0.001 0.939 0.009 0.001 0.811 0.010 0.002 1.098* 0.008
0.65 0.001 0.976 0.009 0.001 0.902 0.010 0.002 1.130** 0.008
0.60 0.001 0.972 0.009 0.001 0.888 0.010 0.002 1.123** 0.008
0.55 0.001 0.967 0.009 0.001 0.874 0.010 0.002 1.107** 0.008
0.50 0.001 0.964 0.009 0.001 0.860 0.010 0.002 1.095** 0.008
0.45 0.001 0.983 0.009 0.001 0.870 0.010 0.002 1.108** 0.008
0.40 0.001 0.989 0.009 0.001 0.865 0.010 0.002 1.108** 0.008
0.35 0.001 0.985 0.008 0.001 0.848 0.009 0.002 1.095** 0.007
0.30 0.001 0.981 0.008 0.001 0.831 0.009 0.002 1.076** 0.007
0.25 0.001 0.978 0.008 0.001 0.815 0.009 0.001 1.057** 0.007
0.20 0.001 1.022 0.009 0.001 0.866 0.009 0.002 1.098** 0.007
0.15 0.001 1.021* 0.008 0.001 0.851 0.009 0.002 1.078** 0.007
0.10 0.001 1.010 0.008 0.001 0.822 0.009 0.001 1.049** 0.007
0.05 0.001 1.015** 0.008 0.001 1.007 0.010 0.001 1.038** 0.007
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Table B.9: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming unilateral manipula-
tion in (4,3,α1). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
0.00 0.001 1.000 0.000 0.001 1.000 0.000 0.001 1.000 0.000
-0.05 0.001 0.953 0.008 0.001 0.953 0.010 0.001 0.926 0.006
-0.10 0.001 0.862 0.008 0.001 0.962 0.010 0.001 0.805 0.006
-0.15 0.001 0.776 0.008 0.001 0.952 0.011 0.001 0.690 0.007
-0.20 0.001 0.617 0.009 0.001 0.784 0.011 0.001 0.493 0.008
-0.25 0.001 0.384 0.011 0.001 0.521 0.012 0.000 0.210 0.010
-0.30 0.000 0.241 0.012 0.000 0.327 0.013 0.000 0.004 0.012
-0.35 0.000 0.013 0.014 0.000 0.034 0.015 0.000 -0.289 0.015
-0.40 -0.001 -0.597 0.019 -0.001 -0.533 0.019 -0.001 -0.979 0.019
-0.45 -0.002 -1.633 0.026 -0.002 -1.653 0.026 -0.003 -2.119 0.027
-0.50 -0.003 -2.250 0.030 -0.003 -2.342 0.031 -0.004 -2.846 0.032
-0.55 -0.005 -3.534 0.038 -0.005 -3.727 0.038 -0.006 -4.277 0.040
-0.60 -0.007 -4.816 0.046 -0.007 -5.187 0.046 -0.008 -5.728 0.048
-0.65 -0.009 -6.410 0.055 -0.009 -6.979 0.055 -0.011 -7.514 0.058
-0.70 -0.013 -8.938 0.068 -0.013 -9.667 0.068 -0.015 -10.289 0.071
-0.75 -0.018 -12.632 0.085 -0.018 -13.769 0.085 -0.020 -14.298 0.089
-0.80 -0.025 -17.296 0.105 -0.025 -18.891 0.106 -0.027 -19.330 0.109
-0.85 -0.035 -23.877 0.127 -0.035 -26.155 0.128 -0.037 -26.386 0.132
-0.90 -0.044 -30.227 0.148 -0.044 -33.188 0.149 -0.047 -33.255 0.153
-0.95 -0.056 -38.130 0.171 -0.056 -41.956 0.172 -0.059 -41.777 0.177
Table B.10: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming unilateral manipu-
lation in (4,3,α3). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
1.00 0.096 0.807 0.093 0.078 0.651 0.180 0.119 0.988 0.074
0.95 0.098 0.817 0.094 0.080 0.662 0.182 0.119 0.994 0.075
0.90 0.099 0.826 0.095 0.080 0.667 0.182 0.120 0.999 0.075
0.85 0.100 0.834 0.095 0.081 0.673 0.183 0.120 1.003 0.075
0.80 0.101 0.844 0.096 0.082 0.683 0.184 0.121 1.008* 0.075
0.75 0.102 0.852 0.096 0.083 0.691 0.185 0.122 1.012** 0.074
0.70 0.103 0.863 0.096 0.085 0.701 0.186 0.122 1.017** 0.074
0.65 0.105 0.875 0.097 0.086 0.715 0.188 0.123 1.023** 0.074
0.60 0.106 0.886 0.097 0.087 0.724 0.189 0.123 1.026** 0.074
0.55 0.107 0.894 0.097 0.088 0.732 0.189 0.123 1.027** 0.073
0.50 0.108 0.905 0.097 0.090 0.746 0.191 0.124 1.030** 0.073
0.45 0.109 0.916 0.097 0.093 0.769 0.193 0.124 1.034** 0.072
0.40 0.111 0.928 0.097 0.094 0.782 0.194 0.125 1.037** 0.072
0.35 0.112 0.939 0.097 0.096 0.800 0.195 0.125 1.038** 0.071
0.30 0.114 0.954 0.097 0.100 0.828 0.197 0.125 1.043** 0.070
0.25 0.115 0.964 0.096 0.101 0.841 0.198 0.125 1.041** 0.069
0.20 0.117 0.975 0.096 0.104 0.865 0.199 0.125 1.040** 0.068
0.15 0.118 0.986 0.095 0.107 0.891 0.199 0.125 1.037** 0.067
0.10 0.119 0.997 0.094 0.113 0.935 0.201 0.124 1.033** 0.065
0.05 0.120 1.001* 0.093 0.117 0.970 0.203 0.123 1.020** 0.064
0.00 0.119 1.000 0.000 0.120 1.000 0.000 0.120 1.000 0.000
-0.05 0.118 0.988 0.091 0.125 1.033** 0.203 0.116 0.967 0.065
-0.10 0.115 0.962 0.092 0.128 1.061** 0.202 0.110 0.917 0.069
-0.15 0.110 0.921 0.095 0.129 1.070** 0.201 0.102 0.849 0.077
-0.20 0.103 0.863 0.100 0.128 1.065** 0.199 0.091 0.761 0.087
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Table B.10: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming unilateral manipu-
lation in (4,3,α3). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
-0.25 0.094 0.785 0.109 0.127 1.053** 0.199 0.078 0.650 0.101
-0.30 0.081 0.677 0.120 0.122 1.013 0.200 0.061 0.506 0.118
-0.35 0.067 0.563 0.132 0.116 0.961 0.201 0.043 0.354 0.135
-0.40 0.051 0.425 0.147 0.108 0.892 0.205 0.021 0.174 0.153
-0.45 0.034 0.283 0.160 0.098 0.811 0.210 -0.001 -0.012 0.171
-0.50 0.015 0.127 0.174 0.085 0.709 0.216 -0.026 -0.214 0.188
-0.55 -0.003 -0.029 0.188 0.072 0.594 0.223 -0.050 -0.418 0.206
-0.60 -0.025 -0.213 0.201 0.058 0.480 0.233 -0.078 -0.652 0.222
-0.65 -0.047 -0.390 0.213 0.042 0.348 0.242 -0.106 -0.882 0.238
-0.70 -0.068 -0.566 0.225 0.026 0.214 0.252 -0.134 -1.113 0.253
-0.75 -0.087 -0.730 0.237 0.009 0.076 0.262 -0.160 -1.331 0.268
-0.80 -0.108 -0.901 0.248 -0.009 -0.073 0.273 -0.187 -1.559 0.282
-0.85 -0.128 -1.067 0.258 -0.026 -0.214 0.283 -0.214 -1.782 0.295
-0.90 -0.149 -1.250 0.266 -0.044 -0.363 0.294 -0.243 -2.023 0.307
-0.95 -0.170 -1.427 0.275 -0.063 -0.519 0.304 -0.271 -2.259 0.319
Figure B.1 illustrates of manipulation rates that maximize the service providers’
utilities in different configurations. Moreover, Figure B.2 plots the relative utility
gain (or loss) from manipulation by x% with any other service provider reporting
its true type for an additional set of four network configurations where deviation is
only profitable in a very limited extent applying the PRTF. Figure B.3 shows another
four configurations that allow for profitable manipulation of price bids to a larger
extent.








































































































(b) Network configurations with |Y| = {3,4}
Figure B.1: Manipulation rate that maximizes a service provider’s utility assum-
ing unilateral deviation






































































(d) Utility ratios in (3,4,α1)
Figure B.2: Utility ratios of different manipulation rates applying unilateral
strategies (selected configurations): Deviation is only profitable in a negligible
range in PRTF















































































(d) Utility ratios in (4,3,α1)
Figure B.3: Utility ratios of different manipulation rates applying unilateral
strategies (selected configurations): The PRTF allows for more severe profitable
deviation
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B.2.2 Symmetric Manipulation
For each payment rule (PRTF, ETF-1, and ETF-2) and at each manipulation level r,
the following Tables B.12 to B.14 outline the mean absolute utilities AU, the mean
utility ratio UR of single manipulating service providers, and the standard deviation
SD of the mean absolute utility. Recall that in a symmetric manipulation scenario,
all service providers manipulate their price bid by x%.
Table B.11: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming symmetric manipu-
lation in (2,3,α1). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
1.00 0.021 0.708 0.066 0.020 0.699 0.078 0.020 0.724 0.059
0.95 0.021 0.714 0.066 0.021 0.706 0.078 0.021 0.732 0.058
0.90 0.021 0.724 0.065 0.021 0.718 0.078 0.021 0.742 0.057
0.85 0.021 0.732 0.065 0.021 0.726 0.078 0.021 0.753 0.057
0.80 0.021 0.739 0.064 0.021 0.734 0.078 0.021 0.762 0.056
0.75 0.022 0.755 0.064 0.022 0.750 0.079 0.022 0.778 0.056
0.70 0.022 0.771 0.064 0.022 0.766 0.079 0.022 0.794 0.056
0.65 0.023 0.791 0.064 0.023 0.787 0.080 0.023 0.814 0.055
0.60 0.024 0.816 0.064 0.024 0.811 0.080 0.024 0.836 0.055
0.55 0.024 0.826 0.064 0.024 0.822 0.080 0.024 0.848 0.054
0.50 0.024 0.843 0.063 0.025 0.838 0.080 0.024 0.863 0.054
0.45 0.025 0.865 0.063 0.025 0.862 0.081 0.025 0.883 0.053
0.40 0.026 0.881 0.062 0.026 0.877 0.081 0.025 0.895 0.052
0.35 0.026 0.900 0.061 0.026 0.897 0.081 0.026 0.915 0.051
0.30 0.027 0.920 0.060 0.027 0.917 0.081 0.026 0.934 0.050
0.25 0.027 0.939 0.059 0.027 0.936 0.080 0.027 0.952 0.048
0.20 0.028 0.953 0.057 0.028 0.952 0.080 0.027 0.968 0.047
0.15 0.028 0.975 0.056 0.028 0.974 0.080 0.028 0.993 0.045
0.10 0.029 0.991 0.054 0.029 0.989 0.080 0.028 0.999 0.044
0.05 0.029 0.999 0.053 0.029 0.997 0.080 0.028 1.004 0.042
0.00 0.029 1.000 0.000 0.029 1.000 0.000 0.028 1.000 0.000
-0.05 0.029 0.993 0.050 0.029 0.995 0.080 0.028 0.998 0.041
-0.10 0.028 0.975 0.050 0.029 0.980 0.080 0.028 0.984 0.042
-0.15 0.028 0.949 0.050 0.028 0.956 0.081 0.027 0.956 0.045
-0.20 0.026 0.910 0.053 0.027 0.919 0.083 0.026 0.918 0.050
-0.25 0.024 0.839 0.058 0.025 0.851 0.086 0.024 0.847 0.057
-0.30 0.022 0.771 0.064 0.023 0.784 0.090 0.022 0.789 0.066
-0.35 0.020 0.680 0.073 0.020 0.693 0.095 0.020 0.698 0.077
-0.40 0.016 0.554 0.085 0.017 0.569 0.102 0.016 0.568 0.091
-0.45 0.012 0.430 0.098 0.013 0.449 0.109 0.012 0.442 0.105
-0.50 0.008 0.283 0.112 0.009 0.306 0.118 0.008 0.294 0.120
-0.55 0.005 0.158 0.127 0.005 0.183 0.126 0.005 0.166 0.135
-0.60 0.001 0.028 0.142 0.002 0.054 0.134 0.001 0.027 0.150
-0.65 -0.001 -0.040 0.155 0.000 -0.011 0.140 -0.001 -0.045 0.164
-0.70 -0.002 -0.063 0.167 -0.001 -0.029 0.144 -0.002 -0.069 0.175
-0.75 -0.002 -0.070 0.179 -0.001 -0.031 0.147 -0.002 -0.076 0.185
-0.80 -0.002 -0.077 0.191 -0.001 -0.033 0.150 -0.002 -0.082 0.196
-0.85 -0.002 -0.084 0.203 -0.001 -0.035 0.153 -0.003 -0.089 0.207
-0.90 -0.003 -0.091 0.215 -0.001 -0.037 0.156 -0.003 -0.095 0.217
-0.95 -0.003 -0.098 0.227 -0.001 -0.040 0.160 -0.003 -0.102 0.228
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Table B.12: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming symmetric manipu-
lation in (2,5,α2). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
1.00 0.058 0.740 0.136 0.058 0.722 0.186 0.058 0.748 0.115
0.95 0.060 0.768 0.137 0.060 0.750 0.189 0.061 0.776 0.117
0.90 0.062 0.795 0.138 0.062 0.777 0.191 0.063 0.802 0.117
0.85 0.063 0.812 0.136 0.063 0.794 0.192 0.064 0.819 0.116
0.80 0.065 0.830 0.134 0.065 0.812 0.192 0.065 0.836 0.113
0.75 0.067 0.855 0.133 0.067 0.838 0.193 0.067 0.860 0.112
0.70 0.068 0.879 0.130 0.069 0.862 0.194 0.069 0.881 0.109
0.65 0.070 0.896 0.127 0.070 0.880 0.194 0.070 0.899 0.106
0.60 0.071 0.916 0.124 0.072 0.902 0.194 0.072 0.920 0.103
0.55 0.072 0.930 0.120 0.073 0.916 0.194 0.073 0.933 0.098
0.50 0.073 0.938 0.115 0.074 0.926 0.193 0.073 0.940 0.093
0.45 0.074 0.950 0.111 0.075 0.939 0.193 0.074 0.952 0.088
0.40 0.074 0.956 0.105 0.076 0.946 0.192 0.075 0.956 0.082
0.35 0.075 0.964 0.100 0.076 0.956 0.191 0.075 0.966 0.077
0.30 0.076 0.974 0.095 0.077 0.968 0.191 0.076 0.979 0.071
0.25 0.076 0.982 0.090 0.078 0.976 0.190 0.077 0.986 0.066
0.20 0.077 0.989 0.084 0.079 0.985 0.190 0.077 0.993 0.060
0.15 0.078 0.997 0.079 0.079 0.994 0.189 0.078 1.000 0.055
0.10 0.078 1.000 0.073 0.080 0.997 0.189 0.078 1.001 0.051
0.05 0.078 1.001 0.068 0.080 1.000 0.189 0.078 1.002 0.048
0.00 0.078 1.000 0.000 0.080 1.000 0.000 0.078 1.000 0.000
-0.05 0.078 0.997 0.061 0.080 0.999 0.189 0.078 0.998 0.047
-0.10 0.077 0.995 0.060 0.080 0.998 0.189 0.078 0.993 0.050
-0.15 0.077 0.991 0.060 0.080 0.997 0.189 0.077 0.989 0.055
-0.20 0.077 0.986 0.062 0.079 0.994 0.190 0.077 0.985 0.061
-0.25 0.076 0.981 0.066 0.079 0.991 0.191 0.076 0.980 0.068
-0.30 0.076 0.976 0.072 0.079 0.988 0.192 0.076 0.975 0.075
-0.35 0.076 0.970 0.079 0.079 0.984 0.193 0.076 0.969 0.084
-0.40 0.075 0.967 0.086 0.079 0.982 0.194 0.075 0.965 0.092
-0.45 0.075 0.965 0.094 0.079 0.982 0.195 0.075 0.963 0.101
-0.50 0.075 0.963 0.103 0.078 0.982 0.196 0.075 0.961 0.109
-0.55 0.075 0.961 0.112 0.078 0.982 0.198 0.075 0.959 0.118
-0.60 0.075 0.960 0.121 0.078 0.982 0.199 0.075 0.957 0.127
-0.65 0.075 0.958 0.131 0.078 0.982 0.200 0.075 0.956 0.136
-0.70 0.074 0.956 0.140 0.078 0.982 0.202 0.074 0.954 0.146
-0.75 0.074 0.954 0.150 0.078 0.982 0.204 0.074 0.952 0.155
-0.80 0.074 0.952 0.160 0.078 0.982 0.206 0.074 0.950 0.164
-0.85 0.074 0.950 0.171 0.078 0.982 0.207 0.074 0.948 0.173
-0.90 0.074 0.948 0.181 0.078 0.982 0.209 0.074 0.946 0.183
-0.95 0.074 0.946 0.191 0.078 0.982 0.212 0.074 0.944 0.192
Table B.13: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming symmetric manipu-
lation in (3,3,α2). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
1.00 0.028 0.533 0.097 0.028 0.533 0.109 0.028 0.527 0.085
0.95 0.029 0.556 0.097 0.029 0.555 0.110 0.029 0.550 0.085
0.90 0.031 0.586 0.098 0.031 0.585 0.112 0.031 0.580 0.086
0.85 0.032 0.612 0.099 0.032 0.612 0.113 0.032 0.605 0.086
0.80 0.033 0.633 0.098 0.033 0.633 0.114 0.033 0.630 0.086
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Table B.13: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming symmetric manipu-
lation in (3,3,α2). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
0.75 0.034 0.654 0.097 0.034 0.653 0.114 0.034 0.648 0.084
0.70 0.035 0.672 0.096 0.035 0.671 0.114 0.035 0.665 0.082
0.65 0.036 0.692 0.095 0.036 0.691 0.114 0.036 0.687 0.081
0.60 0.038 0.727 0.094 0.038 0.727 0.115 0.038 0.724 0.080
0.55 0.040 0.759 0.093 0.040 0.758 0.115 0.040 0.756 0.079
0.50 0.042 0.795 0.092 0.042 0.795 0.115 0.042 0.793 0.077
0.45 0.044 0.835 0.091 0.044 0.833 0.116 0.044 0.832 0.076
0.40 0.045 0.859 0.088 0.045 0.857 0.115 0.045 0.854 0.073
0.35 0.046 0.879 0.085 0.046 0.876 0.115 0.046 0.873 0.070
0.30 0.048 0.910 0.083 0.048 0.907 0.114 0.048 0.903 0.067
0.25 0.049 0.933 0.079 0.049 0.929 0.114 0.049 0.925 0.063
0.20 0.050 0.957 0.076 0.050 0.952 0.113 0.050 0.950 0.059
0.15 0.052 0.980 0.072 0.051 0.975 0.112 0.051 0.973 0.056
0.10 0.052 0.993 0.068 0.052 0.989 0.112 0.052 0.988 0.052
0.05 0.053 1.000 0.064 0.052 0.998 0.111 0.052 0.996 0.049
0.00 0.053 1.000 0.000 0.053 1.000 0.000 0.053 1.000 0.000
-0.05 0.052 0.995 0.059 0.052 0.997 0.111 0.052 0.997 0.049
-0.10 0.052 0.986 0.058 0.052 0.989 0.112 0.052 0.987 0.052
-0.15 0.051 0.972 0.060 0.051 0.976 0.113 0.051 0.972 0.057
-0.20 0.050 0.955 0.063 0.051 0.961 0.115 0.050 0.953 0.065
-0.25 0.049 0.938 0.069 0.050 0.945 0.117 0.049 0.934 0.073
-0.30 0.048 0.916 0.077 0.049 0.926 0.120 0.048 0.914 0.083
-0.35 0.047 0.891 0.086 0.047 0.902 0.123 0.047 0.889 0.094
-0.40 0.046 0.875 0.096 0.047 0.887 0.126 0.046 0.874 0.104
-0.45 0.045 0.855 0.107 0.046 0.869 0.130 0.045 0.856 0.115
-0.50 0.044 0.842 0.118 0.045 0.858 0.134 0.044 0.842 0.126
-0.55 0.044 0.840 0.128 0.045 0.857 0.137 0.044 0.841 0.136
-0.60 0.044 0.839 0.139 0.045 0.857 0.140 0.044 0.839 0.147
-0.65 0.044 0.837 0.150 0.045 0.857 0.144 0.044 0.838 0.157
-0.70 0.044 0.835 0.161 0.045 0.856 0.147 0.044 0.836 0.167
-0.75 0.044 0.834 0.172 0.045 0.856 0.151 0.044 0.835 0.178
-0.80 0.044 0.832 0.184 0.045 0.855 0.155 0.044 0.833 0.189
-0.85 0.044 0.831 0.196 0.045 0.855 0.159 0.044 0.832 0.199
-0.90 0.044 0.829 0.208 0.045 0.854 0.163 0.044 0.830 0.210
-0.95 0.044 0.827 0.220 0.045 0.854 0.168 0.044 0.828 0.221
Table B.14: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming symmetric manipu-
lation in (2,2,α3). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
1.00 0.535 0.968 0.378 0.542 0.963 0.626 0.536 0.969 0.321
0.95 0.539 0.974 0.366 0.545 0.969 0.624 0.539 0.975 0.310
0.90 0.541 0.978 0.354 0.547 0.973 0.622 0.542 0.979 0.299
0.85 0.542 0.980 0.343 0.549 0.976 0.620 0.543 0.981 0.289
0.80 0.544 0.983 0.331 0.551 0.979 0.618 0.545 0.985 0.278
0.75 0.547 0.988 0.318 0.554 0.984 0.616 0.547 0.989 0.266
0.70 0.548 0.991 0.306 0.555 0.987 0.614 0.549 0.992 0.256
0.65 0.550 0.994 0.294 0.557 0.990 0.612 0.550 0.994 0.245
0.60 0.551 0.996 0.283 0.558 0.992 0.611 0.551 0.996 0.236
0.55 0.551 0.997 0.271 0.559 0.994 0.610 0.552 0.997 0.227
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Table B.14: Utility of an arbitrary service provider assuming symmetric manipu-
lation in (2,2,α3). * denotes significance at the level of p = 0.1 and ** at p = 0.01.
PRTF EFT-1 ETF-2
r AU UR SD AU UR SD AU UR SD
0.50 0.552 0.998 0.261 0.560 0.995 0.609 0.552 0.998 0.218
0.45 0.553 0.999 0.250 0.560 0.996 0.608 0.553 0.999 0.210
0.40 0.553 1.000 0.240 0.561 0.998 0.607 0.553 1.000 0.202
0.35 0.553 1.000 0.230 0.562 0.998 0.606 0.554 1.000 0.196
0.30 0.553 1.000 0.221 0.562 0.999 0.606 0.554 1.001 0.190
0.25 0.553 1.000 0.213 0.562 0.999 0.605 0.554 1.001 0.185
0.20 0.553 1.000 0.205 0.562 0.999 0.605 0.554 1.001 0.181
0.15 0.553 1.000 0.199 0.562 0.999 0.605 0.554 1.000 0.178
0.10 0.553 1.000 0.193 0.562 1.000 0.605 0.554 1.000 0.176
0.05 0.553 1.000 0.188 0.562 1.000 0.605 0.553 1.000 0.174
0.00 0.553 1.000 0.000 0.563 1.000 0.000 0.553 1.000 0.000
-0.05 0.553 1.000 0.182 0.563 1.000 0.605 0.553 1.000 0.175
-0.10 0.553 1.000 0.181 0.563 1.000 0.605 0.553 1.000 0.176
-0.15 0.553 1.000 0.181 0.563 1.001 0.605 0.553 1.000 0.179
-0.20 0.553 1.000 0.182 0.563 1.001 0.606 0.553 1.000 0.182
-0.25 0.553 1.000 0.184 0.563 1.001 0.606 0.553 0.999 0.186
-0.30 0.553 0.999 0.187 0.563 1.001 0.607 0.553 0.999 0.192
-0.35 0.553 0.999 0.192 0.563 1.001 0.608 0.553 0.999 0.197
-0.40 0.553 0.999 0.197 0.563 1.001 0.608 0.553 0.999 0.204
-0.45 0.553 0.999 0.203 0.564 1.002 0.609 0.553 0.999 0.211
-0.50 0.553 0.999 0.211 0.564 1.002 0.610 0.553 0.999 0.218
-0.55 0.553 0.999 0.219 0.564 1.002 0.611 0.553 0.999 0.226
-0.60 0.553 0.999 0.227 0.564 1.002 0.612 0.553 0.999 0.235
-0.65 0.553 0.999 0.237 0.564 1.002 0.613 0.553 0.998 0.244
-0.70 0.552 0.999 0.246 0.564 1.003 0.614 0.553 0.998 0.253
-0.75 0.552 0.999 0.257 0.564 1.003 0.615 0.552 0.998 0.262
-0.80 0.552 0.998 0.267 0.564 1.003 0.617 0.552 0.998 0.272
-0.85 0.552 0.998 0.279 0.564 1.003 0.618 0.552 0.998 0.282
-0.90 0.552 0.998 0.290 0.564 1.003 0.620 0.552 0.998 0.292
-0.95 0.552 0.998 0.302 0.565 1.003 0.621 0.552 0.998 0.303
Figure B.4 illustrates the results of Tables B.11 to B.14 by showing the trend of
the utility ratios at different manipulation rates.












































































(d) Utility ratios in (2,2,α3)
Figure B.4: Utility ratios of different manipulation rates applying symmetric
strategies (selected configurations) (2)
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